Palestine–United Arab Emirates Relations

Relations between the UAE and the Palestinians involve financial support to Palestinian institutions, aid for refugees and Gaza residents, diplomatic support for Palestinian statehood, and contacts with Palestinian political figures. They have also been shaped by the UAE’s independent diplomacy toward Israel and disagreements with the PA over who should receive or administer assistance.[1][2]

The central political tension is that the UAE maintains that relations with Israel can serve Palestinian interests, while the PA opposed normalization before an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. The disagreement became public in August 2020, when the UAE and Israel announced normalization and the PA recalled its ambassador. Aid and limited high-level contacts subsequently continued, but relations remained affected by the accords and by competing views of the PA’s authority and future role in Gaza.[3][4]

During the Gaza war, Emirati assistance included medical facilities, patient evacuations, air and maritime relief efforts, and water infrastructure. Abu Dhabi also set political and security conditions for reconstruction, including opposition to Hamas governing Gaza, demands for PA reform, and calls for a credible path toward Palestinian statehood.[5][6]

Before the 2020 normalization agreement, the UAE supported the PA’s bid for statehood recognition, opposed U.S. decisions recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and generally deferred to Saudi Arabia in developing Arab or Gulf Cooperation Council proposals on the conflict.[7] Emirati officials continued to endorse a two-state solution. In 2019, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash argued that the Arab refusal to maintain contact with Israel had been mistaken and that communication could help advance peace. He warned that the existing trajectory could make two states infeasible and shift debate toward equal rights in one state.[8]

The UAE supported Fatah rather than Hamas, donating $12 million for Gaza war victims through Fatah in June 2015.[7] A compilation of payments lists UAE transfers to the PA totaling $258.9 million from 2002 through 2008, although the table relies on a cited Washington Post account and does not measure assistance across all years.[9] Other reference material describes regular payments to the Palestine Liberation Organization and substantial aid to the PA by 2007 without specifying complete amounts or periods.[10]

The UAE also supported Palestinian refugees through UNRWA. It contributed $50 million in April 2018 and reported providing more than $500 million through the agency for humanitarian projects in the Palestinian territories and Syria. It had also funded the Rafah housing project known as Shaykh Khalifa City.[7]

Direct financial relations with the PA later deteriorated. PA Finance Ministry figures reported in 2018 indicated that Emirati contributions averaged $87.8 million annually from 2008 through 2013, with no contributions to PA coffers from early 2014. Money continued to reach the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and Gaza through the United Nations and other organizations, sometimes bypassing the PA.[11]

A major source of strain was the UAE’s relationship with Mohammed Dahlan, a former Palestinian security official and rival of PA President Mahmoud Abbas. Dahlan left the West Bank in 2011, settled in Abu Dhabi, and became an adviser to the Emirati leadership.[1][11] The UAE hosted and financially backed him, while Palestinian leaders viewed his position as interference in internal affairs and possible support for an alternative to Abbas. Claims about a succession strategy remained politically sensitive assessments rather than a settled Emirati plan.[1][7]

The UAE’s movement toward public engagement with Israel was visible before 2020. A Jerusalem Center analysis reported that the UAE planned to host Israel at Expo 2020 in Dubai, where Israel would present work in water, medicine, technology, and information. The PA planned to protest the participation, and Hamas also opposed it.[12] Gargash separately called for greater Arab openness toward Israel, arguing that changed Arab-Israeli relations could help advance peace with the Palestinians.[8]

In the weeks before normalization was announced, Emirati officials opposed Israel’s planned extension of sovereignty over parts of the West Bank. Gargash warned of “dangerous repercussions,” while UAE Ambassador to the United States Yousef Al Otaiba argued that annexation would damage prospects for improved ties between Israel, the UAE, and the wider Arab world.[13] On August 13, 2020, the United States, Israel, and the UAE announced full normalization. Their joint statement said Israel would suspend declaring sovereignty over areas outlined in the U.S. “Vision for Peace” and that the parties would continue seeking a just, comprehensive, and enduring resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[14]

