01In brief
The Great Sea Interconnector is a planned undersea electricity connection linking the power grids of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece through Cyprus and Crete. Its proposed Israel–Cyprus segment would extend about 330 kilometers, reach depths of up to 2,300 meters, and transmit as much as 2,000 megawatts in either direction. The project is intended to provide emergency electricity supplies, reduce energy isolation, and strengthen regional energy cooperation. Its development has involved successive diplomatic agreements, technical studies, and financing negotiations; in August 2026, Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure envisaged electricity transmission by 2034.
02Overview
Emergency backup and access to interconnected electricity systems are central purposes of the proposed link between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece.[1] Israel and Cyprus have been described as energy-isolated systems, and the interconnector would allow electricity to move between participating countries when domestic generation could not meet demand.[1] The planned route connects Israel to Cyprus and continues toward Crete and the Greek electricity system, providing a connection with the European grid.[1]
The project also forms part of broader efforts to integrate renewable electricity and strengthen energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean.[3] Interconnections can allow regions with abundant wind or solar production to export electricity during periods of high output and import it when additional supply is needed to stabilize their grids.[3] In October 2024, Cyprus and the United States identified electricity interconnections, including the Great Sea Interconnector, as instruments for ending the Republic of Cyprus’s energy isolation.[4]
Development has proceeded through agreements, route studies, cable manufacturing, and separate discussions about the financing of different sections.[5][2] In August 2026, the Israel–Cyprus section remained in a cost-benefit analysis phase, with Israel’s contribution still to be negotiated.[2] The same month, the project development company had acquired a new principal shareholder, while completion of seabed surveys remained an immediate priority.[2]
03Origins and History
The 2011 explosion at Cyprus’s Mari power plant highlighted the importance of having alternative electricity connections available after a serious domestic failure.[1] In November that year, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece agreed to establish a tripartite electricity-sector working group.[1] A further framework agreement signed in August 2013 provided for linking the three countries’ electrical grids.[6]
Earlier development took place under the EuroAsia Interconnector name.[1][7] By 2019, plans described Cyprus as the project’s base and hub, with European Union financial support for an undersea cable connecting Israel, Cyprus, and Greece to the EU grid.[8] The Great Sea Interconnector was subsequently described as having previously been known as the EuroAsia Interconnector.[1]
In March 2021, Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz, Cypriot Energy Minister Natasa Pilides, and Greek Energy Minister Kostas Skrekas signed a memorandum of understanding in Nicosia concerning EuroAsia.[9] The memorandum committed the ministers to cooperate in coordinating, developing, and implementing the project; it did not announce an operating connection.[9] Steinitz identified emergency supplies from European grids and greater reliance on solar power as potential benefits for Israel.[9]
Technical descriptions accompanying the 2021 agreement envisaged a capacity of 1,000–2,000 megawatts and a maximum depth of approximately 2,700 meters.[10] One contemporary route description divided the connection into approximately 310 kilometers between Israel and Cyprus, 900 kilometers between Cyprus and Crete, and another 310 kilometers between Crete and Attica.[9] That account gave an overall length of about 1,500 kilometers and anticipated completion by 2024.[9]
An inauguration event for the EuroAsia Interconnector took place on October 14, 2022.[11] Plans associated with that event identified Cyprus–Crete as the first construction section and described the interconnector as an EU Project of Common Interest.[11] The project description gave a length exceeding 1,200 kilometers, a maximum capability of 2,000 megawatts, and a depth approaching 10,000 feet.[11]
The electricity connection also gained prominence as the three countries shifted attention away from the EastMed natural-gas pipeline.[12][13] In 2022, the United States withdrew its endorsement of that pipeline, citing economic feasibility and environmental concerns as well as Turkish opposition.[13] The three countries subsequently focused on the undersea electricity cable then called EuroAsia.[13] An account of the shift recorded an EU allocation of $736 million in January 2022 for the proposed 2,000-megawatt electricity connection.[12]
