Arab–Israeli Relations

Arab–Israeli relations encompass disputes and negotiations over immigration, land, resources, communal rights, and access to holy sites, as well as relations between governments.[1] Their historical scope extends from the Ottoman period through the establishment of Israel and subsequent regional diplomacy, with Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union among the outside powers involved.[1] The interstate and Israeli–Palestinian dimensions are connected, but agreements between Israel and individual Arab states have followed different courses.[4]

The regional conflict that developed around Israel’s establishment consisted of linked but distinct conflicts with its Arab neighbors, rather than a single bilateral confrontation.[4] Egypt and Jordan eventually concluded peace treaties with Israel through separate diplomatic processes, while the Palestinian question continued to connect regional political concerns.[4] The treaties reduced the likelihood of another multi-front war, although security challenges persisted.[3]

Diplomatic recognition has not always meant extensive social contact or public acceptance.[2] Relations have ranged from secret meetings without diplomatic ties to formal government cooperation and broader exchanges involving businesses, tourists, and cultural institutions.[2] The Abraham Accords expanded public engagement beyond the earlier Egyptian and Jordanian treaty relationships, including trade, tourism, investment, and reciprocal diplomatic representation.[3]

The conflict’s late nineteenth-century origins involved Jewish nationalism, or Zionism, and Palestinian Arab nationalism seeking political control in Palestine.[5] Zionism sought a Jewish homeland, while Arabs across the Middle East pursued self-determination and independence from European colonial powers.[3] Under the British Mandate, increased Jewish immigration accompanied growing tensions and clashes involving Arabs, Jews, and British authorities.[3] Palestinian opposition to immigration and Zionism included concerns about domination or expulsion, demands for restrictions on immigration and land sales, and calls for Palestinian independence.[5]

On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, proposing partition into Jewish and Arab states.[6] The Jewish Yishuv leadership welcomed the plan, while Palestinian Arab leaders and the Arab League rejected it, arguing that partition was unfair to Palestine’s Arab majority.[3] Fighting between Jewish and Arab groups began after the vote and escalated as Britain withdrew.[6]

Israel declared independence on May 14, 1948, after which armies from Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq entered the conflict; Saudi forces fought alongside Egypt.[6][7] The War of Independence thus developed from fighting between communities within Palestine into warfare involving neighboring states.[8] More than 6,000 Israelis died during the war.[9]

The war also produced extensive displacement.[3] Roughly 700,000 Palestinians were driven or fled from their homes during and after the conflict, with many becoming refugees in areas controlled by Jordan or Egypt or in nearby Arab countries.[3] Palestinians call this displacement the Nakba, meaning “catastrophe,” while Palestinians who remained in Israel became Israeli citizens.[3] Hundreds of thousands of Jews were subsequently forced out of Middle Eastern and North African countries.[10]

UN-assisted negotiations produced general armistice agreements with Egypt on February 24, 1949, Lebanon on March 23, Jordan on April 3, and Syria on July 20.[11] Iraq did not conclude an armistice with Israel and refused to negotiate.[12] The agreements established lines based on military positions rather than a comprehensive regional peace settlement.[6][7]

Jordan held the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and eastern Jerusalem, while Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip; Jerusalem was divided between Israeli and Jordanian control.[7][12] Israel hoped that armistices would lead to peace treaties, but Arab states did not recognize it and a broad boycott continued.[7] Security Council Resolution 73 nevertheless characterized the armistice agreements as an important step toward permanent peace.[11]

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion characterized the agreements as military arrangements governing lines and the movement and deployment of forces, rather than settlements of political or territorial questions.[13] He regarded them as a step toward peace while warning that peace with the Arab countries had not yet been achieved.[13] Official meetings following the 1949 Rhodes armistice accords generally remained low-level for nearly two decades, addressing security incidents, water, and refugees, alongside higher-level private contacts.[14]

The 1956 Suez Crisis combined Israeli–Egyptian tensions with Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal.[15] The preceding period included cross-border incursions and Israeli reprisals, restrictions on Israeli shipping through the canal and Straits of Tiran, and an Egyptian–Syrian–Jordanian military alliance.[8][12] Following a secret October meeting at Sèvres, Israel, Britain, and France coordinated war against Egypt; the fighting began on October 29.[8]

Israeli forces captured Sinai and Gaza during an eight-day campaign.[12] American and Soviet pressure helped bring about withdrawal, and a UN Emergency Force was established.[15] Israel withdrew in stages between November 1956 and March 1957, following arrangements for the emergency force and Egyptian assurances concerning navigation in the Gulf of Eilat.[12] Egypt dropped its blockade of Eilat.[15]