The UAE portrayed the agreement as a way to stop or suspend annexation and preserve a two-state solution. Emirati officials argued that direct relations would provide greater diplomatic leverage to advocate for Palestinians, and Al Otaiba said Palestinians “must benefit from normalization.”[3][13] The approach departed from the Arab Peace Initiative’s principle of conditioning normalization on an overall Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.[3]

The effect on annexation remained contested. The announcement referred to suspending a declaration of sovereignty, while a senior Israeli diplomatic source later said sovereignty measures had been postponed rather than removed from the agenda.[15] The treaty established peace and full normalization and committed the parties to pursue a negotiated solution meeting the legitimate needs and aspirations of both peoples, but it did not explicitly recognize or define Palestinian statehood.[16]

The PA rejected the UAE’s interpretation, arguing that normalization before a settlement weakened Palestinian leverage and accepted an unacceptable status quo. Palestinian leaders recalled their ambassador, called for the agreement’s retraction, and described the accords as a “stab in the back” and a “betrayal of the Palestinian people.”[1][17] The dispute reflected fundamentally different views of whether normalization could advance Palestinian interests without a prior Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

The UAE attempted to reduce PA opposition by offering financial and infrastructure assistance, but Abbas refused, according to an INSS analysis. The analysis anticipated greater Emirati engagement with Palestinian society, including possible employment opportunities for young Palestinian academics and engineers.[2] In September 2020, the UAE economy minister confirmed a proposal for major investments intended to encourage a Palestinian return to negotiations, but gave no amount, project list, timetable, or distribution mechanism.[18]

A symbolic dispute had occurred in May 2020, when an Emirati commercial aircraft carrying COVID-19 supplies for Palestinians landed at Ben Gurion Airport on the first direct Abu Dhabi–Tel Aviv flight of its kind. The PA rejected the shipment because it had not been coordinated with Palestinian authorities.[4][13] The first flight carried 14 tons of supplies, and a second arrived on June 9 for transfer through the United Nations.[13]

The rupture also affected financial and political channels. The PA rejected UAE aid offers and declined to join regional initiatives associated with the accords, while the UAE argued that normalization had prevented annexation. An INSS analysis further described a sharp reduction in Emirati support for UNRWA and a shift toward humanitarian assistance delivered to the PA and Gaza. Its conclusions about lost Emirati influence and competition with Qatar were policy assessments rather than independently measurable findings.[1]

Contacts began to resume after the initial rupture. In October 2021, PA General Intelligence Service head Majed Faraj visited Dubai and met ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum. He was described as the first senior PA official to visit since normalization. Palestinian sources said the trip did not signify public endorsement of the accords, while analysts linked the PA’s interest in renewed Emirati assistance to its financial crisis.[19]

Before Abbas visited the UAE in May 2022, the PA had returned its ambassadors to Abu Dhabi and Manama. Abbas traveled to offer condolences after the death of President Khalifa bin Zayed and met Mohammed bin Zayed, the new president. The visit was described as a possible turning point, although the UAE was not expected to set aside its grievances quickly.[1]

In May 2025, PA representative Hussein al-Sheikh met UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed to discuss regional developments and Gaza’s humanitarian situation. The contact indicated continued diplomacy but did not establish a comprehensive political or financial reconciliation.[20]

Emirati assistance continued through humanitarian channels even when relations with the PA were strained. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the UAE dispatched medical equipment to the PA and Gaza, although the direct-flight shipments were rejected because they arrived through Israel without Palestinian coordination.[4][13]

After the May 2021 fighting between Israel and Hamas, the UAE promised to help finance Gaza reconstruction. A Washington Institute analysis attributed difficulties in direct delivery to strained UAE-PA relations, Emirati opposition to Hamas, and Dahlan’s inability to administer the funds. The assistance was routed through Egypt, and Egypt’s $500 million reconstruction commitment appeared to consist of UAE funding delivered through Egyptian goods and services.[21]

In November 2023, five Emirati aircraft carrying food and medical equipment landed at Egypt’s El-Arish airport to support a field hospital in southeastern Gaza. About 100 doctors and support staff volunteered, and the UAE offered additional equipment and medicines.[22] Other reporting described the facility as a 150-bed hospital.[23] Figures attributed to Al-Ain media at the time included 1,039 tons of collected aid, 24,000 volunteers, and 64 aircraft sent for Gaza relief, including 32 associated with “Gallant Knight 3.” These were interim figures rather than final totals.[24]

