1999 in Israel

The elections of 1999 were held a year ahead of schedule after a parliamentary no-confidence motion brought down Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government.[6] Infighting over implementation of the October 1998 Wye River Memorandum was a central cause of the government's collapse.[7] That agreement had called for further Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — alongside Palestinian security commitments.

The election was conducted under Israel's then-operative system of direct voting for prime minister alongside proportional voting for the Knesset. The separate contests allowed voters to choose a prime-ministerial candidate and a different party list, contributing to the distinction between Barak's personal victory and the fragmented parliament that emerged.[2][8]

On May 17, 1999, Israel elected the Fifteenth Knesset and held the country's second direct prime-ministerial election.[2] Ehud Barak, a retired general leading the One Israel alliance, campaigned on change and renewed engagement in the peace process.[9] He defeated Netanyahu by approximately 56 percent to 44 percent.[1] Central Elections Committee data reproduced by the Jewish Virtual Library list 4,285,428 eligible voters, 3,309,416 ballots in the Knesset contest, and turnout of 77.2 percent.[10] Barak took office on July 6 and visited the United States from July 14–20, pledging to President Bill Clinton that making peace would be a top priority.[11] He predicted that agreements with Syria and the Palestinians could be reached "in 12 to 15 months."[7]

The simultaneous Knesset vote produced a fragmented result. One Israel won 26 seats, Likud 19, Shas 17, and Meretz 10. Yisrael Ba'aliyah, Shinui, and the Center Party each won 6 seats; the National Religious Party, United Torah Judaism, and the United Arab List each won 5; National Union and Yisrael Beiteinu each won 4; Hadash won 3; and Balad and One Nation won 2 each.[9]

Barak formed a coalition incorporating One Israel, Shas, Meretz, the Center Party, the National Religious Party, United Torah Judaism, and Yisrael Ba'aliyah.[1] A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs commentary described the coalition as spanning much of the political spectrum and argued that its divisions over diplomacy, religion, law, and education hindered governance.[12] The same commentary disputed descriptions of Barak's victory as a landslide, noting that his margin among Jewish voters was 3.2 percentage points and that center-right parties collectively received more Knesset votes than the center-left.[12]

Barak's election generated renewed activity in Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. Within three months, he obtained Yasser Arafat's agreement to modify the Oslo negotiating formula, setting a target of mid-February 2000 for a framework agreement on permanent-status issues and September 2000 for a comprehensive agreement.[13]

The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, formally titled the Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, was signed on September 4, 1999.[3] The ceremony included Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Jordan's King Abdullah, and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.[14]

Under the memorandum, the parties committed to implementing outstanding obligations from agreements concluded since September 1993 and accelerating permanent-status negotiations. They agreed to make "a determined effort to conclude a Framework Agreement on all Permanent Status issues in five months" and to conclude a comprehensive agreement within one year.[3] The memorandum scheduled staged transfers between Areas C, B, and A beginning in September 1999 and required both sides to refrain from steps changing the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[3] Arafat also pledged not to declare a Palestinian state during the implementation period, while Barak pledged not to take unilateral steps.[15]

Israel released 350 Palestinian security prisoners during 1999, in addition to 250 released under the Wye River arrangements in late 1998.[16] The releases occurred in two groups on September 9 and October 15, and the southern safe-passage route between Gaza and the West Bank opened on October 25.[14] On October 5, Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed a Safe Passage Protocol establishing a southern route through Erez Crossing, Ashkelon Junction, Plugot Junction, Beit Guvrin Junction, and Tarkumiyeh for Palestinian residents and foreign visitors traveling between the two territories.[17]

A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs commentary argues that Barak's government initially sought to reduce the American role in the negotiations, but that Arafat's position during the Sharm el-Sheikh talks brought Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the U.S. peace team back into the process.[12]

