Egypt–Palestine Relations

Egypt administered Gaza after the War of Independence until 1967, except during the interruption caused by the 1956–1957 Suez Crisis and its aftermath; it neither annexed the territory nor granted its Palestinian residents Egyptian citizenship.[1] After that administrative role ended, Egypt continued to influence Palestinian affairs through negotiations with Israel, relations with Palestinian leaders, and control of its side of the Gaza–Egypt border.[1] Its relationship with the Palestinians consequently encompasses both diplomacy over a political settlement and practical decisions affecting movement, trade, security, and relief in Gaza.[1][2]

Egypt has maintained strong ties with the Palestinian Authority and Fatah while also conducting negotiations with Hamas, particularly since Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007.[3] Cairo’s contacts with Hamas have not displaced its recognition of the Palestinian Authority or its advocacy of a unified Palestinian political entity.[1][3] Egyptian policy treats Gaza as part of a future Palestinian state rather than as a separate political problem, linking its future to the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and to a broader settlement with Israel.[2]

The border gives these relations an immediate humanitarian and security dimension: Rafah has served as a passage for travelers and goods, while underground tunnels have carried commercial supplies, people, equipment, and weapons between Gaza and Sinai.[2][4] Egypt has combined restrictions and tunnel closures with periods of expanded travel, overland commerce, medical access, and reconstruction assistance.[2][5] Its mediation likewise serves several purposes, including ending fighting, supporting Palestinian political arrangements, preserving Egyptian regional influence, and limiting security threats to Sinai.[1]

Egypt was among the Arab states whose armies entered the former Mandate of Palestine after Israel declared independence on May 14, 1948.[6] Gaza became the headquarters of Egypt’s expeditionary force, and fighting reduced the Arab-held area around the city to a narrow coastal strip approximately 40 kilometers long and 6–8 kilometers wide.[4] The 1947 United Nations partition plan had assigned a coastal strip to the proposed Arab state, but the war left its southern portion in Egyptian hands.[7] The Egyptian–Israeli armistice agreement of February 24, 1949, established Gaza’s boundaries, with final demarcation following in February 1950.[7][4]

More than 200,000 Palestinian refugees lived in Gaza after the war.[1] Of roughly 700,000 Palestinians driven or fleeing from their homes in 1947–1948, approximately one-third ended up in the Egyptian-controlled Strip.[8] The influx tripled Gaza’s population, and many refugees settled in camps maintained by UNRWA.[7] Poverty, unemployment, dependence on relief, and limited industry marked life under Egyptian administration, although commerce benefited from Gaza’s partial role as a duty-free port for Egyptians.[9]

Egypt governed Gaza under military rule without incorporating it into Egyptian territory.[4] Palestinian residents did not receive Egyptian citizenship or permission to migrate to Egypt or other Arab countries for integration.[4] Palestinians had little effective control over local administration, although some attended Egyptian universities and, at certain times, elected local officials.[9] In the absence of a clear Palestinian political structure able to govern their affairs, Palestinian interests were largely represented by Arab states whose priorities did not always coincide.[8]

An All-Palestine Government was established in Gaza under Egyptian auspices in 1948.[10] Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, identified as its premier and acting foreign secretary, declared that it derived authority from a representative council and sought to safeguard minority and foreign residents’ rights, protect holy places, and guarantee freedom of worship.[10] A Palestinian official explained its purpose as giving Palestinian Arabs a legal position in relation to the Arab League.[10] Amin al-Husseini declared the government, but its dependence on Egypt limited its independent political role.[9] Palestinians in Gaza received All-Palestine passports rather than Egyptian citizenship; after the government’s dissolution in 1959, Egypt continued governing through a military governor.[11]

Israeli forces took Gaza and Sinai during the Suez War, which began in late October 1956.[7] Israel withdrew from Gaza in March 1957 under international pressure, ending its first period of military rule there.[7] President Gamal Abdel Nasser restored Egyptian administration while allowing the United Nations Emergency Force to remain along Gaza’s perimeter.[12] Egyptian administration then continued until the June 1967 war.[13]

Egypt also influenced the development of Palestinian national institutions beyond Gaza’s administration.[14] An Arab summit in Cairo in 1964 led to the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, whose first leader, Ahmad Shukeiri, was a protégé of Egypt.[14] Its initial Palestine National Council included civilian representatives from several areas; guerrilla organizations were added in 1968, when the PLO charter set out goals including an independent state and the liberation of Palestine.[14]

In June 1967, Israel captured Gaza and Sinai from Egypt, ending Egyptian administration of the Strip.[8][13] Israel also took the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria.[8] The war changed the relationship between Palestinian nationalism and the Arab states: governments that had presented themselves as protectors of the Palestinians lost control of these territories, while the PLO emerged as a prominent representative of Palestinian national aspirations.[8]

