Israel–Sweden Relations

Swedish officials participated in the international deliberations over Mandatory Palestine before Israel’s establishment. Justice Emil Sandström chaired the UN Special Committee on Palestine in 1947, and Sweden voted for the UN partition plan recommending independent Jewish and Arab states.[6] Sweden also voted for the plan on November 29, 1947, and accounts of the early relationship describe it as warm, including Swedish volunteers working on kibbutzim.[7]

The Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte became the first UN mediator for Palestine. Appointed on May 21, 1948, he worked on truce supervision, mediation, and the emerging refugee problem.[4] His September 16 progress report acknowledged that “a Jewish State called Israel exists in Palestine” and said there were no sound reasons to assume it would not continue to exist. The report also recommended international UN control of Jerusalem and reallocating the Negev as Arab territory.[4] Another account says Bernadotte proposed replacing separate Arab and Jewish states with a union that would include a small Jewish entity and an enlarged Transjordan; the Israeli government rejected that proposal.[5]

Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem on September 17, 1948, by members of LEHI, before Sweden recognized Israel.[5] Rosenne reports that Bernadotte’s recommendations were widely believed to have led to the assassination, but his account does not establish them as its cause.[4] The distinction between the assassins and the Israeli government was also explicit in an account published in the 1951 Anglo-Jewish Association yearbook: after an Israeli inquiry acknowledged “grave gaps” in police work, Israel decided to pay compensation to the United Nations while maintaining that the crime had been committed by opponents of the government, not government agents.[8]

Sweden and Israel established diplomatic relations in 1949. Available reference tables give different dates under different headings: one lists January 1949 for recognized relations, while another specifies February 15, 1949, as Sweden’s recognition of Israel.[9][10] A 1951 yearbook, meanwhile, says Sweden granted de jure recognition in July 1950, after accepting Israel’s explanation concerning the Bernadotte assassination. It describes relations as still “slightly over-clouded” by the aftermath of the murder and records that Israel’s minister for Scandinavia, Abraham Nissan, arrived in Stockholm in mid-August 1950.[8] These accounts identify different milestones, and the January and February 1949 dates should not be treated as necessarily describing the same act as the de jure recognition reported for 1950.

The early relationship also included Jewish and humanitarian connections. The Swedish Europe Help Organisation donated 750,000 kroners, given in the yearbook as approximately £50,000, to Youth Aliyah to help establish a hospital in Israel. The yearbook also reports that Jews who had arrived in Sweden from 1945 onward continued to emigrate to Israel, the United States, and other countries.[8]

Sweden’s UN role continued through individual diplomats. After the 1967 Six-Day War, Security Council Resolution 242 called for a special representative to help promote agreement and a peaceful settlement. Dr. Gunnar Jarring, then Sweden’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, was appointed the UN Secretary-General’s representative to the Middle East while retaining his Moscow assignment. He arrived in the region in early 1968 and met Israeli and Arab leaders; the account says Arab states refused direct or indirect contact with Israel.[11]

Accounts describe a significant change in Sweden’s approach to Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict from the late 1960s and early 1970s, though they differ in emphasis and interpretation. A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs article dates a worsening of Swedish policy toward Israel to Olof Palme’s rise as Social Democratic Party leader at the end of the 1960s. Its author argues that Palme shifted Sweden away from Israel and toward a pro-Arab policy, and reports that Sweden was the first European country to invite Yasser Arafat for an official visit; the article does not give the visit’s date.[12] A Jerusalem Post commentary describes a major policy shift under Palme as prime minister in the early 1970s, connecting his activist interpretation of Swedish neutrality and support for national liberation movements with a stronger Swedish orientation toward Palestinian claims. It presents that account as an interpretation of a politically contested period.[6]

A Ynet account similarly says relations changed after the Six-Day War and more sharply after Palme became prime minister in 1969. It characterizes his policy as anti-American, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist, and says Sweden subsequently advanced proposals and cast votes against Israel in international bodies.[7] These characterizations are not uncontested descriptions of the period: another account quotes Swedish foreign minister Ann Linde saying Sweden had maintained good relations with Israel since the 1950s.[7] The sources thus describe both a history of Swedish diplomatic engagement and a pronounced disagreement over how to interpret its political orientation.

