Pakistan–Palestine Relations

Pakistan’s support for the Palestinian cause has operated within a broader foreign-policy setting rather than in isolation. One INSS study identifies Islamic solidarity and relations with Middle Eastern countries as important considerations and interprets Pakistan’s Palestine policy in connection with its conflict with India over Jammu and Kashmir.[6] Historian Moshe Yegar similarly argues that Islamic solidarity shaped Pakistan’s Middle East policy from its establishment, and that Pakistan supported Arab positions in international forums while seeking Arab and Muslim backing in its disputes with India.[2]

Economic and strategic considerations also featured in accounts of the policy. Yegar traces a stronger Islamic orientation in Pakistan’s foreign policy to the early 1970s and lists the search for support against India, oil and other economic interests, employment for Pakistani workers, access to markets, loans and grants, and international support during the Soviet–Afghan conflict among the incentives for closer relations with Muslim and Arab countries. He also identifies domestic expressions of Islamic solidarity and concern about Iranian influence in Pakistan.[2]

As Western military support declined in the early 1970s, Pakistan increasingly looked to Arab oil-producing countries for economic assistance, while valuing relations with Arab and Islamic states for security and religious reasons.[7] These accounts describe overlapping motivations; they do not imply that every policy decision was driven by a single consideration.

The Palestine question also became a recurring public and diplomatic symbol of solidarity. Pakistan used dates including November 29, Palestinian Revolution Day, and Intifada Day to restate support for the Palestinian cause.[1] A 1950 U.S. policy statement identified the American position on Palestine as one factor making Pakistani public opinion more critical of the United States.[8]

Pakistan’s engagement with Palestine began before Pakistan itself was established. The Muslim League’s concern about Palestine is traced to the 1917 Balfour Declaration; opposition to a Jewish national home became an early strand of the League’s position, according to a historical study of Pakistan–Israel relations.[1] The study also says antisemitic stereotypes appeared in League deliberations, a characterization that should be understood as the study’s account of the political rhetoric of the period.[1]

The question became an issue in international diplomacy during the 1947 United Nations debate over Palestine’s future. Pakistan’s representative, Foreign Minister Sir Zafrulla Khan, chaired the subcommittee considering an Arab-backed unitary-state proposal. He argued that the United Nations lacked legal authority to partition Palestine and sought to reduce the proposed Jewish state’s territory; an amendment he advanced, in his account, would have limited it to land owned by Jews.[1]

Pakistan opposed the UN partition plan, which the General Assembly adopted on November 29, 1947, by 33 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions.[9] In December, Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah sent U.S. President Harry S. Truman a message condemning the decision as “basically wrong and invalid in law” and “morally untenable.” Jinnah argued that partition could not be enforced against Arab resistance and appealed to Truman to uphold Arab rights; these were Jinnah’s arguments, not an independent legal determination.[10]

Pakistan also voted against Israel’s admission to the United Nations. A historical study says Israel requested Pakistani recognition within days of its formation, but the request went unanswered; Pakistan’s public position thereafter supported the Palestinian struggle and refused to recognize Israel.[1] After joining the UN in September 1947, Pakistan took a leading role among Muslim states there and a “strong initiative” on Palestine.[8]

The early period also includes reports of possible material assistance to Arab forces during Israel’s War of Independence (1947–1949). Historian Moshe Yegar writes that Israel’s diplomatic mission in Washington received information that Pakistan was trying to provide military assistance, and reports purchases of 250,000 rifles in Czechoslovakia apparently intended for Arab forces and three aircraft in Italy for Egypt.[2] A CIA daily summary from July 1948 relayed, through a U.S. official in Jidda, a report that Pakistan had offered forces for the Palestine war; it also referred to preliminary steps in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan to send volunteers, supplies, and financial aid, without identifying the basis for that latter claim.[11] These reports are indirect and do not establish the full extent or implementation of any assistance.

Pakistan’s relationship with Palestinian institutions grew especially close through its support for the Palestine Liberation Organization. Pakistani leaders repeatedly backed Palestinian self-determination and an independent state under the PLO’s leadership, which they described as the Palestinians’ “sole and legitimate representative.”[1] In 1953, Zafrullah Khan told Israeli ambassador Abba Eban that Pakistan’s government could not withstand extremist opposition to improved relations with Israel, but expressed approval of exchanges involving experts, students, and professors. He also said Pakistan might encourage Arab leaders to negotiate when they were willing to do so.[2]

