Opinion Polling for the 2026 Israeli Legislative Election

The 25th Knesset dissolved in July 2026, setting the national election for October 27. Earlier reporting had described that date as the latest permitted by law.[1][2] Polling during the campaign took place amid party mergers, new lists, and uncertainty over which smaller parties would qualify for the ballot.

Israel's 3.25% electoral threshold was central to interpreting the surveys. A list below the threshold receives no Knesset seats, while one that barely crosses it may contribute roughly four seats to a bloc. Because the principal blocs were often separated by only a few seats, small movements around the threshold could matter more to coalition arithmetic than shifts between Likud and Yashar.[1]

The campaign included Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid's joint B'Yachad list, the separation of Bezalel Smotrich's Religious Zionism from Itamar Ben-Gvir's Otzma Yehudit, and Smotrich's subsequent agreement to run with Moshe Feiglin's Zehut.[3][4] Gadi Eisenkot's Yashar and Ofer Winter's Amcha Yisrael further complicated projections because new and smaller lists were sometimes near the threshold.[5][1]

Public support for Likud had recovered from its late-2023 lows, although polling remained volatile.[6] The available surveys did not consistently establish whether Netanyahu's supporters or opponents were more likely to secure a governing majority.[1]

The campaign's polling structure developed through a succession of political realignments. Bennett and Lapid's April merger initially polled strongly, with one early survey placing their joint list ahead of Likud, but later surveys generally put it in the mid-to-high teens. The polling did not establish that the merger itself caused the decline.[1]

Over the same period, Yashar moved from a secondary position to the center of the contest over who would lead an alternative government. By July, Yashar had been measured ahead of, tied with, or narrowly behind Likud, making the Eisenkot-Netanyahu comparison a recurring focus even though the largest party does not automatically form the government.[1]

April and May 2026

An April 28 Kan News poll conducted by Kantar projected Likud at 27 seats, Bennett-Lapid at 24, Eisenkot at 15, Benny Gantz at 11, Ben-Gvir and Aryeh Deri at 9 each, Avigdor Liberman at 8, United Torah Judaism at 7, and Hadash-Ta'al and Meretz at 5 each. The anti-Netanyahu bloc had 58 seats excluding Arab parties, while the Netanyahu bloc had 52.[3] A later repeat gave 68 seats for the anti-Netanyahu parties including Arab parties and again specified 58 without them; those figures are consistent rather than contradictory.[3]

A May 20 Kantar poll projected Likud at 27, Bennett-Lapid at 23, Eisenkot at 16, the Democrats at 10, Otzma Yehudit and Shas at 9 each, Yisrael Beiteinu and United Torah Judaism at 8 each, and Hadash-Ta'al and Ra'am at 5 each. It placed Netanyahu's bloc at 53 and the opposition at 67, or 57 without Arab parties.[7] A joint Bennett-Lapid-Eisenkot run left bloc totals unchanged but cost the combined list one seat; a united Arab list was projected at 13 seats while also leaving bloc totals unchanged. Netanyahu led Eisenkot 45%-35%, Bennett 45%-32%, and Yair Golan 46%-20% in suitability questions.[7]

June and July 2026

A June 25 Kan segment reported Likud rising to 24 seats. Its description of alternative opposition configurations was ambiguous, referring to 20 seats for Eisenkot and Lapid and 16 for a Bennett-Lapid configuration. A proposed Benny Gantz-Dedi Simhi-Yoaz Hendel list was projected at 7 seats and described as a potential swing faction. The segment characterized the map as a stalemate and said unsettled alliances made prediction premature.[8]

A July 8 Channel 13 report said Yashar had overtaken Likud by a small margin but supplied no seat totals or methodology.[9] A July 5 Kan poll tied Likud and Yashar at 23 seats; a Maariv poll about a week later put Yashar ahead 23-22; and a July 15 average of seven Israeli media series put Likud ahead 24.6-21.9. A mid-July Channel 14 Filber poll instead projected Likud at 33 and Yashar at 21.[1] A July 29 Channel 14/Next Data poll projected Likud at 32 and Yashar at 22, with a 62-58 Netanyahu-bloc advantage. Its 539-person sample had a stated ±4.6% margin of error, and Netanyahu led Eisenkot 51%-37% in suitability.[10]

August 2026

A Zman Yisrael poll conducted August 12-13 projected Yashar at 25 seats and Likud at 21. It placed the anti-Netanyahu change bloc at 58, the pro-Netanyahu bloc at 50, and Arab parties at 12. B'Yachad received 13, Yisrael Beytenu 11, the Democrats 9, Shas and United Torah Judaism 8 each, Otzma Yehudit 7, and Religious Zionism 6. The poll had 500 respondents and a 4.4% margin of error.[11]