A 2022 project estimate placed the cost at approximately €1.6 billion and EU-approved funding at €757 million.[14] At that stage, the plan envisaged an initial capacity of 1,000 megawatts, expandable to 2,000 megawatts, with construction scheduled to begin in 2022, finish in 2027, and enter operation in the first half of 2028.[14] Another project description projected completion of the entire grid connection in 2027 and recorded €657 million earmarked by the EU for construction.[11]
In 2023, the EuroAsia project announced a €1.43 billion submarine-cable contract with French manufacturer Nexans.[15] The announced design was a 525-kilovolt high-voltage direct-current connection extending 1,208 kilometers and reaching depths greater than 3,000 meters, linking Israel and Cyprus with mainland Greece through Crete.[15] Nexans was to manufacture cable at Halden in Norway and Futtsu in Japan, and completion was then expected in 2029.[15]
Israeli and Cypriot energy ministers agreed in March 2024 to give the Great Sea Interconnector high priority.[16] During a visit to Israel, a Cypriot delegation toured the Reading power station as a possible connection site, which would bring electricity directly to the Greater Tel Aviv demand center.[16] Israel’s energy minister emphasized the potential for emergency electricity imports from Europe and a contribution to energy independence; natural-gas infrastructure was discussed separately from the cable.[16]
By July 2024, Cyprus was considering a €100 million government allocation, subject to examination of the project, analysis of economic data, and Ministry of Finance approval.[1] Greece was pressing Cyprus to accelerate approval, while Nexans had secured the cable-laying contract and was reported to have made an initial €55 million payment.[1] A construction period beginning in 2026 and ending in 2029 was envisaged if the project received approval.[1]
In February 2025, Israeli government work teams were conducting a cost-benefit analysis and synchronizing transmission models.[17] The government considered a grant for the Israel–Cyprus section imperative to advancing that segment.[17] By April, Greece’s Independent Power Transmission Operator said that 160 kilometers of cable had been manufactured, although cable laying had not begun because marine surveys were still determining the route between Crete and Cyprus.[5] Technical and regulatory preparations for the Cyprus–Israel section were also advancing.[5]
In December 2025, a senior Greek official said the three countries aimed to begin laying subsea cables in 2026, with financing still unresolved.[18] The official expected the shorter Israel–Cyprus section to finish before the Cyprus–Crete section.[18] Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure described the Greece–Cyprus section as being in the construction stage while conditions for the Israel–Cyprus section were still being formulated, and said schedules would depend on progress and agreed terms.[18]
At a December 5, 2025 event, Greek Environment and Energy Minister Stavros Papastavrou said technical and economic surveys had been conducted and project figures were being updated to attract additional partners.[19] He identified interest from potential partners in the United States and Middle East and from private funds, without announcing that those parties had joined.[19] Asked whether the project was back, he replied, “It’s alive and kicking.”[19]
The December 22, 2025 trilateral summit in Jerusalem produced an explicit renewed commitment from Benjamin Netanyahu, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and Nikos Christodoulides.[20] Their joint declaration expressed “strong commitment to the Great Sea Interconnector project” and agreement to work together to advance it.[20] Discussions also considered a possible connection with the planned India–Middle East–Europe Corridor, or IMEC.[21]
04Practice and Application
The proposed Israel–Cyprus segment is designed for two-way transmission of up to 2,000 megawatts over approximately 330 kilometers, at depths reaching about 2,300 meters.[1] A separate Cyprus–Crete section is approximately 900 kilometers long.[1] Later descriptions put the route from Crete through Cyprus to Israel at about 1,200 kilometers, while an April 2025 account gave a Greece-to-Israel length of 1,208 kilometers.[2][5]
The 2023 high-voltage direct-current design envisaged an eventual transfer capability sufficient to supply more than three million homes.[15] Its 525-kilovolt specification, deep-water route, and manufacture at two specialized Nexans facilities formed part of the announced cable contract.[15] Papastavrou subsequently described the undertaking as technologically difficult, while emphasizing that technical and economic surveys had already been conducted.[19]
Financing arrangements have distinguished between the Cyprus–Greece connection and the Israel–Cyprus section.[22] For Cyprus–Crete, a July 2024 estimate placed the cost at €1.9 billion, with a promised EU grant of €657 million and the remaining expenditure divided 63% to Cyprus and 37% to Greece.[1] The larger Cypriot share was associated with the greater benefits expected for Cyprus.[1]
