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Energy Triangle

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01In brief

Energy Triangle is a term for energy cooperation among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, encompassing proposed natural-gas export routes, electricity interconnection, and regional energy security. One major proposal, the EastMed pipeline, was estimated in 2020 at 1,900 kilometers in length, with an annual capacity of approximately 10 billion cubic meters of gas. The partnership developed alongside Eastern Mediterranean gas discoveries and expanding diplomatic relations, and later included cooperation with the United States through a “3+1” format. The term describes shared interests rather than the formal name of a single organization or treaty.

02Overview

Natural-gas exports and cross-border electricity links form the two principal infrastructure strands of Israel–Greece–Cyprus energy cooperation.[1] The gas proposals seek to connect Eastern Mediterranean resources with European markets, while electricity interconnection would enable the participating countries to exchange power and provide reciprocal backup.[4][5] Their cooperation also encompasses protecting offshore installations, preparing for emergencies, developing renewable energy, and safeguarding critical infrastructure against cyber threats.[4]

The trilateral framework extends beyond energy into defense, internal security, trade, tourism, environmental protection, health, and education.[3] Energy discoveries gave the relationship an important practical foundation: neighboring resources created incentives to coordinate production, exports, shipping security, and the protection of gas facilities.[3] Greece and Cyprus initiated the tripartite framework, and Israeli policymakers and government staff subsequently worked to formalize it.[3]

The label “energy triangle” appeared in a 2016 account of the three countries’ shared interests in gas and electricity infrastructure.[1] It has also been used to characterize their gas-export relationship as a multibillion-dollar operation, although the passage making that characterization supplied neither a valuation nor supporting figures.[6] Official cooperation instead takes the form of trilateral declarations, project agreements, ministerial working arrangements, and the wider United States–Greece–Cyprus–Israel dialogue.[4]

03Origins and History

Improving bilateral relations from 2010, regional natural-gas discoveries, Israel’s deteriorating relations with Turkey, and the search for Eastern Mediterranean partners helped shape the trilateral framework.[3] Israel and Cyprus signed an agreement delimiting their maritime border in 2010.[3] The Aphrodite field lies mostly in Cypriot economic waters, with part extending into Israel’s jurisdiction, creating a direct reason for cooperation over adjoining offshore resources.[3]

Cyprus’s exploration program preceded the formal trilateral energy arrangements: the Republic of Cyprus licensed Noble Energy to explore block 12, the Aphrodite field, in 2007, and Noble announced a discovery there in 2011.[7] By 2018, Cyprus’s regional strategy included combining its gas with Israeli gas and potentially Egyptian resources to develop a regional energy market.[7] Proposals included a Cypriot pipeline terminal and liquefied natural gas facilities, alongside a European-supported pipeline toward Greece and southern Europe.[7]

A 2013 Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs analysis reported that Israel’s Tamar field had been discovered on January 17, 2009, and estimated its resources at 275 billion cubic meters, while giving an estimate of 18 trillion cubic feet for Leviathan.[8] The analysis described Aphrodite as comparable to Tamar and extending slightly into Israeli waters near the Pelagic licenses, and argued that Israeli and Cypriot hydrocarbon activities could potentially be treated as an integrated whole.[8]

Early cooperation also addressed electricity and environmental management.[5] In March 2012, Israeli and Greek ministers signed an agreement to share expertise in water management, desalination, renewable biological energy, energy efficiency, and environmental protection.[5] They also signed a memorandum concerning an electricity cable linking Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, intended to provide redundancy, reciprocal backup, security, and long-term domestic energy supplies.[5]

In August 2013, the three countries signed a tripartite energy memorandum in Nicosia.[9] Its provisions included an underwater cable connecting their electricity grids, cooperation to protect natural-gas fields, and work on sewage treatment and water recycling for agriculture.[9] The electricity-grid framework subsequently became part of the foundation for the countries’ broader summit diplomacy and energy planning.[10]

