1991 in Israel

Israel entered 1991 governed by its 24th government, headed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, which had been in office since June 11, 1990, after Shimon Peres failed to assemble a coalition following the collapse of the preceding national-unity government.[1] The coalition was a narrow one—approved by a majority of only 62 Knesset members—and included Likud, the Party for Advancing the Zionist Idea, the National Religious Party, Shas, Agudat Yisrael, and Degel Hatorah.[2] It would be tested severely over the following twelve months by events that no prior Israeli government had faced in combination.

In the broader regional context, Saddam Hussein's Iraq had invaded Kuwait in August 1990, prompting the assembly of a U.S.-led multinational coalition that included Western and Arab states.[3] The approaching confrontation placed Israel in an acutely difficult position: it was not a member of the coalition, yet it was a plausible Iraqi target. Israel had also been absorbing an extraordinary influx of immigrants since 1989—overwhelmingly from the collapsing Soviet Union—with 184,177 arrivals from former Soviet republics recorded in 1990 alone.[4] An additional community in need of rescue, the Beta Israel of Ethiopia, was caught amid a decades-long civil war as rebel forces advanced on Addis Ababa.[5]

The U.S.-led coalition's air campaign against Iraq began on January 16, 1991.[6] Within hours, Iraq responded by launching ballistic missiles at Israel. On January 18, eight Scud missiles struck Israeli territory in the predawn hours, with impacts in Tel Aviv and near Haifa.[7] The attacks continued through February, targeting primarily the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.

An IDF archival count published by Ynet records 43 Iraqi missiles directed toward Israel: 26 toward the Tel Aviv area, eight toward Haifa, five toward Dimona, and four toward Samaria.[8] Other official and research accounts count 39 missiles launched at or landing in Israel by February 28.[9][10] The difference reflects conflicting approved-source totals rather than a settled single figure.

A January 22 strike on Ramat Gan injured 96 people and damaged 400 apartments. A January 24 attack killed one person, injured 45, and heavily damaged 144 apartments.[11] One el-Hussein missile struck a Ramat Gan courtyard between four apartment buildings, injuring scores but killing no one; four buildings were condemned and 48 apartments were later demolished.[12]

Official and retrospective accounts also differ on casualties. One Defense Ministry archive records two deaths and three additional deaths from panic and heart failure, while a separate IDF timeline records one person killed.[13][10] A later N12 report citing archival material gives three direct deaths and 77 indirect deaths from suffocation or heart attacks.[14]

Israeli authorities feared that Iraqi warheads might be chemical. Civilians were issued NBC protective kits containing gas masks and atropine injectors and were instructed to prepare sealed rooms—treating every incoming missile as potentially chemical until officially informed otherwise.[8] Many Tel Aviv residents left their homes at night, and the attacks effectively paralyzed much of the country for approximately three weeks.[15]

American crews launched 54 Patriot missiles in response to the Iraqi attacks.[8] A Jerusalem Center retrospective states that U.S. aerial operations did not hit or immobilize a Scud launcher and that the Patriot batteries did not successfully intercept a Scud.[3] The Institute for National Security Studies later described the physical damage as negligible but the psychological effect as profound, stating that the attack "opened a new era" in Israel's military conflicts and showed that its home-front capacities required drastic change.[9] American, Dutch, and German personnel operated Patriot systems on Israeli soil, an unusual deployment of foreign forces to defend Israeli population centers.[15]

Throughout the missile campaign, Israel did not respond militarily to the Iraqi attacks.[14] The United States asked Israel to remain outside the conflict to protect the cohesion of its coalition, which included Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia—Arab states whose continued participation might have been jeopardized by an Israeli counterattack.[3] Shamir's government acceded to the request, requiring Israel to absorb repeated strikes on its civilian population while relying on American reassurances and Patriot batteries.

A Jerusalem Center retrospective states that Israel prepared a ground operation against mobile Iraqi Scud launchers under General Nehemia Tamari, but the plan was not executed because the United States declared a ceasefire first.[3] The coalition's land campaign began on February 24 and lasted four days; the war ended on February 28 with Iraq's defeat and retreat from Kuwait.[6]

Israel's restraint generated public criticism domestically but was viewed sympathetically internationally.[14] The IDF archive describes the attacks as creating a new public consciousness that the entire country—including the civilian rear—was at war.[13] The episode exposed primitive warning systems, improvised sealed rooms, and hastily distributed gas masks, helping drive the establishment of the IDF Home Front Command in 1992.[9] The missile experience also intensified work on the Arrow missile-defense system, whose development had begun before the war but accelerated under Scud fire.[12]

Even as the Gulf War ended, Israel mounted one of the most dramatic rescue operations in its history. Operation Solomon took place on May 24–25, 1991, during acute political and military upheaval in Ethiopia following the flight of ruler Mengistu Haile Mariam as rebel forces advanced on Addis Ababa.[16] In approximately 36 hours, more than 14,300 Ethiopian Jews—members of the Beta Israel community—were airlifted from Addis Ababa to Israel.[5] The operation's formal military name was Operation Gishmei Za'am, meaning "Storm Clouds."[17]

The Ethiopian government reportedly received approximately $35 million to secure the Jews' passage, with the money raised by American Jewry.[18] The operation was planned and executed by the Jewish Agency and the Government of Israel, with the Israel Defense Forces, Israeli Air Force, Sayeret Shaldag, El Al, Mossad, Shin Bet, Israel's embassy in Ethiopia, and Ethiopian authorities participating.[19] American Jewish organizations, including the American Joint Distribution Committee, the American Association for Ethiopian Jews, and Jewish federations in North America, also provided support.[20] Amnon Lipkin-Shahak served as deputy chief of staff and operation commander, while Benny Gantz commanded Sayeret Shaldag.[19]

