01In brief
The Oslo Accords were a series of agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), beginning with the Declaration of Principles signed in Washington, D.C., on September 13, 1993, after secret negotiations in Norway. The first meetings of the secret channel took place on January 20–22, 1993, at the home of Norwegian official Jørgen Holst and his wife Marianne Heiberg near Oslo. Preceded by mutual-recognition letters, the agreements established a framework for Palestinian interim self-government, Israeli military redeployment, and negotiations toward a permanent settlement. They led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority and elected Palestinian institutions, but the planned transitional period ended without a permanent-status agreement.
02Background
The 1991 Madrid Conference launched bilateral peace negotiations between Israel and neighboring Arab states, together with discussions of interim Palestinian self-rule.[2] Palestinians participated through a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation rather than through direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO.[2] The distinction mattered to the development of the Oslo channel: Norwegian sociologist Terje Larsen and Israeli Labor Party politician Yossi Beilin considered direct Israel–PLO negotiations necessary and helped initiate a separate negotiating track in January 1993.[2]
The initial Oslo meetings were unofficial and secret, involving Israeli academics and PLO representatives rather than a formal Israeli government delegation.[1] Israeli law prohibited contact with PLO officials, and the first discussions involved two Israeli professors and three PLO officials led by Ahmed Qurei, also known as Abu Ala.[1] The Israeli academics were Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak, who participated in the initial private academic channel.[3] The first meetings took place on January 20–22 near Oslo, at the home of Holst and Heiberg, under Norwegian auspices.[2] Secrecy allowed participants to explore possible concessions and alternative arrangements without immediately incurring domestic political costs.[2]
The channel gradually changed from an academic initiative into an official negotiation.[3] In May 1993, Israel sent Uri Savir to elevate the discussions to government level.[2] After the initial participants had developed a paper that month, Savir led formal, still-secret negotiations, assisted by legal adviser Yoel Singer.[4] The parties initialed the agreement in Norway on August 20, preparing the way for the public Declaration of Principles.[3]
The intended diplomatic sequence separated interim arrangements from the most difficult questions of a permanent settlement.[5] Incremental Israeli withdrawals from Palestinian population centers and transfers of administrative powers were to precede final-status negotiations.[5] The rationale was that cooperation and confidence developed during the interim period might make the outstanding issues more manageable.[5]
03Course of Events
On September 9, 1993, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin exchanged recognition letters before the public signing of the Declaration of Principles.[6] Arafat wrote: “The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.”[6] His letter accepted United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, committed the PLO to resolving the conflict through peaceful negotiations, and renounced terrorism and other violence.[6] Arafat also undertook to submit the necessary changes to the Palestinian National Covenant for formal approval.[6] Rabin’s reply recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and stated that Israel would begin negotiations with it.[6]
Arafat further committed the PLO to taking responsibility for its members and preventing violations of its undertaking against violence.[7] He declared that Covenant provisions denying Israel’s right to exist were no longer valid and promised to seek the amendments needed to formalize that position.[7] The exchange therefore combined recognition of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security with Israeli recognition of the PLO as its Palestinian negotiating counterpart.[6]
The Israeli cabinet had considered the proposed agreement on August 30, 1993, amid concerns about its security and political consequences.[8] Rabin called it a “difficult deal,” while IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak warned of serious difficulties in implementing its security provisions.[8] Sixteen ministers voted to approve the agreement and two abstained, while right-wing opponents organized mass protests.[8]
The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements was signed in Washington, D.C., on September 13, 1993.[9] Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO official Mahmoud Abbas signed the document, while Rabin and Arafat watched the signing.[10] US President Bill Clinton attended the White House ceremony, which became closely associated with the handshake between Rabin and Arafat.[10] The United States and Russian Federation witnessed the agreement.[9]
The Declaration’s preamble committed the parties to ending decades of confrontation, recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights, and seeking peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, and historic reconciliation.[9] It framed the interim arrangements as a step toward a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace rather than as the final settlement itself.[9] Oslo I was the first signed Palestinian-Israeli agreement and opened direct talks between Israel and the PLO.[11][1]
The central institutional proposal was an elected Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, also called the Council, for Palestinians in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and the Gaza Strip.[9] The transitional period was not to exceed five years and was intended to lead to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.[9] The agreement treated the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit whose integrity was to be preserved throughout the interim period.[9]
