Indonesia–Palestine Relations

Indonesia’s relationship with the Palestinians combines recognition of Palestinian statehood, diplomatic support in multilateral institutions, humanitarian assistance, and expressions of public solidarity. Its foreign-policy position has generally called for an independent Palestinian state and, in recent statements, a two-state settlement that also guarantees Israel’s safety and security.[1][2] Indonesia has no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, and its leaders have repeatedly made possible normalization conditional on Israel recognizing an independent Palestinian state.[1][3]

A recurring political reference point is the preamble to Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, which declares: “With independence being the right of every nation, colonialism must be eliminated from the face of the earth as it is contrary to the dictates of human nature and justice.”[1] An analysis by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) connects this anti-colonial principle to Indonesia’s own 1945–1949 war of independence against the Netherlands and to its later place in the Non-Aligned Movement. It describes Indonesian support for Palestinians as often framed through justice, legitimate rights, and freedom.[1]

The cause has also been discussed through Muslim solidarity, notably around Jerusalem, but the available analyses describe that as one influence alongside national anti-colonialism rather than a complete explanation of policy. A 2024 analysis from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy likewise frames Indonesia’s position chiefly in terms of principles articulated in the UN Charter, while noting that the Indonesian Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama ruled in 2023 that the Charter constitutes a legitimate agreement binding on Muslims under Islamic law.[4] Assessments of how widely particular motives are held among Indonesians are interpretations by the cited authors, not proof of a uniform public view.[1][4]

The relationship therefore spans several connected but distinct areas: Indonesia’s recognition of Palestine, votes and statements at the United Nations, political contacts with Palestinian representatives, practical aid, and Indonesian proposals for peacebuilding. Its policy toward Palestine is also linked to a separate question—whether, and on what terms, Indonesia might establish relations with Israel.[1][3]

One published account traces Indonesian interest in Palestine to the 1920s, when the subject was regularly discussed in the Muhammadiyah Islamic organization. The article’s authors associate these discussions with affinity for Arabs and Islamic solidarity, as well as with Indonesian religious scholars’ study in Arab-world centers and Indonesians’ pilgrimages to the region.[3] These are the authors’ account and interpretation of early connections, rather than a comprehensive survey of Indonesian public opinion at the time.

In the period of President Sukarno, Indonesia’s support for Arab positions developed alongside anti-colonial and non-aligned foreign policy. The same authors argue that the policy was not driven solely by pan-Islamic solidarity: Indonesia also sought Arab backing in international forums, including in connection with Western Guinea, or Western Irian, which it sought to annex while it remained under Dutch rule.[3] A separate analysis points to the constitutional anti-colonial principle, the Indonesian war of independence, and the country’s role in the Non-Aligned Movement as important contexts for support of the Palestinian cause.[1]

The 1967 war marked a period after which Indonesian commitment to the Palestinian cause became increasingly visible in public political discourse, according to the INSS analysis. That account emphasizes that support could be expressed in national and anti-colonial terms, not only through Islamic symbols, while Muslim solidarity—especially concerning Jerusalem—also influenced public and governmental attitudes.[1] A separate account describes Indonesia’s policy under Suharto as more moderate than under Sukarno, although support for the Arab cause and reluctance to establish formal relations with Israel continued.[3]

After the 1967 war, Indonesia called for direct negotiations between Israel and Arab states and proposed international supervision of Jerusalem to safeguard freedom for all religions. Foreign Minister Adam Malik also said publicly and in informal contacts that Arab states should respect Israel’s aspiration for territorial and national recognition.[3] This account presents those positions as part of a diplomatic approach that combined support for Arab and Palestinian interests with proposals for negotiation and recognition.[3]

In 1972, Malik said Indonesia would not object to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) opening an office in Jakarta. The office did not open until 1990. The published account reports that senior army officers worried it could attract agitators and extremist Muslim groups, and suggests the government may also have wanted to avoid complicating unofficial dealings with Israel.[3] Those explanations are the article’s interpretation of the delay.[3]

PLO chairman Yasser Arafat made his first visit to Jakarta in July 1984 and was received warmly, according to the same account.[3] Indonesia’s engagement with Arab states had also expanded under Suharto.[3] Indonesia recognized the State of Palestine in 1988. Sources place it among the states that recognized Palestine in November–December 1988, following Arafat’s declaration of independence in Algiers, without specifying an exact date.[5][6]

