Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: 2020 Timeline

On January 28, 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump presented his administration's "Peace to Prosperity" proposal at the White House after meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and opposition leader Benny Gantz.[1][2] The plan proposed a demilitarized Palestinian state occupying roughly 70 percent of the West Bank, with land swaps accompanying proposed Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and Jewish communities.[3] Jerusalem would remain Israel's undivided capital, while a Palestinian capital would be located in areas east and north of the existing security barrier, including Abu Dis; the Old City and 14 of the city's 16 Arab neighborhoods would remain under Israeli sovereignty.[4][2]

Palestinian statehood was conditioned on governance and security requirements, including the disarmament of Hamas and other Palestinian organizations.[5] The plan also proposed that people of all faiths be permitted to pray on the Temple Mount, a change from the then-existing status quo.[4] Netanyahu said Israel was prepared to negotiate on the plan's basis, while the Palestinian Authority and other Palestinian factions rejected it.[1][2][5]

The plan prompted a U.S.–Israel mapping process, conducted without Palestinian participation, to identify areas that might be subject to Israeli sovereignty measures.[6] Under Israel's unity-government coalition agreement, a cabinet or Knesset vote could be brought forward as early as July 1, subject to U.S. coordination.[6] Initial reports indicated that the Prime Minister's Office was preparing cabinet resolutions in two stages: first for the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area, then for Jewish communities throughout Judea and Samaria.[5] Netanyahu backed away from immediate unilateral action after the United States signaled its opposition to an uncoordinated move.[5]

A Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs account, citing unnamed sources in Ramallah, described anger at the plan but said local traders did not join a proposed strike and that demonstrations were attended primarily by PA civil servants rather than the broader public.[7] The Arab League was scheduled to discuss the plan on February 1 at the PA's request.[7]

The year opened with violent incidents alongside the political upheaval generated by the peace plan. On January 24, unknown perpetrators set fire to a mosque in Jerusalem's Sharafat neighborhood in what authorities described as a suspected hate crime; graffiti suggested a possible connection to an unpermitted West Bank outpost whose structures Israeli Border Police had demolished nine days earlier.[8]

On February 6, an Israeli soldier shot and killed Palestinian Authority police officer Tareq Badwan outside a police station in Jenin. Israel acknowledged one of its personnel had fired and said it was investigating; the investigation remained open at the end of the year.[9] On February 23–24, Palestinian Islamic Jihad launched a two-day rocket campaign from Gaza. Approximately 30 projectiles were reported on Sunday, followed by at least 14 more on Monday, of which 12 were intercepted by Iron Dome.[10] Rockets damaged a playground in Sderot and shattered a car windshield in Nir Am; schools were canceled for 55,000 students across southern Israeli communities.[10] Israel responded with airstrikes on Palestinian Islamic Jihad targets in Gaza and Syria. The rocket fire followed the killing of two Gazans whom Israeli troops said had been attempting to plant a bomb at the Israel–Gaza border.[10]

In February, a Palestinian rammed IDF soldiers in Jerusalem, injuring 12, in an incident the State Department characterized as a terrorist attack.[11] As COVID-19 spread in March, a Jerusalem Center account described a temporary decline in Gaza border activity and attributed calls for calm to Hamas sources and Palestinian voices who argued that the pandemic made clashes inappropriate.[12] Great March of Return rallies planned for March 30 were cancelled amid coronavirus concerns; Islamic Jihad leader Khaled al-Batsh urged people to stay home, though a rocket was still fired from Gaza and Israel struck in response.[9] Another Jerusalem Center account reported that Israeli laboratories analyzed Palestinian COVID-19 diagnostic tests, Palestinian medical professionals received training in Israeli hospitals, and Israel delivered 250 test kits to the West Bank.[13]

The most significant political development within the Palestinian–Israeli relationship in the first half of the year was the Palestinian Authority's decision to suspend security and civilian coordination with Israel. On May 19, Mahmoud Abbas announced before a body invoking the PA, the PLO, and other Palestinian factions that Palestinians were released from "all the agreements and understandings with the American and Israeli governments and of all the commitments based on these understandings and agreements, including the security ones."[14][15] Abbas framed the announcement as a response to Netanyahu's renewed declaration of an intention to apply Israeli sovereignty to parts of the West Bank; he stated that Israel's plans had effectively nullified the Oslo Accords.[16] Abbas also said the decision was not a green light for attacks, and Saeb Erekat said Palestinian security forces would resist attempted attacks.[17]