Sadat’s November 1977 Knesset address called for a “just solution to the Palestinian problem,” although his practical negotiating priority was restoring Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai.[1] The September 1978 Camp David summit produced two frameworks, one for Egyptian–Israeli peace and another for Palestinian self-government in Gaza and the West Bank.[15] Egypt pressed for Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, borders, while Israel proposed Palestinian autonomy during a five-year interim period and rejected Egypt’s withdrawal demand, particularly regarding Gaza and the West Bank.[15]

The Palestinian framework proposed transitional arrangements lasting no more than five years, with a freely elected self-governing authority replacing Israel’s military government and civilian administration.[16] Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Palestinian representatives were envisaged as participants in negotiations, with Egypt, Israel, and Jordan agreeing on arrangements to establish the authority.[16] Final-status negotiations were to begin no later than the third year of autonomy, and elected Palestinian representatives were to vote on the resulting agreements.[16][17] A continuing committee would address the admission of people displaced from Gaza and the West Bank in 1967, while Egypt and Israel would work with other interested parties on procedures concerning the refugee problem.[17]

The Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty was signed on March 26, 1979; the treaty negotiations omitted references to a proposed special Egyptian role in Gaza.[15] Palestinian representatives did not participate in the autonomy negotiations, and Jordan also remained outside the talks held by Egypt and Israel from 1979 to 1982.[15][17] Differences over Palestinian self-government, withdrawal, settlements, and East Jerusalem’s legal status prevented agreement.[15] The Palestinian autonomy framework therefore did not develop into the arrangements envisaged at Camp David.[17]

Under President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt brokered negotiations leading to the May 1994 Cairo Agreement between Israel and the PLO, providing for Israeli military withdrawal from most of Gaza and the Jericho area.[1] During the signing process, Mubarak pressed Yasser Arafat to sign before television cameras, including by whispering an Arabic expletive in his ear.[1] Mubarak later convened the January 2001 Taba Summit in an effort to prevent the collapse of Israeli–PLO permanent-status negotiations, but did not press the parties to accept the compromises necessary for a final agreement.[1]

At the February 2005 Sharm el-Sheikh summit, Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced an agreement to suspend violence.[18] Mubarak called for a just solution based on two states, and Abbas said he would pursue his obligations with assistance from Egypt, Jordan, and the international Quartet.[18] Understandings also concerned transferring military responsibility in five West Bank towns and treating Israel’s Gaza withdrawal as part of the Road Map.[18]

Egypt and Israel cooperated on border security during Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza.[1] Withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor required an amendment to the peace treaty’s security arrangements allowing 750 Egyptian police to deploy on Egypt’s side of the border.[1] Rafah opened as an international passage under Palestinian control and European Union supervision, while Egypt sought to use disengagement to renew the peace process.[1] Hamas’s 2007 takeover subsequently disrupted those arrangements and substantially altered Egypt’s dealings with Gaza.[3][19]

Egypt’s security and intelligence services have served as intermediaries both between Israel and Hamas and between Hamas and Fatah.[8] Cairo had maintained strong ties with the Palestinian Authority and its Fatah leadership since the Authority’s establishment in 1994, generally avoiding direct relations with Hamas in the earlier period.[3] Nevertheless, it mediated with Hamas at Fatah’s request in 1996, sponsored factional discussions requested by Abbas in 2005, and intervened after Hamas abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006.[3]

After Hamas took Gaza in June 2007, senior Cairo–Hamas exchanges became routine, but Egypt refused to recognize the Hamas-led administration and continued recognizing Abbas’s authority.[1][3] It moved its diplomatic representation to Ramallah and called for the Palestinian Authority to resume control of Gaza.[3][1] Egypt closed crossings into Sinai, while Israeli and Egyptian authorities maintained strict control over Gaza’s border access.[1][8]

In January 2008, Hamas breached the border fence, allowing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to enter Egyptian Rafah to obtain essential goods.[1] Increased underground smuggling added to Egyptian economic and security concerns.[1] In January 2009, Egypt and France proposed an immediate ceasefire followed by negotiations on border security and reopening crossings.[19] Egypt opposed international troops on its territory and sought to revive the 2005 movement-and-access arrangements involving European monitors at Rafah and vehicle passage through Kerem Shalom.[19]

Egypt brokered a Hamas–Fatah reconciliation agreement signed in Cairo on May 4, 2011.[20] It called for an interim government to organize legislative and presidential elections; the parties later selected Abbas for the interim presidency, but full reconciliation did not follow.[20] Egypt also reopened Rafah to a broader range of travelers on May 28, 2011.[21] During the first five and a half hours, officials recorded 340 travelers entering Egypt from Gaza and 150 moving in the opposite direction.[21] Restrictions remained, including a visa requirement for men aged 18–40.[21]