The five-year period was to begin with Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.[9] Permanent-status negotiations were to begin as soon as possible, and no later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period.[9] Their agenda included Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with neighboring states, and other issues of common interest.[9] These subjects were excluded from the interim Council’s jurisdiction, and the Declaration expressly stated that interim arrangements should not prejudge or preempt the permanent negotiations.[9]
The Declaration called for direct, free, and general elections to the Palestinian Council under agreed supervision and international observation.[9] It set a goal of holding the elections no later than nine months after the Declaration entered into force, with Palestinian police responsible for public order.[9] Palestinians living in Jerusalem were to have the right to participate under arrangements agreed by the parties.[9] The election protocol also stated that the future status of displaced Palestinians registered on June 4, 1967, would not be prejudiced by their inability to participate for practical reasons.[9]
Before the elected Council’s inauguration, the Declaration provided for a preparatory transfer of authority from Israel’s military government and Civil Administration to authorized Palestinians.[9] The initial fields were education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism.[9] The Palestinian side was also to begin building a police force, while a later interim agreement would define the Council’s structure and the powers transferred to it.[9] After the Council’s inauguration, the Civil Administration was to be dissolved and the Israeli military government withdrawn.[9]
Security responsibilities were divided rather than transferred without qualification.[9] The Council was to establish a strong police force responsible for Palestinian public order and internal security.[9] Israel retained responsibility for defense against external threats and for the overall security of Israelis, including their internal security and public order.[9] Israeli forces were to redeploy outside populated areas, with further gradual redeployments linked to the Palestinian police assuming their responsibilities.[9]
The Declaration required a separate agreement on withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho within two months of its entry into force.[9] Withdrawal was to begin immediately after that agreement was signed and finish within no more than four months.[9] The accompanying protocol addressed transfers of authority, Palestinian responsibility for internal security and public order, a joint security coordination committee, and arrangements for passages between Gaza and Egypt and between Jericho and Jordan.[9]
Implementation was also to involve continuing joint institutions.[9] A Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee would coordinate implementation, handle matters of common interest, and address disputes.[9] Disputes were first to be discussed through negotiation in that committee; unresolved questions could be referred to an agreed conciliation mechanism, and arbitration was possible if both parties consented.[9] The Declaration also provided for an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee and invited Jordan and Egypt to participate in further liaison and cooperation arrangements.[9]
The economic annexes proposed cooperation in water, electricity, energy, finance, transport, trade, industry, labor, human resources, and environmental protection.[9] Regional proposals included a Middle East Development Fund and Development Bank, coordinated development of the Dead Sea area, water-development and desalination projects, interconnected electricity grids, and joint tourism and transport planning.[9] These were proposals contained in the agreement, not a record that the projects had subsequently been implemented.[9]
The next major implementation agreement was signed in Cairo on May 4, 1994, and became known as the Gaza-Jericho Agreement or “Gaza and Jericho First.”[7] It provided for Israeli withdrawal from the Jericho area and 83 percent of the Gaza Strip, established the Palestinian Authority and its security forces, and transferred Palestinian public-order and internal-security responsibilities to that Authority.[3] Israel retained responsibility for the overall security of Israelis in those areas and for the borders with Jordan and Egypt.[3] The agreement also provided for the release of 5,000 Palestinian prisoners.[3]
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement put the first stage of the 1993 framework into effect. On August 29, 1994, another agreement transferred six civil spheres to the Palestinian Authority, and on August 27, 1995, a further agreement transferred eight additional spheres before Oslo II.[12] The Gaza-Jericho Agreement received Knesset approval with 52 votes in favor and none against.[3]
The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly called Oslo II, was signed in Washington on September 28, 1995.[13] Rabin signed for Israel and Arafat for the PLO.[13] Clinton and representatives of Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Norway, and the European Union witnessed the signing.[14] The agreement exceeded 400 pages and included seven annexes and maps covering elections, transfers of authority, security, legal and economic relations, and cooperation.[12]
Oslo II provided for an elected Palestinian Council and an elected head of its executive authority.[13] The Council was to exercise legislative and executive powers within its jurisdiction, while foreign relations remained outside its authority.[13] Israel was to transfer specified powers from its military government and Civil Administration, retaining powers that had not been transferred.[13] Until the Council’s inauguration, the Palestinian Authority established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was to exercise the transferred responsibilities.[13] The election provisions again allowed Palestinians living in Jerusalem to participate under agreed arrangements.[13]