In April 2025, the project was estimated at €1.94 billion, with approximately €800 million in EU funding.[5] A May 2026 financing account again put investment in the Cyprus–Greece connection at €1.9 billion and identified an EU contribution of approximately 35%, or €657 million.[22] It allocated about €786 million to Cyprus and €460 million to Greece for that connection.[22]
The Israel–Cyprus section was still awaiting a cost-benefit analysis in May 2026, intended to inform subsequent cost-sharing discussions.[22] At that point, the EU was not expected to finance the section, and bank loans and private investment were anticipated as funding sources.[22] In August, Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure instead described a sequence in which the countries would complete the analysis, negotiate cost allocation, and apply for an EU grant.[2]
Israel’s contribution therefore remained unset in August 2026.[2] The ministry, Electricity Authority, and Noga were examining complementary aspects of the project, and the ministry’s stated schedule envisaged electricity transmission by 2034.[2] These preparations concerned the Israeli and Cypriot portions of the undertaking rather than an announcement that electricity could already be exchanged.[2]
French infrastructure investor Meridiam became a backer in 2026 and was identified in August as the principal shareholder in the development company.[23][2] Greece’s electricity transmission company ADMIE remained a strategic partner.[2] The development company and ADMIE also signed an agreement with Nexans intended to accelerate work, beginning with completion of seabed surveys.[2]
The overall cost remained under review in August 2026, above an earlier estimate of $2.2 billion, and a European Investment Bank report was expected to clarify it.[23] Under an existing agreement, Cypriot electricity consumers could be responsible for as much as 63% of construction costs.[23] Additional private investment was being sought to reduce that burden, further EU funding was under consideration, and the EU’s existing commitment was reported as €658 million, approximately $760 million.[23]
By October 2026, Meridiam was reported to have signed its majority-shareholder agreement during the summer.[24] Greece was also preparing to resume work, with the French survey vessel Abeille Marengo expected to conduct marine surveys.[25] The immediate operational emphasis therefore continued to include survey completion and preparation of the cable route.[2][25]
05Significance
For Israel, access to electricity from European grids during emergencies has been a stated objective since the March 2021 ministerial agreement.[9] The same agreement linked the interconnector with the possibility of increasing reliance on solar power.[9] In 2024, Israeli ministerial discussions again emphasized emergency backup and energy independence, while considering a landing connection serving Greater Tel Aviv.[16]
For Cyprus, the project addresses the goal of ending electricity isolation through regional connections.[4] An August 2026 account described Cyprus as the only EU country not connected to the European electricity grid, a circumstance cited in Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s strong support for the project.[2] In October, Cypriot Defense Minister Vasilis Palmas characterized the interconnector as strategically important for ending that isolation and strengthening energy security.[24]
Electricity exchange also connects the project to the clean-energy transition.[3] Wind and solar generation can create periods of high production in one area while another system needs imports, allowing an interconnector to serve both export opportunities and grid stabilization.[3] In October 2024, a U.S. official placed the Great Sea Interconnector alongside other regional proposals intended to strengthen energy-system connections and support the clean-energy transition, identifying Cyprus as Greece’s connection to its south and east.[26]
The project has become part of the institutional relationship among Israel, Cyprus, and Greece.[20] Their December 2025 declaration placed it alongside electricity interconnectors, natural-gas development, and renewable-energy initiatives, with cooperation grounded in international law, the law of the sea, and respect for states’ rights in their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.[20] The summit’s discussion of a possible IMEC connection also situated the cable within wider regional connectivity planning.[21]
A study published online in December 2025 included the Great Sea Interconnector among recent memoranda of understanding covering trade, energy, and entrepreneurship.[27] Informants discussing the Israel–Cyprus–Greece alliance cited energy projects such as the interconnector as part of its geopolitical dimension.[27] Their comments concerned the relationship’s political significance rather than a technical timetable or confirmation of completed infrastructure.[27]
U.S. engagement has included diplomatic statements and legislative proposals.[4][28] A Senate bill reported on July 27, 2026 identified the interconnector among Eastern Mediterranean projects important to European energy security and potentially critical to infrastructure connecting India, the Gulf, and Europe.[28] Its legislative history remained at the reported-to-Senate stage, so that characterization represented a proposed congressional policy position rather than enacted confirmation of the project’s delivery.[28]
