Cyprus–Israel Military Relations

Cyprus–Israel military relations encompass a layered set of arrangements: bilateral defense agreements, recurring joint exercises on land and at sea, counterterrorism cooperation, mutual emergency-assistance commitments, and government-to-government arms sales. The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) explicitly states that these ties "have never constituted a military alliance," describing Israel's interest in a "friendly Cyprus" primarily as part of emergency planning rather than a binding defense commitment.[1] A senior Israeli official who accompanied Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Nicosia in February 2012 reinforced that point, stating: "You are required to defend your sovereign territory; elsewhere, if you have no military alliance, you are not required to defend. We have interests, but no obligations."[2]

Despite that formal limitation, the practical depth of cooperation has grown considerably. Joint exercises have involved hundreds of soldiers, elite commando units, naval forces, and air forces from both countries. The January 2012 agreements covered defense cooperation and the protection and exchange of classified information, while reporting on a separate February agreement described Israeli aircraft and naval access in connection with offshore energy protection and emergencies.[3][4] Cyprus's mountainous, urban, and open terrain has made the island a valued training environment for Israeli forces preparing for operations in unfamiliar geography.[5] The relationship also has a multilateral dimension: since 2016, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus have held regular summits and joint exercises, with the United States codifying its support for trilateral military cooperation in statute in 2019.[6]

As early as 1998, Cyprus–Israel relations were characterized as cordial by U.S. analysts, though those years were also marked by tension arising from Israeli military cooperation with Turkey. A Congressional Research Service report from that year described Cypriot officials making "friendly representations" to Israel over alleged Israeli airspace violations and accepting Israel's explanation that they were unintentional.[7] More serious allegations circulating in parts of the Cypriot media at the time — including claims that Israeli aircraft might gather intelligence for Turkey over Cyprus or assist Turkish operations against Cyprus's Russian-supplied S-300 missiles — were not presented as verified facts, and Israel denied any such role.[7]

The decisive turning point came after 2010, when Israel's relations with Turkey deteriorated sharply. The INSS describes the subsequent period as one in which relations with Cyprus and Greece "thrived."[1] In January 2012, during Cypriot Defense Minister Demetris Eliades's official visit to Israel, the two countries signed two formal agreements: one on defense cooperation and another on the protection and exchange of classified information.[3] Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said the countries shared values; Eliades linked the relationship to natural-gas discoveries in the two countries' exclusive economic zones.[3]

The following month, in February 2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Cypriot President Demetris Christofias signed an agreement in Nicosia that, according to reporting, allowed Israeli aircraft and naval vessels to use Cypriot airspace and territorial waters to protect offshore gas installations and to access Cypriot military facilities in emergencies such as fires or earthquakes.[4] Netanyahu characterized the desired cooperation as being conducted "in peaceful ways."[4] The same Israeli senior official noted that the agreements created no obligation for Israel to defend Cyprus or even Israeli economic interests there, framing closer ties as part of a broader Western-oriented regional coalition.[2]

The Israel–Greece–Cyprus framework was formally inaugurated in January 2016. The three countries agreed to hold biannual summit meetings addressing defense in peacetime and emergencies, as well as internal security.[8] On March 3, 2016, Cypriot, Greek, and Israeli representatives signed a broader cooperation agreement establishing a basis for regular annual meetings and listing topics for discussion that included cybersecurity, counterterrorism, joint emergency response to natural disasters, exchange of information in emergencies, and energy and technology cooperation.[9] These arrangements created a cooperation framework rather than a formal defense pact.

An INSS analysis describes the framework's security scope as covering maritime threats, joint training and exercises, and counterterrorism, with exercises sometimes including forces from the United States and other European countries.[8] The analysis presents possible wartime use of Greek and Cypriot airports and seaports as strategic depth that Israel might consider, rather than as an established basing arrangement.[8]

U.S. support for the framework was codified in the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019, which set out U.S. policy to support joint military exercises among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus and recorded that the three countries had participated in trilateral summits addressing energy and security, including a summit on March 20, 2019.[6] In November 2020, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz met in Nicosia with his Greek and Cypriot counterparts and announced an agreement to step up military cooperation, emphasizing joint training, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, and defense-industry cooperation — the latter described as a way to strengthen capabilities and create jobs.[10]