A ceremony marking the renewal of final-status talks took place in October 1999 in the presence of Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy and Palestinian negotiator Abu Mazen.[18] On November 8, Israeli negotiator Oded Eran and Palestinian negotiator Yasser Abed Rabbo held a 75-minute meeting at the Grand Park Hotel in Ramallah. They expressed confidence that a framework agreement could be prepared by February 2000 and a final accord by September, although major disagreements remained over Palestinian statehood, refugees, Jerusalem, the 1967 borders, and Israeli settlements.[19] Another ceremony marked the start of talks between their negotiating teams in December.[18] Substantive final-status negotiations did not begin in earnest until March 2000, after the Israeli-Syrian track had failed.[18]

Parallel to the official process, a secret Israeli-Palestinian backchannel began on March 28, 1999, when Shlomo Ben-Ami and Abu Ala held their first meeting. Early sessions took place in Tel Aviv and Kiryat Anavim, and Gilead Sher and Hassan Asfour later joined the channel. It became known as the "Stockholm track," although its first round in Sweden occurred in May 2000.[18]

In November 1999, a team was established to address Jerusalem in the final-status negotiations. Headed by Reuven Merhav, it included representatives of the Peace Administration and researchers Ruth Lapidoth, Israel Kimhi, Maya Choshen, Israel Hasson, Pini Meidan-Shani, and Gidi Grinstein. Its work stopped after a media leak revealed its existence.[18]

A later Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs retrospective reports that Barak also asked legal adviser Daniel Reisner in 1999 to examine the legal aspects of a possible withdrawal from Gaza, including evacuation of its settlements and compensation for residents of communities such as Gush Katif. Barak's government fell before such a plan could be implemented.[20]

The Israeli-Syrian diplomatic track reopened in 1999 after a break of nearly five years.[4] During the summer, Barak and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad exchanged complimentary messages through a British intermediary. In December, the two countries agreed to restart negotiations "from the point where they left off," although each side defined that point differently.[5]

Formal negotiations resumed in Washington on December 15–16, 1999, with Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa leading their delegations and President Clinton intervening in the process. Trilateral committees addressed borders, security arrangements, peaceful relations, and water, and a second round was scheduled for Shepherdstown, West Virginia, beginning January 3, 2000.[5]

On January 26, 1999, the Knesset passed a law requiring a 61-member Knesset majority and a national referendum before any part of the Golan Heights could be returned to Syria.[5] When Barak told the Knesset in December that peace with Syria might require a "heavy territorial price," he survived a confidence vote by 47 votes to 31, with 24 abstentions and 18 members absent.[14]

Withdrawal from southern Lebanon had been a central element of Barak's campaign. In his first speech as prime minister in July 1999, he reiterated his preference for a negotiated withdrawal within one year, tied where possible to Israeli-Syrian peace, while retaining the option of withdrawing without a wider regional agreement.[21] His stated deadline was July 7, 2000.[5]

Israel began reducing its presence during 1999, downsizing its force in southern Lebanon in April. In June, the Israeli-allied South Lebanese Army withdrew from Jazzin, north of the security zone.[5]

The northern front remained dangerous. On June 24, after Hezbollah fired 36 rockets into Israel and killed two civilians, the Israel Defense Forces struck bridges and power stations near Beirut.[14] The exchange illustrated the continuing military pressure surrounding Barak's proposed withdrawal.

September 1999 brought a thwarted terrorist attack on Israeli civilians. Car bombs exploded prematurely in Haifa and Tiberias, injuring several passersby rather than reaching their intended targets.[22] Israeli security investigators concluded that the attacks had been carried out by a cell of Israeli Arabs associated with the northern branch of the Islamic Movement. The cell had reportedly been recruited by Hamas in the West Bank and assigned to plant bombs on Egged buses.[22]

The status of the Palestinian Orient House offices in Jerusalem also reflected the year's contested security and political environment. Israel's High Court of Justice ruled on May 11 that the offices could remain open until after the May 17 election despite police closure orders. After Barak took office, Internal Security Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami reportedly intended to recommend that the cabinet not close Orient House, reversing Netanyahu's policy.[23]