The three countries formalized cooperation through an agreement signed on March 3, 2016, covering energy alongside regional issues, research and development, technology, cybersecurity, and other subjects.[5] Seven trilateral summits took place between January 2016 and January 2020, and the framework developed an agreed pattern of twice-yearly leaders’ meetings and ministerial discussions across multiple policy areas.[3] At a summit discussed in an early analysis of the partnership, the joint declaration named energy among seven cooperation areas and called for a committee of the three energy ministries’ directors general to examine a pipeline from Israel through Cyprus to Greece.[11]

04Natural-Gas Export Proposals

The EastMed pipeline proposal envisaged transporting Eastern Mediterranean gas through Cyprus and Greece toward Italy and other European markets.[3] It was one of two principal routes considered for Israeli exports beyond the region, the other being delivery to Egyptian liquefaction facilities for onward shipment as liquefied natural gas.[3] Egypt’s role as a route for liquefying and transporting Israeli gas to Europe remained part of subsequent regional energy discussions.[12]

In 2016, a Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs commentary reported that the three countries had decided to formalize a pipeline proposal and present it to the European Union’s climate action and energy commissioner.[13] The commentary characterized the feasibility findings and financial competitiveness as encouraging and argued that the project could secure gas deliveries while reducing European dependence on Russian supplies.[13] Leaders discussed a proposed route from Israel to Greece and onward to Italy and Bulgaria in December 2016, with an estimated cost of $6.7 billion and a prospective completion date of 2025; they discussed the project again in Thessaloniki in June 2017.[14]

A 2018 commentary on Israel–Europe relations described Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy as moving toward an intergovernmental agreement concerning a pipeline feasibility study.[15] It connected the initiative to European supply diversification, while questioning whether preliminary studies would change European attitudes.[15] The subsequent four-country agreement identified a pipeline system intended to transport gas initially discovered in Israel and Cyprus to Greece, Italy, and other European markets.[16]

The agreement’s preamble presented the pipeline as a potential new route for diversifying European gas sources and recorded its recognition as an EU Project of Common Interest.[16] It also cited a preliminary engineering study that found the project technically feasible, economically viable, and commercially competitive.[16] A joint energy ministerial statement recorded that the intergovernmental agreement had been finalized in December 2018 and approved by the European Commission in February 2019.[4]

At a March 2019 summit, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented the planned route through Cyprus and Greece as a means of benefiting the participating economies and diversifying Europe’s energy supplies.[17] Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras described it as “a safe and secure network” for transporting Eastern Mediterranean energy resources to Europe.[17] Greece, Cyprus, and Israel signed a framework agreement in early January 2020, and Israel’s cabinet ratified it in July.[2] The Greek parliament also ratified the pipeline agreement.[3]

The proposed scale was substantial: a July 2020 estimate envisaged 1,900 kilometers of pipeline, including 1,300 kilometers at sea, annual capacity of approximately 10 billion cubic meters, and a cost of €6 billion.[2] Another contemporary estimate specified 1,300 kilometers offshore and 600 kilometers on land, with a cost of $6–7 billion.[3] A separate account of the January 2020 agreement gave a projected length of 1,300 miles and a €6 billion cost, describing its intended cargo as Israeli, Greek, and Cypriot gas bound for EU markets.[18]

The project continued to feature in later discussions.[19] In November 2025, Israeli Energy and Infrastructure Minister Eli Cohen raised EastMed again at a “3+1” energy ministerial meeting in Athens.[19] Attention was also turning toward linking Israeli fields with liquefied natural gas facilities in Cyprus.[19] One company proposed a subsea pipeline to a planned Cypriot power-generation facility, with a reported cost of about $400 million and annual capacity of 1 billion cubic meters.[19] At a December 2025 trilateral summit, the countries discussed offshore gas coordination, including Aphrodite.[14]

05Electricity Interconnection

The EuroAsia Interconnector was planned as an undersea electricity link joining the Israeli, Cypriot, and Greek power grids.[20] A 2016 plan envisaged a 2,000-megawatt cable running from Hadera to Vasilikos in Cyprus, then to Crete and mainland Greece, over a total route of 1,518 kilometers.[1] Electricity was intended to flow in both directions, with possible onward connections from Greece to other European countries and support through the EU’s Connecting Europe Facility.[1]