The crisis preceding the Six-Day War in 1967 included Palestinian cross-border attacks and Israeli reprisals, Syrian bombardment of Israeli villages, and a false Soviet report that Israel had massed troops on Syria’s border.[15][16] Egypt deployed forces in Sinai, demanded the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.[16] Egypt also formed a military alliance with Jordan, while Syria and Jordan mobilized forces.[12][17]

Israel struck Egypt on June 5, and Jordan and Syria entered the fighting.[17] During the June 5–10 war, Israel took Sinai and Gaza from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.[16] These territorial changes placed the territories’ status and the terms of a negotiated settlement at the center of subsequent diplomacy.[15] Israel became responsible for approximately one million Arabs in the captured areas.[18]

At the August–September 1967 Khartoum summit, Arab heads of state declared “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it.”[19] They also called for Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in the June war, affirmed Palestinian rights, and addressed Arab coordination, military preparation, economic support for affected states, and the use of oil to support Arab goals.[19]

Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on November 22, 1967, called for Israeli armed forces to withdraw from “territories occupied in the recent conflict” and for the termination of claims or states of belligerency.[20] It also affirmed sovereignty, territorial integrity, secure and recognized boundaries, freedom of navigation, a just settlement of the refugee problem, and measures to guarantee territorial inviolability.[20] The resolution became a framework for later diplomacy.[11]

The 1969–70 War of Attrition along the Suez Canal ended with an American-imposed ceasefire.[8] On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack on Israeli forces in Sinai and the Golan Heights, crossing the Suez Canal and advancing on the Golan.[12][21] Early Arab gains and heavy Israeli casualties were followed by Israeli recovery and an Israeli crossing of the canal.[15] Other Arab states participated, and Saudi Arabia provided financial support.[22]

The United States airlifted weapons to Israel while the Soviet Union resupplied Egypt and Syria, bringing the superpowers close to a nuclear confrontation.[21] Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on October 22, called for an immediate ceasefire, implementation of Resolution 242, and negotiations for a just and durable peace.[11] Fighting continued for approximately three weeks, and a ceasefire followed on October 25.[12][22]

The war prompted an Arab oil embargo against the United States and some Western European countries, causing international economic upheaval.[21] It also opened the way for Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, which produced Israeli–Egyptian and Israeli–Syrian disengagement agreements.[21] Disengagement arrangements in 1974 and 1975 established a step-by-step diplomatic process that ultimately helped pave the way for Egyptian–Israeli peace.[15]

On November 20, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat met Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and addressed the Knesset, becoming the first Arab leader to visit Israel officially.[23] Sadat had declared himself “ready to travel to the ends of the earth” to protect Egyptian lives and expressed willingness to go to the Knesset.[23] His visit opened a new phase of direct diplomacy.[24]

At Camp David in September 1978, Sadat, Begin, and US President Jimmy Carter negotiated two framework documents: one for an Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty and another addressing Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza.[24] The summit did not itself produce a formal peace treaty.[24] Disagreements over territories, settlements, and the terms and timing of withdrawal complicated the negotiations that followed.[24]

The treaty signed on March 26, 1979, ended the state of war and made Egypt the first Arab state to establish diplomatic normalization with Israel.[23][25] It provided for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians from Sinai and the resumption of full Egyptian sovereignty there.[25] Israel completed its Sinai withdrawal in 1982, while the status of the Taba area was resolved later.[26][27]

The agreement provided for normal and friendly diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts, and security arrangements including limited-force zones and UN personnel.[25] It barred the use of force, required peaceful settlement of disagreements, and addressed free passage through specified international waterways.[27] Its preamble presented the treaty as a step toward a comprehensive settlement and invited other Arab parties to join the peace process.[25]

Israel’s embassy in Cairo opened in February 1980, followed by Egypt’s embassy in Israel in March.[27] The parties signed at least 50 civilian agreements in 1980–1981, although many were ultimately not implemented.[2] The intended fields of cooperation included trade, culture, movement of people and vehicles, civil aviation, and access to ports.[2]

Other Arab governments opposed the treaty as a separate peace that damaged Arab unity and Palestinian rights.[26] Egypt was suspended from the Arab League, the League moved its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis, and many Arab states recalled ambassadors or cut diplomatic relations.[26] Egypt nevertheless regained Sinai and began diplomatic and commercial relations with Israel.[26]

The relationship developed into a “cold peace”: official ties endured, but popular normalization remained limited and vulnerable to regional and domestic tensions.[2] Egypt recalled its ambassador after Israel’s 1982 Lebanon operation and during the violence beginning in 2000, and suspended most intergovernmental ties after Operation Defensive Shield in March 2002.[27] Diplomatic relations and cooperation in trade, agriculture, and tourism nevertheless continued.[27] Under Hosni Mubarak, Egypt upheld the treaty and mediated in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process without moving to full popular normalization.[28]

