1993 in Israel

The path to 1993's diplomatic breakthroughs ran through the turbulence of the preceding year. In December 1992, Israel expelled 415 Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists, after which the Washington peace talks reached a standstill. Under the new Labor-led government, the peace process shifted toward secret negotiations with the PLO.[6]

On January 19, the Knesset repealed a 1986 law that had banned meetings between Israelis and members of organizations designated as terrorist organizations, opening the way for talks with the PLO. Ezer Weizman was sworn in as Israel's president on March 13, succeeding Chaim Herzog. On March 30, Israel's Inner Cabinet decided to seal off the Gaza Strip and the West Bank—known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria—preventing approximately 100,000 Palestinians from working in Israel.[4]

Israeli law had previously prohibited contact between Israelis and PLO officials, a constraint that helped shape the Oslo channel: secrecy allowed negotiators to explore possible scenarios and concessions without immediate domestic political costs.[2] Secret contacts near Oslo began in January 1993 at the home of Norwegian Defense Minister Jørgen Holst and his wife, Marianne Heiberg, after Norwegian sociologist Terje Larsen and Israeli Labor Party member Yossi Beilin set the process in motion.[2] Israeli academics Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak met Palestinian negotiator Abu Ala—Ahmed Suleiman Khoury—and his aides, initially seeking an interim declaration of principles for Palestinian self-rule.[7] By May, Israel had raised the talks to an official level by sending Uri Savir.[2]

The Oslo negotiations developed under the auspices of Norway's Foreign Ministry and initially involved Israeli and Palestinian diplomats and academics.[8] By late spring, the representatives had become official negotiators while maintaining the channel's secrecy.[7] A Congressional Research Service report states that Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO official Mahmoud Abbas initialed the Declaration of Principles in Oslo on August 19, 1993, and that the agreement was announced publicly on August 27.[9]

On August 30, the Israeli cabinet convened to consider what the contemporaneous record called the "draft declaration of principles with the Palestinians." The State Archives later released an 81-page transcript of the previously top-secret meeting, with some sections still redacted for security reasons.[10] The meeting lasted five and a half hours, reflecting the gravity of the decision.[11]

The cabinet approved the draft by 16 votes, with two abstentions—Arie Deri and Shimon Shitreet—and none against. Deri said he could not support the agreement but framed his abstention as an unwillingness to accept collective responsibility for the next stage of negotiations. The debate addressed security, settlements, Jerusalem, terrorism, and public support.[10]

Prime Minister Rabin described the autonomy arrangement as difficult to implement, warning that security would be more complicated under shared authority than under Israel's existing control. He advocated proceeding gradually, beginning in Gaza and assessing the performance of the Palestinian authority and its forces.[10] Foreign Minister Shimon Peres raised the possibility that the PLO leadership could collapse and be replaced by more extreme forces, while IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak warned about Palestinian police, coordination, roads, Israeli communities, and infiltration by terrorist elements. Barak identified the road network as especially complex, citing 150–200 kilometers of roads and routes in Gaza and nearly 1,000 kilometers in Judea and Samaria.[10] The agreement also faced intense right-wing opposition and public demonstrations.[10]

Four days before the Washington ceremony, on September 9, Arafat and Rabin exchanged letters of mutual recognition.[9] Arafat stated that the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist in peace and security, accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, committed itself to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, renounced terrorism and other violence, and undertook to submit changes to provisions of the Palestinian National Covenant that denied Israel's right to exist. Rabin replied that Israel's government had decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and would begin negotiations with it.[9][12]

The exchange formalized a major policy change: Israel recognized the PLO as the Palestinians' representative, while the PLO formally recognized Israel and renounced terrorism.[8] The PLO's recognition of Israel angered Syria and other Arab states. Syria objected both to the recognition itself and to the PLO's willingness to negotiate without first requiring full Israeli withdrawal from all territory captured in 1967.[13]

The Declaration of Principles was formally signed on the South Lawn of the White House on September 13, 1993, with the United States and Russia as witnesses. The White House transcript records Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO Executive Council member Mahmoud Abbas signing the document, followed by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev signing as witnesses. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat were the principal leaders at the ceremony and delivered speeches.[3]

