Arab Gas Pipeline

The pipeline begins at al-Arish in northern Sinai and runs to Jordan, continuing north into Syria with a branch toward Lebanon; its original development also contemplated an extension to southern Turkey.[1] Built as an outlet for Egyptian natural gas, the system subsequently became connected to infrastructure carrying Israeli gas into Jordan and formed part of proposals to address Lebanon’s electricity shortages.[1][5]

A 2025 description placed the pipeline’s northern reach at Homs in Syria, with branches toward Tripoli in northern Lebanon and Banias in western Syria.[6] These physical connections should be distinguished from operating service: the Syrian section was described as unused in January 2025, before northbound flows from Jordan into Syria were reported again in 2026.[7][3]

The Arab Gas Pipeline is distinct from the separate Egyptian export pipeline to Israel, which began operating in 2008.[8] The latter connection runs approximately 100 kilometers underwater between al-Arish and Ashkelon, links the Egyptian end of the Arab Gas Pipeline with Israel, and had a reported physical capacity of 9 billion cubic meters annually.[8] Its operation began in February 2008.[8]

The Arab Gas Pipeline’s annual capacity was approximately 10 billion cubic meters, with a potential increase to 15 billion through additional compression stations.[7] Published length figures differ: an Israeli energy ministry review listed 620 kilometers, while a 2021 account described approximately 1,200 kilometers of pipeline and construction costs exceeding $1 billion.[8][9] The ministry review identified the state-owned Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company, through its subsidiary GASCO, as the majority owner and manager.[8]

Construction began in 2000 with the wider ambition of creating a gas-export route from the Mashreq to Europe through Turkey.[9] Plans to incorporate Iraq and Saudi Arabia as additional producing countries were not implemented.[9] A 2001 description of the proposed Egypt–Jordan route envisaged its continuation through Syria and Lebanon to Turkey without crossing Israeli territory.[10]

Egypt and Jordan established the Eastern Gas Company to export Egyptian gas to Jordan.[11] The first section, between al-Arish and Aqaba, was completed in 2003, and Egyptian exports began in late summer that year.[9][11] Initial gross revenues were projected at $70 million in the first year, rising to $200 million annually by 2005 as the pipeline extended across Jordan; these were contemporary forecasts rather than reported final earnings.[11]

The Aqaba connection was operational by 2005, when a northern extension intended to serve the Amman area and destinations beyond it was scheduled to enter service later that year.[12] By September 2010, the line had reached northern Jordan, while further construction to connect it with Syria and destinations beyond was described as underway.[13] Separately, the connection between Syria and the Tripoli terminal in northern Lebanon was completed in 2008, with Russian involvement reported in construction of the Syrian section.[9]

Agreements for an extension to Turkey were signed in 2006 and 2008, but the project was abandoned in 2009 amid financial disputes and a shortage of Egyptian gas available for export.[7] The proposed Turkish connection therefore did not fulfill the original ambition of carrying regional gas onward toward Europe.[7][9]

Egyptian gas reached Lebanon through the regional system by the end of the decade.[2][9] One account placed the beginning of Lebanese deliveries in late summer 2009, while another described a period of supply between 2008 and 2010.[2][9] Former Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora described the arrangement as a swap: Syria received Egyptian gas in the south and supplied Lebanon from its own reserves in the north.[2] Lebanon was still receiving Egyptian gas through the Arab Gas Pipeline in 2010.[14]

In 2010, Egyptian exports through the pipeline totaled 3.4 billion cubic meters: 2.5 billion to Jordan, 0.2 billion to Lebanon, and 0.7 billion to Syria.[8] This throughput was substantially below the system’s stated annual capacity of 10 billion cubic meters.[8]

An explosion in February 2011 disabled the pipeline and stopped gas supplies for approximately one month.[15] The natural-gas terminal near al-Arish, which supplied the Arab Gas Pipeline’s customers in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, was attacked again at the end of April during unrest in Egypt.[15]

Repeated attacks affected the wider Sinai gas network rather than only one export destination.[16] An explosion west of al-Arish in November 2011 was described as the eighth attack that year, and the resulting shutdown affected transportation to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egyptian consumers, and the separate EMG export connection.[16] By January 2012, at least ten attacks during 2011 and more than 200 days of suspended deliveries had been reported.[17]

Pipeline security was entangled with tensions between the Egyptian government and local Bedouin communities.[15][17] Demands surrounding protection of the network included payments, pipeline-guard jobs, and prisoner releases; the government rejected those demands, and protection work was reported to have stalled.[17] The targeting of the al-Arish terminal was linked to Bedouin grievances about neglect and oppression by Cairo.[15]

Disruption persisted after 2011.[18] In 2013, explosions at two points on a pipeline to Jordan south of al-Arish interrupted gas flows, following a period of intermittent operation as security deteriorated after Egypt’s revolution.[18] Declining Egyptian production and subsidized domestic demand compounded the effects of repeated attacks, curtailing exports and making Lebanon’s gas imports infeasible.[14]

Jordan also experienced gas-supply shortfalls.[14] By 2014, Egyptian shortages, problems in Sinai, and sabotage had reduced supplies to Jordan almost to a halt, forcing the country to use diesel and fuel oil as substitutes.[19] In 2020, Egyptian exports through the Arab Gas Pipeline were described as serving Jordan alone.[20]