At the 10th Israel–Greece–Cyprus Trilateral Summit, held in Jerusalem on December 22, 2025, the three leaders signed a joint declaration committing to "reinforce our ongoing trilateral cooperation on security, defense, and military matters" and reaffirmed their commitment to combating terrorism.[11] The declaration pledged to deepen cooperation on maritime security and protecting sea lanes and critical infrastructure, and welcomed a Maritime Cybersecurity Center of Excellence in Cyprus, with inauguration planned for 2026.[12] A separate trilateral military-cooperation work plan for 2026 was signed during the countries' annual meeting of military leaders, while bilateral 2026 plans between the IDF and the Greek and Cypriot armed forces had also been signed in Cyprus.[13] The plans encompass joint exercises and training, working groups in multiple fields, and strategic military dialogue on shared security interests.[13]

Greek media reported around the same time that officials were discussing a joint rapid-reaction force comprising 1,000 troops each from Israel and Greece and 500 from Cyprus, intended to protect critical Mediterranean infrastructure; that force was described as under discussion rather than as an agreed or established arrangement.[11]

Joint land and special-forces exercises have been a defining feature of Cyprus–Israel military cooperation since at least 2014, when Cyprus's ambassador to Israel stated that bilateral military exercises began. The ambassador, speaking in 2024, noted that exercises had continued through at least May 2023, and described the 2023 exercise as involving the largest deployment of Israeli soldiers abroad that year.[14]

The Onisilos-Gideon air exercises were upgraded in 2014, when dozens of Israeli Air Force fighters and support aircraft trained over Cyprus, simulating firing at targets on land and at sea between Limassol and Paphos.[15] In 2018, Israeli Maglan commandos trained in Cyprus alongside Cypriot units, with Israeli Air Force personnel also present; the exercise included counterterrorism scenarios, urban and open-terrain combat, and activities conducted jointly with Cypriot units. A Cypriot military official said Cypriot commandos were learning from Israeli units, particularly in urban warfare.[16]

The most extensively documented early exercise took place in 2017, when approximately 500 Israeli Commando Brigade soldiers — including Egoz Unit personnel, dog-handling teams, and combat engineers — deployed to Cyprus alongside some 200 Israeli Air Force personnel.[5] About 100 special-forces fighters from the Cypriot National Guard also took part.[5] Israeli forces flew from Nevatim Air Base in C-130J Super Hercules aircraft, joined Black Hawk helicopters already in Cyprus, and trained in the Troodos Mountains in disciplines that included incursions, land and urban warfare, rocket-launch-area seizures, and tunnel warfare.[5] The Cypriot Air Force deployed anti-aircraft systems to simulate a threat to Israeli helicopters.[5] The Egoz commander described the exercise: "We landed deep in enemy territory and received our mission on the plane on the way to the destination. We had a range of enemy scenarios and many different type of terrain for fighting."[5] The exercise was the Commando Brigade's first unit-wide exercise abroad; an Israeli officer noted that planning had taken about six months and characterized the scenarios as generic rather than directed at a specific enemy.[17]

In December 2019, IDF Commando Brigade units — including Egoz, Maglan, and Duvdevan — participated in a week-long Cyprus exercise named "Game of Thrones," alongside Cypriot troops and Israeli Air Force units.[18] The IDF described the exercise as using unfamiliar terrain to simulate combat in the northern arena, a reference to Lebanon and Syria, with activities that included mountain raids, attacks on infrastructure, air support, resupply, helicopter refueling, pilot rescue, and casualty evacuation.[18] The IDF characterized it as the military's fourth exercise in Cyprus in three years following the defense cooperation agreement.[18]

In May 2022, the IDF conducted the large-scale exercise "Beyond the Horizon" (also called Agapinor-2022) in Cyprus as part of its month-long Chariots of Fire training cycle.[19] The exercise was reported as the IDF's first exercise of that scale outside Israel, involving thousands of troops — including forces from Division 98, Shayetet 13, and Unit 669 — along with more than 50 ships, landing craft, aircraft, and helicopters.[20] Naval commandos, combat engineers, canine-unit troops, intelligence personnel, and Cyber Defense Directorate troops participated, alongside the Cypriot National Guard.[19] Defense Minister Benny Gantz described the Cyprus drills as among the IDF's largest and most expansive exercises in recent years.[19] The exercise practiced sending forces deep into simulated enemy territory, with Lebanon and a possible conflict with Hezbollah as the operational reference.[20]

A June 2024 Globes report described an exercise with the same "Beyond the Horizon" name as having taken place in Cyprus in May 2023, with the Cypriot military participating; the available reports do not clarify its relationship to the May 2022 exercise.[21] The reported 2023 exercise, led by the IDF Ground Forces Training Center, practiced missions deep in enemy territory, unfamiliar terrain, dispersed operations, emergency conditions, and surprise events. Participants included regular and reserve forces from the Fire Formation, Air Force squadrons, naval and ground special forces, and personnel from the Intelligence and C4I and Cyber Defense directorates.[21] A May 2023 air exercise called "Jason-Blue Sun" also took place, involving personnel from the Cypriot National Guard air force command and the Israeli Air Force.[22] In May 2019, the air forces of Cyprus and Israel had conducted a separate joint exercise in the area of Nicosia, and a large-scale joint exercise involving infantry and air forces was also held in Cyprus that month.[23][8]

