Trans-Israel Pipeline

The Eilat–Ashkelon route provides an overland connection between the Red Sea and Mediterranean, allowing oil to move between the two seas without passing through the Suez Canal.[7] Its terminals connect tanker transport on either side of Israel, making the pipeline a land bridge rather than simply a supply line to domestic refineries.[1][8] The original commercial direction brought oil from the Persian Gulf through Eilat and Ashkelon toward Europe; later investment enabled movement from the Mediterranean toward the Red Sea and East Asia.[8][9]

Known as line 42, the pipeline is 254 kilometers long and links the oil ports at Eilat and Ashkelon.[7] The large-diameter line measures 42 inches across.[10] It forms part of a wider network, with connections serving the Ashdod and Haifa refineries; those branches are distinct from the 254-kilometer Eilat–Ashkelon line itself.[3][11]

The operator is the Europe-Asia Pipeline Company, abbreviated EAPC, formerly the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company and also known by the Hebrew acronym KATZAA.[4] Its activities have included oil transport, storage, and, following diversification from its original Iranian transit business, distillates production for Israeli and international markets.[9] The pipeline’s commercial role therefore encompasses both international transshipment and connections to Israel’s petroleum infrastructure.[3][9]

The two coastal terminals occupy sensitive settings: the Eilat terminal lies between tourist beaches and coral reef reserves, while the Ashkelon terminal is close to the Gaza border.[12] Inland, substantial parts of the route cross environmentally sensitive land, including nature reserves and national parks.[13]

After the War of Independence, Eilat held strategic importance as Israel’s Red Sea port and an outlet toward the Indian Ocean.[14] Restrictions on Israeli access to the Suez Canal created an incentive to develop alternative routes for petroleum transport.[14][3] Egypt banned Haifa-bound cargo through the canal in May 1948, when the British-built Kirkuk–Haifa oil pipeline was also cut; the Haifa and Ashdod refineries subsequently depended on distant and expensive supplies, including oil from Venezuela.[3]

A proposal discussed in the 1950s envisaged a 32-inch Trans-Israel pipeline from Eilat to the Mediterranean, with an estimated capacity of about 400,000 barrels per day and a cost of approximately $70 million.[15] Its feasibility depended partly on securing an assured oil supply, and United States government financing was unavailable.[15] French interest in assisting a smaller, 16-inch version was also reported.[15] These specifications belonged to a proposed project, rather than describing the dimensions and capacity of the later 42-inch Eilat–Ashkelon line.[15][10]

Iranian oil had been reaching Israel since 1957, transported by tanker around the Arabian Peninsula and through the Gulf of Aqaba to Eilat.[16] Transactions passed through third parties, allowing Iran publicly to deny direct sales while maintaining the supply relationship.[16] Iranian officials were concerned about the implications of ties with Israel for their relations with moderate Arab states.[16]

Early pipeline development connected Eilat with Israel’s northern refining infrastructure.[10][17] A 16-inch Eilat–Haifa pipeline was laid in 1958–59, and that older line subsequently passed to the Israeli-Iranian pipeline company.[10][17] Oil reached Haifa overland from Eilat on August 2, 1968, providing an alternative to the Suez route, which remained closed to Israeli ships and ships that called in Israel.[3] The earlier Eilat–Haifa link was separate from the later large-diameter Eilat–Ashkelon line, and most use of the older route was eventually discontinued.[17]

Israel and Iran established the Eilat Ashkelon Pipeline Company in 1968 as a joint venture intended to use Israel as a bridge to Europe for Iranian oil.[3] The two governments held equal ownership shares.[8] The company’s system comprised the Eilat–Ashkelon line and connections from Ashkelon to the refineries at Ashdod and Haifa.[3] Development of the route followed the 1967 closure of the Suez Canal, which disrupted tanker shipments of Iranian oil to Europe.[2][8]

Engineering studies for the major Eilat–Ashkelon pipeline were undertaken by Tahal in 1967.[18] Construction of the 42-inch line began in 1968, and the line was completed and operational in 1970.[10][18] Ynet reported that the pipeline was ready by December 1969 to handle 60 million tons of crude oil annually, although it never reached that level.[2] The infrastructure reinforced Eilat’s strategic role as Israel’s outlet to the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and beyond.[14]

In its original operating pattern, Iranian tankers unloaded at Eilat, oil crossed Israel to Ashkelon, and tankers then carried it onward through the Mediterranean.[2][8] This arrangement bypassed Suez and avoided the much longer sea journey around Africa.[1][8] The line served this Iranian export trade for roughly a decade before the 1979 revolution.[2]

