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Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: 2008

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01In brief

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict in 2008 was a year of parallel diplomatic and military crises that began with intensive peace negotiations and ended with a major Israeli military operation in Gaza. Two tracks defined the year: the Annapolis process, in which Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas pursued a permanent two-state settlement during approximately 300 meetings and eight months of intensive talks, and an escalating cycle of rocket fire and military operations centered on the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. The central diplomatic moment came on September 16, when Olmert presented Abbas with proposals on territory, Jerusalem, refugees, and security that did not become an agreement. On the security track, an Egyptian-brokered lull took effect on June 19, sharply reduced but did not eliminate attacks, and began to unravel after an Israeli raid on a cross-border tunnel on November 4. Hamas declared the arrangement over in mid-December, rocket and mortar fire intensified, and Israel launched Operation Cast Lead on December 27.

02Background: Two Tracks Entering 2008

The year opened against the backdrop of the late-2007 Annapolis summit, which had relaunched direct Israeli–Palestinian negotiations with the goal of reaching a permanent-status agreement before the end of U.S. President George W. Bush's term.[1] Negotiations proceeded through meetings between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and through parallel talks between Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Palestinian negotiator Ahmad Qurei.[5]

The political landscape was complicated on both sides. Abbas's Palestinian Authority governed the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — while Hamas exercised de facto authority and maintained independent security forces in Gaza following its 2007 takeover.[6] The Palestinian Legislative Council did not meet because it lacked a quorum, and the rival Palestinian factions detained members and supporters of one another.[6] On the Israeli side, allegations against Olmert and his eventual announcement that he would leave office added urgency and uncertainty to the negotiations.[1]

Gaza was simultaneously a humanitarian and security problem. Israeli restrictions affected the movement of goods through the crossings, while Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist organizations continued to fire rockets and mortar shells at southern Israeli communities.[6][7] These conditions created pressure for a security arrangement even as the political negotiations proceeded.

03Early-Year Violence and Operations

January brought a dramatic episode at Gaza's southern border. On January 23, after a week-long Israeli closure of Gaza's crossings, Hamas supporters blew holes in the Gaza–Egypt border fence at Rafah, allowing perhaps as many as 200,000 Gazans to enter Egypt.[8] A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs account says Egyptian police used water cannons and clubs to restrain crowds, injuring approximately 40 Egyptian security personnel, before Egypt reached an understanding for the people to return.[9] Egypt resealed the border on February 3.[10]

On February 4, a Palestinian suicide bomber attacked a shopping mall in Dimona, killing one person and injuring nine. Israeli police killed a second attacker before he detonated his bomb belt; the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine jointly claimed responsibility.[7][11]

In late February, Katyusha or Grad rockets struck Ashkelon, expanding the number of Israeli civilians exposed to rocket fire from an estimated 25,000 to 250,000, according to Public Security Minister Avi Dichter.[12] Israel responded with a military operation in Gaza that sources call either "Operation Warm Winter" or "Operation Hot Winter," concentrated around February 29–March 1.[7][13] The UN account recorded at least 75 Israeli air strikes and said more than 100 Palestinians and two Israelis were killed in Gaza during this period.[13]

The most devastating terrorist attack inside Israel in this period occurred on March 6, when a gunman entered the Mercaz Harav Kook Yeshiva in Jerusalem at approximately 8:30 p.m. and opened fire with an automatic weapon.[14] Eight students were killed and ten or eleven wounded; police initially searched for additional attackers but concluded that the gunman had acted alone.[14][11] An off-duty soldier entered the yeshiva and killed the attacker, who was identified as a Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem.[11]

April saw sustained violence. On April 9, Palestinian gunmen attacked the Nahal Oz fuel depot, killing two Israeli civilian employees; Israeli forces killed attackers, and a tank fired during the incident, killing three civilians and others according to the CRS account.[10] On April 16, Hamas claimed responsibility for an ambush and for firing more than 20 rockets into southern Israel, killing three Israeli soldiers; Israeli retaliatory strikes killed 19 Palestinians.[10] On April 19, Hamas's military wing carried out a suicide-car bombing and mortar ambush at the Kerem Shalom crossing, wounding 13 Israeli soldiers; Israeli air strikes then killed seven Hamas terrorists.[10] A separate April 28 incident in which a Palestinian mother and four children died remained disputed, with Palestinian accounts attributing the deaths to an Israeli tank shell or missile and an Israeli investigation suggesting Palestinian ammunition explosions as the cause.[10]

On April 24, a Hamas leader offered Israel a six-month truce in Gaza while saying that the fate of captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was a separate issue. Israel insisted that Shalit had to be included in any ceasefire arrangement.[15] Talks continued through May but faltered over Israel's refusal to reopen Gaza's crossings.

