Palestine–Ukraine Relations

Ukraine’s engagement with Palestinian issues has included diplomatic proposals for a Middle East settlement, votes on Palestinian participation in international institutions, and support for refugee assistance.[7][1][4] Its recorded positions have differed by issue: Ukraine supported the December 2023 resolution on assistance to Palestine refugees but abstained on the May 2024 resolution expanding Palestinian participation rights at the United Nations.[4][5]

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought Palestinian relations with Moscow into the foreground.[6] In March 2022, the Palestinian Authority had not publicly condemned Russia or expressed public solidarity with Ukraine, while Palestinian officials emphasized non-intervention and the needs of Palestinians living in the country.[6][2][8] INSS contrasted that silence with the 144 countries that condemned the invasion at the United Nations General Assembly.[6]

On 29 November 1947, the Ukrainian SSR voted in favor of General Assembly resolution 181(II), concerning the future government of Palestine; the resolution passed with 33 votes in favor, 13 against, and 10 abstentions.[9] That vote belonged to the Ukrainian SSR, rather than independent Ukraine.[9] A later account places Ukraine among the countries that recognized Palestine in November–December 1988, following Yasser Arafat’s declaration of Palestinian independence in Algiers.[10]

On 24 April 2002, Ukraine submitted a letter to the UN Secretary-General transmitting proposals for international diplomatic efforts toward a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict.[7] Ukraine’s president had announced the proposals during a visit to Jordan that day.[7]

In June 2011, senior Fatah member Nabil Shaath said, after meetings with Ukrainian officials, that they had announced recognition of a Palestinian state and supported the Palestinian Authority’s effort to secure UN recognition.[11] Ukraine subsequently abstained when UNESCO admitted Palestine as a full member on 31 October 2011; the vote was 107 in favor, 14 against, and 52 abstentions.[1]

Ukraine did not cast a vote on General Assembly resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012.[12] That resolution changed Palestine’s status from permanent observer to non-member observer state and passed with 138 votes in favor, nine against, and 41 abstentions.[13]

During the first days of Russia’s invasion in February 2022, the Palestinian Foreign Ministry urged Palestinians in Ukraine to leave and monitored expatriates and students through the Palestinian embassy.[2] The Palestinian envoy told official Palestine TV that about 2,500 Palestinians remained in the country.[2][3] In his account, Yoni Ben Menachem reported that most were students and that Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh said on 26 February that they were safe and that the embassy was addressing their needs.[3]

Through early March 2022, Palestinian Authority officials had not taken a public position on the Ukraine crisis.[14] Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki described the authority as not intervening in the Russia–Ukraine conflict and said Palestinians were being pressured to take a position.[8] Abbas sought to preserve relations with Russia, which the Palestinian leadership regarded as an ally, and wanted Moscow involved in mediation with Israel alongside the United States or within a multilateral framework.[6]

Ben Menachem reported that Hussein al-Sheikh, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, spoke with Russian deputy foreign minister and Middle East envoy Mikhail Bogdanov shortly before 3 March 2022.[3] His account identified Ukraine and the PLO Central Council’s resolutions of 8 February as topics of the call, while noting that al-Sheikh did not disclose the substance of the discussion about the invasion.[3] During Abbas’s 2024 visit to Moscow, he told Vladimir Putin that he stood with Moscow “without the slightest doubt.”[15]

In November 2022, Ukraine supported a General Assembly Fourth Committee resolution requesting an urgent International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s prolonged occupation, settlements, and annexation of Palestinian territory.[16][17] The committee approved it by 98 votes to 17, with 52 abstentions.[16] Ukraine did not cast a vote when the related resolution reached the General Assembly in December.[18][17] That ballot ended with 87 votes in favor, 26 against, and 53 abstentions.[18]

Ukraine abstained on an October 2023 General Assembly resolution calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza.[19] Drafted by Arab representatives led by Jordan, the resolution passed with 120 votes in favor, 14 against, and 45 abstentions.[19] Ukraine also abstained on a separate ceasefire resolution in December 2023, which received 153 votes in favor and 10 against, with 23 countries abstaining or absent.[20]

On 7 December 2023, Ukraine voted for resolution A/RES/78/74, “Assistance to Palestine refugees,” adopted with 168 votes in favor, one against, and 10 abstentions.[4] It again supported the corresponding resolution, A/RES/79/88, on 4 December 2024, when the tally was 171 in favor, three against, and nine abstentions.[21]

On 10 May 2024, Ukraine abstained on resolution A/RES/ES-10/23, which expanded Palestinian participation rights in the General Assembly without granting full UN membership.[5] The resolution affirmed Palestine’s qualification for membership and recommended that the Security Council reconsider its application; it passed with 143 votes in favor, nine against, and 25 abstentions.[5][22] On 3 December 2024, Ukraine also abstained on resolution A/RES/79/81, “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine,” which received 157 votes in favor, eight against, and seven abstentions.[23]

Palestinian leaders sought Russian participation in Israeli–Palestinian diplomacy alongside, rather than solely through, the United States.[6] Yoni Ben Menachem argued that Abbas’s preference for a larger role for the Middle East Quartet—the United Nations, European Union, United States, and Russia—reflected an interest in preserving Russian support.[3] He interpreted the Palestinian leadership’s caution over Ukraine as an effort to balance Moscow against the risk of straining relations with Washington and Kyiv.[3]

Palestinian academic Dalal Erekat likewise argued that the leadership was balancing long-standing ties with Moscow against the importance of avoiding difficulties with Washington.[24] She described Abbas as maintaining frequent direct conversations with Putin while Palestinian leaders also wished to preserve American involvement in Palestinian affairs.[24]

Ukraine’s November 2022 committee vote prompted public criticism from Israel’s ambassador to Ukraine, who called it disappointing and said such support did not help build trust between the countries.[16] Ukraine’s subsequent absence from the December ballot followed a conversation between Volodymyr Zelensky and Benjamin Netanyahu about bilateral cooperation, security, and relations in international bodies; a causal connection between that conversation and the absence was not established.[17]

Palestinian reactions to the invasion included concern that Ukraine was displacing Palestinian issues internationally and complaints about perceived double standards in descriptions of Ukrainian and Palestinian resistance.[6] A pro-Russia demonstration took place in Bethlehem, and PLO Executive Committee member Bassem al-Salahi blamed the United States for the crisis while supporting a diplomatic solution preserving both sides’ rights and peaceful relations.[8] Erekat described other Palestinians as expressing solidarity with Ukrainians, while some welcomed the invasion in hopes of weakening American influence.[24]

Accounts of recognition require chronological care: the 1988 account gives no separate recognition date for Ukraine, while the 2011 report conveys Shaath’s claim rather than a direct Ukrainian government announcement.[10][11] Likewise, the Palestinian Authority’s public silence in early 2022 and Abbas’s explicit expression of support for Moscow in 2024 concern different moments, rather than interchangeable statements of policy.[6][15]