Broader wartime activity included field hospitals in Gaza and Egypt, participation in a Cyprus-to-Gaza maritime corridor, and airdrops conducted with Egypt. The UAE housed more than 2,200 Palestinian evacuees in Abu Dhabi, including sick and injured children, and ranked second worldwide in 2024 donations to the Palestinian response plan, with more than $396 million.[5] A January 2026 update described it as the largest country donor of humanitarian aid to Gaza as of December 2025.[25] The two rankings cover different periods and measures and are not contradictory.

By January 2026, the UAE had funded a water pipeline from Egypt to Gaza, evacuated more than 3,000 patients for treatment in the Emirates, operated hospitals in Gaza and Egypt, and cooperated with the World Health Organization on medical evacuations.[25] Other reported arrangements included a July 2024 plan to evacuate 250 sick and wounded Gazans and a November 6 evacuation of 231 patients and caregivers to the UAE and Romania.[26]

The UAE also declined an Israeli request to fund the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, criticizing the mechanism as inadequate unless changes were made.[26] A March 2024 report said the UAE had threatened to stop operating a land trade bridge unless more aid reached Gaza and that an Emirati military officer secretly visited Tel Aviv, although it did not identify the bridge’s route, operator, cargo, or the dates of the reported events.[27]

The UAE has sought a role in discussions about Gaza’s postwar future while conditioning reconstruction on political and security changes. A September 2025 INSS analysis said Abu Dhabi demanded a political vision based on two states, rejected any future Hamas role in local government, and made Hamas’s complete disarmament a precondition for financial support. It also described Emirati demands for comprehensive PA reform and discussions with Israel and the United States about a temporary administration based on a reformed PA or technocratic body.[6]

In January 2025, Ynetnews reported discussions about a possible temporary Emirati role in governance, security, and reconstruction until a reformed PA could assume responsibility. An Emirati official said the UAE would not participate without substantial PA reform and empowerment and a credible path toward Palestinian statehood. The discussions had not become a formal written plan or been adopted by any government.[28]

In May 2025, Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed said hostage release and calm should precede governance by an authority other than Hamas, with long-term reconstruction following those conditions. He said Gaza’s governance should ultimately remain in Palestinian hands. He also claimed that the UAE had provided more than 42 percent of international aid delivered to Gaza during the preceding two years; the cited account did not independently verify that percentage.[29]

A January 2026 proposal called for a Palestinian technocratic committee supported by a Gaza Executive Board and a Board of Peace. Reem al Hashimy, the UAE’s Minister of State for International Cooperation, was named to the executive board.[25] In February 2026, the UAE categorically denied a report that it planned to take over Gaza’s civilian administration and stated that governance and administration were the responsibility of the Palestinian people.[30]

The distinction between discussing a conditional temporary role and claiming authority over Gaza is important. Reported Emirati proposals depended on PA reform, Hamas’s disarmament, Palestinian participation, and a path toward statehood; they were not described as an adopted UAE plan to govern Gaza.[6][28]

The most consequential dispute concerns the 2020 normalization agreement. The UAE said the deal suspended annexation plans and provided new tools for advocating Palestinian interests; the PA argued that normalization before a final settlement weakened Palestinian leverage.[3][31] The agreement referred to suspension of a sovereignty declaration, while an Israeli source described annexation measures as postponed rather than permanently abandoned.[14][15]

A second dispute concerns Abu Dhabi’s relationship with the Abbas-led PA. Emirati backing for Dahlan, declining direct PA funding, and the routing of assistance through international organizations contributed to mistrust.[1][11] Assertions that the UAE intended to install Dahlan as Abbas’s successor remained attributed political assessments.[7]

Humanitarian aid has also become entangled with diplomatic recognition and political authority. The PA rejected the 2020 medical shipments because they were delivered through Israel without PA coordination, while the UAE argued that direct cooperation enabled assistance and advocacy.[4][13] During the Gaza war, Emirati aid was extensive, but its reconstruction conditions and continued ties with Israel remained politically contentious.[6]