In December 1988, Indonesia voted in favor of all three recorded-vote parts of General Assembly Resolution 43/54. Part A reaffirmed Palestinian national rights, including self-determination, national independence, and establishment of an independent sovereign state, and supported the PLO as the Palestinian people’s representative.[7] Indonesia also voted in favor of the recorded-vote parts of Resolution 43/57 concerning Palestine refugees. The resolution addressed refugee assistance, UNRWA financing, displaced people, education and scholarships, return, refugee property, and protection; parts B and C were adopted without a vote, so the record does not show an individual Indonesian vote on those parts.[8]

In September 1993, following the Israel–PLO Declaration of Principles, Arafat visited Jakarta and met Suharto; Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin also visited and met him. A published account describes both visits as low-key and says Suharto’s office kept news of Rabin’s visit secret until his plane had landed in Singapore.[3] In 1993, Defense Minister Edi Sudrajat said Indonesia would consider normalizing relations with Israel if the peace process advanced and Palestinian interests were not compromised; he also said Indonesia would follow if all Arab states established diplomatic relations with Israel.[3] These statements were part of the period’s discussion of how the Israeli–Palestinian process might affect Indonesia’s own relations with Israel.[3]

In 1994, Abdurrahman Wahid, then leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, visited Jerusalem at Shimon Peres’s invitation to witness the signing of the Israel–Jordan peace accord. The account describes Nahdlatul Ulama as a traditionalist Islamic organization with around thirty million members; Wahid became president of Indonesia in 1999.[3] A 2005 article assessing the period concluded that movement toward Indonesia–Israel relations was connected to progress in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and that trade and people-to-people ties between Indonesia and Israel had improved after the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles. That conclusion reflects the authors’ assessment at the time of publication, not a current account of Indonesia–Palestine relations.[3]

Indonesia has advocated for Palestinian statehood through international organizations and bilateral contacts. A 2015 Israeli government report said Indonesia consistently voiced support for establishing an independent Palestine through bodies including UNESCO, UNRWA, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.[9] The report also noted Indonesian and Japanese cooperation on the second Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development (CEAPAD), held in March 2014, which collected funding for Palestine from East Asian countries and international organizations.[9]

Indonesia and Japan were identified as co-chairs, alongside Palestine, of CEAPAD in a UN document recording Non-Aligned Movement positions. The document welcomed Indonesia’s establishment of New Asian African Strategic Partnership capacity-building programs for Palestine and commended Indonesian initiatives supporting Palestinians.[10] These programs and forums illustrate a practical strand of policy alongside diplomatic statements and votes.[10]

Indonesia’s participation in interfaith and people-to-people engagement has also been noted by other governments. At the Fifth Extraordinary OIC Summit on Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif, a U.S. State Department representative thanked Indonesia for hosting the summit and described its support for international efforts as longstanding. The representative cited Indonesia’s organization of an interfaith delegation to the region in 2012 as an example of its role in Track II diplomacy.[11]

Indonesia was among the additional sponsors of General Assembly resolution A/RES/79/81, “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine,” dated 25 November 2024. The resolution included an annex setting out modalities for a 2025 High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution.[12] On 12 September 2025, Indonesia voted in favor of a General Assembly resolution endorsing the New York Declaration on peaceful settlement and implementation of the two-state solution. The resolution received 142 votes in favor, 10 against, and 12 abstentions.[13]

The formal policy framework described by INSS supports a two-state solution, with a Palestinian state based on the June 4, 1967 lines and East Jerusalem as its capital. The same analysis says Indonesia has made establishing diplomatic relations with Israel conditional on creation of an independent Palestinian state; this condition concerns Indonesia–Israel relations and does not describe Indonesia’s diplomatic relationship with Palestine.[1]

Prabowo Subianto reiterated the two-state position in his September 2025 address to the UN General Assembly. He called for an independent Palestinian state while guaranteeing Israel’s safety and security, and said that “the two descendants of Abraham must live in reconciliation, peace, and harmony.”[2] Other accounts of the address report that he said Palestinian statehood must be guaranteed, that freedom and security should be secured for both Palestinians and Israelis, and that Indonesia would recognize Israel the same day Israel recognized a Palestinian state.[14][15]