Relations with Hamas deteriorated after the Egyptian military removed President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013 and Egypt outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood.[22] The new military-led interim administration heavily restricted crossings and closed most smuggling tunnels, which had supplied goods to Gaza and generated tax revenue for Hamas.[20] Under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi from 2014, Egypt pursued operations against armed groups in Sinai and sealed tunnels in coordination with Israel.[2] These tunnels had carried weapons, equipment, people, and goods after 2011.[2]

Border access later expanded selectively.[5] In 2016, Egypt increased the number of people permitted to leave Gaza and allowed commercial goods through Rafah for the first time since 2013.[5] The crossing had opened for more than 40 days during the preceding six months, compared with 26 days in all of 2015, enabling travel for work, medical care, family visits, and study.[5] Egypt admitted cargo including cars and construction materials and hosted Gaza delegations discussing possible commercial arrangements, including a trade zone.[5]

In early 2017, Hamas delegations led by Ismail Haniyeh and other senior figures met Egyptian security officials in Cairo.[22] Their discussions addressed weapons smuggling, armed groups in Sinai, a mechanism for Rafah operations, expanded trade, and Egyptian mediation with Israel and Fatah.[22] The resulting understandings were pragmatic and conditional rather than a fundamental strategic realignment.[22] In October 2017, Hamas and Fatah negotiators signed another Egyptian-mediated reconciliation agreement in Cairo, announcing plans for the Palestinian Authority to resume full control of Gaza, although implementation remained difficult.[23]

Commercial traffic also developed outside the formal Palestinian Authority crossing system.[8] Egypt opened the Salah al-Din Gate near Rafah for overland trade in 2018.[2] Egypt and Hamas permitted some commerce through this informal crossing, bypassing Palestinian Authority controls and taxes applied elsewhere.[8] Thus, Egypt’s support for restoring Authority governance coexisted with practical economic arrangements involving Hamas-administered Gaza.[1][8]

Egypt brokered ceasefires ending several rounds of fighting between Israel and Palestinian factions between 2014 and 2023 and participated in reconstruction afterward.[1] During the May 2021 fighting, Egyptian mediation again involved contacts with Israel and Hamas, while Sisi ordered Rafah opened for wounded Gazans to receive treatment in Egyptian hospitals and for aid to enter.[24] Egypt also mediated a ceasefire involving Palestinian Islamic Jihad after five days of fighting; Israel, the United States, and the United Nations publicly recognized its role, and an Islamic Jihad official in Cairo thanked Egypt.[25]

Reconstruction became a substantial component of Egyptian engagement after the May 2021 conflict.[26] Egypt pledged $500 million and sent workers, engineers, drivers, and other personnel to rebuilding projects, including a coastal road in Beit Lahya.[11][26] Reconstruction was linked to maintaining the ceasefire, with Rafah providing an important route for construction materials.[26] Egyptian economic cooperation also extended to the offshore Gaza Marine gas field: a February 2021 memorandum between the Palestinian Authority and the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company addressed development, a pipeline to Gaza, and liquefaction facilities in Egypt.[27] Further negotiations promoted in 2022 involved Egypt, the Authority, and Israel, with potential benefits including fuel for Gaza’s power station, Authority revenue, and Gazan employment.[27]

Egypt continued promoting a broader political settlement alongside these practical initiatives.[28] At Davos in January 2015, Sisi said Egypt’s role should go beyond arranging ceasefires and supported a Palestinian state on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital.[28] In 2016, Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry met Abbas in Ramallah as Egypt pursued an initiative for Israeli–Palestinian dialogue, linked to a two-state framework and wider Israel–Arab League engagement.[29] A 2021 meeting between Sisi and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett addressed the two-state solution, stability in Gaza, Rafah controls, rocket fire, Israeli responses, and Israeli captives and missing persons held in Gaza.[30]

During the Israel–Hamas war that began in 2023, Egypt used its relations with both sides to support ceasefire negotiations and hostage–prisoner exchanges, while facilitating humanitarian assistance.[31] It worked alongside Qatar, with Qatar leading practical negotiations in parts of the 2023 process and Egypt helping implement arrangements on the ground.[32] Egyptian crossings were important to the movement of wounded patients, humanitarian aid, fuel, and goods.[32]

Egypt repeatedly opposed forcibly moving Palestinians into Sinai.[31] Sisi warned that such displacement would threaten Egyptian national security and undermine prospects for a Palestinian state.[31] Egyptian concerns included the humanitarian and economic consequences of a large refugee influx and the possibility that Sinai could become a base for attacks on Israel, provoking Israeli retaliation.[33] Opposition also reflected fears that displacement would reproduce the experience associated with 1948 and weaken a two-state settlement.[33]