The agreement divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C as part of phased Israeli redeployments and expanded Palestinian self-government.[12] In Area A, the Palestinian Council was to assume internal-security and public-order responsibilities for Palestinians after Israeli forces redeployed.[13] In Area B, Palestinian police were responsible for public order for Palestinians, while Israel retained overriding security responsibility for protecting Israelis and confronting terrorism.[13] In Area C, powers and territorial jurisdiction were to transfer in phases, subject to matters reserved for permanent-status negotiations.[13] Israel retained responsibility for external security and the overall security of Israelis and settlements.[13]
Area C included settlements and their immediate surroundings as well as designated strategic or security areas.[15] A later description of the arrangements assigns the Palestinian Authority formal civil-administration and security responsibility in Area A, Palestinian civil administration alongside Israeli security control in Area B, and full Israeli security and administrative control in Area C.[16] That later account estimates Area C at approximately 60 percent of the West Bank; it describes conditions addressed in that report rather than establishing that every aspect remained unchanged after 1995.[16]
Oslo II called for initial Israeli redeployment from populated West Bank areas before the Palestinian elections.[13] Further redeployments were to occur in three phases, six months apart, and finish within 18 months of the Council’s inauguration.[13] The agreement required measures against terrorism, crime, and hostilities, provided for safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza, and included prisoner-release arrangements and civil, legal, economic, and security cooperation.[13] Joint patrols and a PLO undertaking concerning amendments to the Palestinian National Covenant also formed part of the framework.[7]
The agreement scheduled Palestinian Council and executive elections for early 1996 and permanent-status negotiations to begin no later than May 4, 1996.[3][13] Its transitional timetable ended on May 4, 1999.[13] Neither side waived its existing rights, claims, or positions by signing, and neither was to change the status of the West Bank and Gaza pending the permanent negotiations.[12][13] The agreements did not promise the establishment of a Palestinian state.[12] Oslo II received Knesset approval on October 6, 1995, by 61 votes to 59.[3]
04Aftermath
Rabin was assassinated on November 4, 1995, by Yigal Amir, an Israeli opponent of the Oslo Accords on religious grounds.[17][18] The assassination followed intense political and social polarization around the process.[18] Hamas terrorist attacks subsequently weakened support for the Labor Party ahead of the May 1996 Israeli elections.[17]
Implementation unfolded amid opposition and violence on both sides.[3] Likud, settler leaders, and other right-wing groups organized mass protests, while Hamas and Islamic Jihad carried out terrorist attacks against Israelis to sabotage the process.[3] In February 1994, an Israeli terrorist murdered 29 Palestinians at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron; Palestinian terrorism then intensified.[3] As attacks mounted, Israel increasingly closed its borders to Palestinian job seekers.[19]
Palestinian Council and presidential elections took place on January 20, 1996, under international supervision.[12] The first Israeli redeployments from major Palestinian cities preceded the elections, although a full withdrawal from Hebron was excepted.[12] Later withdrawals were delayed amid suicide bombings against Israeli civilians in 1996, the election of a Likud government, and Israeli-Palestinian violence.[12]
The Hebron Redeployment Protocol was reached on January 17, 1997.[15] It divided security responsibility between Israel in the Jewish part of the city and the Palestinian Authority in the Palestinian part, with provision for an international monitoring force.[15] Most of Hebron was to come under full Palestinian control, while a smaller area containing the Jewish community and about 40,000 Palestinians remained under Israeli control.[15]
The 1998 Wye River agreement renewed commitments to earlier agreements.[12] The undertaking not to take unilateral actions was soon violated by both parties.[12] The May 4, 1999 deadline passed without a permanent-status agreement.[12] The interim arrangements therefore did not culminate in the comprehensive settlement envisaged by the original timetable.[2]
Israel and the Palestinian Authority attempted to negotiate a permanent agreement at Camp David in Maryland in July 2000, but the summit ended without a settlement.[15] Disputes included borders, Jerusalem, and whether Israel would recognize Palestinian refugees’ claimed right of return.[17] The subsequent outbreak of the Second Intifada followed the unsuccessful summit, and the Oslo process effectively ended without resolving the permanent-status questions.[2]
Nevertheless, the territorial and institutional transfers were substantial.[5] By September 2000, the Palestinian Authority controlled more than 85 percent of the Gaza Strip and 39.7 percent of the West Bank, while 99 percent of the Palestinian population lived under its jurisdiction.[5] The creation of Palestinian governing institutions and Israeli redeployments from Gaza, Jericho, and West Bank cities and villages remained concrete outcomes of the agreements.[2] The Palestinian Authority and direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations endured as legacies even though the permanent settlement was not achieved.[5]
05Historiography and Legacy