A KAN 11 online poll of 1,103 Israeli adults conducted August 13-16 put Likud and Yashar at 23 seats each, B'Yachad at 14, the Democrats, Otzma Yehudit, and Yisrael Beiteinu at 10 each, United Torah Judaism at 8, Shas at 7, Hadash-Ta'al at 6, Ra'am at 5, and Religious Zionism at 4. Its stated margin of error was ±2.9%, with a 24% response rate. Netanyahu led Bennett 37%-35%, while Eisenkot led Netanyahu 41%-36%.[12] With an Ofer Winter list included, Yashar rose to 25 while Likud remained at 23. In a separate Arab-party-merger scenario, Yashar received 24, Likud 23, and Hadash-Ta'al-Balad 8.[12]

An August 18 Channel 14/Next Data poll of 636 adults reported Likud at 32 seats and Yashar at 24. It projected Shas at 10, the Democrats at 9, Otzma Yehudit at 8, United Torah Judaism and Yisrael Beiteinu at 7 each, Religious Zionism, B'Yachad, and Ra'am at 6 each, and Hadash-Ta'al-Balad at 5. The Netanyahu bloc led 63-57; the response rate was 9%, the stated margin of error ±4.6%, and Netanyahu led Eisenkot 55%-45% in a direct comparison.[13]

An August 19 Kan Reshet B poll placed Eisenkot first with 24 seats, Likud at 23, Bennett at 14, the Democrats at 10, Ben-Gvir and Liberman at 9 each, United Torah Judaism at 8, Shas at 7, and New Hope at 6. It gave 57 seats to the opposition excluding Arab parties, 11 to Arab parties, and 52 to Netanyahu's coalition.[14] The broadcast said changes occurred within rather than between blocs and reported that 39% would prioritize a state commission of inquiry into the October 7 disaster as the first action of a future opposition government.[14]

Maariv/Lazar Research, September 2-3

A 600-person Lazar Research poll projected Yashar at 23 seats, Likud at 20, B'Yachad at 15, the Democrats at 10, Yisrael Beytenu at 9, Otzma Yehudit at 8, United Torah Judaism, the Joint List, and Shas at 7 each, and Ra'am, Religious Zionism-Zehut, and People of Israel at 5, 5, and 4 respectively. The Netanyahu bloc had 51 seats and the opposition 57. Eisenkot led Netanyahu 48%-39% in suitability, Bennett led Netanyahu 43%-39%, and Netanyahu led Liberman 42%-39%.[15]

KAN News/Kantar, September 6

A Kantar poll of 551 adults projected Likud at 20 seats, Yashar at 23, B'Yachad at 13, and Ra'am and Religious Zionism at 6 each. It placed the Netanyahu bloc at 52 and the opposition at 51; with a separate four-seat Hendel-Zelekha faction included, the blocs rose to 56 and 55 respectively.[16] Eisenkot led Netanyahu 38%-35% in suitability, while Netanyahu led Bennett 37%-32%. Sixty-two percent rated Netanyahu's conduct on the morning of October 7, 2023, as "not good," and 26% rated it "good."[16]

Maariv/Lazar Research, September 7-8

The latest poll in the bundle surveyed 600 adults and projected Yashar at 25 seats, Likud at 20, B'Yachad at 13, the Democrats at 10, Yisrael Beytenu at 9, Otzma Yehudit at 8, United Torah Judaism, Shas, and Hadash-Ta'al-Balad at 7 each, and Ra'am and Religious Zionism-Zehut at 5 each. Hendel and Zelekha's slate received 4 seats, while Ofer Winter's party was below the threshold at 2.8%; 10.4% were undecided.[5]

The Netanyahu coalition stood at 47 seats and the Zionist opposition at 57. If the Hendel-Zelekha slate joined the opposition, it could produce a 61-seat majority without Arab parties. Because fieldwork preceded completion of candidate-list submissions and two small lists were near the threshold, minor changes could substantially alter the result.[5]

Several surveys focused on particular communities or issues and therefore were not directly comparable with nationwide seat projections.