In 1954, Zafrullah Khan stated that Pakistan did not recognize Israel and had no intention of doing so. Yegar recounts that Pakistan’s prime minister told visiting Palestinian Arab clergy that Palestine was “not only an Arab one but also a Muslim one,” and pledged Pakistan’s loyalty on matters concerning Muslims in Palestine.[2] In 1962, Pakistan declared its commercial, economic, and cultural boycott of Israel to be total and said it would act with Arab countries to return the Holy Land to its “lawful inhabitants.”[2] On July 4, 1967, the UN General Assembly adopted a Pakistani resolution expressing concern about Israeli steps to change Jerusalem’s status.[2]

The relationship took a more institutional form in the 1970s. After the 1973 war, Pakistan and the PLO agreed to train PLO officers in Pakistani military institutions, according to Yegar.[2] At the second summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, held in Lahore in February 1974, the organization recognized the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian nation in its just struggle.”[1] An Arab summit in Rabat endorsed the position six months later, and PLO missions in Karachi and Islamabad received full diplomatic recognition in 1975.[2]

At the 1974 Islamic summit, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made a sharply worded distinction between Jews and Zionists: “To Jews as Jews we bear no malice; to Jews as Zionists, intoxicated with their militarism and reeking with technological arrogance, we refuse to be hospitable.”[4] The statement documents the charged political language used by a Pakistani leader at the time; it is not a neutral description of Jews or Zionism.

Pakistan warned the United States in March 1984 against moving its embassy to Jerusalem and severed relations with Costa Rica that year after Costa Rica moved its embassy there.[2] During the First Intifada, which began in 1987, pro-PLO rallies took place in Pakistan and the Pakistani government sent the organization food and medical supplies.[2]

Pakistan’s refusal to recognize Israel has coexisted with periods of exploratory contact and discussion about possible normalization. In 1992, Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, Sayyidah Abidah Hussein, said there was no reason Pakistan should not establish ties, citing Palestinian talks with Israel and India’s normalization. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson denied that her comment represented a change in policy; Yegar also describes diplomatic contacts between Pakistani and Israeli officials during this period.[2]

Pakistan supported the Israeli–PLO agreement of September 13, 1993. The next day, Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi said Pakistan’s position on recognition would not change until Jerusalem’s status was resolved.[2] In September 1994, Pakistan’s foreign minister told the National Assembly that the country had no immediate plans to recognize Israel, citing the need for substantial progress in implementing the PLO–Israel accord and resolving Jerusalem. In October 1995, Benazir Bhutto likewise ruled out recognition while the status of the Golan Heights and Jerusalem remained unresolved.[1]

The 1994 plan for Bhutto to visit Gaza illustrates the practical tensions in Pakistan’s policy. While travelling to Cairo, she planned to visit the Gaza Strip to express support for Palestinians and see the emerging Palestinian entity. A Pakistani representative was denied entry at the Rafah crossing, and Pakistan objected to the prospect of seeking Israeli permission. Bhutto abandoned the visit after being told she needed a permit, later explaining: “when I heard I needed a permit from the Israeli authority.”[1] The episode reflected a clash between Pakistan’s wish to make visible its support for Palestinians and its refusal to deal directly with Israel.[1]

Accounts of the episode differ in emphasis over the arrangements for crossing. Yegar says Pakistan declined formally to request entry for its ambassador, arguing that it did not recognize Israeli rule over Gaza and regarded the PLO as the legal authority there.[2] Bhutto said in 1995 that she was interested in principle in ties with Israel, but would have to ensure extremist groups could not exploit the question; she also linked recognition to an OIC decision and peace between Israel and its neighbors.[2]

The 2005 period brought a highly visible meeting but no recognition. On September 1, Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri met Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom in Istanbul.[2] On September 14, President Pervez Musharraf and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon shook hands in a chance meeting at a United Nations summit.[12] Pakistan also accepted Israeli humanitarian aid after the devastating October 2005 earthquake.[12] Pakistani officials continued to say that Pakistan would not recognize Israel until an independent Palestinian state was established, and Musharraf described progress in relations with Israel as dependent on progress in the peace process and the establishment of such a state.[12][2]

In April 2007, Musharraf offered to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians and said he would be willing to visit Israel to help bring peace to the Middle East. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declined, preferring to deal directly with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.[13]

Pakistan’s formal support has also been reflected in Palestinian diplomatic representation. In 2013, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visited Pakistan, met the president and other government officials, and took part in laying the cornerstone for a Palestinian embassy. Abbas expressed the hope of welcoming Pakistan’s president in Jerusalem and praying with him at Al-Aqsa Mosque.[14]

Abbas returned to Islamabad for a three-day visit beginning January 30, 2017, and inaugurated the Palestinian embassy in the presence of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and other senior officials.[15] A Palestinian diplomatic adviser said the opening brought the Palestinian Authority’s worldwide total of embassies to 90.[15] The embassy’s establishment gave the relationship a standing diplomatic presence in Pakistan, distinct from the recurring political statements and international votes that had previously formed much of its public profile.