In August 2026, U.S. lawmakers urged Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to support the interconnector.[2] The State Department also expressed support for Eastern Mediterranean energy security and cooperation, including through the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center.[2] In October, Palmas said Rubio had expressed support for the cable during a visit to Greece.[24]
06Controversies
Economic viability and the burden on Cyprus have generated significant disagreement.[1][29] Critics, mainly in Cyprus, have argued that cheaper or more practical alternatives exist and questioned expectations of Cypriot electricity exports, contending that electricity generated in Greece or Israel would generally be cheaper.[1] In December 2025, the Cypriot government appeared to be reconsidering viability, and Athens and Nicosia had openly disagreed in the preceding weeks.[29] These concerns accompanied changing cost estimates, grant figures, and schedules rather than a single settled budget or delivery date.[14][2]
Maritime jurisdiction along the route is disputed by Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus.[5][2] Turkish Defense Ministry officials argued in April 2025 that the project required Turkey’s consent because it would cross waters under Turkish jurisdiction claims, while Greece maintained that international law and its maritime-border agreement with Egypt supported its position and rejected the validity of Turkey’s agreement with Libya.[5] Turkey has also used its 2019 maritime agreement with Libya to assert a role in the interconnector’s development.[30]
Turkish warships reportedly impeded survey vessels near Kasos and Karpathos, while Greek officials said work would continue.[5] Further reporting in 2026 linked postponed cable work to Turkish threats and described competing Greek and Turkish NAVTEX notices south of Crete.[2][25] An October account also linked an earlier postponement involving the Italian vessel NG Worker to threats to cut cables and Athens’s wish to avoid military confrontation.[25] A University of Nicosia professor argued that implementation would require both a cost-benefit analysis and security guarantees concerning Turkey.[24]
A Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs commentary characterized Turkey as strongly opposed to deeper energy and security cooperation among the three partners and described their alliance as formalized in Jerusalem in December 2025.[31] The leaders’ joint declaration itself explicitly committed them to advancing the project in accordance with international law.[20]
Sources
- 1Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, The Great Sea Interconnector: Prospects for an Electrical Cable Connecting Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 2Globes, Israel-Cyprus-Greece power grid connection gets US backing, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 3U.S. Department of State, Energy and Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 4U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement on the First Strategic Dialogue Between the Republic of Cyprus and the United States of America, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 5Ynetnews, EU frustrated by Turkish warnings over Greece-Cyprus-Israel power cable, Cyprus says, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 6Center for Israel Education, Cyprus-Israel-Greece Trilateral Summit Declaration, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 7The Times of Israel, March 2021 Grid Agreement, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 8U.S. Department of State, Cyprus, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 9Calcalist, Memorandum of understanding signed to connect Israel to the European electricity grid, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 10Ynet, Israel signs memorandum with Greece and Cyprus to lay an undersea electricity cable—the longest and deepest in the world, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 11Jewish Virtual Library, The EuroAsia Interconnector, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 12Jewish Virtual Library, Israel International Relations: Greece-Israel Relations, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 13Jewish Virtual Library, Israel Science & Technology: Oil & Natural Gas, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 14The Times of Israel, 2022 Project Launch, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 15The Times of Israel, Nexans Cable Contract, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 16Globes, Israel advances connection of the electricity grid with Cyprus and Greece, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 17Government of Israel, February 2025 EU Association Council, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 18Globes, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus could find themselves in a