Greece–Israel Relations

Full diplomatic relations were established in 1990, after decades of limited contact, and the partnership now encompasses defense, energy, trade, tourism, technology, culture, and innovation.[1][2] Political dialogue has been reinforced by government-to-government meetings and a broader pattern of military, commercial, cultural, and educational cooperation.[2][3]

The rapprochement brought together several practical interests: Greece sought a larger role in the Eastern Mediterranean and benefits from tourism and commerce, while Israel sought regional partners and alternative military training airspace after Turkey closed its airspace to the Israeli Air Force in 2009.[2] Offshore energy resources and the possibility of connecting Israel with European markets gave the relationship an additional economic and strategic dimension.[2]

Cyprus became a regular third partner, creating a framework for leaders’ meetings, military exercises, energy proposals, and cooperation in fields ranging from emergency response to education.[2][3] The United States subsequently participated in a complementary “3+1” format supporting the trilateral mechanism.[4] These arrangements linked bilateral cooperation to broader Eastern Mediterranean priorities without establishing a commitment by Greece or Israel to intervene militarily in a conflict involving the other.[2]

Greece recognized the State of Israel in the late 1940s but maintained diplomatic representation in Tel Aviv below embassy level for many years.[3] INSS dates the upgrade to full diplomatic relations to 1990, while a 2013 Jewish Review of Books article gives 1991 for official recognition, reflecting differing terminology for diplomatic milestones.[1][5] Interaction between the countries remained limited for decades.[3]

Relations were especially cold under Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in the early 1980s, when Greece aligned with Arab states, supported the Palestinian cause, and became one of Israel’s strongest critics in Europe.[2] Nevertheless, some practical contacts developed before full diplomatic normalization: in 1986, Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias cited increased foreign-ministry contacts, reciprocal tourism-minister visits, and cooperation in agriculture and microelectronics.[6] He also discussed a planned visit to Israel in 1987 and anticipated that full recognition would develop as relations evolved.[6]

The 1990 upgrade to full diplomatic relations took place under Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis.[2] The improvement during the 1990s accompanied Greece’s interest in strengthening its deterrence against Turkey, better Greek-American relations, progress in Middle Eastern peace negotiations, and the death of Andreas Papandreou in June 1996.[3] Bilateral trade doubled between 1989 and 1995; Israeli exports to Greece reached $200 million in 1995, while imports from Greece totaled $150 million.[3]

Israel’s strategic cooperation with Turkey complicated the developing relationship with Greece.[7] In 1998, Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos called the Israeli-Turkish relationship “an alliance of wrongdoers that brings us to a cold war situation,” expressing Greek anxiety about their military cooperation.[8] Efforts to build a more balanced Greek relationship with Israel nevertheless gained momentum from the late 1990s.[7]

President Moshe Katsav made the first official visit to Greece by an Israeli head of state in 2006.[7] During that visit, the countries signed an industrial research-and-development agreement in February.[9] Bilateral trade had reached $450 million in 2005, comprising $200 million in Israeli exports and $250 million in imports, after average annual growth of 12 percent in the preceding years.[9] Israeli exports had risen sharply before the 2004 Athens Olympics.[9]

The diplomatic groundwork for the later rapprochement preceded the May 2010 flotilla incident.[2] Discussions began in 2009 among Greek political advisers and an unofficial Israeli counterpart known as the Electra Group, followed by contacts involving Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Prime Ministers George Papandreou and Benjamin Netanyahu.[2] Papandreou and Netanyahu met in Moscow in February 2010.[2]

The flotilla incident initially prompted Greek condemnation and the postponement of a joint military exercise, but diplomatic contacts continued.[2] Papandreou visited Israel in July 2010, becoming the first Greek prime minister to do so in three decades; Netanyahu followed in August with the first visit to Greece by an Israeli prime minister.[2] Their discussions included expanding strategic ties and military and defense-industry cooperation.[3] Deteriorating Israeli-Turkish relations and the prospect of energy cooperation accelerated the shift.[2]

Cooperation subsequently developed across successive Greek administrations.[2] The defense ministers signed a memorandum of understanding in September 2011, and a further defense-cooperation agreement was announced during Barak’s January 2012 visit to Greece.[2][3] In October 2013, Netanyahu and Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras led the first government-to-government meeting in Jerusalem and signed ten agreements covering areas including energy, science, technology, culture, and education.[3] Samaras described the partnership as one that “excludes no one” and could involve other regional peoples seeking stability, security, peace, and growth.[3]