Mutual recognition and the establishment of ongoing direct Israel–PLO negotiations were central diplomatic consequences of Oslo.[18] The agreements also created Palestinian institutions and fostered security and economic cooperation alongside Israeli military redeployment.[18] Their structure remained interim: the Declaration established a process for negotiating a future settlement rather than supplying a comprehensive peace treaty.[1] The signing ceremony’s symbolism, particularly the Rabin–Arafat handshake, accompanied a document whose immediate commitments concerned a limited transition to Palestinian self-government.[20]
Israeli opinion varied over time and across the questions asked.[18] Polling showed 60 percent support for the Declaration of Principles shortly after its September 1993 signing, compared with 37 percent support for the Interim Agreement in October 1995.[18] In December 1994, 47 percent believed that the peace process had worsened Israel’s security situation, while 49 percent considered the September 1995 Interim Agreement a contribution to stronger security.[18] Because these figures concern different dates and questions, they do not constitute a single directly comparable measure of support.[18]
The August 1998 Peace Index found approximately 42 percent of Israelis in favor of the Oslo agreements and 30 percent opposed, with the remainder undecided.[21] Asked whether the agreements would bear fruit, 35 percent answered positively and 40 percent negatively.[21] The results reflected a distinction between support for the agreements and confidence in their eventual success.[21]
The accords’ strategic meaning remains disputed: supporters have viewed them as a historic breakthrough, while opponents have regarded them as a strategic mistake and security threat.[3] One interpretation emphasizes political separation between Israel and the Palestinians and protection of Israel’s Jewish and democratic character as Rabin’s principal strategic considerations.[3] Another analysis of his public speeches emphasizes his combination of support for negotiations with insistence on combating terrorism and maintaining security, together with his presentation of interim arrangements as temporary and reversible.[18]
Explanations of the process’s breakdown place different weight on failures to fulfill commitments, domestic political opposition, stalled permanent-status talks, and violence.[2] A separate assessment emphasizes Palestinian violence and Arafat’s failure to contain it, while also identifying settlement growth as increasingly limiting prospects for a contiguous Palestinian state.[11] These are competing causal interpretations rather than additional terms of the agreements.[11]
Debate also concerns the gap between expectations and the written framework.[19] One analysis distinguishes Palestinian expectations of halted settlement expansion, timely withdrawals, and improved economic conditions from Israeli expectations that the Palestinian Authority would prevent attacks.[19] The agreements contained no explicit commitment to stop settlement expansion, despite Palestinian expectations to that effect.[19] The same analysis identifies inadequate mechanisms for monitoring violations and ensuring corrective action as a contributor to the breakdown, distinct from the negotiation, conciliation, and consensual arbitration procedures actually provided in the Declaration.[19][9]
Contemporary Israeli commentary likewise differed over whether the framework clarified the eventual political destination or weakened Israel’s control without sufficient safeguards.[21] Criticisms included underestimated opposition, insufficient assurance that each stage would be implemented before the next, and failure to involve Jordan adequately.[21] Alongside these criticisms stood an assessment of mutual recognition as a positive historic turning point whose promise depended on completion through compromise.[21]
Sources
- 1Jewish Virtual Library, The Oslo Accords, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 2U.S. Department of State, The Oslo Accords, 1993, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 3Institute for National Security Studies, The Securitization of the Bi-National State: The Oslo Accords 1993-1995, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 4The Times of Israel, Interview with Ron Pundak, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 5Anti-Defamation League, The Oslo Accords/Oslo Process, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 6Institute for National Security Studies, Israel–PLO Recognition Letters, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 7Ynet, All the Way to Sharm, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 8The Times of Israel, Declassified Cabinet Protocols, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 9Institute for National Security Studies, Declaration of Principles, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 10U.S. National Archives, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 11Center for Israel Education, Oslo Accords (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Agreements), Israel and PLO, 1993, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 12Center for Israel Education, Oslo II Agreement Between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, 1995, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 13Jewish Virtual Library, Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 14The Jerusalem Post, On This Day: Oslo II Accord signed by Rabin and Arafat, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 15Ynet, The Oslo Accords, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 16U.S. Department of State, West Bank and Gaza, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 17Office of the Historian, Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 18Tel Aviv University, Nimrod Rosler, Leadership and Peacemaking, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 19My Jewish Learning, Why the Oslo Accords Failed, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 20My Jewish Learning, The Oslo Accords, accessed on November 17, 2026.
