Camp David Accords

The territorial setting followed the 1967 war, after Israel took control of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and the Gaza Strip.[3][5] Egypt pressed for Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in 1967, while Carter pursued a broader Middle East settlement grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.[3]

Direct diplomacy gained momentum when Sadat visited Jerusalem in November 1977 and addressed the Knesset.[4] His journey provided the breakthrough preceding the Camp David negotiations and opened direct contacts between the Egyptian and Israeli leaderships.[4] Begin subsequently made a reciprocal visit to Ismailia, but the direct talks did not generate substantive progress toward a peace agreement.[1][3] The exchanges created an opportunity for negotiations without resolving the territorial and political questions separating the parties.[1][3]

A central obstacle was disagreement over the West Bank and Gaza.[3] Egypt sought Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 borders in exchange for security arrangements and minor border modifications.[3] Israel rejected the Egyptian position, particularly regarding those territories, and instead advocated Palestinian autonomy during a five-year interim period.[3] The competing proposals concerned both the extent of territorial withdrawal and the political arrangements that would follow it.[3]

As negotiations stalled, Sadat expressed disappointment with their progress and a desire to end direct contacts.[3] Carter responded by calling a summit with Sadat and Begin at Camp David, the American presidential retreat in Maryland.[3] The summit brought the parties into an isolated negotiating setting after their earlier public diplomatic initiative had encountered an impasse.[3]

Sadat, Begin, and Carter met at Camp David from September 5 through September 17, 1978.[1] American Middle East specialists prepared a draft treaty text to provide a starting point for the negotiations.[3] The agenda included Sinai settlements and airbases, the terms of Egyptian-Israeli peace, and the proposed arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza.[3] Questions concerning the application of Resolution 242 and the status of settlements during autonomy negotiations proved especially difficult.[3]

The initial format of direct three-way talks could not be sustained.[3] Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance then met separately with the Egyptian and Israeli delegations.[3] An American negotiating text addressing the major issues was repeatedly revised in response to the parties’ positions.[3]

The fate of Israeli settlements in Sinai became a particularly serious obstacle.[2] Begin initially opposed their dismantling forcefully, telling Zbigniew Brzezinski, “My right eye will fall out, my right hand will fall off before I ever agree to the dismantling of a single Jewish settlement.”[6] He later accepted a Knesset vote on removing the settlements after other Sinai questions had been settled.[6] As the summit appeared close to failure, Sadat threatened to leave; the breakthrough came when Begin agreed to let the Knesset determine the settlements’ future.[2]

Agreement was reached on the summit’s final day.[2] The resulting documents were signed at the White House on September 17, with Begin and Sadat as signatories and Carter as witness.[1][7] They were titled “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East” and “A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel.”[3] These were negotiating frameworks rather than a completed peace treaty, leaving the parties to translate their principles into subsequent agreements.[3]

At the signing ceremony, Carter acknowledged both the achievement and its limits: “The summit exceeded our highest expectations, but we know that it left many difficult issues which are still to be resolved.”[2] He explained that Egypt considered removal of the Sinai settlements a prerequisite to a treaty, whereas Israel regarded the matter as one to be resolved during peace negotiations.[8] The agreement to submit the question to the Knesset therefore enabled the diplomatic process to continue without making the summit itself the final settlement of that issue.[2][8]

The Framework for Peace in the Middle East identified Security Council Resolution 242 “in all its parts” as the agreed basis for a peaceful settlement.[9] It sought a “just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict” through peace treaties based on Resolutions 242 and 338.[10] Its stated reach extended beyond Egypt and Israel to other neighboring states prepared to negotiate on the same basis.[1] Other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict were invited to join the framework and pursue comparable peace treaties.[1]

The framework linked peace to respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and secure and recognized boundaries.[9] Egypt and Israel committed themselves to settling disputes peacefully rather than through the use or threat of force.[1] The regional approach also contemplated practical security measures, including demilitarized or arms-limited zones, early-warning stations, international forces, and monitoring arrangements.[7] These provisions placed negotiated security arrangements alongside territorial and political commitments in the proposed peace process.[7][9]

Associated principles called for normal relations between signatories, including full recognition, the abolition of economic boycotts, and legal protections for one another’s citizens under due process.[10] They also proposed exploring opportunities for economic development.[10] The United States was invited to participate in discussions on implementation and timetables, while the Security Council and its permanent members were asked to support the peace treaties.[10] The proposed regional settlement therefore included diplomatic recognition, economic relations, security provisions, and international support rather than territorial arrangements alone.[10]