Iran’s oil exports to Israel ended after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the pipeline company continued under Israeli management.[2] The joint arrangement ended with the fall of the Shah, after which Israel took control of the company.[3] The pipeline was subsequently largely unused for a period, apart from occasional transfers of Egyptian oil arranged under the Israel–Egypt peace treaty.[1] The company retained connections from Ashkelon to Ashdod and Haifa, and a direct Ashkelon–Haifa pipeline was later established to shorten the distance between refineries.[3][19]

The decisive change in the main line’s later commercial use came in 2003, when EAPC upgraded it for reverse flow.[9] Oil could then travel from Ashkelon south to Eilat, linking shipments from the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions to East Asian markets.[9] Smaller tankers could discharge at Ashkelon, and larger tankers could load at Eilat for the onward journey to Asia.[1] Completion of the reversal, together with expanded storage at both ends, produced a reported capacity of 1.2 million barrels per day in 2003.[1]

Russian oil was moving through the Ashkelon–Eilat route toward Asia by 2004.[20] Writing that October, Antoine Halff argued that restrictions imposed by some Arab producers on tankers that had called at Eilat or Ashkelon appeared to be slowing the trade.[20] By 2023, the route was described as carrying Russian, Azerbaijani, and Kazakh oil southward for storage at Eilat or onward shipment.[4]

The pipeline’s commercial advantage rests on replacing part of a sea voyage with a relatively short overland crossing, while using storage and tanker terminals on both coasts.[1][4] In its southbound configuration, oil arriving from Mediterranean and Black Sea routes can be transferred at Ashkelon, stored or moved through Israel, and loaded at Eilat for Asian destinations.[1][9] This route can reduce transit costs compared with passage through the Suez Canal, while also offering an alternative to the journey around Africa.[1][4]

Capacity figures have been expressed in different units and for different stages of development.[1][2] A 2016 report said the line was ready to handle up to 60 million tons annually but had never reached that level.[2] The 1.2-million-barrel-per-day figure reported in 2003 accompanied the flow-reversal project and terminal-storage expansion.[1] These figures describe potential handling capacity, not evidence that the pipeline consistently operated at those rates.[1][2]

The Abraham Accords opened a new prospective role for the infrastructure in trade between Israel and the United Arab Emirates.[4] In October 2020, EAPC signed a binding memorandum of understanding with Med-Red Land Bridge, an Israeli-Emirati venture, to use existing facilities to convey oil between the Red Sea and Mediterranean.[21] The commercial aim was a shorter route from the Gulf to western markets that would avoid the expense and time of Suez Canal transit.[21] The proposed northbound movement would bring oil to Eilat, move it overland to Ashkelon, and ship it onward toward Europe, reversing the southbound pattern developed for Russian and Caspian oil.[4][21]

The proposal included use of storage facilities alongside the pipeline.[22] Mako reported expectations of roughly 100 to 200 tanker calls associated with the agreement, while a scientists’ letter cited company reports of up to 120 large tankers annually.[7] These were proposed traffic levels associated with an expansion, not demonstrated annual traffic under the agreement.[7][21]

Implementation did not follow immediately from the memorandum.[12][23] In July 2021, the Environmental Protection Ministry delayed the arrangement because EAPC’s risk assessment was considered inadequate.[12] By November 2021, the deal was described as frozen, and senior Emirati figures had warned that cancellation could affect bilateral relations.[23] A 2023 assessment described it as mostly dormant following controversy over the risks of increased oil handling to Eilat Bay’s marine life and tourism.[4]

Wartime conditions also affected the allocation of terminal activity.[24] In November 2023, crude-oil imports at EAPC’s Ashkelon port were somewhat limited, and activity had shifted to other terminals.[24] Reports indicated that tankers carrying Mediterranean crude, including Azerbaijani oil, were unloading at Eilat instead of Ashkelon.[24] The Ashkelon terminal’s proximity to Gaza had already exposed it to rocket fire during the 2021 Israel–Hamas fighting.[12]

Regulatory policy continued to change after the initial freeze. The government canceled the Environmental Protection Ministry’s “zero additional risk” policy in 2024.[6] By 2026, EAPC was challenging restrictions at its Ashkelon terminal while an interministerial team worked on a broader regulatory framework.[6]