04The Gaza Ceasefire: Terms and Early Strains

Egypt brokered what became known as a "lull" arrangement between Israel and Hamas. Sources give slightly different announcement dates — an Israeli government account says Egypt and Hamas separately announced it on June 17, while the UN Fact-Finding Mission gives June 18 — but agree that it took effect at 6:00 a.m. on June 19.[3][16] The arrangement was unwritten, and the Mission emphasized that the parties' understandings of its terms differed significantly.[16]

As reported to the Mission, the terms included Gaza authorities undertaking to halt attacks by Palestinian armed groups and Israel ceasing military operations in Gaza; Israel also reportedly agreed to ease the blockade and gradually lift restrictions on many imports.[16] Discussions on a prisoner exchange for Gilad Shalit and the reopening of the Rafah crossing were expected after an initial three-week period, while Egypt reportedly undertook to work toward extending the calm to Judea and Samaria after the first six months.[16] Accounts also differed over duration: Hamas and other organizations described a six-month term, while the Meir Amit Center reported that Israel regarded the lull as having no fixed time limit.[17]

The Israeli government characterized its understanding as an arrangement conducted through Egypt rather than a direct agreement with Hamas.[18] In July, Hamas suspended prisoner-swap talks amid disputes over the blockade and cross-border rocket fire.[15]

Despite the declared calm, strains emerged almost immediately. During its first week, Karni, Erez, and Sufa operated on restricted schedules while Kerem Shalom and Rafah remained closed.[16] On June 23, a Palestinian civilian was reportedly injured by Israeli fire near Beit Lahia, and two mortars were fired from Gaza.[16] On June 24, Israeli forces raided Nablus, killing an Islamic Jihad activist and another Palestinian man; Islamic Jihad responded by firing three Qassam rockets into Israel.[19][3] Israeli security sources called the rockets a ceasefire violation, while a Hamas spokesman described Israel's crossing closures as a violation.[19] Defense Minister Ehud Barak kept the Sufa, Nahal Oz, and Karni goods-transfer facilities closed on June 25, while Erez remained open for medical cases.[19] In June, truckloads entering Gaza were reported at approximately 17 percent of the May 2007 level, and an international assessment determined that July imports fell far below needs.[3]

05Relative Quiet and Diplomatic Developments, July–October

The period from June 19 through November 4 was characterized by a marked reduction in attacks compared with the first half of the year, though violence did not stop entirely.[20] Israeli figures cited in the UN report recorded one rocket and one mortar shell in October.[16] Security-establishment figures reported by Ynet gave a July–October monthly average of approximately five rockets and six mortar shells.[21] An Israeli government summary recorded 20 rocket landings and 18 mortar shells during the quieter first phase of the lull, including several projectiles that landed inside Gaza.[20]

Two July attacks in Jerusalem marked a violent rupture within that relative calm. On July 2, a Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem drove a bulldozer into people in West Jerusalem, killing three and wounding at least 18 before an off-duty soldier killed him; the Israeli government defined the incident as a terrorist attack, although police could not determine a clear motive.[11] A separate vehicle-ramming attack also occurred in Jerusalem that month; a Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs account says the two attacks together killed three people and injured 68.[22]

Settlement construction remained a persistent point of dispute. A UN report stated that construction in Israeli settlements in 2008 increased by a factor of 1.8 compared with the same period in 2007 and that housing tenders in East Jerusalem rose from 46 units in 2007 to 1,761 in 2008.[13] On July 28, Olmert acknowledged publicly that a comprehensive agreement could not be reached that year because of the difficulty of negotiating Jerusalem; an Abbas spokesman responded that any agreement excluding Jerusalem was unacceptable.[13]

Despite that acknowledgment, negotiations continued and culminated in Olmert's September proposal on the core final-status issues.[2][23] Hamas, meanwhile, used the relative calm for military consolidation. According to the Shin Bet's annual summary as reported by Ynet, Hamas trained fighters, improved Qassam rockets' range and accuracy, constructed underground launch sites, bunkers, and connecting tunnels, and benefited from increased weapons smuggling through Rafah, including standard Grad rockets, after the January fence breach.[24]