A Dialog poll conducted August 31-September 1 surveyed 508 adults in Israel's national-religious sector, with 484 answering the vote question. After respondents were told of a proposed Religious Zionism-Zehut merger, 30% supported the merged list, 17% Likud, 12% Otzma Yehudit, 6% Amcha Yisrael, 4% each Shas and Yashar, and 3% each B'Yachad and the reservists' list; 13% were undecided. The response rate was 17% and the stated maximum sampling error ±4.3%.[17]

An Afkar survey conducted August 27-September 1 sampled 815 Arab citizens. The three-party Joint List received 38%, Ra'am 19%, Makom Lekulanu 7%, the Democrats 5%, Likud 3%, Yashar and B'Yachad 2% each, and Yisrael Beiteinu 1%; 12% were undecided and 9% would not vote. The stated sampling error was ±3.4%. Its fractional seat equivalents were not nationwide Knesset projections.[18]

A July Jewish People Policy Institute survey measured voter certainty and coalition preferences. It reported that 53% were completely sure how they would vote, 29% fairly sure, 14% undecided, and 4% unlikely to vote. Complete certainty was 71% on the left, 58% on the right, and 44% in the center. The largest single coalition preference, at 27%, was a change-bloc government including Arab parties.[19]

Pollsters and commissioning outlets produced widely different results. KAN 11 tied Likud and Yashar at 23 seats in mid-August, while the August 18 Channel 14/Next Data poll put them at 32 and 24. JNS reported that Channel 14 surveys had placed the Netanyahu coalition as high as 65 seats, while other surveys generally put it in the low-to-mid 50s.[1][12]

The threshold magnified those differences. Movement of a few tenths of a percentage point could determine whether roughly four lawmakers entered the allocation, while the main blocs were often separated by only a few seats.[1]

Methodologies also varied. KAN 11's August poll had 1,103 respondents, a 24% response rate, and a ±2.9% margin of error; Channel 14's August 18 poll had 636 respondents, a 9% response rate, and a ±4.6% margin of error. The September Lazar surveys received 600 responses from roughly 4,000 invitees.[5][12] Official reports described online panels, probability sampling, weighting, or stratified analysis depending on the survey.[12][13]

Party configurations also differed across scenarios, and several September polls preceded final candidate-list submissions. Channel 14's official reports explicitly stated that their findings reflected the fieldwork date and were not election forecasts.[13][10] Although governing requires 61 seats rather than merely the largest party, political scientist Gayil Talshir argued that "the psychological effect is that people want to vote for the winner," potentially reinforcing the leading party.[1]

Academic issue polling showed that electoral blocs also differed sharply over Israeli-Palestinian policy. Tel Aviv University's Peace Index is conducted online by Dr. Nimrod Rosler and Dr. Alon Yakter among a nationally representative sample of Israeli adults.[20]

In March 2026, 26% of Jewish respondents supported negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, compared with 67% of Arab respondents. Jewish support ranged from 5% on the right to 84% on the left and from 8% among coalition voters to 54% among opposition voters.[21] Among Jewish respondents, 23% supported a two-state arrangement, 38% annexation under Israeli rule with limited Palestinian rights, 31% continuation of the status quo, and 8% a binational state with equal rights.[21]

In July, Jewish support for negotiations increased to 29%. It stood at 7% on the right, 22% on the moderate right, 54% in the center, and 83% on the left; coalition and opposition support was 7% and 63% respectively.[22] Annexation with limited Palestinian rights was the most selected long-term option among Jewish respondents at 33%, followed by the status quo at 25%, two states at 24%, and a binational state at 6%. No option received majority support.[22]

The Peace Index measured policy attitudes rather than named-party voting intentions or projected Knesset seats, so its results illustrate ideological divisions but cannot be incorporated into the election-seat series.[22]

The polling record contains inconsistencies and comparability problems. The April 28 broadcast's figures were not internally contradictory: 68 anti-Netanyahu seats including Arab parties is consistent with 58 excluding them.[3] The May 20 broadcast did contain a discrepancy, describing the Netanyahu bloc as both one and two seats higher than in the previous poll.[7]

The published JPPI coalition preferences accounted for 94% of respondents, leaving 6% unexplained.[19] Its publicly reported methodology also omitted an immediately available sample size and margin of error.

Channel 14's August 18 poll had a 9% response rate and projected Likud at 32 seats, substantially above most other cited surveys. Its official report nevertheless disclosed the response rate, margin of error, and warning that the findings were not a forecast.[13] Divergence alone does not establish that a poll is invalid, but it prevents the results from being treated as a single continuous trend.

Some reports merely said that Yashar had overtaken Likud or was drawing roughly equal support without publishing seat totals, field dates, sample sizes, or margins of error.[9][2] JNS supplied useful comparative figures but not complete methodology for every poll it discussed.[1]

The Dialog national-religious survey, the Afkar Arab-sector survey, and the Peace Index addressed different populations or questions. Their results should not be combined directly with nationwide party-seat projections.[17][18]