The body Abbas invoked to lend the announcement collective authority had never convened in full forum, and the declaration's initial scope and implementation remained unclear.[17] Practical steps included suspending joint meetings and a field-commanders' hotline between Israeli and Palestinian security services; the State Department noted that the formal decision to end coordination was taken on May 20.[15] The suspension disrupted farmers' access to olive groves, work and medical-travel permits, and population-registry updates; Gazans were also left without access to certain advanced medical care outside Gaza for several weeks.[15][8]

Several violent incidents fell within this period. On May 12, Palestinian Nizmi Abu Bakar threw a brick from a rooftop in Area A that killed IDF soldier Amit Ben Yigal.[8] Israel indicted Abu Bakar in June for intentionally causing death; he pleaded not guilty in November, and his defense sought to annul his interrogation confession.[8] The following day, an Israeli sniper shot and killed 17-year-old Zeid Qaysiyah on the roof of his home in the al-Fawar refugee camp; the Israeli military investigated the incident and submitted findings to the Military Advocate General.[9]

In 2020, Israeli border police shot and killed Iyad Halak, a Palestinian man with autism, in Jerusalem's Old City after he reportedly failed to heed orders to stop; police initially said he was carrying a "suspicious object."[8] In October, the Ministry of Justice concluded that Halak had posed no danger to police or civilians, that the officer had fired contrary to police procedures, and that proportionate alternatives had not been used; prosecutors announced an intention to indict the officer on reckless-homicide charges.[8] On June 23, Israeli border police fatally shot Ahmed Erekat after his car crashed into a checkpoint.[11] Israeli authorities characterized the incident as a terrorist car-ramming attack; Erekat's family and Palestinian authorities disputed that account, saying it was an accident.[11]

In April, a 20-year-old Palestinian stabbed a 62-year-old Israeli woman in Kfar Saba, and a bystander shot the assailant; in August, a Palestinian man from Jenin stabbed a man from Rosh Ha'ayin 20 times, leaving him seriously injured.[11] The State Department characterized both as terrorist attacks.[11]

July 1, 2020, was the earliest date on which the Israeli government could begin formally considering measures to apply Israeli sovereignty to parts of the West Bank under its coalition agreement.[6][18] No annexation announcement was made that day. The mapping process that had been underway since January was not completed by July 1, and international opposition, the absence of an agreed map, and the disruption of governance priorities by COVID-19 contributed to the delay.[6][18]

Protest activity against the prospective sovereignty move was visible during July 1–7. A "day of rage" was held in Gaza, and demonstrations occurred in the West Bank, though they were described as less well attended than organizers had expected.[19] At a joint virtual press conference on July 2, Fatah official Jibril Rajoub and Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri announced that the factions would work together against the Trump plan and any annexation move; the cited analysis assessed that the public display did not amount to practical reconciliation.[19] On July 5, three rockets were launched from Gaza toward Israel: two landed in open areas and a third was intercepted.[19] Israeli aircraft struck targets in northern Gaza, including an underground Hamas facility, in response.[19]

On July 5, demonstrators in Gaza City chanted "We want to eat, we want to live," protesting the continued closure of weekly markets amid the border tensions.[19] In June, PA Prime Minister Mohammed Shtayyeh had described a Palestinian counterproposal submitted to the Quartet — the United Nations, United States, Russia, and European Union — proposing a "sovereign Palestinian state, independent and demilitarized" along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.[20] Shtayyeh warned that if Israel proceeded with annexation on July 1, the PA would make a "constitutional announcement" and convene a constituent assembly.[20]

On August 13, 2020, Israel and the United Arab Emirates announced that they had agreed to normalize relations and that Israel would suspend plans to declare sovereignty over areas covered by the Trump peace plan.[21][22] Netanyahu described the suspension as temporary and said he remained committed to applying sovereignty but that it would require U.S. coordination; UAE officials presented the arrangement as preserving prospects for a two-state solution.[23][21] The parties therefore interpreted the connection between normalization and the suspension, and its permanence, differently.[21]