Rabin described the agreement as difficult for Israelis and said the parties had come together to try to end hostilities and spare their children the cost of war, violence, and terror. He concluded: "The time for peace has come."[3] The ceremony ended with the now-iconic handshake between Rabin and Arafat.[1]

The Declaration's opening stated that the Israeli government and the Palestinian delegation had agreed it was time to end decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and seek peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, a comprehensive peace settlement, and historic reconciliation through an agreed political process.[14] European countries warmly endorsed the agreement and indicated their readiness to provide funds supporting Palestinian self-rule.[13]

The Declaration established a framework for an elected Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, called the Council, for the West Bank and Gaza Strip during a transitional period of no more than five years. The process was intended to lead toward a permanent settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It called for direct, free, and general elections under agreed supervision and international observation, with the goal of holding them no later than nine months after the Declaration entered into force.[14]

The transfer of authority from Israel's military government and Civil Administration to authorized Palestinians was to begin after the Declaration entered into force and Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. The initial spheres of Palestinian authority were education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism; Palestinians were also to begin building a police force. The Council was assigned responsibility for public order and internal security for Palestinians, while Israel retained responsibility for defense against external threats and the overall security of Israelis.[14]

The Declaration treated the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit during the interim period and provided for Israeli forces to redeploy outside populated areas before Council elections, with further redeployments as Palestinian police assumed responsibility for public order and internal security.[14] Jerusalem was excluded from the interim self-government arrangements and reserved for permanent-status negotiations, although Palestinians of Jerusalem who lived there were given the right to participate in the election process for the interim authority.[15]

Permanent-status negotiations were to begin as soon as possible and no later than the start of the third year of the interim period. Deferred topics included Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with neighboring states, and other issues of common interest. The text specified that interim agreements should not prejudge the permanent-status outcome.[14] The declaration was followed by the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho arrangements and the September 1995 Interim Agreement, commonly called Oslo II.[16]

The agreement provoked intense controversy in public debate and the Knesset. On September 23, the Knesset considered a no-confidence motion connected to the recently signed Declaration. Sixty-one members voted against the motion—effectively supporting the government—while 50 voted in favor, eight abstained, and one was absent.[6] Five Arab-party members voted with the government, and six Shas members abstained.[17]

Critics argued that the PLO had not genuinely renounced terrorism and that negotiating with it breached Israel's long-standing policy against dealing with terrorist organizations. Opponents also pointed to the deferral of Jerusalem, refugees, final borders, and settlements as evidence that the agreement offered few concrete guarantees.[1]

The cabinet transcript demonstrates that even ministers who approved the agreement did so with considerable wariness. Rabin stressed the difficulty of implementing shared security arrangements and proposed treating Gaza as an initial test, while Peres and Barak raised concerns about extremist forces, Palestinian policing, intelligence, roads, and the security of Israeli communities.[10]

While the Oslo negotiations were proceeding secretly, Israel was engaged in open military operations on its northern front. Operation Accountability began on July 25, 1993, after an escalation of Hezbollah rocket fire against northern Israeli communities and rising Israeli military fatalities.[18] The Rabin government ordered the campaign with the stated aim of restoring quiet to the northern border; an Israeli statement also described preventing Hezbollah and other groups from obstructing the peace process as an objective.[4] Under Chief of Staff Ehud Barak and Northern Command head Yitzhak Mordechai, Israeli forces employed artillery, naval, air, and armored units against villages and Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon.[19]

Hezbollah shelling killed two Israeli civilians in Kiryat Shmona and injured 13 others. The IDF suffered one fatality and three additional casualties.[18] Mako reported approximately 300,000 Lebanese villagers displaced toward Beirut, 118 Lebanese fatalities—including about 50 Hezbollah militants—and 40 wounded.[19]

Barak wanted to expand the operation to Beirut, but Military Intelligence chief Uri Sagi opposed the proposal and Rabin declined to expand the campaign. The operation ended on July 31 with an understanding that neither side would attack civilian populations.[4][19] Critics argued that the arrangement effectively legitimized Hezbollah's continued warfare in southern Lebanon so long as civilians were not targeted.[19] The campaign damaged Lebanese civilian infrastructure and drew harsh international criticism.[18]