Maritime cooperation has developed in parallel with land exercises. The Israel Navy has held multiple joint exercises with the Cypriot Navy, and Cyprus joined the Israeli-led Noble Dina multinational naval exercise.[5]

In July 2015, a five-day multinational naval exercise off Cyprus brought together Israeli, Cypriot, Greek, and U.S. forces around a scenario in which terrorists seized an offshore gas platform.[24] Israeli missile boats and patrol craft practiced maritime search and rescue and coordination through a joint rescue coordination center; a Greek helicopter participated in evacuating a simulated casualty.[24] The exercise tested coordination among participating forces in unfamiliar waters and around a simulated threat to offshore energy infrastructure.[24]

Noble Dina — an annual exercise traditionally including Israel, Greece, and the United States — expanded its participant roster significantly in the years that followed. In March 2021, Cyprus participated in Noble Dina for the first time, joining France, which was also a first-time participant, in waters west of Cyprus.[25] Israel contributed a submarine and the missile boat INS Romach; Greece contributed a frigate, a fast-attack missile craft, a Type 214 submarine, a helicopter, and a P-3B maritime patrol aircraft.[25] The exercise trained maritime situational awareness, counterterrorism, port defense, anti-submarine and surface warfare, and search and rescue.[25]

In 2012, Noble Dina was planned to continue off Cyprus's southern coast after activity near the Greek island of Mais, with the Greek and Israeli air forces training to simulate repelling attacks on offshore natural-gas and oil installations; the source identifies Cyprus as a planned exercise area but does not establish that Cypriot forces participated in that iteration.[9]

The 2022 Noble Dina exercise took place near Cyprus and involved Israel, Cyprus, Greece, France, and the United States. Participating fleets practiced naval defense, anti-submarine procedures, search and rescue, and medical aid at sea, addressing both naval and aerial threats; Cyprus's Defense Ministry said the drill fostered interoperability.[26] In March 2023, the Israeli Navy led a two-week Noble Dina exercise involving Cyprus, Greece, Italy, the United States, and France, using surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft, as well as Israeli Air Force fighter jets and helicopters.[27] Activities included anti-submarine and joint naval combat, responding to air and sea threats, search and rescue, mass-casualty response, and joint refueling; the IDF stated the goals included improving interoperability and strengthening deterrence.[27]

Alongside military exercises, Israel and Cyprus signed an agreement to assist one another in emergencies.[5] The practical dimensions of that arrangement became visible in two major wildfire incidents. When the 2010 Carmel fire devastated forested areas of northern Israel, Cyprus dispatched firefighting aircraft to assist in the response.[5] Six years later, when the 2016 Paphos fire struck Cyprus, Israel sent three firefighting aircraft and an IDF transport aircraft to Cyprus in return.[5]

The U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism for both 2021 and 2022 list Israel among the partners with which Cyprus participated in regional and multinational counterterrorism exercises, alongside Egypt, Greece, Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the 2022 list also includes France.[28][29] The 2022 report additionally notes that Cyprus took part in a U.S.-facilitated, National Counterterrorism Center-led exercise focused on readiness for a mass-casualty terrorist incident, though it does not identify Israel as a participant in that particular event.[29]

Defense cooperation has increasingly extended to the transfer of Israeli-made equipment to Cyprus. In June 2022, the head of Israel's Defense Ministry International Defense Cooperation Directorate signed government-to-government agreements with Cyprus that included the sale of personal protective and tactical equipment — specifically, protective and carrying systems and load-bearing and weight-distribution systems manufactured by the Israeli company Marom Dolphin — to the Cyprus National Guard.[21][30] Cyprus's Defense Minister Charalambos Petrides described defense cooperation as expanding and the partnership as long-term and strategic.[30]

The most prominent reported equipment transfer to emerge from the relationship has been Cyprus's acquisition of Israel Aerospace Industries' Barak MX integrated air-defense system. Purchase discussions reportedly began in 2021.[31] A government-to-government deal with Cyprus's Ministry of Defense was reported as having been signed in 2021.[32] Cyprus first imported Barak MX missiles in December 2024, and the systems were reported fully operational by March 2025, with further imports continuing in October 2025; the source does not specify the total number of systems or their locations.[33] Once all systems under the agreement were deployed, Cyprus's air-defense network was reported to have a range of approximately 150 kilometers.[32] The system is described as capable of intercepting missiles, drones, and aircraft at ranges up to 93 miles, or roughly 150 kilometers.[34] Reporting attributed the shift away from Russian equipment partly to shortages of spare parts following EU sanctions after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[31]