The October 1991 Madrid Peace Conference brought Israeli, Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese delegations together with a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation under American and Soviet auspices.[12][29] It was the first gathering of all the parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict for direct negotiations.[29] The conference launched bilateral and multilateral tracks, including discussions on refugees, security, the environment, economic development, and water.[29][30]

The bilateral negotiations later deadlocked and were overtaken by separate Israeli–Palestinian and Israeli–Jordanian processes.[29] Negotiations with Syria eventually collapsed over disagreement about the border by Lake Tiberias.[31] Madrid also opened wider regional contacts, while the subsequent peace process included low-level institutional ties between Israel and several Arab states.[4]

Secret Oslo negotiations led to the September 1993 Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.[31] Mutual recognition accompanied the agreement: Israel accepted the PLO as representative of the Palestinians, while the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and renounced terrorism.[31] The framework envisaged a Palestinian Authority and a five-year transfer of governing responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza, followed by permanent-status negotiations on borders, refugees, and Jerusalem.[31]

The 1994 Cairo Agreement covered Israeli withdrawal from most of Gaza and Jericho.[31] The 1995 Taba agreement, also called Oslo II, broadened Palestinian self-government and divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, with different arrangements for Palestinian control, Israeli control, and Israeli military responsibility alongside Palestinian civil administration.[12][31] It also provided for elections and bilateral cooperation.[31] By the end of 2000, permanent-status questions remained unresolved and renewed Israeli–Palestinian violence had followed the peace process.[31]

Israel and Jordan had maintained extensive clandestine contacts before public negotiations.[2] King Hussein met senior Israeli decision-makers at least 50 times before the peace treaty, illustrating the depth of contact that preceded formal recognition.[2] Three years of talks following Madrid culminated in a July 1994 declaration ending their 46-year state of war.[12]

The treaty signed on October 26, 1994, established peace and full diplomatic and consular relations, and defined an international boundary while preserving the status question of territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967.[32] It established security commitments and water-sharing arrangements concerning the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers and Arava/Araba groundwater.[32] The treaty recognized Jordan’s special role regarding Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem and called for access to places of religious and historical significance.[32][33]

Water arrangements had particular symbolic importance: before the agreement, Hussein quoted the Quranic verse “And We created every living thing from water” while presenting the arrangements as a religious duty.[34] Cooperation also extended to economic and cultural relations, counterterrorism, and efforts concerning refugees and displaced persons.[2][33] Fifteen bilateral agreements implemented economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation, although relations experienced strains, including Jordan’s recall of its ambassador in 2000.[35]

Other forms of engagement expanded during the same period.[12] Israel established interest offices with Morocco and Tunisia in 1994, trade representation offices with Oman and Qatar in 1996, and full diplomatic relations with Mauritania by 1999.[12] These arrangements were distinct from the full peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan.[12]

Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah proposed the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002, and the Arab League adopted a revised version at its Beirut summit that March.[36] It called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories to the June 4, 1967 line, a just solution to the Palestinian refugee issue in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194, and an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital.[36] In return, Arab states would consider the conflict ended, make peace with Israel, and establish normal relations.[36]

The Arab League readopted the initiative in 2007.[37] Some Israeli politicians welcomed it, while others objected to what they regarded as preconditions concerning borders and refugees.[37] The proposal did not restart stalled Israeli–Palestinian negotiations.[38]

In August 2020, Israel and the United Arab Emirates announced normalization, with Israel stating that it would suspend plans to extend sovereignty over parts of the West Bank.[39] On September 15, Israel signed separate US-mediated instruments with the UAE and Bahrain: a full peace treaty with the UAE and a Bahraini declaration committing to full diplomatic relations.[39] The Abraham Accords Declaration called for interfaith and intercultural dialogue.[40]

Morocco’s normalization agreement followed on December 22, 2020.[40] Sudan announced a normalization agreement on October 23, 2020, and signed the general declaration on January 6, 2021, but its bilateral process stalled.[40] Implementation appeared to be on hold after Sudan’s military seized power in October 2021.[3]

The UAE and Bahrain established reciprocal embassies with Israel in 2021, while Israel and Morocco reopened liaison offices.[3] Trade, tourism, and investment generally deepened, with commitments extending to health care and security cooperation.[3][41] Economic and security interests, including shared concerns about Iran’s regional influence, helped bring previously less-public ties into the open.[41] Israel–UAE trade exceeded half a billion dollars in the first year of normalized relations.[41]

