Energy in Israel

Israel's electricity sector produced 80.4 terawatt-hours in 2024.[6] Natural gas generated 57.4 TWh, or 72% of production; coal generated 11.5 TWh, or 14%; and renewable energy generated 11.1 TWh, or 14%.[6] Private power facilities produced 59% of the energy in 2024, with the remainder produced by the Israel Electric Corporation.[2]

The shift away from coal has been substantial. Natural-gas generation rose from 30.4 TWh in 2014 to 57.4 TWh in 2024, while coal generation fell from 30.1 TWh to 11.5 TWh and renewable generation rose from 0.9 TWh to 11.1 TWh over the same decade.[6] In 2022, by comparison, natural gas generated approximately 68% of Israel's electricity, coal approximately 22%, and renewable energy approximately 10%.[7] The Israel Electricity Authority's 2024–2025 report forecasts 94.6 TWh of total production in 2030, with natural gas still accounting for approximately 72%, renewables for 28%, and coal essentially phased out.[6]

Beyond electricity, the broader energy system is approximately 60% electricity and 40% fuels used in transportation and industry.[7] In 2022, approximately half of all energy consumption was electricity, about one-third was transportation and industrial fuels and derivatives, and the remainder was natural gas consumed directly by industry.[7] That same year, 37% of primary energy sources consisted of imported fuels and 16% consisted of imported coal — reflecting that while domestic gas has transformed the electricity sector, Israel continues to rely on imports for a significant portion of total energy.[7]

Renewable-energy production totaled 11,097 GWh in 2024, with approximately 92% coming from solar energy and approximately 85% generated by photovoltaic facilities; the remainder came mainly from solar thermal and wind facilities.[6] During some hours in 2024, more than half of Israel's national electricity production came from renewable sources.[6] The actual renewable-energy consumption rate was 14.6%, while the potential rate at the end of the year was 16.2%; approximately 1 gigawatt of new renewable capacity was connected during 2024.[6]

Natural-gas production increased by 8.3% in 2024, and total natural-gas consumption reached approximately 27.1 billion cubic meters.[8][6] State revenue from gas royalties rose by almost 11% to approximately NIS 2.37 billion in 2024.[8]

For most of its modern history, Israel was almost entirely dependent on imported energy. Imported oil met nearly 99% of the country's total oil demand, while significant domestic natural-gas production emerged only after offshore fields were developed.[1] This vulnerability was compounded by geopolitical isolation; in a 2008 ministerial presentation, Israel was described as geopolitically "like an island."[9]

The earliest steps toward domestic gas supply came through the small Mari-B offshore field, which began supplying Israel's gas-fired power plants in 2004.[10] Egyptian gas provided an additional source: the El Arish–Ashkelon pipeline, operated by the Eastern Mediterranean Gas company, became operational in May 2008 under a twenty-year contract and supplied approximately 40% of Israel's gas consumption by 2009–2010, while Mari-B supplied approximately 60%.[10][9] Together these two sources accounted for roughly 40–45% of Israel's electricity production by 2010, compared with essentially nothing half a decade earlier.[10]

Egyptian supplies were severed abruptly. After the fall of President Hosni Mubarak, deliveries were interrupted almost continually during 2011 and the trade formally ended by the end of that year.[9] The disruption coincided with declining production at Mari-B and created an urgent gap that the newly discovered offshore fields would ultimately fill. The Ministry of National Infrastructures had previously presented a plan extending to 2020 that envisioned an energy mix of 40% natural gas, 40% coal, and up to 20% renewable energy, conceived as a means of securing supply rather than as an immediate transition away from fossil fuels.[9] Even then, senior officials recognized that renewable generation alone would not provide energy security and called for aggressive demand management, improved efficiency, diversified gas supplies, and long-term planning.[9]

A 2013 analysis argued that the succession of offshore natural-gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean exceeded feasible projections of Israeli demand for decades and positioned Israel to become a net gas exporter.[10]