The Palestinian Authority condemned the UAE agreement as "a betrayal of Jerusalem" and "an aggression against the Palestinian people," while Hamas also denounced it.[22] Abbas recalled the Palestinian ambassador to the UAE.[21] Palestinian leaders argued the deal legitimized Israel's annexation threats, while UAE officials said the delay preserved prospects for future negotiations.[21]

On September 11, a joint U.S.–Israel–Bahrain statement announced that Israel and Bahrain would normalize relations.[21] On September 15, Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and the United States signed the Abraham Accords documents at the White House.[24] The UAE signed a full normalization treaty, while Bahrain signed a declaration of peace, cooperation, and friendly relations providing for subsequent negotiations covering investment, flights, tourism, security, energy, technology, and embassies.[24]

The agreements marked a shift in which a comprehensive agreement establishing a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital and a right of return for refugees, was no longer treated by participating Arab states as a precondition for normalization with Israel.[25] The Bahrain declaration referred to continuing efforts toward a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but the new partnership was not structured around that issue.[26] Palestinian leaders condemned the agreements, and their broader political significance for Israeli–Palestinian negotiations remained contested.[24]

On the day the Accords were signed, a rocket fired from Gaza struck Ashdod, wounding two people.[27] Israeli aircraft later struck Gaza after additional rocket fire.[27]

In October, Israel and Sudan announced the normalization of relations.[25] On December 22, Morocco signed a declaration announcing the renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel, described as being in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.[25] Sudan's formal normalization declaration was signed in Khartoum on January 6, 2021.[25] The Palestinian leadership characterized Sudan's move as a "disaster," viewing the successive agreements as an erosion of the PLO's traditional Arab diplomatic backing.[28]

From early August, the Gaza border saw a renewed campaign of incendiary and explosive balloon launches. From August 6, Gaza-based groups launched balloon-borne devices into Israel, igniting fires across communities near the border.[9] Israeli tanks and aircraft struck approximately 100 Hamas targets in Gaza during this period, including observation posts, tunnel openings, construction facilities, and weapons-related sites.[9]

On August 16, Israel halted transfers of goods except food and humanitarian aid, stopped fuel transfers, blocked Qatar's monthly cash contribution, and reduced the permitted fishing zone from 15 to 8 nautical miles.[9] The closures reduced Gaza's electricity supply.[29] That day, rockets fired from Gaza injured one man with flying glass and two women running to a shelter in Sderot; two other women were treated for shock.[29] On August 17, incendiary balloons caused approximately 20 fires, including at an empty kindergarten in Sderot.[29] Egyptian mediation during the week failed to stop the activity.[29]

On August 31, Hamas announced that, with the assistance of the Qatari ambassador, understandings had been reached to stop the escalation.[30] Qatar subsequently mediated a broader agreement to restore calm: Israel agreed to reopen the Kerem Shalom crossing, restore the fishing zone to 15 nautical miles, and allow Qatari cash and other assistance to resume.[9] A formal ceasefire arrangement was reported on September 1.[9]

Against the backdrop of shared opposition to the Trump plan and the normalization agreements, Hamas and Fatah made renewed reconciliation gestures during the year. The joint Rajoub–al-Arouri virtual press conference on July 2 was one early signal, though analysts assessed that it lacked substantive practical cooperation.[19] On September 24, Rajoub and al-Arouri met in Istanbul and agreed to draw up a joint plan addressing challenges facing the Palestinian national movement, reaching understandings about elections to Palestinian institutions.[31] The final document still required approval by both organizations at the time of the meeting.[31] The Fatah Central Committee approved Rajoub's outline on October 1.[31] Despite these steps, the underlying split between Hamas and Fatah endured; the reconciliation process did not produce a functioning unified Palestinian governance structure during 2020.[31]

After approximately six months during which the PA had declared civilian and security coordination with Israel ended, coordination was renewed in November 2020. PA official Hussein al-Sheikh said relations would return to their previous state following written and oral communications confirming Israel's commitment to past agreements.[32] Palestinian officials said the decision opened the way for tax revenues collected by Israel on the PA's behalf to be released; Hamas criticized the move as a "stab in the back."[32]

