1989 in Israel

The November 1988 Knesset elections left neither Likud nor Labor able to form a government independently. Likud edged Labor by a single seat but could not assemble a coalition, and the two rivals consequently formed another national-unity government.[3] Israel's Twenty-Third Government formally entered office on December 22, 1988.[4] Throughout 1989, Yitzhak Shamir served as prime minister, Shimon Peres as vice premier and finance minister, Yitzhak Rabin as defense minister, Moshe Arens as foreign minister, Ariel Sharon as minister of industry and trade, and Ezer Weizman as minister of science and technology.[4]

Israel's proportional electoral system, in which voters selected national party lists rather than individual constituency candidates, produced recurring coalition stalemates and gave smaller parties influence disproportionate to their electoral share.[5] That dynamic was on display in early November 1989, when Agudat Israel — a small ultra-Orthodox party — temporarily left the National Unity Government for two months, protesting a proposed Basic Law on Human Rights and a possible change in the electoral system that it feared could adversely affect Orthodox Jews.[5]

The government entered 1989 facing what one analysis described as the nadir of its diplomatic fortunes: the First Intifada, now in its second year, had increased the international visibility of Israeli troops confronting Palestinian demonstrators, while the PLO's declaration of a Palestinian state had improved its standing on the world stage.[1] Rabin concluded early on that Israel needed a combined military and diplomatic response, a view that helped drive the peace initiative that became the year's defining political event.[1]

On April 6, 1989, Prime Minister Shamir visited the White House and presented the outlines of a peace plan; five weeks later, on May 14, the Cabinet formally adopted the Israeli Government Peace Initiative.[1] The vote was 20 in favor and 6 against, with Likud ministers Ariel Sharon, David Levy, and Yitzhak Modai among the dissenters.[6]

The initiative rested on several stated premises: direct negotiations grounded in the Camp David Accords, opposition to the creation of an additional Palestinian state in Gaza and the territory between Israel and Jordan, refusal to negotiate with the PLO, and opposition to changing the status of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza outside the government's guidelines.[1] Its four principal elements called for strengthening the Egyptian-Israeli peace as a foundation for regional peace, state-to-state negotiations for a comprehensive settlement, an international effort to address the refugee problem, and — most prominently — free and democratic elections in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district to choose Palestinian representatives for negotiations.[1][6]

The proposed elections were to be held "in an atmosphere devoid of violence, threats and terror."[6] East Jerusalem residents were excluded from voting under the plan.[7] The process was divided into two stages: a transitional period of up to five years under an interim self-governing arrangement, with permanent-status negotiations to begin no later than the third year.[1] Alongside the election track, the initiative called on Arab states to end their hostility and boycott of Israel, for direct bilateral negotiations, and for a U.S.-led international effort to address the Arab refugee problem.[8]

The United States welcomed the initiative as a useful step, but the PLO and King Hussein of Jordan rejected it.[9] In September 1989, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak — mediating among the PLO, Israel, and the United States — advanced a ten-point plan seeking common ground, including a provision for Palestinians in East Jerusalem to participate in elections on the grounds that Jerusalem formed part of the West Bank.[7] Secretary of State James Baker followed in October with a five-point framework involving Israel, the United States, and Egypt to advance the elections concept; Israel agreed in principle in November but demanded that the PLO play no role in selecting Palestinian delegates and that discussions remain confined to electoral preparations.[5][9]

The initiative also generated internal tension. At year's end, Prime Minister Shamir threatened to dismiss Science Minister Ezer Weizman after it emerged that Weizman had maintained unauthorized contacts with PLO members, an episode that crystallized the deep disagreements within the national-unity government over the direction and pace of the peace process.[10]

The First Intifada, which had erupted in December 1987, remained the central security challenge throughout 1989.[11] By April 8, Israeli military statistics recorded 6,951 disturbances directed against soldiers, 7,216 directed against civilians, and 11,031 incidents in which people were not the direct target, such as tire burning.[11] In late January, Defense Minister Rabin publicized a two-stage plan for responding to the uprising: first, a period of calm, followed by elections for Palestinian political representatives, negotiations on an interim settlement, and subsequent talks on a permanent arrangement.[11]

Security measures implemented during the year included the deportation of 15 intifada activists to Lebanon on January 1 and a further eight intifada leaders on June 29; the UN Security Council condemned the latter deportation on July 6.[12] Schools in the West Bank — Judea and Samaria — were open for only three months during 1989, while curfews, restrictions on movement, interruptions of utilities, and periodic denial of access to employment in Israel affected Palestinian communities.[5]