Pakistan has used United Nations forums to support Palestinian representation and initiatives. On November 29, 2012, it voted in favor of General Assembly Resolution A/RES/67/19, “Status of Palestine in the United Nations.” The resolution’s recorded vote was 138 in favor, nine against, and 41 abstentions.[16] On November 24, 2015, Pakistan also voted for Resolution A/RES/70/13, concerning the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat; the recorded vote was 99 in favor, eight against, and 59 abstentions.[17]

Pakistan participated in efforts to establish UN Human Rights Council inquiries into allegations concerning Palestinian territories. In 2018, it was one of six countries that submitted a proposal for an inquiry focused especially on Gaza demonstrations beginning March 30, 2018. The Council approved the proposal by 29 votes to two, with 14 abstentions; the inquiry was to examine alleged human-rights and international-law violations in the occupied Palestinian territories.[18]

Following the 2021 Israel–Palestinian violence, Pakistan joined the Palestinians in submitting another inquiry proposal. It passed by 24 votes to nine, with 14 abstentions, and its remit included collecting evidence about alleged violations and examining causes of recurring tensions and instability.[19] The allegations and the Council’s inquiries were politically contested; the reported votes, proposal sponsors, and stated mandates are procedural facts and do not themselves establish the truth of every allegation.

In May 2021, Pakistan, acting on behalf of the OIC and the “State of Palestine,” sent the president of the Human Rights Council a letter requesting a special session on the human-rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem.[20] Pakistan’s role in such initiatives formed part of its wider practice of pursuing Palestinian issues through multilateral bodies, alongside diplomatic support for Palestinian statehood.

Pakistan’s stated position in recent decades has generally linked a settlement with an independent Palestinian state to any future recognition of Israel. In October 2023, the Foreign Ministry supported a two-state solution and called for a just, comprehensive, and lasting resolution based on international law and relevant UN and OIC resolutions. It specified a “viable, sovereign and contiguous State of Palestine” on pre-1967 borders, with Al Quds Al-Sharif as its capital, and called for an end to hostilities and protection of civilians.[3]

In November 2020, Prime Minister Imran Khan said Pakistan stood with the Palestinian people and would condition any future agreement with Israel on a “just and satisfactory agreement with the Palestinians.” His statement connected that position to the outlook of Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, while Mahmoud Abbas praised Pakistan’s support for Palestinian rights.[21] In July 2025, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar rejected the possibility of Pakistan joining the Abraham Accords, arguing that recognition of Israel through that route would abandon Pakistan’s longstanding support for a two-state solution. He reiterated support for an independent Palestinian state.[22]

At an all-party conference in Islamabad on October 7, 2024, President Asif Ali Zardari backed a two-state solution and said peace required resolving the Palestinian problem in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called for a ceasefire and said Pakistani expert teams would travel to world capitals to highlight Palestine.[23] Religious-party leaders at the same gathering rejected a two-state solution. Their statements reflected differences among Pakistani political actors and should not be confused with the government’s stated policy.[23]

In December 2025, members of a Pakistani delegation attending a business conference reportedly said that normalization with Israel would require a two-state agreement first. Their identities were withheld for security reasons, and the comments were presented as the views of delegation members rather than an official government announcement.[5] The distinction matters because public remarks, party declarations, and formal Foreign Ministry positions do not necessarily carry the same policy status.

In November 2025, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar joined ministers from seven other Muslim-majority countries in Istanbul to discuss implementing a Gaza peace plan. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson said the country would call for Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories, particularly Gaza; unhindered humanitarian aid and reconstruction; and an independent, viable, contiguous Palestinian state. The stated purpose of the meeting was to coordinate implementation of a ceasefire and delivery of humanitarian assistance.[24]

Following an October 23, 2026 meeting in Istanbul, the foreign ministers of Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey issued a joint statement calling for urgent implementation of a two-state solution. They backed a Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. They also said Israeli policies had deepened global perceptions of injustice and characterized the occupation as a principal source of regional instability; these were the ministers’ political assessments.[25]

Pakistan’s public statements on Gaza have combined demands for a ceasefire, civilian protection, and humanitarian access with its stated support for Palestinian statehood. In April 2024, during a visit to Islamabad by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire and for aid to enter Gaza. Dar described the killings there as “genocide”; this was his characterization, not an independently adjudicated conclusion.[26] The Saudi minister also called for de-escalation and uninterrupted humanitarian assistance.[26]