Prabowo also offered Indonesian personnel for peace efforts. In September 2025, he said Indonesia was prepared to deploy 20,000 or more personnel to establish or defend peace in Gaza or elsewhere if the United Nations decided to do so; he described guarantees for Israel’s security as necessary for genuine peace.[14][15] In November 2025, Indonesia’s representative at the Security Council called for sustained humanitarian assistance and safe, unhindered access, and urged rejection of starvation as a weapon of war. The representative said Indonesia had contributed $12 million through the World Food Programme that year to address Gaza’s food crisis. These are recorded as Indonesia’s official statements and position.[16]

A May 2026 report to the Security Council lists Indonesia among the 28 member states of the Board of Peace. It also records Indonesia as one of five states that signed the Declaration of Founding Contributors to the International Stabilization Force on 19 February 2026, expressing an intention to contribute troops. The report says force generation and deployment efforts were ongoing; it does not establish that an Indonesian deployment had occurred.[17]

Indonesia’s formal ties with Palestine have coexisted with a long-standing absence of formal diplomatic relations with Israel. The policy has not meant that Indonesian leaders never discussed relations with Israel: statements over several decades have linked normalization to developments in the peace process and to Palestinian interests.[1][3]

In 2014, presidential candidate Joko Widodo voiced support for Palestinian independence and promised that Indonesia would open a representative office in Ramallah, according to a 2015 Israeli government report.[9] In 2016, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi was scheduled to visit Ramallah to inaugurate an honorary Indonesian consulate and meet Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki. The Palestinian Foreign Ministry alleged that Israeli officials barred her from entering because she did not plan to meet Israeli government members during the visit, while Israel’s Foreign Ministry declined to comment.[18]

A 2018 report said the Indonesian and Palestinian foreign ministers were scheduled to hold what it described as their first bilateral consultation meeting. The report said the meeting was due to take place on the Tuesday following publication, but did not confirm whether it took place or describe an outcome.[19]

During the 2014 Gaza war, Indonesia called on the United Nations and international community to pressure Israel to stop what the 2015 Israeli government report described as violent actions against civilians in Gaza. The report said Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa called for countries to consider reviewing diplomatic relations with Israel and boycotting Israeli products in solidarity with Palestine.[9]

Prabowo’s statements in 2025 retained a conditional opening to diplomatic relations. In May, after meeting French President Emmanuel Macron, he said Indonesia would be ready to establish relations with Israel if Israel recognized a Palestinian state. He described Palestinian freedom and a two-state solution as a path to peace while also saying Israel’s rights as a sovereign country and its safety should be guaranteed.[20]

The relationship between support for Palestine and possible normalization is politically contested and has shifted in emphasis over time. The sources document statements, proposals, and conditions rather than a treaty establishing relations with Israel; Indonesia’s position remains distinct from its recognized relationship with Palestine.[1][20]

Indonesia’s support has included humanitarian aid and medical assistance. In November 2023, it sent 51.5 tons of aid for Gaza, including medical equipment, food, blankets, tents, and other supplies collected from the government and Indonesian civilians through humanitarian agencies. President Joko Widodo dispatched the shipment from Jakarta’s Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base; two Hercules aircraft and an Airbus cargo plane were to carry it to el-Arish Airport in Egypt. Widodo called the shipment “a form of Indonesian solidarity” and said the humanitarian tragedy in Gaza was unacceptable and must stop.[21]

Indonesia funded the Indonesia Hospital in Gaza, which opened in 2016 and was staffed by Palestinians and some Indonesian volunteers.[6] The facility became the subject of conflicting claims during the Gaza war. Israel accused Hamas of using hospitals, including this one, to conceal command centers and tunnels; Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry denied the accusation and said the hospital served humanitarian and medical needs. The ministry condemned an Israeli attack on the hospital as a “blatant violation of international humanitarian law.”[6] The accusation and denial are both reported positions, not independent findings established by the cited account.[6]

During the 2023 Gaza war, Widodo repeatedly called for an end to escalation and violence, a focus on humanitarian concerns, and attention to what he called the root of the problem, “namely the Israeli occupation of Palestine.”[6] In November 2023, Indonesia’s Ulema Council issued a religious ruling urging Muslims to support the Palestinians’ fight for independence and avoid supporting Israeli “aggression”; it also recommended avoiding products affiliated with Israel.[6] Politicians, ministers, and religious leaders also took part in a large Jakarta gathering in November 2023 called the “Indonesian People’s Alliance to Defend Palestine.”[22]