A Library of Congress study, drawing on U.S. Department of State human-rights reporting and documentation from Al Haq, reported that by the end of 1989 at least 244 Palestinian houses had been destroyed, affecting nearly 2,000 people; approximately 48,000 Palestinians had been arrested and imprisoned since the uprising began, about 7,900 had been placed in administrative detention, and 61 had been deported from Israel.[5] The same study reported that 44 Israelis had been killed during the Intifada by year's end and that Israeli government statistics recorded more than 2,000 wounded.[5] It also cited a U.S. government calculation placing Israel's cost of suppressing the uprising at approximately $132 million per month, excluding lost production and tourism revenue; tourism had fallen by 40 percent, though it was beginning to recover in late 1989.[5]

A notable terrorist attack struck on July 6, 1989, when a bus traveling between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv was deliberately forced off the road into a ravine, killing 14 civilians. A Jewish Virtual Library timeline reports 30 wounded, while the Board of Deputies of British Jews recorded 27 injured and noted that Israeli President Chaim Herzog received a message of condolence.[12][13] The First Intifada ultimately lasted nearly six years, ending with the signing of the Oslo Accords on September 13, 1993.[14]

In 1989, Hamas was actively competing with Fatah for leadership of the First Intifada and working to build an organizational infrastructure across the West Bank and Gaza.[15] The organization carried out six attacks against Israelis during the year, including kidnappings, stabbings, and shootings.[15]

Israeli security forces moved decisively in response. By May, hundreds of Hamas activists and militants had been arrested, and Israel declared Hamas an illegal organization on September 28, 1989.[15] A separate source records that Israel listed both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as terrorist organizations on June 22, 1989.[16] The arrests created a significant vacuum in Hamas's senior- and middle-level leadership, according to Israeli political scientists Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela.[15] Boaz Ganor characterized 1989 as Hamas's "institutionalizing stage," during which it strengthened its organizational infrastructure and established regional command structures — a foundation that, despite the arrests, enabled its subsequent expansion.[15]

1989 marked the opening of what became Israel's largest immigration wave since independence.[3] The Soviet Jewish community had struggled for years for the right to emigrate; by 1989, prisoners of Zion were being permitted to leave, and emigration restrictions had been eased for approximately 300,000 Jews seeking to go to Israel and the West.[13] Jewish cultural associations were simultaneously emerging inside the Soviet Union with apparent government approval, and a Moscow conference in December attracted 800 delegates representing thousands of Jewish cultural activists, along with approximately 150 Jewish delegates from abroad.[13]

The recorded 1989 movement totaled approximately 72,000 departures from the Soviet Union, including 12,900 to Israel, 56,000 to the United States, and 600 to Germany — meaning Israel received approximately 18 percent of recorded emigrants that year, with the United States still the dominant destination.[17] An Israel Central Bureau of Statistics table reproduced by the Jewish Virtual Library records 24,050 total immigrants to Israel in 1989, with 12,932 — roughly 54 percent — arriving from the former Soviet Union.[2] Romania contributed 1,533, Ethiopia 900, the United States 1,853, France 452, and Argentina 262, among others.[2] A separate Ministry of Foreign Affairs statistical series places the 1989 total at 24,250, with 12,780 from the former Soviet Union, 2,526 from Latin America, 1,773 from the United States and Canada, 998 from France, 1,368 from Ethiopia, and 462 from the United Kingdom.[18]

The acceleration was dramatic in the year's final months: approximately 2,000 Soviet Jews arrived in November and 3,700 in December, prompting Israel to announce plans to resettle 100,000 Soviet Jews over the following three years at an estimated cost of $2 billion.[5] Israel would ultimately receive approximately 962,000 of the roughly 1.58 million emigrants who left the former Soviet Union between 1989 and 2004 — about 61 percent.[17] The newcomers included highly educated professionals, scientists, artists, and musicians whose skills and consumer demand contributed to economic growth and later played a major role in the development of Israel's high-technology sector.[18]

Israel restored full diplomatic relations with Ethiopia on November 3, 1989, following years of severed ties.[12] The restoration created conditions for renewed Ethiopian Jewish emigration in a manner acceptable to both governments.[19] From August 1985 through the end of 1989, approximately 2,500 Ethiopian immigrants had reached Israel; the renewal of relations raised expectations among the Beta Israel community, and by summer 1990, more than 20,000 Ethiopian Jews had gathered in Addis Ababa awaiting emigration — where they faced disease, malnutrition, and inadequate housing before the mass evacuation operations of the early 1990s.[19]

Several significant bilateral relationships shifted during 1989. The Central African Republic restored diplomatic relations with Israel on January 16, and Hungary restored full diplomatic relations on September 18.[12] The resolution of the Taba dispute with Egypt closed a longstanding source of friction: Israel and Egypt completed border demarcation near Taba on January 4, with the resort area formally returned to Egypt on February 15 and restored to Egyptian sovereignty on March 15; the two countries further signed a memorandum on industrial and commercial ties on October 4.[12]