The principal unresolved dispute concerned PA payments to Palestinian prisoners and families of those killed in security-related incidents. After the PA announced renewed cooperation, Israel transferred pending tax revenues but said it would deduct approximately $184 million for payments Israel associates with those imprisoned for terrorism or designated as "martyrs."[11] The PA describes the payments as social support for families that have lost their primary breadwinners; Israel characterizes them as incentivizing or rewarding terrorism.[11]

Israeli authorities demolished 673 Palestinian structures in the West Bank during 2020, a 61 percent increase from 2019.[15][8] The demolitions included 116 inhabited residences and displaced 605 people, among them 315 minors; more than 98 percent of the structures were reportedly demolished for lacking Israeli-issued construction permits.[15][8] The single most significant event occurred on November 3, when structures belonging to 11 families — 74 people, most of them minors — were demolished in Khirbet Humsah, described as the largest single-day demolition in more than ten years.[15][8]

UNOCHA recorded 327 settler-attack incidents resulting in Palestinian fatalities, injuries, or property damage during 2020, a 2.4 percent decrease from 2019.[15] A separate State Department terrorism report cited UNOCHA's broader 2020 tally of 771 settler-violence incidents, causing 133 Palestinian injuries and damage to 9,646 trees and 184 vehicles; the two tallies use different counting criteria and are not directly interchangeable.[11]

In December, 16-year-old settler Ahuvia Sandak died in a vehicle crash involving Israeli police; the report states that Sandak and four other settlers had reportedly been throwing stones at Palestinians before the incident. Following his death, settlers protested, blocked roads, threw rocks at Palestinian-licensed vehicles, and raided Palestinian homes.[8] Also in December, Muhammad Marwah Kabha killed Israeli citizen Esther Horgan near Tal Menashe; Kabha reportedly confessed to scouting the area in advance and killing Horgan, and remained in Israeli custody awaiting trial at year's end.[8][8]

In October, the IDF used underground sensors to uncover a Hamas tunnel running from Khan Younis toward the Israeli community of Kibbutz Kissufim — two kilometers long and 74 meters deep.[11] The State Department's terrorism report noted that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad tunneling activity continued throughout 2020.[11] The discovery underscored the persistent nature of Gaza's underground infrastructure-building efforts even during a year of relatively reduced above-ground armed activity.

Different official and analytical sources recorded sharply reduced rocket fire from Gaza compared with 2019, though their totals varied. The INSS annual review records 195 rockets fired from Gaza in 2020, compared with 1,403 in 2019 — a decline of more than 86 percent.[1] The Israeli government's tally, as reported by the State Department, counted 190 rockets and mortar shells launched toward Israel from Gaza, with 90 landing in empty fields and 70 intercepted by Iron Dome.[15] The State Department's terrorism report cited more than 175 rockets and more than 150 incendiary balloons launched by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other groups.[11] A Ynet account of IDF figures reported 176 rockets and mortar shells through December 20, with approximately 90 percent landing in open areas and Iron Dome intercepting 80 launches — approximately 93 percent of those aimed at built-up areas.[15] Israeli forces carried out approximately 300 strikes on targets in Gaza during the year.[15][15]

West Bank attack statistics showed mixed trends. IDF figures reported by Ynet recorded 60 attacks in the West Bank in 2020, compared with 51 in 2019.[33] The breakdown included 31 shooting attacks and nine stabbings; the report also recorded 1,500 stone-throwing incidents, 229 firebomb incidents, the seizure of 541 firearms and 330 knives, and the closure of 50 weapons-production workshops.[33] The INSS annual review separately recorded 51 "significant terrorist attacks" under its own category, defined as shootings, stabbings, car-rammings, or the laying of explosive charges.[1]

Israeli forces killed 19 Palestinians in the West Bank and one in Gaza during 2020, according to B'Tselem figures cited in the State Department's human-rights report; B'Tselem said at least 11 did not pose a lethal threat at the time.[15] The IDF also reported exposing one Hamas-dug tunnel running into Israel.[15]

