Palestine–Russia Relations

Russia’s relations with the Palestinians combine support for Palestinian statehood with participation in negotiations intended to produce an independent Palestinian state living alongside Israel in peace and security.[5] The Palestinian Authority (PA) has maintained relations with Russia while also dealing with Western governments, and has supported Moscow’s preference for a multilateral peace process through the Middle East Quartet.[1] Russia’s Palestinian policy has therefore operated through both bilateral relations and international diplomatic arrangements, rather than solely through direct assistance to Palestinian institutions.[1][6]

The institutional relationship extends beyond the PA to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Fatah, Hamas, and other Palestinian factions.[1][7] Moscow has hosted representatives of rival groups and attempted to promote reconciliation, while preserving its relationship with the Palestinian leadership headed by Mahmoud Abbas.[1] Its contacts with Hamas have continued alongside participation in the Quartet, whose conditions for assistance after Hamas formed a government included renouncing violence, recognizing Israel, and accepting previous Israeli–Palestinian agreements.[8]

Russia’s diplomatic involvement has been more extensive than its material aid, which has been constrained by available resources.[1] High-level meetings, support in international institutions, proposed peace conferences, and cultural facilities have remained recurring features of the relationship.[1][4][9] Although Moscow has repeatedly offered to facilitate negotiations, its initiatives have not consistently translated into renewed direct Israeli–Palestinian talks or Palestinian political unity.[1][10]

In a May 14, 1947 address at the United Nations on Palestine, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko outlined several possible political arrangements, including a single Arab–Jewish state and partition into independent Arab and Jewish states.[11] His preferred proposal was an independent, democratic common state “based on equality of rights for the Jewish and the Arab populations”; partition was presented as an alternative if coexistence within one state proved impossible.[11] He rejected arrangements that would establish either an Arab or a Jewish state without regard for the other population’s rights.[11]

Soviet policy subsequently shifted away from its earlier support for the Zionist cause, with a major turn toward the Arab states after 1953.[12] Moscow supplied substantial military and economic assistance to Egypt and Syria and adopted a strongly pro-Arab, anti-Israeli position that, with modifications, continued into the 1980s.[12] After the Six-Day War in 1967, the Soviet Union severed diplomatic relations with Israel while developing relations with Palestinian organizations.[1] It eventually recognized the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinian Arabs.[12]

A Soviet settlement proposal in 1970 called for Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines and included “legitimate Palestinian rights,” but did not yet demand Palestinian statehood.[13] Official Soviet support for a Palestinian-state demand followed in 1974.[13] Moscow favored a comprehensive settlement negotiated through an international forum, rather than a process consisting only of separate bilateral agreements.[13] The Geneva Conference, which opened in December 1973 under United Nations auspices, was co-chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union, but quickly broke into bilateral negotiations concerning disengagement of forces.[13]

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union became a leading benefactor of Yasir Arafat, Fatah, and the Palestinian cause.[14] Soviet support encompassed diplomatic, economic, and military assistance to the PLO.[14] By 1977, Moscow supported establishing a Palestinian state, while preparations for a renewed Geneva conference raised the question of PLO participation contingent on its acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.[13]

The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs traces the PLO’s Soviet relationship to the 1960s and places the opening of its formal interests office in Moscow in 1974.[15] Its historical account describes close PLO relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc during the following two decades, including PLO public approval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.[15] It also describes Palestinian participation in warfare, espionage, and ideological training in Communist countries, while cautioning that the precise training received by particular individuals cannot always be established.[15]

Personal connections accompanied these institutional ties.[15] The same JCFA analysis identifies Abbas as a Palestinian leader educated in Moscow and dates his doctorate from Moscow’s Oriental College to 1982.[15] A later JCFA account describes him as Russian-speaking and as having served as the PLO’s ambassador to the Soviet Union.[16] It quotes Abbas explaining the continuity of the relationship: “we have historical relations with the Soviet Union which has become Russia.”[16]