A later thaw is associated in one commentary with Prime Minister Göran Persson’s efforts to normalize relations between 1999 and 2001. The Jerusalem Post account says Persson expressed greater understanding for Israel’s positions in the conflict and identifies his 1999 visit to Israel—the first Swedish prime-ministerial visit since 1962—as a manifestation of that diplomatic thaw.[6] The same commentary reports that Sweden facilitated two rounds of secret, high-level Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 2000, headed by Israeli minister Shlomo Ben-Ami and Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurei, in the diplomatic process leading up to the Camp David Summit.[6]

The most consequential recent diplomatic rupture followed Sweden’s recognition of Palestinian statehood on October 30, 2014. Sweden’s newly elected government had announced its intention to recognize a Palestinian state, and Prime Minister Stefan Löfven presented the policy as an effort to encourage negotiations and a two-state solution.[13][14] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy describes Sweden as the first major EU member to take this step. In a broader European count, the article groups Sweden with Iceland’s 2011 recognition and the Vatican’s 2015 diplomatic treaty, while noting that Cyprus and Malta had recognized Palestine in 1988 before joining the EU.[2]

Sweden’s stated argument was that recognition could make negotiations more equal by replacing talks between Israel and an entity without full state recognition with negotiations between two states. Swedish officials said the objective was to help build a future in which Israel and Palestine could live “in peaceful coexistence with secure and recognized borders.”[2] Foreign Minister Margot Wallström described recognition as support for Palestinian self-determination, arguing that it could improve Palestinians’ starting position in negotiations and offer young people hope.[14] Sweden framed the decision as a contribution to negotiations; Israel objected that recognition before an agreement risked encouraging unilateral action instead.

Israel protested the decision and temporarily recalled its ambassador from Stockholm.[2] The U.S. State Department’s October 30 briefing record contains a reporter’s description of Israel recalling its ambassador in protest; the spokesperson said the United States supported Palestinian statehood but held that it should result from direct negotiations addressing final-status issues and ending the conflict.[15] Israeli officials argued that unilateral foreign-policy steps could jeopardize negotiations and that recognition might reduce Palestinian incentives to negotiate by allowing the Palestinian side to seek pressure on Israel through international bodies.[2] At the UN on November 24, Israeli ambassador Ron Prosor criticized recognition before a negotiated agreement as rewarding unilateral action and diminishing incentives for negotiations. He called it “nothing more than an historic mistake.”[16]

Prosor also alleged that the Swedish government was seeking Arab support for a seat on the UN Security Council. That was his allegation, not an established account of Sweden’s motive.[16] Swedish officials defended the policy as a way to support self-determination and improve the prospects for negotiations, while Israel’s objection was that recognition without an agreement could undermine the negotiation process.[2][14] These opposing rationales became central to the diplomatic dispute.

Israel returned its ambassador on November 29, 2014, after recalling him for consultations. The date coincided with the anniversary of the 1947 UN partition vote; Israel’s Foreign Ministry said that choice was intended to emphasize Israel’s stated support for a two-state solution, and a ministry spokesman said the recall had conveyed Israel’s displeasure and relations would return to normal.[17] The Congressional Research Service placed Sweden’s recognition within a wider series of Palestinian efforts to secure international recognition, noting that parliamentary resolutions supporting recognition had also passed in the United Kingdom, France, and Spain.[18]

In February 2015, the Palestinian Authority opened an embassy in Sweden, an event described as further straining Israel–Sweden ties. A Jewish Virtual Library account also reports that Löfven and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas signed an agreement for Sweden to increase aid to the Palestinian Authority by $180 million by 2020.[13] These developments added to the political significance of Sweden’s recognition, though they did not end diplomatic relations between Sweden and Israel.

Another public dispute arose in December 2015, when Wallström called for investigations into Palestinian deaths during a wave of violence and accused Israel of unlawful extrajudicial killings. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sharply rejected her comments and calls for investigations; the opposing statements became a prominent source of tension between the governments.[13] The allegations and responses are recorded here as attributed positions rather than as settled findings about the events in question.

A separate controversy in 2009 concerned an article published by the Swedish daily Aftonbladet. A critical commentary reports that a freelance writer’s article alleged Israeli military and medical institutions had colluded to harvest organs from Palestinians. The allegation prompted complaints to Swedish authorities, but Chancellor of Justice Göran Lambertz decided on September 19 not to open an investigation.[19] The same commentary says Sweden’s ambassador to Israel expressed disgust at the article, while the foreign ministry in Stockholm distanced itself from her statement and said she did not have the government’s backing. Accounts differed over whether Foreign Minister Carl Bildt had planned a visit to Israel and why it was called off.[19] The report does not establish the original allegation as true.