On July 29, IDF commandos seized Sheikh Obeid, whom the cited timeline describes as Hezbollah's spiritual leader, in southern Lebanon.[12] In a separate incident illustrating the turbulent regional environment, a Syrian pilot defected to Israel later in the year, landing a MiG-23 at Megiddo.[12]

A British Jewish communal assessment described Israel's central political dilemma in 1989 as how to respond to a PLO that claimed to recognize Israel and renounce terrorism while, in the assessment's view, retaining its covenant and continuing attacks on civilians.[13] The Board of Deputies of British Jews supported Israel's search for a peaceful political solution while insisting that any settlement protect Israel's security and that Jerusalem remain united under Israeli sovereignty.[13]

An economic history classifies September 1987 through December 1989 as a post-stabilization recession, during which the business sector adjusted to the 1985 Stabilization Plan.[20] The adjustment involved restructuring the Koor industrial conglomerate, terminating the Lavi jet fighter project, and absorbing the mounting costs associated with the First Intifada.[20] Inflation was nearing 23 percent, unemployment was approximately 9 percent, and the government faced budget deficits.[5][20]

In late December 1989, Finance Minister Shimon Peres announced a 5 percent devaluation of the new Israeli shekel, the first in a sequence of austerity measures.[5] The following January, the government announced an additional 8 percent devaluation, $550 million in budget cuts, $220 million in savings from reduced food and gasoline subsidies, plans to dismiss thousands of civil servants, and reductions in cost-of-living adjustments.[5] The incoming Soviet immigration wave that began accelerating in late 1989 would subsequently trigger an immigration-related growth period beginning in January 1990, ending the post-stabilization recession.[20]

On December 30, 1989, the Israeli peace movement Peace Now organized a large demonstration in Jerusalem. More than 15,000 people — Israelis, Palestinians, and approximately 1,400 foreign peace activists — formed a human chain around the city.[5] The event illustrated both the breadth of domestic debate over the peace process and the international interest the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had attracted by year's end.

Israel State Archive documents reported by The Times of Israel indicate that businessman Donald Trump was scheduled to visit Israel from July 29 through July 31, 1989, on a three-day business-oriented trip that would have included Jerusalem, the Dead Sea, Mitzpe Ramon, Eilat, Tel Aviv, and Herzliya, with planned meetings involving Prime Minister Shamir, Finance Minister Peres, and Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek, among others; reported business interests included a possible casino in Eilat, the purchase of El Al, and investments in an airport and other sites.[21] No record has been found that Trump actually entered Israel that year, and officials connected with the proposed itinerary generally did not recall hosting or meeting him; Yossi Beilin stated, "Honestly, I don't think it was me. I don't think the visit ever took place."[21]

The year 1989 set in motion processes whose consequences extended far beyond the calendar year. The Soviet aliyah that began in earnest in late 1989 ultimately brought nearly one million citizens to Israel and became the country's largest immigration wave since independence.[3] A demographic study records approximately 962,000 immigrants to Israel from the former Soviet Union between 1989 and 2004, while the State Department described many of the arrivals as highly educated and linked their skills and consumer demand to Israel's subsequent economic growth.[17][3]

The Israeli peace initiative of May 14 established an elections-and-negotiations framework that remained central to U.S. peacemaking efforts through 1990 and formed part of the diplomatic background to the Madrid Conference.[22] Its core assumptions, particularly the insistence on Palestinian elections as a precondition and the exclusion of the PLO as a direct negotiating partner, shaped Israeli and American diplomacy into the early 1990s.[1][8]

The Israeli government's legal measures against Hamas in 1989 and the arrests of much of its leadership disrupted but did not dismantle the movement. Hamas's organizational consolidation during what analysts termed its institutionalizing stage meant that it emerged from the period capable of expanding its influence in subsequent years.[15]

For the national-unity government itself, 1989 proved to be its final full year of operation. The government lost a no-confidence vote in March 1990 amid disagreement over its response to Secretary of State Baker's peace initiative. Shamir subsequently formed a Likud-led coalition that took office in June, and the Twenty-Third Government formally ended on June 11, 1990.[3][4]

Accounts of Hamas's legal status in 1989 use different dates and terminology. The Washington Institute states that Israel declared Hamas an illegal organization on September 28, while the Foundation for Defense of Democracies records a June 22 listing of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as terrorist organizations. These may represent distinct legal steps and should not be collapsed into a single date.[15][16]

Retrospective immigration series also differ slightly. The Central Bureau of Statistics table reproduced by the Jewish Virtual Library gives 24,050 total immigrants and 12,932 from the former Soviet Union, while a Ministry of Foreign Affairs series gives 24,250 and 12,780 respectively.[2][18] The differing statistical series are therefore presented separately rather than merged into a single definitive total.