In December 2014, approximately five million liters of crude oil escaped from an EAPC pipeline into the Evrona Nature Reserve near Be’er Ora, north of Eilat.[25] The rupture occurred during work to divert the pipeline, after an engineering failure caused the pipe to break.[25] Oil damaged vegetation and wildlife, soil structure, and water availability in the affected area.[25]

The spill spread through rivers and streams, flooded Route 90, and blocked traffic into and out of Eilat before being contained short of the Jordanian border.[26] More than 80 people were reported hospitalized with respiratory and other problems.[26] About 144 dunams were affected, and reporting in 2021 said the reserve’s ecosystems had not yet recovered.[7][25] The environmental consequences extended beyond the immediate removal of spilled oil to the longer-term condition of the reserve’s soil and ecosystems.[7][25]

The Environmental Protection Ministry sued EAPC in May 2015 for $28.8 million over damage to Evrona.[26] Because EAPC was a government-owned corporation, the litigation involved a dispute between government entities.[26] The ministry later assessed total damage at NIS 281 million, comprising NIS 65 million for rehabilitation and NIS 216 million for environmental harm.[27] The rehabilitation costs had already been paid by EAPC as part of its cleanup work.[27]

A separate civil class-action settlement in 2019 provided approximately NIS 100 million for compensation, reserve restoration, and prevention of future damage.[28] Its components included NIS 65.2 million payable under the settlement and about NIS 32 million that the company said it had already spent on restoration and research.[28] The settlement also provided for pipeline safety upgrades.[28] These civil obligations were separate from the environmental-damage assessment and the criminal penalties that followed.[27][28]

In January 2024, a court convicted the company and two officials under a plea agreement connected with the spill; the company’s offenses included aggravated water pollution and hazardous-waste violations.[25] At final sentencing in January 2025, the company was fined NIS 1,562,000, and former deputy operations director Shlomi Levy was fined NIS 35,000.[29] Field operations manager Haim Bar Sela ultimately was not convicted; he was fined NIS 30,000 and ordered to perform 360 hours of community service.[29] Proceedings against two other defendants, who did not join the plea agreement, remained separate.[29]

Another leak occurred near Ashkelon on August 29, 2021.[5] Authorities replaced a 40-foot pipe section and removed 800 tons of contaminated earth, and the Environmental Protection Ministry subsequently announced a criminal investigation into the cause.[5] A 2025 review also identified significant leaks in the Zin Stream area in 2011, Evrona in 2014, and near Moshav Mash’en in 2021.[13]

Environmental exposure is a feature of the route itself: 119 kilometers of the 254-kilometer pipeline pass through areas of high or very high environmental sensitivity, and 101 kilometers cross nature reserves and national parks.[13] National preparedness remained a related concern in 2026, when a proposed marine oil-spill response system was discussed against estimates that existing capacity could meet about 30 percent of the needs of a significant territorial-water spill and about 10 percent of a deep-sea incident.[6] The proposed national system would not remove oil-transport and storage companies’ responsibilities to prevent and prepare for pollution incidents within their own operations.[6]

The end of the Iranian partnership produced a decades-long arbitration dispute over unpaid oil and Iran’s claimed share of the venture’s assets.[2][9] In 2016, Switzerland’s highest court ordered Israel to pay Iran approximately $1.1 billion plus interest and legal costs.[2] Whether Israel would pay remained unclear, with legal restrictions under its Trading with the Enemy Act cited as an obstacle.[2]

EAPC’s secrecy also attracted scrutiny.[9] In 2017, a Knesset committee decided that the reorganized company would remain under a confidentiality regime.[9] Publication of classified information could carry a sentence of 15 years to life, while the predecessor company had been exempt from public-disclosure requirements, State Comptroller review, and income tax.[9]

Environmental organizations opposed expanded Med-Red traffic on the grounds that additional tanker movements and oil handling could increase spill risks around Eilat and Ashkelon, particularly near Eilat’s coral reefs.[7] Petitioners also challenged whether the arrangement had received the required government consideration; the company maintained that relevant government bodies had been informed and that the pipeline was inspected and in proper condition.[7] At sentencing in 2025, the judge described the Evrona plea deal as significantly lenient but accepted it after considering remediation and compensation efforts.[29]

A 2025 review found that recommendations dating to 2015 to install or move valves on a high-risk section had not been implemented.[13] EAPC responded that international consultants advised against replacing two valves and favored monitoring and maintenance instead.[13] In the separate debate over national marine spill preparedness, EAPC welcomed the proposed response system but maintained that responsibility for territorial waters and extreme scenarios rested with the state.[6]