For the West Bank and Gaza, the regional framework proposed transitional arrangements lasting no more than five years.[1] Once the inhabitants freely elected a self-governing authority, Israel’s military government and civilian administration were to be withdrawn.[1] The transitional period would begin when that authority was established and inaugurated, making the creation of elected self-government the starting point for the proposed timetable.[1]

Egypt, Israel, and Jordan were assigned roles in negotiating how the authority would be established and defining its powers and responsibilities.[1] Jordan was to be invited into the negotiations, and delegations could include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed.[10] The proposed arrangements thus connected local elections with negotiations involving neighboring governments and Palestinian participants.[1][10] They did not simply prescribe an authority’s powers in advance; those responsibilities were to be worked out through agreement.[1]

Security arrangements were also to be negotiated.[1] Israeli armed forces would withdraw, with remaining forces redeployed to specified security locations.[9] The framework called for arrangements covering internal and external security and public order, including a strong local police force.[1] That force was to consist of inhabitants, with liaison on internal security matters involving Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.[11] Israeli and Jordanian forces were also to participate in joint patrols and man control posts to help secure borders.[9]

Negotiations on final status were to begin as soon as possible, and no later than the third year of the transitional period.[1] They were to conclude by the end of the transition and address the territories’ final status and relationship with neighboring states.[1] Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and elected representatives of the inhabitants were to participate.[1] Boundaries and security arrangements were among the matters to be negotiated, and the framework required recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.[11]

Palestinian participation was envisaged at several stages rather than through elections alone.[10] Elected representatives were to take part in negotiations, vote on final-status agreements, and decide how to govern themselves within the agreed terms.[10] The framework itself did not specify a final sovereign status for the territories, leaving that outcome to future negotiations.[10] Its immediate institutional proposal was elected self-government during a transition, followed by an agreed settlement of final-status questions.[1][10]

The framework separately addressed displaced persons and the refugee problem.[9] A continuing committee comprising Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority was to agree on arrangements for admitting people displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 and on measures to prevent disruption and disorder.[1] Egypt and Israel were also to work with other interested parties to establish procedures for a prompt, just, and permanent resolution of the refugee problem.[1] These provisions established a proposed negotiating mechanism rather than a final disposition of refugee status.[9][11]

The separate Egyptian-Israeli framework called for good-faith negotiations aimed at concluding a peace treaty within three months.[1] It accepted full Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border with mandated Palestine and withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Sinai.[10] Unless the parties agreed otherwise, the treaty’s terms were to be implemented within two to three years of its signing.[10] The document therefore distinguished the conclusion of a treaty from the subsequent timetable for carrying out its provisions.[10]

An interim withdrawal was to take place between three and nine months after the treaty was signed.[1] All Israeli forces were to move east of a line running from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, with its precise course to be determined by agreement.[1] This initial movement was a separate stage within the broader withdrawal process rather than the full implementation of the treaty.[1][10]

The framework provided for normal relations after the treaty was signed and the interim withdrawal completed.[9] These included full recognition and diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations.[9] Economic boycotts and barriers to the movement of goods and people were to end, while each country’s citizens would receive protection under due process of law in the other.[9] The intended peace thus involved formal recognition and civilian relations as well as military withdrawal and territorial arrangements.[9]

Navigation and transport received detailed treatment.[1] Israeli ships were to enjoy free passage through the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal, while the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba would remain open to all nations for navigation and overflight.[9] Certain Sinai airfields left by Israel were designated for civilian use.[9] A highway connection between Sinai and Jordan near Eilat was also envisaged, providing free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan.[11]

Military limitations applied on both sides of the international border.[9] In an area approximately 50 kilometers east of the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal, Egyptian forces were limited to no more than one division.[9] An area west of the border and Gulf of Aqaba was to contain only United Nations forces and lightly armed civil police.[9] On the Israeli side, forces within three kilometers east of the border were limited to no more than four infantry battalions.[9] Exact boundaries of the designated zones were to be determined in the peace negotiations.[10]

The security provisions also contemplated United Nations observers and early-warning stations to help ensure compliance.[1] United Nations forces were designated for locations near the Mediterranean border and in the Sharm el-Sheikh area, including a role in helping ensure passage through the Strait of Tiran.[11] Their removal from specified locations required approval by a unanimous vote of the Security Council’s five permanent members.[9] These provisions supplied an international monitoring component to the restrictions on Egyptian and Israeli deployments.[1][9]

Begin presented the accords to the Knesset on September 25, 1978.[12] In his presentation, he argued that the government was seeking authorization both to negotiate a peace treaty and to remove and relocate Israeli settlers from Sinai.[12] He called the settlements question painful, while maintaining that rejecting the government’s proposal would mean rejecting what had been agreed at Camp David.[12] He also described the anticipated diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations, the end of the boycott, and free movement of goods and people as elements of the peace being pursued.[12]