The first Greek-Israeli defense-cooperation agreement was concluded in December 1994 but was not activated at the time.[2] Greek concern about alienating Arab partners and Israeli reluctance to upset Turkey limited implementation.[3] Planned naval maneuvers in 1997 were postponed, and the agreement remained incompletely implemented in the late 1990s.[8]

Joint training became substantially more visible in the following decade.[2] The 2008 Glorious Spartan exercise involved 80 Greek aircraft and 100 Israeli F-15 and F-16 aircraft.[2] In 2011, Greece, Israel, and the United States began the annual Noble Dina exercise, replacing the canceled Israeli-Turkish Reliant Mermaid naval exercise.[3] Noble Dina involved naval and air forces and expanded from search-and-rescue training to scenarios including defense against attacks and antisubmarine warfare.[3]

In 2015, the countries signed a status-of-forces agreement allowing Greek and Israeli military personnel to be stationed in either country for training exercises.[2]

Defense cooperation extended into long-term training infrastructure.[10] In 2021, Elbit Systems was selected under a government-to-government agreement to build and operate an international flight-training center for the Hellenic Air Force, in a program valued at $1.68 billion over 20 years.[10] The program included ten Italian-made M-346 aircraft, upgrades to existing Greek T-6 aircraft, and simulator centers.[10] The center near Kalamata began operations in October 2022.[3]

Greek procurement also included Israeli unmanned aircraft, Rafael Spike missiles, and an agreement for Orbiter 3 systems in 2023.[3][10] By March 2025, reported defense-industrial links included Israel Aerospace Industries’ acquisition of Intracom Defense for about €60 million and a Rafael SPIKE missile agreement valued at €370 million.[11]

Operational cooperation continued alongside procurement.[3] During a May 2023 exercise, an Israeli aircraft refueled Greek F-16s as the air forces trained crews and improved coordination.[3] A November 2025 exercise over Greece simulated long-range aerial refueling and involved Israel’s 120th Squadron and dozens of Greek fighter jets.[3] An October 2026 naval exercise in the Mediterranean included maritime-threat detection, coordinated sailing, and a missile exercise against an enemy vessel.[3]

In February 2025, discussions were under way on a proposed $2.11 billion Greek air- and missile-defense system described as similar to Iron Dome, while Greece was reportedly considering Elbit Systems’ PULS rocket launchers.[12] During Mitsotakis’s March 2025 visit to Israel, the Israeli International Defense Cooperation Directorate brought defense-industry representatives together with the Greek delegation to discuss existing and prospective projects, research and development, and Israeli investment in Greek industry.[13]

On August 31, 2026, the countries signed the Achilles Shield air-defense agreement in Tel Aviv, valued at approximately €3 billion.[14][15] The integrated network combined Rafael’s David’s Sling and Spyder systems, Israel Aerospace Industries’ Barak MX, IAI ELTA MMR radars, and a command-and-control system.[15] Delivery was scheduled within 35 months, while Greek companies were assigned work valued at €700 million, including production supported by technology and knowledge transfer.[14][15]

Military cooperation also acquired a more structured trilateral dimension.[16] In December 2025, the Israeli military announced a cooperation work plan with Greece and Cyprus covering exercises, training, working groups, and strategic military dialogue; separate bilateral work plans for 2026 were also signed in Cyprus.[16]

Discussions about exporting Israeli natural gas through Greece followed Netanyahu’s August 2010 meeting with Papandreou, at which he proposed supplying Greece with Israeli gas.[17] Greece then obtained about 70 percent of its gas from Russia and the remainder from Algeria and Qatar, giving diversification a practical appeal.[17] A direct pipeline was considered technically complex and was estimated in 2011 to cost at least $6 billion.[17]

The relationship also encompassed environmental technologies and water management.[3] In March 2012, ministers Uzi Landau and George Papaconstantinou signed an environmental agreement covering sewage treatment and reuse, desalination, biogas and biomass production, water management, and energy efficiency.[3] A separate memorandum addressed a proposed electricity cable linking Israel, Cyprus, and Greece to provide reciprocal backup and improve energy security.[3]