Relations began to improve around the end of 2017, following visits to Israel by two senior Swedish officials and the arrival in Stockholm of Israel’s new ambassador, Ilan Ben-Dov. An account of the period describes a “new atmosphere and approach” to bilateral relations.[13] In 2019, Linde said Sweden wanted “more cooperation with Israel, not less,” and that Stockholm did not support boycotts of Israel.[13] A World Jewish Congress account credits her term as foreign minister, from 2019 to 2022, with efforts to mend ties through dialogue and attention to mutual concerns; it says the government of Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson has fostered good relations with Israel.[1]

Despite the thaw, ministerial contacts remained limited for several years. Prime Minister Löfven visited Israel in January 2020 for the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. The visit was described as the first by a Swedish prime minister to Israel in 21 years; the same account reports that no Israeli officials met with him.[13] In September 2021, Israeli foreign minister Yair Lapid and Linde spoke, and they met again later that month. In October, Linde said they had agreed to resume full diplomatic relations after a meeting at a foreign ministers’ conference in Brussels; she said the countries could have productive relations despite disagreements.[7]

Linde visited Jerusalem on October 18, 2021, in what was described as the first visit to Israel by a Swedish foreign minister since the 2014 recognition.[20] She reaffirmed Sweden’s commitment to Israel’s security, supported a two-state solution, and said Israel’s security concerns needed to be addressed.[7][20] The ministers discussed cooperation in innovation, culture, trade, and technology, as well as antisemitism and regional issues. Linde also supported normalization between Israel and Arab countries as positive for peace and security.[20]

Reports of Sweden’s conduct in international forums accompanied the rapprochement. Ynet says Sweden had stopped initiating anti-Israel proposals and in some international forums abstained rather than voting against Israel. It also reports Swedish support for Israeli candidates for certain posts, including Eliezer Rabinovici’s candidacy for president of the CERN Council, and Sweden’s last-minute withdrawal from the Durban conference.[7] According to the same report, Swedish Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Rydberg said Linde had asked officials to reassess Sweden’s approach to Israel in international votes.[7] These are reported examples and characterizations of policy change, rather than a complete account of Sweden’s voting record.

The relationship saw high-level visits again in 2023. Swedish foreign minister Tobias Billström visited Israel in January; the World Jewish Congress describes the visit as a significant step toward strengthening diplomatic ties and deeper engagement, though it gives no exact date or further details.[1] In May, Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen traveled to Stockholm to meet Billström. The visit was described as the first by an Israeli foreign minister to Sweden in 22 years and as part of a thaw that had begun in 2021.[21][22] The ministers discussed bilateral and regional matters, including economic and people-to-people ties, Iran-related security concerns, and antisemitism.[21] Cohen also identified preventing aid money from reaching terrorists and their families, cooperation in international institutions, and Sweden’s adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism as topics of interest.[22]

The ministers discussed a proposed “kibbutz-tech” project under which hundreds of Swedish university students were expected to intern at Israeli startups.[21] The project was one example of efforts to give the thaw practical expression through exchanges and cooperation, alongside formal diplomacy. A further point of strain came in July 2023, when Cohen warned Billström that a planned burning of a Torah outside Israel’s embassy in Stockholm would harm relations. The report does not say whether the planned burning took place or what followed.[23]

Economic and technological exchange has continued alongside political disagreements. An Israeli government trade office based in Stockholm promotes trade and investment between Israel and Sweden as part of Israel’s trade-office network.[24] In 2021, a report on Nordic trade said trade between Israel and Scandinavia totaled almost €2 billion in 2019, comprising €1.1 billion in Israeli exports and €763 million in imports. Sweden led the Nordic countries in exports to Israel, with €300 million that year.[25] Sweden’s ambassador to Israel identified Swedish universities, science and innovation, and advanced telecommunications and information-technology clusters as areas of potential interest for Israeli companies.[25]

A joint innovation initiative was announced in June 2020 by Sweden’s innovation agency Vinnova, Business Sweden, the Swedish Embassy in Israel, and the Israeli nonprofit Start-Up Nation Central. Called The Connector, the platform was designed to develop market-oriented research and development projects and was open to startups, multinational and large companies, research institutions, and academics. Its aims included co-development, data sharing, and partnerships. The announcement gave its budget as about €2 million and described it as Sweden’s first program of this kind with a country outside the European Union.[26]

Defense-industry contracts offer another example of commercial links. In 2022, Israel’s Elbit Systems received a $27 million contract to supply ammunition to the Swedish Armed Forces. In 2023, a Swedish Elbit subsidiary received a $48 million contract for mobile communications platforms, while Elbit separately received a $109 million contract to supply its Iron Fist Active Protection System to BAE Systems Hägglunds.[13] These reported contracts document defense-related business activity, distinct from the broader diplomatic disputes between the governments.