confrontation with Turkey, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 19Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Papastavrou Event, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 20Government of Israel, December 2025 Trilateral Joint Declaration, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 21Institute for National Security Studies, An Intensifying Partnership Tested Over Time: The Greek–Cypriot–Israeli Summit, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 22Globes, Turkey obstructs Israel-Cyprus-Greece power grid connection, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 23The Times of Israel, August 2026 Investment and Costs, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 24Jewish News Syndicate, US supports landmark Israel-Cyprus-Greece electricity project, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 25Globes, The project that is angering Turkey and the Israeli connection, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 26U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the REPowerEU Diversification Workshop, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 27Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Investment in Cyprus, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 28Congress.gov, Senate Bill 4443, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 29Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Israel, Greece and Cyprus: In Search of New Synergies, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 30Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Eastern Libya’s Endorsement of Maritime Agreement With Turkey Undermines U.S. Allies in the Mediterranean, accessed on November 3, 2026.
- 31Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Is An Abraham Security Alliance Possible in the Middle East?, accessed on November 3, 2026.
IsraelPedia Question & Answers
What is the Great Sea Interconnector?
The Great Sea Interconnector is a planned undersea electricity connection linking the power grids of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece through Cyprus and Crete. It is intended to provide emergency electricity supplies, reduce energy isolation, and strengthen regional energy cooperation. The proposed Israel–Cyprus segment would extend about 330 kilometers and transmit as much as 2,000 megawatts in either direction.
How did the Great Sea Interconnector develop?
The project developed through successive agreements, studies, and financing discussions. Israel, Cyprus, and Greece agreed to establish an electricity-sector working group in 2011, and a 2013 framework agreement provided for linking their grids. The project was previously known as the EuroAsia Interconnector; in December 2025, the three countries renewed their commitment to advancing it.
How will the Great Sea Interconnector work?
The proposed Israel–Cyprus segment is designed to transmit electricity in either direction, with a capacity of up to 2,000 megawatts across approximately 330 kilometers and depths reaching about 2,300 meters. The route continues from Cyprus to Crete and the Greek electricity system, connecting to the European grid. The interconnector could allow countries to import electricity when domestic generation falls short and exchange renewable electricity when production is high.
What is the Great Sea Interconnector intended to achieve for Israel and Cyprus?
The Great Sea Interconnector is intended to give Israel and Cyprus access to electricity from interconnected systems during emergencies and help address their energy isolation. Israeli officials have also linked it to energy independence and the potential for greater reliance on solar power. For Cyprus, the project is described as a way to connect with the European electricity grid.
How is the Great Sea Interconnector being financed?
Financing differs between the Cyprus–Greece connection and the Israel–Cyprus section. For Cyprus–Crete, a May 2026 account put the investment at €1.9 billion, with an EU contribution of approximately 35%, or €657 million, and about €786 million allocated to Cyprus and €460 million to Greece. Israel’s contribution to its section remained unset in August 2026, while cost allocation and a possible EU grant were still under discussion.
Why is the Great Sea Interconnector controversial?
The project has faced disputes over economic viability, costs, and the share of expenses Cyprus may bear. Critics in Cyprus have questioned whether cheaper or more practical alternatives exist and whether electricity exports would be economical. Its maritime route is also disputed: Turkey has asserted jurisdictional claims, while Greece has defended its position under international law and its maritime-border agreement with Egypt.
When is the Great Sea Interconnector expected to transmit electricity?
In August 2026, Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure envisaged electricity transmission by 2034. The Israel–Cyprus section was still in a cost-benefit analysis phase, and Israel’s contribution had not been settled. The ministry said the countries would complete the analysis, negotiate cost allocation, and apply for an EU grant.