The 2016 schedule envisaged the Israel–Cyprus leg by 2019 and the complete project by 2022.[1] A 2022 account instead described a cable more than 1,200 kilometers long, descending to nearly 10,000 feet below sea level, with the same proposed 2,000-megawatt transmission capacity.[20] In that account, the first section would connect Cyprus and Crete, while completion of the entire grid was projected for 2027.[20] The project was expected to reduce Cyprus’s energy isolation and connect participating EU countries to the EU electricity grid.[20]

By June 2024, electricity interconnection was identified as the relatively more advanced of the two major trilateral infrastructure plans, alongside the EastMed gas pipeline.[21] Later official remarks described the Great Sea Interconnector as a proposal to connect the electricity systems of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel.[12] Such connections could allow electricity exports during periods of high renewable production and imports when needed to stabilize national grids.[12]

The three countries remained committed in principle to the Great Sea Interconnector in December 2025.[19] A trilateral summit that month also discussed progress on an undersea cable linking Cyprus and Greece and, indirectly, Israel with Europe.[14] Electricity connectivity thus remained a continuing subject of cooperation alongside natural-gas development rather than a replacement for it.[14]

06Regional Institutions and Practical Cooperation

The “3+1” format brought the United States into energy discussions with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel.[4] A joint ministerial statement identified infrastructure, renewable energy, storage, emergency preparedness, environmental protection, and cybersecurity as common interests.[4] The participants agreed to establish a high-level working group to identify specific projects and promote implementation, and to work toward a joint emergency-preparedness and response mechanism for offshore oil and gas operations.[4]

The same statement supported an Eastern Mediterranean energy corridor and linked diversification of import sources and routes to European Union energy security.[4] It endorsed EastMed as a strategic link between Europe and Israel.[4] The 2021 trilateral summit declaration likewise treated natural gas and renewable energy as foundations for regional cooperation, supported electricity connectivity through the Euro-Asia Interconnector, and called for work on climate action, research, and development.[22]

The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum provided a wider regional setting for gas cooperation.[23] Its establishment was discussed at a Cairo meeting on January 14, 2019, attended by energy ministers from Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority.[23] The initiative followed an October 2018 Egypt–Greece–Cyprus summit and was linked to the separate triangular relationships that Egypt and Israel had developed with Greece and Cyprus, as well as the February 2018 Israel–Egypt gas-export agreement.[23]

Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and Jordan established the forum in September 2020, with the Palestinian Authority also participating.[24] Its wider membership distinguished it from the three-country electricity-interconnector project.[24] A Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs account also distinguishes Israel–Greece–Cyprus summits from Egypt–Greece–Cyprus summits, explaining that the two trilateral arrangements did not merge into a quadrilateral.[25]

At the November 2025 “3+1” ministerial in Athens, the four governments reaffirmed cooperation on Eastern Mediterranean energy security, including through the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center.[26] They supported interconnectivity in the context of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, energy development, infrastructure protection, and diversification of regional supplies, and expressed an intention to meet again in Washington in the second quarter of 2026.[26] Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and the United States launched the East Med Energy Center on June 11, 2026, as a platform linking governments, universities, researchers, and industry in energy, technology, innovation, and research, including cybersecurity and critical infrastructure.[5]

07Strategic Significance

The participating leaders explicitly described their relationship as strategic, particularly in energy and security, at the March 2019 summit.[17] For Israel, the framework connected offshore gas development with diplomatic cooperation and potential access to European markets through neighboring countries.[3] For Cyprus, combining resources with Israel and potentially Egypt offered a route toward a regional energy market.[7] Electricity exchange added a separate opportunity to improve supply resilience and accommodate renewable generation.[12]

A 2016 Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs commentary presented Greece and Cyprus as a bridge between Israel and Europe.[13] It also emphasized that joint declarations described the cooperation as “non-exclusive,” leaving room for additional participants.[13] The regional partnerships have been characterized as “flexible and instrumental alliances,” organized around economic interests, energy development, and shared security concerns rather than permanent commitments grounded in a common ideology or culture.[23]