A Washington Institute analysis reported that a tentative 2022 agreement for Cyprus to purchase Israeli Iron Dome systems had been discussed, but it was unclear whether or when delivery would occur.[35] The Jerusalem Post likewise attributed the reported deal to Cypriot media and noted that Israel's Defense Ministry did not respond to an inquiry.[30]

Cyprus's reported procurement of the Barak MX system drew a sharp reaction from Turkey. In September 2025, a Turkish defense official threatened "dangerous consequences" and claimed the procurement undermined the island's "peace and stability."[34] Cypriot Defense Minister Vassilis Palmas rejected the criticism directly: "Cyprus is a peaceful, democratic country which has been under occupation for 51 years. As long as there is an occupation and no political solution, we have the self-evident duty and obligation to ensure the defenses of the Republic of Cyprus."[34]

Reporting on the Barak MX delivery and deployment was attributed largely to Cypriot media and to the military-news website Army Recognition rather than to official Israeli or Cypriot government confirmation.[36][32] Cyprus's president said the country was strengthening its deterrence capabilities but did not confirm the specific procurement in quoted remarks.[31] The FDD linked the buildup to a longer-term security partnership between Cyprus and Israel but did not establish that a specific threat caused the procurement decision.[33]

The accumulating record of exercises, agreements, and arms transfers presents a relationship of real and growing depth. Following the 2016 meeting in Nicosia between Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman and Cypriot officials, Cyprus Defense Minister Christoforos Fokaides described the military-cooperation agenda as covering joint exercises, training, information sharing, cyber defense, and search and rescue, while Liberman described the relationship as exceptionally close.[37] The INSS and other analysts frame Cyprus as offering Israel strategic value in the form of additional training space, unfamiliar terrain, and proximity to areas of potential operational concern.[1][5]

At the same time, the cooperation has defined limits. The INSS is unambiguous that the ties do not constitute a military alliance.[1] The senior Israeli official's 2012 statement — that Israel has interests but not obligations toward Cyprus — illustrates an early official framing of the relationship's strategic character.[2] In June 2024, when Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah claimed that Cyprus was permitting Israel to use its airports or bases for military purposes, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides rejected the claim, stating that it did not reflect reality and that Cyprus would not allow any state to conduct military operations from the island.[38] The Cypriot government distinguished between the access it had previously granted Israel for airspace use during exercises and training — which it confirmed had occurred — and wartime operational use, which it rejected.[38]

The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs describes Nasrallah as fearing that Israel might use Cypriot bases in a conflict with Lebanon, and records his warning that opening Cypriot airports or bases to Israel for attacks on Lebanon would make Cyprus a party to the war.[22] Hezbollah officials separately told the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar that intelligence delegations from Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had met in Cyprus to coordinate military cooperation against Hezbollah and Iran; this claim was attributed to Hezbollah officials and was not independently verified.[22] Cyprus's public position, reiterated by its government in 2024, is that the country would not participate in the conflict and would not allow its territory to be used for military operations by any party.[38]

Several aspects of Cyprus–Israel military relations have been contested or remained ambiguous in public reporting. One report on the February 2012 agreement described Israeli aircraft and naval vessels as being permitted to operate in Cypriot airspace and territorial waters to protect offshore gas installations.[4] A separate Israeli official clarified that the agreements created no obligation for Israel to defend Cyprus or Israeli economic interests there.[2] These are distinct claims about access and obligation, respectively.

The scope of the trilateral Israel–Greece–Cyprus framework has also been characterized in different ways. The INSS explicitly rejects the characterization of bilateral Israel–Cyprus ties as a military alliance, while its analysis of the trilateral framework describes extensive cooperation without establishing mutual-defense commitments.[1][8] The December 2025 joint declaration committed the three countries to reinforce ongoing cooperation on security, defense, and military matters, but did not set out specific operational commitments.[12]

The reported discussions in late 2025 of a joint rapid-reaction force of approximately 2,500 troops were attributed to Greek media reporting on discussions among officials; the force had not been established or formally agreed as of the reporting date.[11] Reports that Cyprus received or deployed Barak MX batteries rested on Cypriot television and outside monitoring sources rather than official confirmation from Israel or Cyprus.[32][36] The 1998 allegations about Israeli intelligence-gathering over Cyprus and possible assistance to Turkish military operations were attributed by the Congressional Research Service to some Cypriot media at the time; Israel denied the allegations, and the CRS did not present them as verified.[7]