06The Olmert Peace Proposal and Negotiating Breakdown

The diplomatic climax came on September 16, when Olmert met Abbas and presented a package of proposals on the core final-status issues.[2][23] The package covered territory, Jerusalem, refugees, security arrangements, and a Gaza–West Bank connection. The INSS account records proposed Israeli annexation of 6.5 percent of the West Bank in exchange for 5.8 percent of Israeli territory, plus a 0.7 percent corridor connecting Gaza and the West Bank.[2] The Jewish Virtual Library gives varying figures, including annexation of approximately 6.4 percent, territorial compensation of 5.8 percent, a later 4.9 percent figure, and an overall Palestinian share of close to 94 percent of the West Bank.[5]

On Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research describes a Declaration of Principles and map under which Jewish neighborhoods built in Jerusalem after 1967, including Har Homa, would remain under Israeli sovereignty, while Arab neighborhoods would come under Palestinian sovereignty as the capital of a Palestinian state.[23] For the Holy Basin — encompassing the Old City, the City of David, and Mount Scopus — the proposal called for an international trusteeship involving Israel, a Palestinian state, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, while leaving the parties' underlying sovereignty claims unresolved.[23] On refugees, the INSS account records a proposal to admit 5,000 Palestinian refugees to Israel over five years.[2]

Olmert displayed the map but declined to give it to Abbas for further study.[23] The subsequent Palestinian response, and whether negotiations collapsed at that meeting or during the following weeks, remain disputed. The INSS account says Palestinian negotiators raised objections concerning territory, refugees, security, the Gaza–West Bank passage, and Jerusalem but submitted no counterproposal and gave no definitive response.[2] The Jerusalem Institute records that Abbas asked to take the map for consultation, Olmert declined, and a planned follow-up meeting between their representatives was postponed.[23]

Olmert and Abbas met again in mid-November and agreed to convene a working group to examine a map, but the Palestinians did not attend the planned meeting, citing the escalating situation in Gaza.[2] The Jewish Virtual Library account says Abbas told Olmert he needed to study the map but never responded or returned to the talks.[5]

Negotiations over Jerusalem had been difficult throughout the year. On January 22, Palestinian negotiators proposed an "open city" arrangement with separate entry checks and shared infrastructure; Livni responded that Israel needed "real borders."[23] On May 4, Palestinian representatives presented a Jerusalem map accepting Israeli annexation of several Jewish neighborhoods and the Jewish Quarter of the Old City while opposing annexation of Har Homa, Ma'ale Adumim, and Givat Ze'ev.[23] At a June 30 session, Qurei raised Jerusalem with Livni, who replied: "Since I cannot refer to it I won't say anything. I am going to just listen."[23] Palestinians continued to advocate an open city and municipal coordination, while Livni maintained that Israel required firm borders.[23]

On September 29, Olmert said publicly that Israel would have to give up "almost all" of the West Bank and accept division of Jerusalem to achieve peace, and that Palestinians should receive an equal amount of Israeli territory for land Israel retained.[10] Abbas separately described rejecting land-swap proposals that, in his view, would leave discontinuous Palestinian areas or deprive Palestinians of control over water resources.[10]

The Annapolis process ended without agreement. Talks were suspended several weeks before the December 27 Gaza operation, and Palestinian chief negotiator Ahmad Qurei formally suspended them on December 29.[10] The INSS account characterizes the process as approximately 300 meetings over eight months of intensive negotiations that ended without a deal.[1]

07Collapse of the Gaza Ceasefire, November–December

The Gaza lull began to break down on November 4, when Israeli forces entered Gaza to destroy a cross-border tunnel that Israeli officials said was intended for abducting soldiers.[3] The UN report's incident breakdown records six Hamas terrorists killed during the raid and ensuing air strike, while a CRS account gives seven Palestinian terrorists killed.[3][10] Hamas's al-Qassam Brigades fired more than 30 rockets into Israel, and both sides blamed the other for triggering the escalation.[3]

Israel closed Gaza's crossings on November 5, reopening them briefly for humanitarian supplies on November 24.[3] Israeli-source figures cited in the UN report showed rocket fire rising from one rocket in October to 125 in November, while mortar fire rose from one shell to 68.[16] Truck entries into Gaza fell 81 percent compared with October; most bakeries closed, and UNRWA suspended food distribution for five days to approximately 750,000 Gazans because of insufficient supplies.[16] A Washington Institute analysis published November 20 reported that in the preceding two weeks Israeli forces had killed 17 Palestinian fighters and Gaza terrorist groups had fired more than 140 rockets into Israel. It presented the incidents as a cycle of raids and retaliation that could heighten tensions, while noting that complete collapse was not certain.[25]