On November 15, 1988, Arafat proclaimed a Palestinian state following the Palestinian National Council’s declaration of independence, without defining its borders.[17] The declaration concerned a state in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and Gaza Strip.[17] The Soviet Union was among more than 25 countries that recognized the government-in-exile within days.[17] In December, Arafat announced the council’s recognition of Israel as a state in the region, rejected terrorism, and publicly accepted Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.[17]

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 43/177 acknowledged the proclamation and affirmed the need to enable Palestinians to exercise sovereignty over territory occupied since 1967.[18] Effective December 15, 1988, it replaced the designation “Palestine Liberation Organization” with “Palestine” within the UN system, without changing the PLO’s observer functions or admitting Palestine as a member state.[18] A Palestinian embassy in Moscow has existed since January 1990.[9]

The United States and the Soviet Union sponsored the Madrid peace conference in October 1991, which included a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation.[17] After the Soviet Union dissolved in December, Russia continued as a sponsor.[17] The disappearance of the Soviet bloc also encouraged Palestinians to seek new patrons, while Russia’s influence over the peace process remained limited during the 1990s.[1][14] Boris Yeltsin’s government nevertheless maintained support for the PA, including the delivery of 50 armored personnel carriers in 1994.[14]

Vladimir Putin’s accession to office in 2000 brought renewed emphasis to Russia’s Palestinian relations.[1] Russian support included votes at the United Nations against Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories.[14] During an April 2005 visit, Putin visited Arafat’s grave and promised technical assistance, equipment, and training for Palestinian leaders.[14] Proposed assistance subsequently included 50 armored personnel carriers, two Mi-17 transport helicopters, and security-force training, but the commitments were withdrawn following pressure from Israel’s military establishment.[14]

Putin also met Abbas in Ramallah during that visit.[16] The JCFA account of the visit describes his call for a stronger Quartet role in monitoring the Roadmap, renewing permanent-status negotiations, and helping Palestinians build institutions and a state.[16] It reports that Abbas welcomed a proposed Moscow peace conference and sought a Quartet “political horizon,” while Israel and the United States demurred.[16]

The Quartet’s Roadmap, prepared by Russia, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations, was presented to Israel and the PA on April 30, 2003.[6] It was a performance-based plan for a two-state solution, combining reciprocal political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building measures.[6] Its three phases covered ending violence and normalizing Palestinian life while building institutions, a transitional stage, and a permanent-status agreement ending the conflict.[6]

Russia continued working within this framework even as its approach to Hamas diverged from that of other participants.[8] Putin invited Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal to Moscow in February 2006 after Hamas defeated Fatah in legislative elections; Meshaal visited in March, returned subsequently, and met President Dmitry Medvedev in 2010.[3] By February 2007, Meshaal had made two visits since Hamas took power.[8] Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov urged Hamas to meet the Quartet’s conditions, while Moscow maintained contact with its officials and argued for lifting the aid embargo.[8]

At a Quartet meeting in Moscow on March 19, 2010, Lavrov joined representatives of the United States, European Union, and United Nations in welcoming readiness for proximity talks.[5] Their joint statement called for an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living alongside Israel in peace and security.[5] It supported PA institution- and state-building, Palestinian unity based on PLO commitments, and an international conference in Moscow at an appropriate time alongside direct negotiations.[5]

During a January 2011 visit to Jericho, Medvedev reaffirmed that the Soviet Union had recognized a Palestinian state in 1988 and that Moscow’s position had not changed.[19] He supported Palestinian self-determination and an independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital, while expressing willingness for Russia to assume a larger peace-process role.[19][20] He did not make a fresh, explicit declaration of recognition on behalf of the Russian Federation.[19] The distinction was between reaffirming the inherited Soviet position and issuing a new Russian declaration, rather than between support for and opposition to Palestinian statehood.[19]

Medvedev announced $10 million in assistance to the PA during the visit.[19] Agreements covering agriculture, sports, and communications were expected to be signed, although their completion was not confirmed in the contemporaneous reporting.[20] Russia also supported the PA’s 2011 appeal to the United Nations, despite previously trying to discourage steps that might complicate renewed negotiations, including a settlement-freeze precondition and a UN recognition bid.[1] It subsequently voted with the 138 General Assembly members supporting an upgrade to non-member observer state status, after having supported Palestinian membership in UNESCO.[9]