The March 2022 Negev Summit brought together diplomats from Israel, the United States, Abraham Accords countries, and Egypt.[42] The accords were followed by diplomatic appointments and efforts to expand cultural, economic, and security ties.[42] Practical engagement included direct flights, tourism, trade, and cultural cooperation, although Sudan did not proceed with the same concrete steps as the other partners.[43]

The Gaza war strained relations without immediately dismantling the new diplomatic framework.[44] A September 2024 account recorded continued official ties and increased bilateral trade with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco during the period examined, alongside Jordan’s recall of its ambassador.[44] By September 2025, none of the Abraham Accords signatories had suspended or withdrawn from the agreements, and quiet engagement continued, although further normalization efforts, particularly with Saudi Arabia, were paused.[45]

The war nevertheless interrupted regional cooperation: Negev Forum activity was suspended, and Jordan suspended a proposed water-for-energy project.[42] Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE expressed mistrust and frustration over Israel’s conduct while remaining committed to their agreements.[42] These developments describe the assessments available at the time of publication rather than guaranteeing the agreements’ future course.[45]

Normalization has operated through three broad patterns: informal and often clandestine ties without diplomatic relations; formal functional relations centered on public diplomacy and government cooperation; and fuller normalization involving both governments and people.[2] The meaning of normalization has differed in Israeli and Arab contexts, while civil-society opposition and political events have influenced how visible and extensive relations became.[2]

Peace treaties provide practical mechanisms beyond recognition.[25][32] The Egyptian treaty combined diplomatic and economic relations with withdrawal, international boundaries, navigation provisions, and security restrictions.[25] The Jordanian treaty addressed water allocation, security, counterterrorism, economic relations, refugees, and religious access.[32][33] These arrangements enabled cooperation on recurring material concerns even when political relations became strained.[2]

Formal agreements have not eliminated public opposition.[2] Egyptian civilian agreements were frequently left unimplemented, while Jordanian relations alternated between cooperation and resistance to normalization.[2] During the 2021 fighting, Abraham Accords partners criticized Israel over Palestinian rights and Al-Aqsa Mosque without practical changes to economic agreements; the later Gaza war intensified public anger and prompted their governments to participate in humanitarian assistance to Gaza residents.[43]

Government cooperation and public sentiment therefore have not necessarily moved together.[2] Security and economic contacts with Jordan continued alongside opposition to normalization, while the Egyptian relationship preserved diplomatic and practical cooperation through repeated regional crises.[27][46] The newer agreements likewise supported commercial and diplomatic activity despite sharply critical political statements during warfare.[43][44]

The 1979 Egyptian and 1994 Jordanian treaties reduced the likelihood of another multi-front war involving Israel, while leaving other security challenges in place.[3] They also demonstrated that individual Arab states could conclude agreements addressing their own territorial, security, and economic priorities rather than await one comprehensive regional settlement.[4][25]

The Abraham Accords broadened that pattern by advancing relations with states outside the earlier Egyptian and Jordanian treaty sequence.[41] Public diplomatic representation, trade, investment, and tourism gave relations a wider practical scope, while shared security interests contributed to engagement.[3][41] Their survival during the Gaza war, as assessed in 2025, demonstrated the durability of formal commitments alongside the vulnerability of wider regional initiatives.[42][45]

Interstate peace and Israeli–Palestinian diplomacy nevertheless remained distinct tracks.[3] Oslo’s unresolved permanent-status issues and the Palestinian leadership’s criticism of normalization before fulfillment of Palestinian national demands underscored that regional recognition did not itself settle borders, Jerusalem, refugees, or Palestinian statehood.[3][31] Arab–Israeli relations thus combined substantial diplomatic achievements with continuing political disputes over the terms of a broader settlement.[3]

Historical debate concerns responsibility for the wars, the circumstances of Palestinian displacement, and differing Israeli and Palestinian national narratives.[3][16] Interpretation of Resolution 242 has been particularly consequential: Israel linked withdrawal to formal peace and agreed boundaries, while Arab states initially demanded total withdrawal before negotiations on an overall settlement.[11]

The relationship between normalization and Palestinian national demands remains another significant dispute.[3] Palestinian leaders criticized the 2020 agreements for preceding a Palestinian settlement, while the UAE presented the delay of Israeli annexation plans as an achievement; Palestinian leaders argued that the agreement instead legitimized the status quo.[3] Disagreement also surrounds the Arab Peace Initiative’s territorial and refugee terms, although some Israeli politicians welcomed the proposal.[37] These disputes concern the conditions and sequence of a broader peace, rather than erasing the separate diplomatic agreements already concluded.[3]