A Ynet report based on security-establishment figures said approximately 2,900 rockets and mortar shells had been fired toward Israel in the first eleven months of 2008, with November accounting for 148 rockets and 85 mortars — a dramatic departure from the July–October monthly average of five rockets and six mortars.[21]

On December 15, Israeli forces killed an Islamic Jihad commander in Nablus. The UN report says rocket and mortar fire subsequently increased and records Israeli-source totals of 71 rockets and 59 mortars from December 1 through 18. A rocket struck a Sderot shopping-center car park on December 17, injuring three people.[16]

On December 18, Gaza authorities declared that the ceasefire had ended and would not be renewed, citing Israel's alleged failure to end the blockade.[16] An Israeli government account dates Hamas's announcement ending the lull to December 19.[20] The same government summary records seven rockets and six mortar shells on December 19, ten rockets and 18 mortars on December 20, and a cumulative 27 rockets and 24 mortars by the afternoon of December 21.[20]

Egypt requested a 24-hour ceasefire on December 22; three rockets and one mortar were nonetheless fired from Gaza that day.[16] On December 24, the UN report recorded 30 rockets and 30 mortars, while the Meir Amit Center reported that the Kerem Shalom and Erez crossings were also shelled.[16][26] On December 26, a rocket fired from Gaza fell short and struck a house in northern Gaza, killing two Palestinian girls, aged five and twelve.[16] More than 100 trucks, including 40 for relief agencies, passed through Gaza's crossings that day, according to a UN secretary-general spokesman cited by the Meir Amit Center.[26]

Prime Minister Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni appealed for the violence to stop, and Egypt made further unsuccessful attempts to restore the arrangement, but the rocket fire continued.[4]

08Operation Cast Lead: Launch and First Days

At approximately 11:30 a.m. on December 27, Israeli aircraft began Operation Cast Lead with strikes on Hamas offices, strongholds, and infrastructure across Gaza.[4] The Israeli government's stated objectives were to stop the bombardment of Israeli civilians, destroy rocket and mortar launching apparatus and infrastructure, and reduce the ability of Hamas and other Gaza organizations to carry out future attacks.[27]

The initial strikes were on a large scale. Ynet reported that the first two waves involved 80 aircraft and helicopters and more than 100 bombs against dozens of targets.[4] By the operation's fourth day, it reported that approximately 500 targets had been destroyed, including an estimated two-thirds of Gaza's rocket-launching pads.[4]

Hamas responded with intensified rocket fire. An Israeli government summary records 61 rocket hits and 33 mortar shells on December 27.[20] The Meir Amit Center reported one Israeli civilian killed, 11 wounded, and 11 treated for shock that day. It also relayed Palestinian media and Hamas estimates of more than 250 Palestinians killed and more than 750 wounded; casualty totals and civilian-versus-combatant classifications were contested.[26]

The UN Fact-Finding Mission reports that attacks on police facilities began between 11:20 and 11:35 a.m. on December 27. It estimated that 99 policemen and nine members of the public were killed in attacks on a police headquarters and five stations it inspected.[3] The Mission concluded that the attacks deliberately targeted the policemen but said it had not been shown that the Gaza police as a whole were incorporated into armed forces or that the policemen killed that day were directly participating in hostilities.[3]

The Israeli government extended special home-front protective measures from communities within 13 miles of Gaza to include Ashdod and Ashkelon, approximately 25 miles away, and kept schools in the affected area closed.[4] The State Department's human-rights report states that at least 315 Palestinians, including some civilians, had been killed in the late-December air strikes by December 31.[6]

09Aftermath and Annual Totals

Operation Cast Lead continued into January 2009, shifting from an air campaign to an air-and-ground operation on January 3 and ending with ceasefires in mid-January. A CRS overview gives overall-operation totals of more than 1,100 and possibly more than 1,400 Palestinians killed and 13 Israelis killed, including three civilians; these figures cover the full conflict rather than 2008 alone.[16][10]

Annual attack figures for 2008 vary by source and methodology. The State Department's human-rights report gives 1,571 rockets and 1,531 mortar shells fired into Israel, while its terrorism report gives approximately 1,750 rockets and 1,528 mortars.[11][7] A Ynet report based on Israeli security-establishment figures cited approximately 2,900 combined rockets and mortar shells for the first eleven months.[21]

The Shin Bet's annual summary, as reported by Ynet, recorded 36 people killed in Palestinian attacks by December 29, compared with 13 in 2007.[24] Its breakdown included eight Israeli civilians killed by rocket fire, four soldiers killed in bomb attacks, seven people killed in shootings on the Gaza border, 14 deaths in Jerusalem attacks, and one Israeli civilian killed in the Dimona suicide bombing.[24] The figures were issued while fighting in Gaza was continuing.