Israeli experience in gas extraction was an important part of the cooperation’s early practical setting: by the 2016 summit declaration, Israel was already extracting gas, while Greece and Cyprus were seeking access to supplies.[10] The partnership’s agenda also incorporated water recycling, desalination expertise, energy efficiency, environmental management, and research, connecting energy diplomacy with technical cooperation.[5][9] Its later emphasis on renewable energy, grid resilience, and cybersecurity broadened the agenda beyond the original gas-export proposals.[4]

08Other Uses of the Term

NewMed Energy chief executive Yossi Abu used “an important energy triangle” for a different proposed configuration linking Persian Gulf states, countries including Israel and Egypt as Mediterranean outlets, and Azerbaijan as an oil and gas exporter.[27] In that interview, he described Azerbaijan as one of Israel’s largest oil sources and argued that the configuration could improve access to European markets.[27]

Abu linked his proposal to rising demand for secure energy, including electricity-intensive artificial-intelligence infrastructure.[27] He argued that renewable energy alone could not provide the certainty required by large consumers, predicted a shift toward natural gas and nuclear energy, and cited reduced Turkish hydroelectric production during drought as an example of variable renewable supply.[27]

His suggested routes included Azerbaijan’s connections through Turkey via the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline and onward toward Italy and Europe.[27] Separately, he proposed a route for Qatari gas through Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Turkey to Azerbaijan.[27] His north–south vision paired a northern gas route through Azerbaijan and Turkey with southern routes through Egypt and Israel.[27] He suggested that Saudi and Emirati oil could reach Eilat and then Ashkelon through an expanded Eilat–Ashkelon pipeline, arguing that multiple routes would provide redundancy and reliability.[27] These were Abu’s proposals for a broader regional configuration, distinct from the Israel–Greece–Cyprus partnership.[27]

09Controversies

EastMed’s feasibility attracted substantially different assessments: the intergovernmental agreement cited favorable preliminary findings, while reporting in 2016 described expert concerns about the distance and water depth between Cyprus and Greece.[16][1] A 2020 assessment identified significant technical, economic, and political doubts and stressed that the agreement did not amount to a long-term EU commitment to construction.[2] In 2022, a senior American diplomat called the project too expensive and time-consuming; financing had not been secured, although its developer was conducting geophysical and geotechnical surveys.[28] The United States withdrew its endorsement in 2022 amid economic-feasibility, environmental, and Turkish-opposition concerns.[24] Reported costs, route lengths, and completion dates were project estimates, not evidence of completion.[18]

Offshore development also intersected with the Cyprus dispute.[7] Turkey and Turkish Cypriots opposed unilateral licensing by the Republic of Cyprus, while the Greek Cypriot position envisaged shared resource revenues under a future federal settlement; the United States and EU supported the republic’s exploration rights while expressing hope that benefits would eventually be shared across the island.[7] Turkey opposed EastMed, sent a drilling ship to Cypriot waters, and signed a maritime-demarcation agreement with Libya in November 2019.[2] Turkey, Lebanon, and Syria were absent from the January 2019 forum meeting.[23] Separately, Cypriot doubts about the Great Sea Interconnector’s viability produced open disagreement with Athens in 2025.[19]

Resource estimates also require distinction from discoveries: a 2013 analysis warned against relying on speculative basin-wide figures, citing the Ishai license’s failure to yield substantial gas despite promising seismic expectations.[8]