On December 30, 1993, Israel and the Holy See signed the Fundamental Agreement in Jerusalem, establishing diplomatic relations after 18 months of negotiations. Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin and Vatican Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Claudio Maria Celli signed the agreement.[5] Its provisions included commitments to peaceful conflict resolution and cooperation against antisemitism, racism, and religious intolerance. The Holy See also agreed not to become directly involved in Israel's disputed territories and unsettled borders, while reserving the right to speak on moral issues connected to the conflict.[5]

The agreement addressed freedom of religion and worship, access to holy sites, and preservation of their status quo. The legal status of Church institutions and economic and fiscal matters—including property rights and tax issues—remained for further negotiation. Article 2 contained an explicit commitment to combat antisemitism.[20] Diplomatic missions in Tel Aviv and the Vatican opened on June 15, 1994.[5]

In a retrospective analysis, former Israeli ambassador to the Holy See Aharon Lopez identified the changed international order, the Gulf War, and the Madrid Conference peace process as important context. He wrote that the emerging climate of regional dialogue encouraged the Holy See not to remain outside the peace process.[20] At the signing, Beilin said: "After 2,000 years, this is a very important move forward in the dialogue between the Jewish and Christian faiths. It was time for them; it was time for us."[5]

In 1993, archaeologist Avraham Biran discovered an ancient inscription at Tel Dan that was associated with the dynasty of King David and described as the first appearance of David's name outside the Bible.[4] The discovery supplied a major archaeological reference to a dynasty identified with David and reinforced the historical depth of the Jewish connection to the Land of Israel.

The inscription's interpretation remains a subject of academic discussion. A Hebrew Union College dissertation notes that the Aramaic expression bytdwd could mean "House of David" or refer to the name of a Judean dynasty, and it characterizes archaeological proof for an actual King David as circumstantial.[21] The discovery nevertheless made 1993 a year of simultaneous political transformation and renewed attention to ancient Israelite history.

Several additional developments marked 1993 in Israel. In the November local elections, Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek was defeated by Ehud Olmert, changing the city's municipal leadership as national politics centered on the Oslo process.[4]

In the religious sphere, Rabbi Maya Leibovic became the first Israeli-born woman to serve as a pulpit rabbi in Israel. This distinguished her from Naamah Kelman, who had been ordained the previous year as the first woman ordained in Israel but was American-born. Hebrew Union College described Leibovic's status as a native-born Israeli as a separate landmark. She became rabbi of Kehilat Mevasseret Zion in Jerusalem.[22]

The agreements reached in 1993 initiated a longer implementation process rather than producing an immediate final settlement. Israel and the PLO signed the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in May 1994, and the September 1995 Interim Agreement expanded the arrangements and divided responsibilities across parts of the West Bank.[16] The process established the Palestinian Authority and direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as enduring institutional consequences of Oslo.[8]

The permanent-status questions deferred in 1993 were not resolved through a final peace agreement. Subsequent negotiations, violence, terrorism, political opposition, and failures of implementation eroded the process, and the accords did not produce the lasting settlement their supporters had sought.[1][8]

Accounts differ over who formally signed the September 13 Declaration of Principles. The contemporaneous White House transcript explicitly records Peres and Abbas signing, followed by Christopher and Kozyrev as witnesses, while Rabin and Arafat delivered speeches.[3] A State Department historical summary instead names Rabin and Abbas, and the Anti-Defamation League describes Rabin and Arafat as the signers.[23][8] The White House transcript therefore provides the clearest sequence of the ceremony itself.[3]

Sources also give different dates for the mutual-recognition exchange. A contemporary Congressional Research Service report and the Center for Israel Education give September 9, while a later CRS report gives September 10.[9][13][24]

The interpretation of the Tel Dan inscription as referring to the "House of David" has also been debated. The HUC dissertation notes that bytdwd could mean "House of David" or the name of a Judean dynasty and characterizes archaeological proof for an actual King David as circumstantial.[21] Jewish Virtual Library nevertheless presents the inscription as a reference to the dynasty of King David and the first appearance of his name outside the Bible.[4]

Sources characterize the September 23 Knesset action differently even while reporting the same 61–50 result and eight abstentions. The Knesset-derived highlights page describes a vote on a no-confidence motion, whereas the Jewish Virtual Library timeline calls the action ratification of the Oslo Agreement.[6][4]