Begin’s account emphasized demilitarized areas, zones with minimal military presence, and early-warning systems.[12] He said Sinai airfields would be transferred to Egyptian civil authorities and that the United States had promised assistance in establishing two airbases in the Negev.[12] Opposition leader Shimon Peres endorsed pursuing peace but criticized the government’s handling of the negotiations, arguing that settlement construction during the talks and hesitation over applying Resolution 242 to the West Bank had imposed avoidable costs on Israel.[12]

The Knesset ratified the agreements.[13] Goldstein’s study argues that the accords received broad support in Israel, including within the political network behind the Likud-led government, even as some circles from Begin’s historical support base opposed the compromises involved.[14]

Further negotiations were necessary before the frameworks could become a treaty.[3] Obstacles included a disagreement between the Carter administration and Begin’s government over the duration of an agreed settlement-construction freeze, Israeli concerns about withdrawal timing, and Egyptian reservations about the treaty’s effect on its obligations to other Arab states.[3] Efforts also failed to secure Jordanian or Saudi support.[3] Carter became personally involved in overcoming a later negotiating impasse.[3]

Egypt and Israel signed their separate peace treaty in Washington on March 26, 1979.[3] It formally ended the state of war between the two countries and closely reflected the proposals developed at Camp David.[13] The treaty process brought full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and evacuation of the Israeli settlements there.[14] Egypt established normal diplomatic relations and granted Israeli ships passage through the Suez Canal.[4] These were consequences of the later treaty and its implementation, not actions completed by signing the 1978 frameworks.[3][14]

The broader regional process had a different outcome. After March 1979, U.S.-led autonomy talks failed to produce an agreement; Palestinian representatives refused to participate, and substantial Egyptian-Israeli differences hindered the discussions.[3] Palestinians rejected the framework and demanded statehood, while the Palestine Liberation Organization rejected the accords.[13] The proposed broader framework consequently remained unimplemented.[13]

Egypt also faced regional opposition to the bilateral peace, and no other Arab state supported the accords at the time.[13] Formal relations between Egypt and Israel later came to be commonly described as a “cold peace,” reflecting the limited warmth of the relationship beyond official diplomatic ties.[4]

The accords paved the way for the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state.[4] Begin and Sadat later received the Nobel Peace Prize for their contributions to the agreements.[13] Their achievement established Egyptian-Israeli recognition and a treaty relationship through a process combining territorial withdrawal, military restrictions, navigation guarantees, and diplomatic normalization.[9] The resulting relationship has also been characterized as a “cold peace,” reflecting the distance between formal interstate relations and broader social acceptance.[4]

The autonomy proposals had a legacy beyond their unsuccessful implementation after Camp David.[15] The concept reappeared in the 1993 Oslo Accords.[15] The Egyptian-Israeli agreement also opened the way for later Israeli negotiations and agreements involving Jordan and the Palestinians.[4]

The Israeli political history of the agreement includes changes within the Right as well as Begin’s individual leadership.[14] Goldstein’s study emphasizes the broader peace discourse developing within the Israeli Right and argues that Begin’s initiative reflected changes across his political network rather than an isolated personal departure from it.[14] The agreement joined a major territorial concession in Sinai to a peace initiative led by an Israeli government of the Right.[14]

The accords’ documentary legacy continued to attract attention decades later.[16] In 2018, Egypt released documents concerning the agreements, including material described as calling for Palestinian autonomy.[16] The distinction between the two tracks remains central to their historical outcome: the bilateral framework produced a treaty, while the proposed Palestinian and broader regional process did not achieve its intended agreement.[3][13]

A major interpretive dispute concerned what Palestinian autonomy would ultimately mean.[10][8] The text established transitional self-government and future negotiations, but did not resolve Palestinian statehood or the territories’ final sovereign status.[10] In the Knesset, Begin argued that the accords would not lead to a Palestinian state, that the PLO would not participate, and that Israel would advance a sovereignty claim after the transition.[12] Opposition members challenged his interpretation and argued that the arrangements withheld the political rights Palestinians sought.[12]

Settlements generated a separate set of disagreements.[3] Egypt and Israel differed at the signing over whether removing Sinai settlements was a prerequisite to a treaty or a question for subsequent negotiations.[8] The Carter administration and Begin’s government also disagreed afterward over how long the settlement-construction freeze would last.[3] These disputes concerned the scope and implementation of the frameworks; they did not alter the distinction between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty process that succeeded and the autonomy negotiations that failed to produce agreement.[3]