Sources

  1. 1The Jerusalem Post, A petite entente in the eastern Mediterranean, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  2. 2Institute for National Security Studies, INSS Insight No. 1355: Size Matters: Chevron Enters Israel, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  3. 3Institute for National Security Studies, Israel’s Policy in its Triangular Relations with Greece and Cyprus, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  4. 4U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the United States, Greece, Republic of Cyprus, and Israel Regarding Cooperation in the Field of Energy, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  5. 5Jewish Virtual Library, Israel International Relations: Greece-Israel Relations, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  6. 6Foundation for Defense of Democracies, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  7. 7Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  8. 8Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, The Geopolitics of Israel’s Offshore Gas Reserves, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  9. 9The Times of Israel, Energy and Water Deal, 2013, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  10. 10Center for Israel Education, Cyprus-Israel-Greece Trilateral Summit Declaration, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  11. 11Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, A New Geopolitical Bloc is Born in the Eastern Mediterranean: Israel, Greece and Cyprus, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  12. 12U.S. Department of State, Energy and Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  13. 13Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Greece-Israel-Cyprus Relations: Ripe for Expansion?, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  14. 14Jewish Virtual Library, Cyprus Virtual Jewish History Tour, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  15. 15Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Preface, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  16. 16Government of Israel: EastMed Pipeline Agreement, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  17. 17U.S. Department of State, Remarks With Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President of the Republic of Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades, and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  18. 18Center for Israel Education, Israel, Greece and Cyprus Sign Trilateral Gas Pipeline Construction Agreement, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  19. 19Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Israel, Greece and Cyprus: In Search of New Synergies, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  20. 20Jewish Virtual Library, The EuroAsia Interconnector, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  21. 21Institute for National Security Studies, We Need a New Concept for the Security of Electrical Systems in Israel in Emergencies and Routine Times, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  22. 22Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of Israel in Cyprus: 2021 Trilateral Joint Declaration, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  23. 23Institute for National Security Studies, Beyond Energy: The Significance of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  24. 24Jewish Virtual Library, Israel Science & Technology: Oil & Natural Gas, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  25. 25Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Egypt’s Place in Israel’s National Security Concept, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  26. 26U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement on the 3+1 Energy Ministerial in Athens, Greece, accessed on November 7, 2026.
  27. 27Globes, "Israel can be a window to the Mediterranean", accessed on November 7, 2026.
  28. 28The Times of Israel, Israeli Gas and European Markets, 2022, accessed on November 7, 2026.

IsraelPedia Question & Answers

  • What is the Energy Triangle?

    The Energy Triangle is a term for energy cooperation among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, not the formal name of a single organization or treaty. It covers proposed natural-gas export routes, electricity interconnection, and regional energy security. The cooperation also includes infrastructure protection, emergency preparedness, renewable energy, and cybersecurity.

  • What is the EastMed pipeline proposal?

    The EastMed pipeline is a proposed route to transport Eastern Mediterranean gas through Cyprus and Greece toward Italy and other European markets. A July 2020 estimate described a 1,900-kilometer pipeline with annual capacity of approximately 10 billion cubic meters and a cost of €6 billion. The project has faced technical, economic, and political doubts, and reported estimates do not mean that construction was completed.

  • How did Israel, Greece, and Cyprus formalize their cooperation?

    Israel, Greece, and Cyprus signed a tripartite energy memorandum in Nicosia in August 2013, covering an underwater electricity cable, protection of natural-gas fields, and cooperation on sewage treatment and water recycling. They formalized broader cooperation through an agreement signed on March 3, 2016, addressing energy and other regional issues. Their framework also developed into regular summits and ministerial discussions.

  • What is the Great Sea Interconnector?

    The Great Sea Interconnector is a proposed undersea link connecting the electricity systems of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. The planned connections could allow electricity exports during periods of high renewable production and imports when needed to stabilize national grids. The three countries remained committed to the project in principle in December 2025.

  • What is the 3+1 format in Eastern Mediterranean energy cooperation?

    The 3+1 format brings the United States into energy discussions with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. Its areas of cooperation include infrastructure, renewable energy, storage, emergency preparedness, environmental protection, and cybersecurity. The participants agreed to establish a high-level working group to identify projects and promote implementation.

  • What is the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, and how does it relate to the Energy Triangle?

    The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum is a wider regional framework for gas cooperation, established in September 2020 by Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and Jordan, with the Palestinian Authority also participating. It is distinct from the Israel–Greece–Cyprus partnership and its electricity-interconnector project. The forum grew from regional discussions involving energy ministers and countries with separate overlapping partnerships.

  • Why is the Energy Triangle strategically important to its participants?

    The Energy Triangle links Israel’s offshore gas development with cooperation with Greece and Cyprus and potential access to European markets. Combining resources offered Cyprus a possible route toward a regional energy market, while electricity exchange could improve supply resilience and accommodate renewable generation. The partnership also expanded into water management, environmental cooperation, research, and cybersecurity.