In July 2024, government adviser Rana Sanaullah announced a pledge to send more than 1,000 tons of relief supplies to Palestinians by the end of that month. Pakistan had already sent nine humanitarian-aid shipments to Gaza since October 2023; the additional supplies were pledged, not confirmed delivered.[27] The pledge came in the context of an agreement to end a sit-in by thousands of Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan supporters, who had demanded government action against Israel.[27]

The Pakistan Foreign Ministry’s October 2023 statement had already called for cessation of hostilities and protection of civilians as part of its proposed framework for a resolution.[3] Subsequent diplomatic meetings continued to place humanitarian access and reconstruction alongside political questions about borders, statehood, and Israeli withdrawal.[24] The combination of emergency-relief commitments and diplomatic advocacy reflects the two main strands of Pakistan’s Gaza policy documented in the available statements.

On January 18, 2026, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif accepted an invitation from U.S. President Donald Trump to join a Board of Peace for Gaza. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said the country would remain engaged in international efforts for peace and security in Gaza, seeking a sustainable resolution of the Palestine issue in accordance with UN resolutions.[28]

Pakistan also voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 2803, which established an international Board of Peace to oversee Gaza’s reconstruction and described a pathway toward Palestinian statehood. The resolution passed with 13 votes in favor, while China and Russia abstained. The Palestinian Authority called for immediate implementation, while Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rejected the arrangement.[29]

In November 2025, Pakistan was among nine countries supporting a U.S.-drafted Security Council resolution on Gaza. The signatories described the plan endorsed by the resolution as offering “a pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood” and said it could support peace and stability between Israelis and Palestinians and across the region.[30] This support for a particular international plan sits alongside Pakistan’s broader insistence on a viable Palestinian state and an outcome grounded in UN resolutions.

The relationship is not limited to official diplomacy; it has also been a subject of domestic political and public debate. In May 2022, a group of 16 Pakistanis visited Israel. Pakistan’s government and much of the public reacted angrily, and participant Ahmed Quraishi lost his talk-show job after returning. Pakistan’s Senate then passed a resolution reiterating support for Palestinians and condemning what it called Israel’s “illegal occupation.”[4] The episode illustrates the political sensitivity of contact with Israel within Pakistan, while the Senate’s language is an attributed political position.

A separate controversy arose in December 2017, when Abbas directly instructed the recall of the Palestinian envoy to Pakistan after the envoy attended a rally alongside Hafiz Saeed, whom the report identifies as a terrorist proscribed by the United Nations. The Palestinian Foreign Ministry called the envoy’s presence an “unintended mistake, but not justified.” The episode followed India’s formal protest over the envoy’s appearance with Saeed.[31]

At the same time, Pakistani officials have occasionally explored contact with Israel, while maintaining that recognition depends on Palestinian statehood or progress toward a settlement. The 1992 debate, the 2005 meeting and handshake, and Musharraf’s 2007 mediation offer show that refusal of recognition did not rule out every form of contact.[2][12][13] The available accounts therefore distinguish formal recognition—which Pakistan has not extended in the reports covered here—from meetings, exploratory diplomacy, and individual expressions of interest.

Pakistan’s Palestine policy has been shaped by a politically contested history, including its opposition to the 1947 partition plan, the rhetoric used by political leaders, and reports of possible assistance to Arab forces during Israel’s War of Independence. Jinnah’s message records his own legal and moral arguments against partition; it should not be treated as a neutral legal ruling. Reports of military assistance rely on accounts relayed through intermediaries or on a secondary historical article, and the available material does not establish every detail independently.[10][2][11]

Interpretations of Pakistan’s motivations also differ in emphasis. The cited historical accounts point to Islamic solidarity, relations with Arab states, economic interests, and the Kashmir conflict, but these are explanations offered by the sources rather than a single definitive account of every decision.[6][2][7] Likewise, statements describing Israeli conduct or the occupation in terms such as “genocide” or “illegal” are attributed to the officials or institutions that used them, not presented here as uncontested findings.[4][26]

Finally, official policy should be distinguished from the statements of party leaders, religious groups, delegation members, and individuals. Pakistan’s government has formally supported a two-state solution, while some political actors have rejected that formula and some private or party-level remarks have been reported as favoring different approaches.[3][23][5] The record thus shows a durable state position in support of Palestinian statehood alongside domestic disagreement about the terms of a settlement and the possibility of engagement with Israel.