After Israeli forces took control of the Gazan side of Rafah in spring 2024, the crossing closed to passengers and aid deliveries through the Egypt–Gaza border stopped.[34] Sisi criticized the offensive, warning about mass displacement and impediments to assistance.[31] Egyptian ceasefire proposals from May 2024 sought to reduce civilian deaths, limit displacement into Egypt, and prevent an Israeli military presence from becoming a lasting arrangement obstructing a future Palestinian state.[2]

Egypt’s March 2025 Gaza plan proposed a five-year, $53 billion recovery and reconstruction program and was adopted by the Arab League in March.[1] Its first six months envisaged a permanent ceasefire, urgent humanitarian measures, a temporary Palestinian technocratic administration, and Palestinian police trained in Egypt and Jordan.[1] Later phases addressed housing, services, infrastructure, and economic recovery.[1] The plan offered an alternative to forced displacement and a route toward renewed Palestinian Authority governance within a two-state political horizon.[1]

Egypt hosted a decisive round of mediation during the 2025 Gaza negotiations.[35] The agreement’s first phase included a ceasefire, partial Israeli withdrawal, hostage releases in exchange for prisoners, and expanded humanitarian assistance.[35] Egypt was among the countries mediating the October 2025 ceasefire and hosted the Sharm el-Sheikh Peace Summit that month.[34] Sisi and United States President Donald Trump co-chaired the summit, attended by representatives of approximately 30 countries and international organizations.[36] Trump, Sisi, and other leaders signed a declaration endorsing the ceasefire.[34]

At the summit, Sisi reiterated support for two states and sought backing for a reconstruction conference Egypt planned to host.[36] Nearly 400 aid trucks had entered Gaza from Egypt on the preceding Sunday under the ceasefire arrangements.[36] Between October 2025 and January 2026, Egyptian officials, including intelligence chief Hassan Rashad, met Israeli, Hamas, Palestinian Authority, and other representatives concerning transitional governance, Rafah, and Hamas’s disarmament.[34]

Egypt’s proposed role in the transition included training Palestinian police to support public order and civilian governance.[34] United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted on November 17, 2025, provided for an International Stabilization Force to work with Egypt, Israel, and newly trained Palestinian police on border security, security conditions, civilian protection, and humanitarian operations.[34] Some Palestinians from Gaza received police training in Egypt and Jordan in preparation for possible service under the proposed transitional government.[34]

Rafah reopened on February 2, 2026, for limited medical travel into Egypt and return journeys to Gaza.[34] Palestinian and European officials operated the crossing, while Israel and Egypt vetted travelers.[34] This arrangement restored a restricted passenger function after the closure that followed Israel’s capture of the Gazan side in 2024.[34]

Egypt’s combination of relations with Israel, recognition of the Palestinian Authority, and working contacts with Hamas has enabled mediation across political divisions that otherwise impede direct negotiations.[8][3] Its intelligence services’ relationship with Hamas provides a channel for Israeli–Hamas discussions, while its ties to Fatah support efforts toward Palestinian reconciliation.[8] Border management gives this diplomacy a practical dimension, linking negotiations to travel, trade, humanitarian supplies, and reconstruction materials.[1][26]

Egyptian sponsorship of the All-Palestine Government and influence on the PLO’s formation connected early stages of Palestinian political development.[10][14] Egypt later participated in the Camp David autonomy framework and supported Palestinian Authority governance.[16][1] Across these stages, Egypt moved from direct administration of Gaza to a role centered on mediation, security cooperation, and political sponsorship.[1]

Egypt’s engagement has served its own interests as well as Palestinian objectives, enhancing its regional standing and leverage while seeking to prevent instability from crossing into Sinai.[1] Its reconstruction and governance proposals have linked immediate recovery to the political unity of Gaza and the West Bank and to a two-state settlement.[1][2] The 2025–2026 negotiations extended this role into proposed police training, transitional administration, and international security coordination.[34]

The Camp David Palestinian framework exposed major differences over withdrawal, settlements, self-government, and East Jerusalem, while Palestinian representatives declined to participate in the negotiations described in the diplomatic record.[15] Its proposed autonomy should therefore be distinguished from an implemented agreement or the establishment of a Palestinian state.[16][17] Egypt’s support for Palestinian political unity has also coexisted with border restrictions and direct commercial arrangements with Hamas that bypassed Palestinian Authority controls.[8]

The 2024 Rafah dispute produced competing accusations: Israel accused Egypt of overlooking Hamas tunnels, while Egypt accused Israel of violating the 1979 peace treaty by stationing forces along the border.[34] These accusations were part of a broader dispute over security and the crossing, rather than jointly established findings.[34] The post-2025 arrangements likewise involved developing proposals concerning transitional governance, Hamas’s disarmament, Palestinian policing, and an international force, not a fully completed political settlement.[34]