In August 2013, the three countries’ energy ministers signed a memorandum in Nicosia that included plans for an electricity cable between Israel and Cyprus, continuing to Crete, and cooperation to protect important Mediterranean infrastructure near natural-gas fields.[18] Water cooperation included sewage treatment and wastewater reuse.[18] Israeli companies had participated in three of Cyprus’s four permanent desalination plants, illustrating the Israeli technological contribution to this regional agenda.[18]

The proposed EastMed pipeline envisaged transporting gas from offshore Israel through Cyprus and Crete to Greece and onward to Italy.[2] Technical discussions continued in 2016 alongside consideration of renewable energy, alternative fuels, natural gas for public transport, and electricity connections.[19] The contemplated pipeline to Greece would extend at least 1,100 kilometers through waters reaching depths of 3,000 meters, while Greece’s own annual gas consumption was then about 2.7 billion cubic meters.[19]

The electricity proposal similarly faced difficult economics.[19] A route considered in 2016 would run from Hadera to Vasilikos in Cyprus and then to Crete and Athens, but had not advanced since the 2012 memorandum.[19] By 2019, the proposed EuroAsia Interconnector was described as a 1,518-kilometer bidirectional undersea cable connecting Israel and Cyprus with Crete and mainland Greece, and it had received European Union designation as a Project of Common Interest.[2]

Energy cooperation gained a regular American dimension in 2019.[20] At a ministerial meeting in Athens, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the United States agreed to establish a high-level working group to identify projects and ways to advance them.[20] Their agenda covered infrastructure, renewables, storage, emergency preparedness, environmental protection, and cybersecurity.[20] They also supported an Eastern Mediterranean energy corridor and supply diversification.[20]

The same ministerial statement reaffirmed support for EastMed and recorded that its intergovernmental agreement had been finalized by Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Italy in December 2018 and approved by the European Commission in February 2019.[20] The ministers called the proposed pipeline “a project of major significance for the energy security of the European Union” and a strategic link between Europe and Israel.[20] The United States withdrew support in 2022, citing economic and environmental concerns and Turkish opposition.[3] Separately, the European Union earmarked $736 million in January 2022 for the proposed EuroAsia electricity interconnection.[3]

Greece and Israel signed a further energy-cooperation agreement in December 2024, and Israel expressed interest in the Great Sea Interconnector linking Israel, Cyprus, and Greece.[12] At the November 6, 2025, 3+1 energy ministerial in Athens, the four governments reaffirmed cooperation on energy security, interconnectivity, infrastructure protection, and supply diversification, and aimed to meet again in Washington in the second quarter of 2026.[21] The December 2025 trilateral declaration endorsed natural-gas development, electricity interconnectors, renewables, the Great Sea Interconnector, and connectivity associated with the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor.[22]

Bilateral trade expanded from $412 million in 2010 to $610 million in 2017, and the Israel-Greece Chamber of Commerce was launched in March 2018.[2] A later series of Israeli statistics showed exports to Greece increasing from $442.6 million in 2019 to $670.3 million in 2022, while imports from Greece rose from $321.2 million to $587 million.[23] The chamber promoted trade, investment, and research and development, and established a high-tech forum to encourage business partnerships.[23]

Trade increased by a reported 41.3 percent in 2024, from approximately $920 million to $1.3 billion.[12] Israeli exports to Greece totaled $353.4 million and included chemicals, basic metals, plastics, and electrical machinery; Greek exports to Israel totaled $902.8 million and included basic metals, electrical machinery, and chemicals.[12] An Israeli trade delegation visited Greece on January 22, 2025, seeking further expansion, partly to offset the effects of severed Israeli-Turkish trade ties.[3] An estimate that bilateral trade could reach about $4 billion was a projection rather than an achieved total.[3]

Tourism grew particularly rapidly during the 2010s.[2] Israeli visitors to Greece increased from 150,000 in 2010 to 600,000 in 2018, with 700,000 forecast for 2019.[2] Regular Tel Aviv–Salonica flights became one visible sign of rapprochement, while Thessaloniki mayor Yiannis Boutaris promoted Jewish and Muslim heritage tourism and stronger connections with Israel and Turkey.[5]