The Tamar field was discovered on January 17, 2009, by a team led by Noble Energy in the Matan license area, with drilling reaching approximately 5,600 feet of water and 16,000 feet of rock and salt.[10] Estimated reserves at various points have been placed at 275 billion cubic meters or approximately 9.7 trillion cubic feet.[10] Commercial gas production from Tamar began in March 2013, when flow to the Ashdod reception facility commenced, marking a turning point in Israel's domestic gas supply.[1][10] The Tamar platform sits approximately 13 miles offshore from Ashkelon and requires additional processing at an onshore terminal in Ashdod; reserves are separately estimated at 7.1 trillion cubic feet, with production of less than 10 billion cubic meters annually.[11]

Leviathan, discovered approximately two years after Tamar and several dozen kilometers farther west, is Israel's largest natural-gas field and one of the largest deep-water natural-gas discoveries in the world.[10][12] Located approximately 120–130 kilometers west of Haifa in water depths of about 1,700 meters, the field was discovered in late 2010 by a consortium consisting of Noble Energy as operator, Delek Drilling, and Ratio Oil Exploration.[12][12] Leviathan contains more than 33 trillion cubic feet of gas resources in place, of which more than 21 trillion cubic feet were estimated to be recoverable; an initial estimate of 16 trillion cubic feet was later raised to 18 trillion cubic feet.[12][10] The planned development comprised four high-rate subsea wells connected to a fixed-leg processing platform.[12] Gas began flowing from Leviathan to the Israeli domestic market in December 2019.[1] The field currently produces about 12 billion cubic meters annually, with three-quarters sent by pipeline to Egypt and the remainder to Jordan.[13]

The Karish field adds a third offshore source. Estimated at 1.75 trillion cubic feet of reserves, Karish was developed by Energean together with the Karish North and Tanin fields using the Energean Power floating production, storage, and offloading vessel, capable of handling 8 billion cubic meters of gas annually.[11] The vessel is positioned about 50 miles off Israel's northern coast in water approximately 5,500 feet deep, and gas from Karish is intended primarily to meet growing domestic energy demand.[11]

By the end of 2019, approximately 66% of Israel's electricity generation was based on natural gas and approximately 7% on renewable energy — a dramatic reversal of a generation's dependence on imports.[14] Natural-gas reserves grew from approximately 780 billion cubic meters in 2012 to an estimated 1,087 billion cubic meters in 2023, while the shift to domestic gas was calculated in 2023 to have saved Israel more than $87 billion over the previous decade and reduced carbon-dioxide emission intensity from electricity and air pollution by 32%.[1] The Ministry of Energy characterized the offshore discoveries as having changed Israel from a country almost completely dependent on energy imports into one capable of meeting its own energy needs and exporting energy to neighbors.[14]

Israel's principal offshore gas assets — Tamar, Leviathan, and Karish — are connected to the mainland through a network whose vulnerability has become an increasing focus of national-security analysis. Natural gas is supplied from offshore reservoirs to the coast through only two pipelines, and Israel has no domestic natural-gas storage capacity.[15] Gas-based electricity production is concentrated at a small number of sites, making supply reliability particularly sensitive during security or climate emergencies.[15]

The transmission system is managed by Israel Natural Gas Lines, a government company licensed to plan, establish, and operate the country's natural-gas transmission network. Approximately 755 kilometers of transmission pipeline had been deployed by 2019, while the private distribution network comprised approximately 508 kilometers of pipes.[14] The Natural Gas Authority regulates transmission, distribution, safety, tariffs, licensing coordination, and further sector development.[14]

During the Swords of Iron War that began in October 2023, the Tamar field was temporarily closed to protect the installation.[6] During that period, 9% of Israel Electric Corporation gas supplies came from Leviathan, illustrating the system's dependence on a limited number of sources and the operational risks created by offshore security threats.[6] Gas-based electricity production is concentrated at a small number of sites, and damage to a major gas pipeline or central transmission facility could cause widespread electricity shutdowns and impair the broader economy.[16]

A proposed $500 million expansion of Leviathan received preliminary approval from Energy Minister Eli Cohen in June 2024.[13] The proposal would raise production from 12 billion cubic meters annually to 21 billion cubic meters, with most of the additional output intended for export, and recoverable reserves have been described as potentially lasting another two decades or more.[13]

For decades, the Israel Electric Corporation held a near-monopoly over electricity generation, transmission, and supply. Reforming that structure was a decades-long policy goal: the 2018 electricity-sector reform had been under discussion for 22 years and was delayed by disputes with the IEC workers' union before an agreement in December 2017 finally cleared the way for approval.[17]