The State Department estimated that Israeli military operations killed 782 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza during 2008.[6] It also reported that 10 Israeli soldiers and 19 Israeli civilians in the territories were killed and that 24 civilians were killed in attacks inside Israel.[6] For the full Gaza operation, the UN Fact-Finding Mission listed differing totals from named sources ranging from 1,166 according to the Israeli military to 1,444 according to Gaza authorities, while declining to make its own finding on the total or civilian proportion.[16]

10Historiography and Contested Accounts

The ceasefire's duration was disputed from the outset: the Meir Amit Center reports that Israel regarded it as having no fixed end date, while Hamas and other organizations described a six-month term.[17] The date of Hamas's declaration that the lull had ended also differs between the UN Fact-Finding Mission, which gives December 18, and an Israeli government account, which gives December 19.[16][20]

The November 4 tunnel raid is likewise described through competing frames. Israel said it was a defensive operation intended to prevent an abduction, while Hamas characterized it as an aggression that broke the ceasefire. Sources also differ over whether six or seven Palestinian terrorists were killed during the raid and ensuing exchange.[3][10]

Accounts of Olmert's September 16 proposal and Abbas's response differ over territorial percentages, whether Abbas responded affirmatively, negatively, or not at all, and how close the parties were to an agreement. The INSS account records Palestinian objections but no counterproposal or definitive response, while the Jerusalem Institute presents both Olmert's account that Abbas gave no clear answer and another account suggesting Abbas accepted the trusteeship concept in principle while disputing its boundaries.[2][23]

The February Gaza operation is called "Operation Warm Winter" in State Department reporting and "Operation Hot Winter" in UN reporting.[7][13] Casualty totals and civilian-versus-combatant classifications for Operation Cast Lead also differ substantially among Israeli military, UN, Palestinian NGO, and Gaza-authority accounts.[16][28] The UN Fact-Finding Mission alleged possible war crimes and grave violations of international and humanitarian law, findings disputed by Israel and later partially qualified by the Mission's lead author, Justice Richard Goldstone.[29]

Sources

  1. 1Institute for National Security Studies, The Annapolis Process: A Missed Opportunity for a Two-State Solution?, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  2. 2Institute for National Security Studies, Package of Core Issues, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  3. 3UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (Goldstone Report), hosted on gov.il, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  4. 4Ynetnews, Operation Cast Lead (2008), accessed on September 28, 2026.
  5. 5Jewish Virtual Library, Ehud Olmert’s Peace Offer, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  6. 6Jewish Virtual Library, Report on Human Rights Practices: Palestinian Territories, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  7. 7U.S. Department of State, Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  8. 8EveryCRSReport, The Egypt-Gaza Border and its Effect on Israeli-Egyptian Relations, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  9. 9Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Why Egypt Is Concerned about Gaza, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  10. 10EveryCRSReport, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  11. 11U.S. Department of State, Israel and the occupied territories, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  12. 12Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Israel’s War to Halt Palestinian Rocket Attacks, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  13. 13United Nations Digital Library, General Assembly document A/64/490, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  14. 14Mako, Massacre in Jerusalem: 8 Yeshiva Students Murdered, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  15. 15Ynet, Gilad Shalit timeline: 1,934 days in Hamas captivity, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  16. 16Jewish Virtual Library, UN Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Mission, Gaza Conflict (Goldstone Report), accessed on September 28, 2026.
  17. 17Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, The Six Months of the Lull Arrangement, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  18. 18Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, The Hamas Interest in the Tahdiya (Temporary Truce) with Israel, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  19. 19Ynet, Gaza crossings to remain closed due to rocket attack, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  20. 20Israeli government, Summary of rocket fire and mortar shelling in 2008, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  21. 21Ynet, Despite the Calm: Sharp Surge in Rocket Fire from Gaza in 2008, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  22. 22Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Chapter 3: The Security Significance of a Division, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  23. 23Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, Peace Talks on Jerusalem, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  24. 24Ynet, 2008, According to the Shin Bet: Hamas Grew Stronger, More Were Murdered, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  25. 25The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Military Consequences of a Gaza Ceasefire Collapse, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  26. 26Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Update No. 1, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  27. 27Israeli government, The Operation in Gaza: Factual and Legal Aspects, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  28. 28Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Civilian Casualties in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Compared to Other Conflicts Involving Western Forces, accessed on September 28, 2026.
  29. 29Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, International Law - Media Perspectives : Gaza Fact-Finding Mission, accessed on September 28, 2026.