A 2021 proposal sought to ease Lebanon’s electricity crisis by moving gas from Egypt, potentially including Israeli-origin supplies, through Jordan and Syria.[1] Technical, logistical, and political obstacles remained, including the condition of Syrian infrastructure and the connections onward into Lebanon.[1][2]

By late 2021, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria had agreed on an arrangement to send Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity to Lebanon.[21] Under the gas component, supplies would transit Jordan and Syria toward Lebanon’s Deir Ammar power plant.[21] Syria would receive gas first and pass a smaller quantity into Lebanon, retaining the difference as an in-kind payment.[21] The gas was expected to provide four additional hours of electricity daily in Lebanon, while Jordanian electricity transmitted through Syria was expected to provide another two hours; these were projected benefits, not confirmed service improvements.[21]

In December 2021, Lebanon’s energy minister announced work to restore the pipeline for Egyptian gas deliveries.[22] The Lebanese section had been out of service since before the Syrian conflict began in 2011, and repairs there were expected to take a little more than two months.[22] Syrian experts were reported to have completed work within Syria.[22]

Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria signed a further agreement in Beirut on June 21, 2022, specifying annual deliveries of 650 million cubic meters to Deir Ammar through the Arab Gas Pipeline via Jordan and Syria.[23] At the time, final approval from the World Bank and the United States was still required.[23] The agreement did not itself establish that the planned deliveries had begun.[23]

Implementation remained unresolved into early 2023.[24] Lebanon’s energy minister said in December 2022 that a World Bank prerequisite had been completed, but Egypt was still reportedly seeking assurances regarding U.S. sanctions.[24]

A different supply proposal emerged in September 2026, when Jordan’s cabinet approved a plan to supply Lebanon with imported natural gas through Syria.[4] Jordan would import liquefied natural gas, regasify it at Aqaba, and send it northward.[4] The proposal was an approved plan, not a report of operating deliveries to Lebanon.[4]

A pipeline carrying gas from Israel’s Leviathan field into Jordan joins the Arab Gas Pipeline within Jordan.[5] This connection contrasts with the early route envisaged in 2001, which bypassed Israeli territory on its way from Egypt toward Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey.[10]

By 2021, Jordan’s reliance on Israeli rather than Egyptian gas had become a major change in the regional supply pattern.[1] Approximately 3 billion cubic meters of Israeli gas annually were described as crossing into Jordan south of the Sea of Galilee from 2020, with supplies directed toward Jordanian power stations north of Amman.[1]

In January 2025, the Arab Gas Pipeline was described as primarily serving Israeli gas exports to Jordan and onward south to Egypt, while the Syrian section remained unused.[7] A separate 2025 account reported an Azerbaijani proposal to expand the pipeline and described Israel’s connection through Jordan to the network extending into Syria and Lebanon.[6]

Northbound use subsequently resumed.[3][4] A June 2026 account described supplies once again moving from Jordan into Syria, including gas originating from Israeli sources and, in some cases, arrangements involving swaps for Qatari liquefied natural gas at Aqaba.[3] A September 2026 report placed the beginning of Jordanian energy supplies to Syria through the Arab Gas Pipeline at the start of that year.[4]

Egyptian gas accounted for 91.9% of Jordan’s total natural-gas consumption and all of Lebanon’s in 2009.[25] It also represented all gas imports into both countries and 12.8% of Syria’s gas consumption that year.[25] These historical figures show the scale of dependence before the subsequent supply interruptions; they are not estimates of current consumption or imports.[25]

The original design linked cross-border gas trade directly to electricity generation, with intended deliveries to a power station in Aqaba, three Syrian power stations, and one Lebanese station.[1] Later proposals again focused on electricity supply, particularly Deir Ammar and Lebanon’s prolonged power outages.[21][23]

The cost of interrupted Egyptian supplies was particularly consequential for Jordan.[19] A 2013 analysis by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs estimated that the cutoff added $5.6 billion to electricity-generation costs and prompted an additional $1.6 billion in subsidies to avoid doubling electricity prices.[26] That analysis put Jordan’s earlier reliance on Egyptian gas for energy production at 2.7 billion cubic meters and reported twelve sabotage incidents affecting the Egypt-to-Israel pipeline during 2012, each also interrupting supplies to Jordan through the shared system.[26]

The pipeline’s later role extended beyond its original Egyptian export function, connecting with Israeli production, supporting renewed Jordan-to-Syria supplies, and featuring in proposals to move regasified imported LNG north from Aqaba.[3][4][5]

The origin of gas proposed for Lebanon became politically contentious in 2022: Lebanon’s Energy Ministry said the agreement required Egyptian gas and rejected claims that supplies would include Israeli gas.[23] A competing analysis argued that some or all could originate at Leviathan because of connections at al-Arish and Mafraq, but this was an assessment rather than a confirmed account of delivered gas.[23] Earlier reporting likewise distinguished claims that Israeli or mixed gas entered the Arab Gas Pipeline from an unverified account that Jordan received it through a separate pipeline.[1]

Transit through Syria also prompted disagreement over U.S. sanctions.[24] The proposed in-kind payment was intended to avoid direct transit-fee payments that could violate sanctions, but some members of Congress argued that the arrangement would enrich the Assad government and trigger the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.[24] U.S. officials maintained that its humanitarian character meant a sanctions waiver would not be required, while Egypt continued seeking sanctions assurances into early 2023.[24]