Educational ties developed through a separate October 2013 memorandum providing for maritime studies, student and pupil exchanges, cooperation between higher-education institutions, and a joint committee.[3] The 2016 trilateral framework broadened the shared agenda to include research, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, emergency response, agriculture, tourism, culture, education, and migration.[3] In December 2025, the three governments committed to deepen cultural, academic, and educational exchanges, accelerate environmental-education and youth-exchange agreements, and enhance diaspora cooperation.[22]

The relationship also included practical assistance and gestures of solidarity.[11] In 2016, Israel thanked Greece and Cyprus for sending firefighting aircraft during widespread fires that November.[24] Joint air and naval activity had expanded, Greece permitted an Israeli military overflight in 2014, and an Israeli military attaché was stationed in Athens from that year.[24] In March 2025, Greece’s embassy held its national-day celebration in the dining room of Kibbutz Be’eri as a gesture of solidarity.[11]

A 2019 commentary linked closer relations to increased official condemnation of vandalism against Jewish monuments, interpreting the change as reflecting both stronger commitments against antisemitism and the practical influence of ties with Israel.[25] The same commentary described cooperation in cybersecurity and satellite technology alongside military training and growing tourism.[25]

The Greece-Cyprus-Israel trilateral track developed from 2012, with the first heads-of-state-level summit held in January 2016.[2] At a December 2018 summit, the leaders agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Nicosia, with operations planned to begin in July 2019.[2] The framework connected bilateral relationships to an ongoing regional process rather than relying only on occasional exchanges of visits.[2]

At the March 2019 summit in Jerusalem, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the United States affirmed commitments to Eastern Mediterranean peace, stability, security, and prosperity.[4] Their 3+1 format supported the trilateral mechanism, with priorities including regional cooperation and energy independence and security.[4] On May 9, 2022, the four foreign ministers agreed to intensify cooperation in energy, the economy, climate action, emergency preparedness, and counterterrorism, and to develop a roadmap with deliverables for the following year.[26] They also supported regional initiatives including the Negev Summit.[26]

A bill introduced in the United States House of Representatives on March 31, 2025, proposed expanding counterterrorism and maritime-security training and cooperation through the 3+1 framework.[27] Its recorded status was introduced, with referral to the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services committees; its provisions were proposals, not enacted law.[27]

The December 22, 2025, Jerusalem meeting was the tenth trilateral summit since 2016 and the first since the October 7, 2023, events.[28] By that point, the three countries had conducted at least 28 joint military exercises since 2014, involving air, naval, and ground forces, sometimes alongside other countries.[28] The summit declaration committed the governments to annual leaders’ meetings and more frequent ministerial and working-level contacts, alongside stronger defense, counterterrorism, maritime, emergency-response, and critical-infrastructure cooperation.[22]

The partnership remained distinct from a formal alliance.[28] Greece’s NATO and European Union membership, Cyprus’s EU membership, and Israel’s preference for independent decision-making limited the likelihood of such an arrangement.[28] A reported proposal for a 2,500-person rapid-response force was denied by the Israeli side.[28]

Greece’s response to Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terrorist attack combined condemnation and support for Israel with subsequent criticism of aspects of the war in Gaza.[1] Mitsotakis visited Israel and affirmed its right to self-defense in accordance with international law, while later calling for a ceasefire and expressing concern about Gaza’s humanitarian situation and Israeli military conduct.[1] Practical cooperation continued: Athens International Airport served as a hub for Israeli airlines when other carriers suspended services, helping Israelis stranded abroad return home.[1]

Differences became visible in international voting and domestic labor action.[1] Greece supported the September 18, 2024, United Nations General Assembly resolution calling on Israel to end its unlawful presence in Palestinian territory, while Greek dockworkers blocked ammunition cargo destined for Israel in June and October 2024.[1] Greece also backed two December 12 resolutions addressing a Gaza ceasefire, hostage releases, and support for UNRWA, and abstained on a December 19, 2024, vote concerning an International Court of Justice advisory opinion.[12] Israel expressed disappointment over the September vote but avoided turning the disagreement into a diplomatic crisis.[1]

High-level contacts nevertheless continued, including Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis’s February 2025 visit to Jerusalem and Mitsotakis’s March 30 meetings with President Isaac Herzog and Netanyahu.[11][12] The December 2025 trilateral declaration acknowledged Greek and Cypriot contributions to humanitarian efforts in Gaza, including the Amalthea maritime corridor, called for assistance to reach civilians through coordinated channels, and reiterated Israel’s right to self-defense under international law.[29]