The reform, approved in July 2018, was designed to reduce the IEC's monopoly, introduce private electricity producers, and create a more competitive and efficient market.[17] Its estimated cost was approximately NIS 7 billion over ten years, and it provided for the sale of 19 gas-fired power stations to third parties and the construction of two new natural-gas combined-cycle turbines.[17] IEC was required to transfer half of its holdings in power stations through a graduated privatization process scheduled to continue until 2026, with approximately 60% of electricity production ultimately to pass into private hands while IEC retained control of the transmission network.[18] System management was to be transferred to a new government System Management Company responsible for coordinating producers and consumers.[18]

The results by 2024 were substantial: independent power producers generated approximately 59% of electricity production and held approximately 53% of production capacity, compared with approximately 3% of capacity in 2012.[14]

A further reform took effect in July 2024, allowing residential consumers — including those without smart meters — to choose among electricity suppliers.[19] Seven private suppliers were initially available, while the Israel Electric Corporation continued to operate the electricity grid.[19] The opening of retail supply to competition marked the completion of a reform process that had restructured almost every segment of the electricity market.

Government Resolution 465, dated October 25, 2020, established a target of generating 30% of Israel's electricity from renewable sources by 2030, with an interim target of 20% by the end of 2025.[16] The target emphasizes solar energy, while the government's plan anticipated natural gas supplying most of the remaining electricity.[4]

Progress toward the 2030 goal has been steady but faces structural constraints. Israel had installed approximately 6,700 megawatts of renewable capacity by October 2024, after averaging about 1,000 megawatts of new installations per year.[5] Reaching the 2030 target was estimated to require total installed capacity of 16,000 megawatts, annual additions of approximately 28 terawatt-hours, and an installation rate of about 1,400 megawatts per year — roughly 40% above the recent average.[5]

The renewable-energy roadmap issued in 2025 estimated that 53% of the 2030 target could come from dual-use installations, 30% from ground-based solar fields with storage, 13% from solar fields without storage, 2% from wind, and 1% each from biogas and solar-thermal energy.[5] The roadmap also identified expansion of the electricity grid as a major financing challenge, including NIS 17 billion in transmission projects and NIS 20 billion for the Israel Electric Corporation's distribution-grid expansion plan.[5]

Storage capacity is a critical bottleneck: Israel had less than 600 megawatts of storage capacity in 2024 but is expected to exceed 9,000 megawatts by 2030.[6] A 344-megawatt pumped-storage facility at Kochav HaYarden became commercially operational in February 2025.[6] Storage is essential because Israel's renewable generation relies primarily on solar energy, whose output declines as evening electricity demand rises.[6]

Grid development has also lagged. In 2023, the energy minister approved a delivery-system development plan totaling approximately NIS 22 billion, including about NIS 12 billion for connecting renewable-energy facilities, and grid plans approved during 2023–2024 aimed to connect approximately 10,000 megawatts of additional renewable capacity.[16] An Electricity Authority oversight report published in January 2025 indicated that the plan was delayed and that only one-third of projects were expected to be completed on schedule, with reported causes including statutory-approval delays, opposition to transmission lines, and demands to place lines underground.[16]

Solar adoption has nevertheless advanced in some areas. In the Southern Arava, a rapid expansion of solar infrastructure began in 2011; a study of five local kibbutz communities found strong local acceptance of photovoltaic technology, attributing this partly to kibbutz co-ownership of solar assets, transparent communication among stakeholders, and the kibbutz decision-making structure.[20] A GIS-based assessment found that approximately 2.93 gigawatts of large-scale, ground-mounted solar capacity could be integrated into Israel's existing grid without system changes — equivalent to approximately 15% of national installed capacity and 7% of national electricity generation — but concluded that ground-mounted photovoltaics alone would provide only a small fraction of the country's energy needs.[21]

High population density limits the land available for large solar installations, making dual-use and agrivoltaic configurations particularly important in the Israeli context.[7]

The Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure's 2050 model projects electricity demand of approximately 19.2 million tons of oil equivalent per year, or about 220 terawatt-hours, by 2050 — more than three times current electricity demand.[7] The ministry expects electricity demand to grow as transportation and industry shift away from fossil fuels, while demand for fuels and natural gas decreases but does not reach zero in most scenarios.[7]