Two High Court of Justice rulings in 1999 carried significant implications for Israeli law and society. In September, the Court prohibited interrogation practices including violent shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, extended sleep deprivation, and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures.[16] A U.S. State Department report described the ruling as a major change from the judiciary's previous routine acquiescence to government positions in security cases.[16]

Earlier in the year, the High Court ruled that the government's use of Jewish National Fund land for public development was discriminatory because the JNF statute prohibited selling or leasing land to non-Jews. The ruling did not invalidate previous allocations and left open the possibility of distinctions under unspecified "special circumstances."[16]

Women held 15 of the 120 Knesset seats, up from 9 in the preceding Knesset. Eleven Arabs and two Druze served as members, while two women served in the Cabinet and no Arab citizens served as ministers.[16]

Late-1999 survey data portrayed an Israeli Jewish public that remained optimistic about diplomacy. Sixty-nine percent preferred peace talks to strengthening military capability, 68 percent believed peace would continue during the following three years, and 59 percent believed terrorist attacks could be curtailed only through negotiations.[24] Support for the "two states for two peoples" formula stood at 57 percent among Israeli Jews.[24]

At the same time, support for the Oslo process began a steady decline in the summer of 1999, approximately three months after Barak's election on a peace platform.[24] The divergence between general support for negotiations and declining confidence in the Oslo framework shaped the political environment as Barak entered the more intensive diplomatic efforts of 2000.

Israel's economy in 1999 showed signs of recovery while unemployment remained high. GDP grew by 2.2 percent in constant prices and reached NIS 417.4 billion in current prices, approximately US$101 billion.[25] After contracting in the first quarter, economic activity accelerated during the remainder of the year, led by recovering domestic demand and exports and accompanied by a widening current-account deficit.[25]

Unemployment averaged 8.9 percent, after rising from 6.7 percent in 1996 to 7.7 percent in 1997 and 8.5 percent in 1998. It peaked at a seasonally unadjusted 9.7 percent in the third quarter of 1999 before declining to 8.8 percent in the final quarter. The number of employed persons nevertheless rose from approximately 2 million in 1996 to 2.1 million in 1999.[25]

Consumer prices rose by 1.3 percent, the lowest inflation rate in more than three decades and the lowest since 1967. Housing prices fell by 0.9 percent; excluding housing, the consumer price index rose by 2 percent.[26]

Imports of goods and services, excluding the Palestinian Authority, totaled $30.6 billion, while exports reached $23.5 billion, producing a trade deficit of $7.15 billion. Manufactured goods and software accounted for 72 percent of exports, diamonds for 24 percent, and agricultural products for 4 percent. High-technology products represented $9.2 billion, or 54 percent of manufactured exports excluding diamonds.[27]

Israel's population was approximately 6.2 million, including 4.8728 million Jews, 934,100 Muslims, 131,800 Christians, and 101,200 Druze.[28]

Beyond the major peace tracks, 1999 brought several developments in Israel's bilateral relations. On July 27, Israel and Georgia signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation, while Israel and Uganda signed an agreement to expand economic ties. On October 28, Israel and Mauritania upgraded their diplomatic missions to embassies.[14]

The diplomatic initiatives launched in 1999 continued into 2000 but did not meet their initial timetables. The parties missed the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum's February 2000 deadline for a framework agreement, and substantive Israeli-Palestinian final-status talks began only in March.[16][18] Israeli-Syrian negotiations continued at Shepherdstown in January but subsequently collapsed. Israel then completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon on May 24, 2000.[5]

Interpretations of 1999 differ according to the measure emphasized. Barak's approximately 56–44 percent overall victory was commonly portrayed as decisive, while a Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs commentary stresses his much narrower margin among Jewish voters and the continued parliamentary strength of the center-right.[12] Accounts of the diplomatic year likewise contrast the optimism and accelerated negotiating schedules that followed Barak's election with the subsequent failure to meet the Sharm el-Sheikh deadlines and the collapse of the Syrian track.[13][16]