High-level contact continued through meetings between Medvedev and Abbas in Jordan, Sochi, and Gorky during 2010–2012.[9] Visiting Bethlehem in June 2012, Putin reiterated that Russia’s position on Palestinian recognition remained unchanged, urged Palestinian factions to reconcile, and called for resumed negotiations.[21] The visit included the inauguration of a Russian cultural and language center.[21] Abbas again advocated a Moscow peace conference and requested Russian help securing the release of 124 Palestinian prisoners held in Israel since before the Oslo Accords.[21]

Economic and humanitarian cooperation also appeared on the bilateral agenda.[22] A planned 2015 Moscow visit by Abbas was to address trade, economic, humanitarian, and regional questions, as well as Israeli–Palestinian negotiations.[22] Meetings with Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev were scheduled, including discussions of investment, while the Palestinian ambassador anticipated several intergovernmental accords.[22] These announcements described intended discussions and agreements rather than completed outcomes.[22]

In February 2016, Lavrov met Israeli Foreign Ministry director-general Dore Gold in Moscow and said Russia sought conditions for resuming negotiations toward two states living in peace and security.[23] Later that year, Moscow attempted to convene a summit between Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[10] Abbas and PA foreign minister Riyad al-Maliki traveled to Moscow, while Abbas initially conditioned participation on a settlement-construction freeze and prisoner releases.[10] Netanyahu ultimately responded favorably, but disagreements, regional partners’ positions, and limited American and European interest obstructed the initiative.[10]

Putin’s July 25, 2016 letter to Arab League summit participants declared: “We believe that the status quo in the Palestinian issue is unacceptable and that the political process must be relaunched.”[10] He identified the intended outcome as an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.[10] On April 6, 2017, Russia’s Foreign Ministry reaffirmed the two-state approach, described East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state, and stated that it viewed West Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.[24] It also said that final settlement parameters, including Jerusalem’s status, should be determined through direct negotiations.[24]

At their May 2017 meeting in Sochi, Abbas said resolving the conflict required meaningful Russian participation, while Putin supported renewed direct dialogue and linked peaceful Israeli–Palestinian coexistence to regional stability.[4] The leaders remotely inaugurated a Russian-sponsored cultural and economic center in Bethlehem named after Putin.[4] The six-floor complex covered 15,000 square meters and was reported to have cost $40 million.[4]

Russia’s reconciliation diplomacy developed alongside these bilateral contacts.[1] After Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, Russian attempts to mediate between Hamas and Fatah were unsuccessful.[1][25] Following an Egyptian-sponsored reconciliation agreement in May 2011, a united Palestinian delegation visited Moscow to discuss institutional cooperation and a shared political course.[1] The JCFA account of a January 2017 meeting describes three days of factional discussions hosted by a Russian research center, with Lavrov participating, while reporting Palestinian skepticism about whether the resulting statement represented genuine progress.[26]

Moscow hosted further inter-Palestinian talks from February 29 to March 2, 2024, addressing the Gaza war and Palestinian political unity.[7] Deputy Foreign Minister and Middle East envoy Mikhail Bogdanov invited as many as 14 groups, including Fatah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[7] The factions’ statement pledged further dialogue toward bringing the groups under the PLO and identified shared positions concerning Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Palestinian statehood.[25] Earlier attempts to integrate Hamas into the PLO had failed.[25]

The Palestinian leadership has repeatedly sought Russian participation as an alternative to exclusive American mediation.[27][28] In 2018, after the Trump administration recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the PA sought a larger Russian role and hoped Russia and the European Union would fill what it regarded as a gap in American mediation.[27] Abbas told Russian officials that the PA wanted stronger relations and valued Russia’s place in the Quartet.[27] Russian officials reaffirmed support for the Palestinians and efforts to achieve peace.[27]