Three principal scenarios are outlined for 2050. The yellow scenario assigns approximately 77% of electricity generation to renewables and uses about 7.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas; the blue scenario assigns approximately 57% to renewables and uses about 19 billion cubic meters for blue hydrogen production; and the red scenario assigns approximately 57% to renewables and projects zero natural-gas use by 2050 after nuclear energy is integrated.[7] A separate climate and energy factsheet lists the target end of coal use as 2026.[22]

In December 2021, Energy Minister Karine Elharrar announced that Israel would not award new natural-gas exploration licenses within its economic zone for the following year and designated 2022 as "the Year of Renewable Energies," signaling a policy shift away from the previous government's emphasis on additional exploration.[23] The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and interruption of Russian gas supplies subsequently changed Israel's export environment as European governments sought alternative sources.[23]

Israel's offshore gas wealth has generated a series of export agreements that provide revenue, deepen regional relationships, and carry geopolitical significance.[8][24]

Exports from the Tamar field to Jordan began in January 2017, and exports from Leviathan to Egypt began in January 2020.[8] In June 2022, Israel, Egypt, and the European Union signed a memorandum of understanding under which Israeli gas would reach the EU through Egypt's liquefied-natural-gas facilities — an arrangement that gained added urgency after the Russian invasion of Ukraine disrupted European gas markets.[8][23] Twenty-six of the twenty-seven EU member states agreed in July 2022 to limit gas consumption and reduce Russian imports by two-thirds by the end of that year.[23]

The pivotal commercial agreement was concluded in February 2018, when Israel and Egypt announced a deal involving the Tamar and Leviathan fields and Egypt's Dolphinus company, valued at approximately $15 billion and covering 64 billion cubic meters over ten years.[24] The arrangement was presented as having both commercial and strategic importance because Egypt could use its existing liquefaction facilities to re-export Israeli gas to Europe, while the deal created additional mutual interests between the two countries.[24]

In August 2025, the partners in the Leviathan field agreed to supply Egypt with approximately 130 billion cubic meters through 2040 in a deal valued at $35 billion — the largest gas deal in Israel's history.[3] The first phase, involving 20 billion cubic meters, was expected to begin in 2026 and raise annual Leviathan deliveries to Egypt from 4.7 billion cubic meters to 6.7 billion cubic meters.[3] A second phase beginning in 2029 was expected to supply another 110 billion cubic meters following expansion of Leviathan and construction of a new transmission pipeline.[3]

Exports to Jordan and Egypt increased by more than 13% year-on-year in 2024.[8] Leviathan currently produces about 12 billion cubic meters annually, with roughly three-quarters sent to Egypt and one-quarter to Jordan.[13] Israel also promoted the EastMed project, which envisions a pipeline connecting Cyprus and Italy, as an additional export route.[14]

In 2018, Delek Drilling acquired a stake in the Egyptian pipeline company Eastern Mediterranean Gas through East Mediterranean Pipeline, including the exclusive right to operate the approximately 90-kilometer El Arish–Ashkelon pipeline, which carries gas from Egypt toward Israel.[25] Upgrades were projected to increase annual flow capacity from 7 billion cubic meters to 9 billion cubic meters.[25] The pipeline route was considered strategically important because repeated attacks on other sections of Egypt's pipeline network had previously interrupted gas flows to neighboring countries.[25]

The Bank of Israel has favored placing export revenues in a sovereign wealth fund outside Israel's shekel system to limit currency, budgetary, and economic distortions and to protect against a later resource downturn — a response to research showing that gas-discovery announcements caused shekel appreciation and harmed manufacturing and industrial sectors.[10][26]

Israel is an energy island: it is not connected to regional or international electricity grids and depends on a limited number of gas sources, offshore pipelines, power stations, and transmission routes.[16] This geographic isolation, already noted by policymakers in 2008, remains a defining feature of Israel's energy challenge in the 2020s.