In April 2025, Prabowo said Indonesia was prepared to temporarily shelter Palestinians affected by the Gaza war. He estimated an initial group of about 1,000, including wounded people, trauma survivors, and orphans, and said he had instructed his foreign minister to discuss arrangements with the Palestinian side and other parties. He said those received would return after recovery and when Gaza was safe; the offer was presented alongside Indonesia’s advocacy for a two-state solution and opposition to forced displacement.[23] Another report recalled a similar offer in June 2024, which included medical treatment and a possible peacekeeping force to enforce a ceasefire.[22]

In August 2025, reports described Indonesian airdrops of humanitarian supplies in Gaza. One account said two Super Hercules aircraft carried aid for an intended drop, with reports in Indonesia describing 800 packages, each weighing one ton, containing food, medicine, and blankets; coordination with Jordan was planned. Indonesia’s army chief said the aid should reach its intended recipients and benefit Gaza’s Palestinian population.[24] An INSS post dated 21 August reported that Indonesia had begun airdropping aid with Israel’s approval. It also said Jakarta had reportedly agreed to receive wounded Palestinians from Gaza for treatment, without specifying the amount or contents of the aid or the details of the treatment arrangement.[25]

A separate reported initiative concerned a medical facility on the uninhabited island of Galang. Indonesia’s presidential office announced that the facility would be converted to treat about 2,000 wounded Gazans and temporarily shelter their families, with patients to return to Gaza after recovery.[20] Reports described the proposal as providing treatment and rehabilitation, not as evidence that patients had been transferred. Senior Indonesian religious figures objected to the plan because they feared it could resemble a Trump administration proposal for voluntary emigration from Gaza; Indonesian authorities did not characterize it as population removal. The available report does not establish whether the plan was implemented or how many people, if any, received treatment there.[20]

Indonesia has also proposed people-to-people engagement as a complement to formal diplomacy. An INSS account of a proposal by Indonesian foreign-ministry diplomat Ary Aprianto describes him as advocating dialogue between ordinary Israelis and Palestinians through non-governmental networks and local communities, alongside peace efforts led by political elites. Aprianto said Indonesia had experience and means to improve such ties and linked that potential to aid programs for Palestinians to which Indonesia contributes; the account does not specify program amounts or beneficiaries.[1] A 2021 webinar at Universitas Islam Indonesia featured lecturer Mohamad Rezky Utama affirming Palestinians’ right to an independent state and arguing that Indonesia should continue humanitarian aid while ensuring it reached the right recipients. The account also says Utama supported an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, living peacefully alongside Israel.[1]

Indonesian public and political expressions of solidarity became especially visible after the outbreak of the Gaza war in 2023. Alongside official calls for a ceasefire and humanitarian attention, the Jakarta rally and the Ulema Council’s religious ruling expressed support for Palestinian independence and opposition to Israeli actions and products.[6][22] The available accounts report these events but do not establish that all Indonesians share the same views.[1]

The slogan “Free Palestine” has also been interpreted within Indonesian political discourse. An October 2026 INSS analysis says Prabowo’s use of the call at a centenary event in East Java was consistent with a demand for Palestinian independence and establishment of a Palestinian state. The author says the phrase is generally associated in Indonesian discourse with Kemerdekaan Palestina (“Palestinian independence”) and cautions against interpreting the slogan, by itself, as a call for Israel’s elimination. The analysis notes that Prabowo had also used the call in 2014.[26]

Prabowo’s positions have combined emphatic support for Palestinian statehood with explicit statements about Israel’s security and conditional recognition. His 2025 UN remarks presented reconciliation between the two peoples as the goal.[2] His May statement offered relations with Israel if Israel recognized Palestine.[20] His September address offered personnel for a UN-authorized peace effort.[14] The statements are political commitments and proposals, not evidence that diplomatic normalization or a troop deployment has occurred.[17]

Some Indonesian proposals for assistance have generated disagreement over their implications. The Galang plan’s announced intention to treat wounded Gazans and host their families temporarily was accompanied by objections from senior religious figures who feared it might resemble voluntary emigration proposals. Reports state that the planned return to Gaza was part of the proposal, but do not establish transfers or completion.[20] This concern reflects debate over the form and consequences of humanitarian arrangements, not a documented outcome of the plan.