The year's political turbulence and security activity coincided with serious economic deterioration in both the West Bank and Gaza. The INSS annual review described the PA's economic crisis and the humanitarian situation in Gaza as worsening amid COVID-19, reduced Arab financial assistance, and six months of severed coordination with Israel.[1] Unemployment in Gaza reached 45.5 percent in the first quarter of 2020, rising to 49.1 percent in the second quarter before settling slightly to 48.6 percent in the third.[1] West Bank figures were considerably lower but also rose across the year: 14.2 percent in Q1, 14.8 percent in Q2, and 18.7 percent in Q3.[1] The source attributes the figures to Gisha — Legal Center for Freedom of Movement.[1]

The PA's suspension of coordination compounded economic difficulties by disrupting permits and delaying tax-revenue transfers. The eventual restoration of coordination and transfer of pending revenues provided relief but did not resolve the dispute over payments associated with prisoners and families of those killed in security-related incidents.[15][11]

An October 2020 joint Israeli-Palestinian public-opinion survey conducted by Tel Aviv University found that 93 percent of Palestinians opposed Trump's peace plan and only 5 percent accepted it.[34] Among Israeli Jews, 51 percent accepted the plan, 30 percent rejected it, and 19 percent were uncertain or did not respond.[34] The survey also found that 37 percent of Palestinians chose "wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation" when asked about preferred next steps, compared with 27 percent two years earlier — a notable shift in stated preferences, though the survey measured opinion rather than actual participation in violence.[34]

The year 2020 closed with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict structurally altered in several respects. The Abraham Accords demonstrated that Arab-Israeli normalization had been decoupled from Palestinian statehood as a prerequisite, departing from the diplomatic framework associated with the 1967 Arab summit's "three no's" and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.[25][28] For Israel, the agreements represented a significant expansion of normalized relationships in the Arab world while the Palestinian issue remained unresolved.

For the Palestinian Authority, the year began with rejection of the Trump plan, passed through a suspension of coordination that disrupted permits, medical travel, registry updates, and tax-revenue arrangements, and ended with restored relations while the prisoner-payments dispute remained unresolved.[15][8][11] Successive normalization agreements also undercut the longstanding Palestinian strategy of making Arab support for normalized relations with Israel contingent on progress toward Palestinian statehood.[25]

From a security perspective, IDF figures described 2020 as one of the better years of the preceding decade: rocket fire from Gaza was at its lowest level in years, and large-scale military confrontation in Gaza was avoided.[15] The February Palestinian Islamic Jihad rocket campaign and the August incendiary-balloon escalation did not develop into full-scale conflict. Hamas and Fatah took steps toward reconciliation that did not materialize into a functioning political union, leaving the division between Gaza and the West Bank governing authorities in place.[31]

The proposed application of Israeli sovereignty to parts of Judea and Samaria — the central political flashpoint of the year's first half — was suspended rather than implemented.[18] The July 1 date passed without action, and the August normalization announcement with the UAE provided a diplomatic framework for delay. Israeli officials continued to characterize the suspension as temporary.[23][21]

Several significant events and figures from the year remain subject to disputed characterizations. The killing of Ahmed Erekat on June 23 at an Israeli checkpoint was described by Israeli authorities as a terrorist car-ramming attack; Erekat's family and Palestinian officials maintained it was an accident.[11] B'Tselem disputed whether at least 11 of the 20 Palestinians killed by Israeli forces during the year posed a lethal threat at the time.[15]

Rocket-count figures differ across reporting organizations and methodologies and should not be collapsed into a single authoritative number: INSS recorded 195, a State Department human-rights report cited 190 rockets and mortar shells, the terrorism report cited more than 175 rockets, and IDF-derived figures through December 20 stood at 176.[1][15][11][15] UNOCHA settler-violence figures similarly differ between State Department reports — 327 incidents in one and 771 in another — reflecting different recorded scopes or criteria.[15][11]

Terminology surrounding the proposed West Bank sovereignty measure was itself contested. Israeli officials and supporters described it as "applying Israeli sovereignty" or "applying Israeli law"; critics and Palestinian officials used the term "annexation." Its legality, practical scope, and relationship to the UAE normalization announcement were disputed among political and legal actors.[6][23]