The concentration of generation in gas-fired stations fed by offshore infrastructure creates a distinctive security profile. During armed conflicts, gas production or transportation at offshore facilities has been halted to protect the installations, creating a direct link between offshore energy infrastructure, military security, and electricity continuity.[16] The temporary closure of the Tamar field after the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War in October 2023 demonstrated this vulnerability in practice.[6]

Renewable energy is presented as a partial security remedy because rooftop, urban, agrivoltaic, reservoir, and other decentralized installations can reduce dependence on a single gas pipeline or transmission route.[16] Consumer-adjacent systems can operate near demand centers, while remote solar and agrivoltaic facilities require additional transmission capacity and storage to deliver electricity to central Israel.[16] Decentralized generation alone cannot meet total demand and must be combined with modern transmission infrastructure, storage, and real-time load management.[16]

Electricity demand is expected to rise by 30% to 40% by 2035 because of population and economic growth, transportation and industrial electrification, and extreme weather.[16] The system also supports energy-intensive desalination, data centers, communications, and digitization services; desalination alone consumes approximately 10% of Israel's electricity.[16] Israel's desalination plants are characterized as among the world's most energy-efficient, but government engineers did not expect major further efficiency gains in the near term, meaning that expanding desalination would require a substantially greater commitment to renewable-energy supply.[27]

Sector investments promoted or approved for 2024–2031 total approximately NIS 90 billion, excluding IEC investments, allocated as NIS 47 billion for production and storage facilities, NIS 20 billion for distribution development, and NIS 22 billion for transmission development.[6]

Several significant policy debates surround Israel's energy sector, reflecting real disagreements among ministries, international bodies, and researchers.

The Finance Ministry's budget division warned that Israel could face a structural shortage of natural gas for domestic use within the next 25 years, citing demand growth faster than forecast, rising exports, slower-than-expected renewable deployment, and the absence of domestic gas-storage infrastructure.[8] It recommended increasing the quantity of gas reserved for domestic use from 440 billion cubic meters to 515 billion cubic meters.[8] The Energy Ministry disputed the warning as unfounded and cautioned that the prediction could discourage international companies from entering Israel and prevent new reserves from being discovered.[8] The ministry said it sought to maintain low prices through additional discoveries, new international participants, and greater competition.[8]

The two ministries also differ on renewable targets. The Energy Ministry set a 30% renewable-electricity target for 2030, while the Environmental Protection Ministry advocated a 40% target.[28] An OECD assessment cited in connection with the debate stated that relying predominantly on natural gas could lock Israel into carbon-intensive infrastructure and hinder deep decarbonization, while solar photovoltaic power could reduce air pollution and improve health.[28]

Official characterizations of Israel as energy-independent warrant careful qualification. While the Ministry of Energy has stated that offshore discoveries transformed Israel from a country almost completely dependent on imports into one capable of meeting its own needs and exporting to neighbors,[14] the Ministry's own 2050 report separately notes that more than half of primary energy sources were imported in 2022 — including 37% imported fuels and 16% imported coal — and that energy imports are expected to remain a feature of future scenarios.[7]

A 2024 academic study examining energy poverty found that Arab-Muslim households in Israel were twice as likely as Jewish households to experience severe energy poverty after controlling for income and education, with higher rates of self-reported electricity disconnections and difficulty affording cooling, heating, or other essentials.[29] The same study linked these disparities to persistent inequalities in planning and housing, unsafe electricity connections, distrust in state institutions, limited payment flexibility, and language and cultural barriers to accessing social rights.[29] The study concluded that addressing energy poverty requires coordinated policies connecting energy services with welfare services, and was based on a survey of 1,274 social-aid recipients.[29]

Research on gas-discovery announcements found that they led to appreciation of the Israeli shekel and that investor expectations of further appreciation harmed manufacturing and industrial sectors, consistent with concerns about the "Dutch disease" phenomenon.[26] The pace and completion of Israel's electricity-sector privatization and grid-development plans have also been subject to regulatory and political delays, with only one-third of projects under the grid-development plan expected to be completed on schedule according to a January 2025 Electricity Authority report.[16]

Official coal phaseout dates differ slightly across sources: one Ministry overview states coal production will cease at the end of 2025, while the COP 30 factsheet lists the end of coal use as 2026.[22][14] The Electricity Authority's 2024 forecast of approximately 28% renewable electricity by 2030 also falls short of the government's stated 30% policy target.[6][16]