Cooperation also took place within the EU’s institutional framework. The EU–Israel Association Agreement, concluded in 2000, provides a framework for trade and political relations and supports scientific cooperation, including through the Horizon program, and student exchanges through Erasmus. Article 2 makes respect for human rights and democratic principles an essential element of the agreement.[3] In May 2025, Sweden supported examining whether Israel was meeting Article 2, amid the war in Gaza and disputes over humanitarian aid. The reported proposal was a call for review, not a decision to suspend the agreement.[3]

On July 31, 2025, Sweden called on the EU to suspend the trade component of its association agreement with Israel. Prime Minister Kristersson said Israel was failing to meet its obligations concerning emergency aid and called for the EU to freeze the trade section and for unhindered humanitarian aid to enter Gaza.[27] Later in 2025, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands were reported to favor suspending the EU’s free-trade agreement with Israel. EU member states were divided: Germany and the Czech Republic opposed suspension and other proposed sanctions, and the division prevented EU action at that point.[28] These proposals concerned EU policy; the reports do not establish that the agreement was suspended or that Sweden independently ended bilateral diplomatic relations.[3][28]

The relationship between the two states is distinct from, but connected to, the lives of Swedish Jews and Israelis in Sweden. A 2026 qualitative study examined how people in these communities responded to two events in Israel: the 2023 judicial-reform proposals and the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, followed by the war in Gaza. Its research included 25 semi-structured interviews—15 with members of the two communities and 10 with diplomats and politicians—as well as newspaper material, social media, and participatory observation.[29]

The study found that the judicial-reform proposals did not bring Swedish Jews and Israelis in Sweden closer together. Israelis in Sweden engaged more actively with the issue, while Swedish-Jewish respondents generally refrained from commenting on Israeli domestic politics.[29] After October 7, Swedish-Jewish respondents reported greater awareness of their connection to Israel, and the attack and subsequent war intensified concern about antisemitism in Sweden.[29]

The authors also describe increased contact and joint advocacy among Swedish Jews and Israelis, including engagement with Israeli hostages, UNRWA funding, and the BDS movement. They emphasize that views varied within both communities and that the findings come from qualitative research, not a representative survey; they therefore illuminate experiences and patterns in the interviewed communities rather than measuring the views of all Swedish Jews or Israelis living in Sweden.[29]

Disagreement over Israel, Palestine, and the terms of diplomacy has been a persistent feature of the relationship. The clearest diplomatic rupture followed Sweden’s 2014 recognition of Palestine. Sweden presented recognition as a way to support self-determination and create more equal conditions for negotiations, while Israeli officials argued that recognition before a negotiated settlement could reward unilateral action and weaken incentives to negotiate.[2][16] The sources document these positions and the ensuing ambassadorial recall; they do not settle the dispute over the policy’s effects.

The dispute also entered Swedish local procurement. On June 13, 2024, Gothenburg’s Purchase and Procurement Board voted 5–4 to direct the municipal administration to exclude goods produced by Israeli settlements in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — which the board treated as occupied Palestinian land. On September 12, 2024, the Swedish Administrative Court overturned the decision, finding that it concerned foreign affairs, a matter within national-government authority and outside the municipality’s powers.[30] The ruling resolved the question of municipal authority in this case, rather than the wider political disagreement over the policy.

The bilateral debate has extended into EU trade policy. Sweden’s 2025 support for an Article 2 review and for suspending the trade component of the EU–Israel agreement reflected its stated concerns about Israel’s conduct in Gaza and the entry of emergency aid. The reports describe proposals and divisions among EU states, not an implemented suspension.[3][27][28] That distinction matters: a dispute over what the EU should do is not equivalent to Sweden ending its diplomatic relations with Israel.

Other incidents have carried symbolic or security significance. A grenade was found outside the Israeli embassy in Stockholm on January 31, 2024, and detonated by police. Israel’s ambassador called it an “attempted attack” and thanked Swedish authorities for their response.[13] The same account reports that in March 2025 the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Sweden-based Foxtrot Network and its leader, Rawa Majid, saying the group had attacked the embassy in January 2024 on behalf of Iran.[13] The report attributes that claim to the U.S. Treasury’s designation.

Interpretations of Sweden’s historical policy also vary. Some accounts emphasize the change associated with Palme and Sweden’s support for Palestinian claims; other accounts stress periods of warmer relations, practical cooperation, and Swedish officials’ stated support for Israel’s security and a negotiated two-state solution.[12][6][7][20] These differences should be understood as competing characterizations of a complex history rather than as a single uncontested account.