Proposals for renewed multilateral diplomacy continued into 2021.[29] A JCFA report describes Russia again raising the possibility of an Israeli–Palestinian summit in Moscow and promoting a ministerial Quartet meeting in cooperation with the Arab League.[29] It reports that a PA spokesman announced plans for Abbas to seek support in Moscow after Putin met Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett in Sochi on October 22, 2021.[29]

In March 2022, the PA had not officially condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine despite pressure on Abbas to do so.[30] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs interpreted the PA’s cautious response as an effort to preserve relations with both Moscow and Washington, while continuing to seek Russian backing for an international peace conference and stronger Quartet involvement.[31] Its account also describes Abbas maintaining direct contact with Putin and PLO Executive Committee member Hussein al-Sheikh cultivating Russian relationships.[31]

Al-Sheikh spoke by telephone with Bogdanov in late February 2022 about Ukraine and PLO Central Council resolutions, among other issues, as recounted in the same JCFA analysis.[31] That account put the Palestinian population in Ukraine at approximately 2,500, mostly students, and reported Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh’s February 26 statement that they were safe and receiving assistance from the Palestinian embassy in Kyiv.[31] In October 2022, Abbas told Putin that Palestinians did not trust the United States to act as the sole mediator of Israeli–Palestinian disputes.[28]

After the Hamas-led terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, Moscow did not directly condemn Hamas, while Putin offered to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians.[3] Putin attributed the escalation to what he described as American policy’s failure to account for Palestinian interests and called for restraint to limit civilian harm.[32] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Putin did not then plan to intervene, although Russia was prepared to facilitate contacts if needed.[32] Senior Russian officials subsequently hosted a Hamas delegation in Moscow.[33]

In August 2024, Putin received Abbas in Moscow and reiterated support for Palestinian statehood and humanitarian assistance.[34] He described the humanitarian situation as causing Russia “great pain” and argued that lasting regional peace required implementing UN resolutions and creating a fully fledged Palestinian state.[34] Abbas expressed unusually emphatic confidence in his host, saying: “We believe in you, we trust you, we feel your support.”[2] Putin announced no new peace initiative at the meeting.[34]

Russian parliamentary diplomacy also reinforced opposition to excluding Palestinian statehood as an outcome.[35] On August 7, 2024, Russia transmitted to the UN Secretary-General a State Duma decision and statement condemning the Knesset’s July 18 statement against establishing a State of Palestine.[35] A 2025 overview continued to list Russia among the countries recognizing Palestine, alongside the longer record of Russian leaders reaffirming the Soviet Union’s 1988 recognition.[36][19]

Russia’s Hamas contacts have created a significant divergence within its claimed mediation role: Moscow maintained engagement and advocated lifting the aid embargo while remaining part of a Quartet that required renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of earlier agreements.[8] Following the October 7 terrorist attack, its failure to directly condemn Hamas and Putin’s comparison of Israel’s siege of Gaza to Nazi Germany’s siege of Leningrad added further points of contention.[3][33] In 2022, a US National Security Council spokesperson also challenged Russia’s credibility as a partner on justice and international law because of its actions in Ukraine.[28]

Claims about covert Soviet assistance require distinction from formal diplomatic relations.[37] Reported archival findings describe Soviet intelligence assistance to Wadi Haddad’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and cooperation with other PLO factions, including arms, funding, training, and operational support.[37] A 1973 diplomatic assessment nevertheless described Soviet influence over Palestinian fedayeen as limited, reported arms transfers through Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and training since 1969, and said Moscow refused Arafat’s requests for heavier weapons and recognition as a national liberation movement.[38] Earlier diplomatic assessments from 1945 and 1948 likewise contain interpretations or secondhand accounts of Soviet aims, rather than direct public policy statements.[39][40]

Assessments of contemporary motives are also interpretive: INSS analysts explain Russia’s involvement partly through competition with the United States and a desire for greater regional standing.[30] A JCFA account additionally relays Hamas representatives’ claim of Russian ammunition assistance, but provides no independent substantiation; it does not establish that such assistance occurred.[41]