- 21Globes, Five Years On, accessed on November 17, 2026.
IsraelPedia Question & Answers
What were the Oslo Accords?
The Oslo Accords were a series of agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), beginning with the Declaration of Principles signed in Washington, D.C., on September 13, 1993. They established a framework for Palestinian interim self-government, Israeli military redeployment, and negotiations toward a permanent settlement. The agreements led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority and elected Palestinian institutions, but the transitional period ended without a permanent-status agreement.
Why did Israel and the PLO begin secret negotiations in Norway?
Norwegian sociologist Terje Larsen and Israeli Labor Party politician Yossi Beilin considered direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO necessary, since Palestinians had participated in the Madrid peace process through a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The initial Oslo meetings were unofficial and secret, involving Israeli academics and PLO representatives. Secrecy allowed them to explore possible concessions and arrangements without immediately incurring domestic political costs.
What did the 1993 Oslo Declaration establish?
The Declaration of Principles established a framework for an elected Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with a transitional period not to exceed five years. It provided for Israeli redeployment from populated areas, transfers of administrative powers, Palestinian elections, and negotiations on permanent-status issues. Those negotiations were to address matters including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, and borders; the interim arrangements were not to prejudge their outcome.
What did the Oslo Accords provide for in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement?
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement, signed on May 4, 1994, provided for Israeli withdrawal from the Jericho area and 83 percent of the Gaza Strip. It established the Palestinian Authority and its security forces and transferred Palestinian public-order and internal-security responsibilities to the Authority, while Israel retained overall security responsibility for Israelis in those areas and responsibility for the borders with Jordan and Egypt. The agreement also provided for the release of 5,000 Palestinian prisoners.
How did Oslo II divide the West Bank?
Oslo II divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C as part of phased Israeli redeployments and expanded Palestinian self-government. In Area A, the Palestinian Council was to assume internal security and public order for Palestinians after Israeli redeployment; in Area B, Palestinian police handled public order while Israel retained overriding security responsibility. In Area C, powers and territorial jurisdiction were to transfer in phases, subject to matters reserved for permanent-status negotiations.
Why did the Oslo process end without a permanent-status agreement?
The Oslo process ended without a permanent-status agreement after the May 4, 1999 transitional deadline passed without a settlement and the Camp David summit in July 2000 also ended without agreement. Disputes included borders, Jerusalem, and whether Israel would recognize Palestinian refugees’ claimed right of return. The subsequent outbreak of the Second Intifada followed the unsuccessful summit, and the process effectively ended without resolving the permanent-status questions.
What were the lasting outcomes of the Oslo Accords?
The Oslo Accords created Palestinian governing institutions and established ongoing direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO, alongside Israeli redeployments. By September 2000, the Palestinian Authority controlled more than 85 percent of the Gaza Strip and 39.7 percent of the West Bank, while 99 percent of the Palestinian population lived under its jurisdiction. The permanent settlement envisaged by the process was not achieved.