IsraelPedia Question & Answers

  • What was the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in 2008?

    The Israeli–Palestinian conflict in 2008 was a year of parallel diplomatic and military crises defined by two main tracks: the Annapolis process, in which Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas pursued a permanent two-state settlement through approximately 300 meetings over eight months of intensive talks, and an escalating cycle of rocket fire and military operations centered on the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. The year began with intensive peace negotiations and ended with Israel launching Operation Cast Lead on December 27.

  • What did Olmert propose to Abbas in September 2008?

    On September 16, Olmert met Abbas and presented a package of proposals covering territory, Jerusalem, refugees, security arrangements, and a Gaza–West Bank connection. On territory, one account records proposed Israeli annexation of 6.5 percent of the West Bank in exchange for 5.8 percent of Israeli territory, plus a corridor connecting Gaza and the West Bank. On Jerusalem, the proposal called for Jewish neighborhoods built after 1967 to remain under Israeli sovereignty, Arab neighborhoods to come under Palestinian sovereignty, and an international trusteeship over the Holy Basin involving Israel, a Palestinian state, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. On refugees, the proposal included admitting 5,000 Palestinian refugees to Israel over five years. Olmert displayed a map but declined to leave it with Abbas, and the subsequent Palestinian response remains disputed.

  • What were the terms of the 2008 Gaza ceasefire, and when did it take effect?

    The Egyptian-brokered ceasefire, known as a "lull," took effect at 6:00 a.m. on June 19, 2008. Its terms, as reported to the UN Fact-Finding Mission, included Gaza authorities halting attacks by Palestinian armed groups and Israel ceasing military operations in Gaza, with Israel also reportedly agreeing to ease the blockade and gradually lift restrictions on many imports. The arrangement was unwritten, and the parties' understandings of its terms differed significantly — Hamas and other organizations described a six-month term, while the Meir Amit Center reported that Israel regarded the lull as having no fixed time limit.

  • What triggered the collapse of the Gaza ceasefire in November 2008?

    The Gaza lull began to break down on November 4, when Israeli forces entered Gaza to destroy a cross-border tunnel that Israeli officials said was intended for abducting soldiers. Hamas's al-Qassam Brigades responded by firing more than 30 rockets into Israel, and both sides blamed the other for triggering the escalation. Israeli-source figures cited in the UN report showed rocket fire rising from one rocket in October to 125 in November, and mortar fire rising from one shell to 68. On December 18, Gaza authorities declared the ceasefire had ended and would not be renewed.

  • How did Operation Cast Lead begin?

    Operation Cast Lead began at approximately 11:30 a.m. on December 27, when Israeli aircraft struck Hamas offices, strongholds, and infrastructure across Gaza. The first two waves involved 80 aircraft and helicopters and more than 100 bombs against dozens of targets. The Israeli government's stated objectives were to stop the bombardment of Israeli civilians, destroy rocket and mortar launching apparatus and infrastructure, and reduce the ability of Hamas and other Gaza organizations to carry out future attacks. Hamas responded with intensified rocket fire, and an Israeli government summary records 61 rocket hits and 33 mortar shells on December 27 alone.

  • What were the overall casualty figures for Operation Cast Lead?

    Casualty figures for Operation Cast Lead were contested and varied substantially by source. A CRS overview gives overall-operation totals of more than 1,100 and possibly more than 1,400 Palestinians killed and 13 Israelis killed, including three civilians. The UN Fact-Finding Mission listed differing totals from named sources ranging from 1,166 according to the Israeli military to 1,444 according to Gaza authorities, while declining to make its own finding on the total or the proportion of civilians.

  • How many people were killed in Palestinian attacks inside Israel during 2008?

    The Shin Bet's annual summary, as reported by Ynet, recorded 36 people killed in Palestinian attacks by December 29, 2008, compared with 13 in 2007. The breakdown included eight Israeli civilians killed by rocket fire, four soldiers killed in bomb attacks, seven people killed in shootings on the Gaza border, 14 deaths in Jerusalem attacks, and one Israeli civilian killed in the Dimona suicide bombing. These figures were issued while fighting in Gaza was still continuing.