The operation used 35 aircraft, including Israeli Air Force C-130 Hercules transports and El Al Boeing 747s.[20] Because Ethiopian authorities required the operation to appear civilian rather than military, planning responsibility was initially assigned to El Al. After the airlift began, Israeli forces controlled the airport, organized transportation from the embassy compound, and loaded the immigrants onto aircraft, with Hercules planes added to accelerate the operation.[19]

One Boeing 747 had its seats removed to maximize capacity and carried at least 1,078 people, including two babies born in flight. The Jewish Agency identifies the flight as holding the Guinness world record for the most passengers carried on a single aircraft and describes Solomon as the largest individual Aliyah mission undertaken from any country up to that time.[5]

The final phase grew dangerous when Israeli personnel received warnings that rebel forces were approaching the city. The last aircraft, carrying command-post personnel and soldiers disguised in civilian clothing, suffered an engine malfunction. After unsuccessful repair efforts, it took off with three engines and reached Israel safely.[19] Addis Ababa fell to the rebels a few days after the operation concluded.[5]

The human dimension of the airlift was vivid. Immigrants had gathered at the Israeli embassy compound in Addis Ababa. One testimony recounts a pregnant woman who left her home without packing, waited four hours at the embassy, reunited with a brother who had immigrated eight years earlier, and arrived in Israel to people dancing, singing "Jerusalem of Gold," and kissing the ground.[17]

Operation Solomon followed earlier rescue efforts. Between mid-November 1984 and early January 1985, Operation Moses brought approximately 6,700 Ethiopian Jews to Israel. After that airlift was halted, the CIA-supported Operation Joshua, also called Operation Sheba, transported a further 648 people.[16] Small groups of Jews remained in remote Ethiopian provinces after Solomon. The same report separately discusses the Falas Mura—converts and descendants whose religious and immigration status was contested—and notes that they were left in Ethiopia during the operation.[16]

Israel's 1991 immigration total included 20,069 arrivals from Ethiopia, of whom more than 14,300 came during Operation Solomon.[5][4] Israel received 176,154 immigrants in total: 147,282 from the former Soviet Union, 20,069 from Ethiopia, 2,076 from the United States and Canada, 1,157 from Latin America, 1,037 from France, 505 from the United Kingdom, and 4,028 from other countries.[4] Former Soviet immigrants thus accounted for approximately 84 percent of all arrivals that year.[21]

The Knesset report's detailed table records 184,177 arrivals from the former Soviet Union in 1990 and 147,282 in 1991—a combined total of 331,459.[4] These two years formed the peak of the former Soviet immigration wave. A U.S. Department of State account described the broader movement, which approached one million immigrants by the mid-2000s, as the largest immigration wave to Israel since independence.[22] It also stated that many immigrants were highly educated and that their skills and consumer demand gave the economy a strong upward push while contributing to Israel's high-technology sector.[22] The influx significantly changed Israel's demographic and political profile.[15]

With respect to the worldwide movement of former Soviet Jews and relatives in 1991, the total recorded movement was approximately 195,000. Israel received 147,800—roughly 76 percent—while the United States received 35,200 and Germany received 8,000.[23]

The Gulf War's end opened new diplomatic possibilities. On March 6, 1991, President George H. W. Bush told Congress that "the time has come to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict."[24] Eight months of intensive shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State James Baker followed, culminating in the Madrid Peace Conference.[24]

The United States and Soviet Union formally invited Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Palestinian representatives to a conference scheduled to open in Madrid on October 30.[25] On October 18, Israel and the Soviet Union resumed full diplomatic relations.[11] A historical survey links the restoration to Israel's insistence that the Soviet Union permit Jewish immigration and establish diplomatic symmetry with Israel before serving as a conference co-sponsor.[15]

The conference opened on October 30, 1991, under the co-chairmanship of President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.[24] Participants included Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Palestinian representatives came from the West Bank—known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria—and Gaza; PLO officials and Palestinians from East Jerusalem did not participate officially.[26] Israel's delegation was headed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.[27]

It was the first time all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict had gathered for direct negotiations, a historically unprecedented event.[24] The conference established bilateral negotiating tracks between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, alongside multilateral discussions concerning water, the environment, refugees, arms control, regional security, and economic development.[28][25] The framework was grounded in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the conference had no authority to impose solutions or veto agreements.[25]

A Jerusalem Center retrospective summarizes Bush's opening position as favoring direct negotiations, give-and-take, and territorial compromise while rejecting an externally imposed settlement. It also states that the process was intended to allow Palestinians to govern their lives while ensuring Israel's security and recognition, and that Israel obtained a U.S. letter of assurances before attending.[29]

The participants largely retained their traditional positions and did not negotiate substantively at Madrid itself, but they agreed to remain in dialogue.[24] Bilateral talks between Israeli officials and Arab counterparts were scheduled to begin in Washington in December 1991, while multilateral negotiations were scheduled to open in Moscow in January 1992.[24]

Retrospective accounts credit Shamir's pre-conference diplomacy with shaping parts of the framework. He insisted that arrangements concerning the West Bank involve Jordan, a position reflected in the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and required a U.S. letter of assurances before Israel would participate.[30] Participation in Madrid caused the withdrawal of Moledet, Tzomet, and Tehiya from Shamir's coalition; the coalition, which had numbered 66 members after Moledet joined in February 1991, fell to 59 after the three parties departed over Palestinian participation within the Jordanian delegation.[31]

Bilateral sessions in Washington over the following eighteen months produced few practical results, although multilateral working groups created frameworks for regional cooperation.[28] Formal bilateral talks between Israeli and Syrian representatives opened in Washington about two months after Madrid.[32] Retrospective sources characterize Madrid as a breakthrough because it established direct dialogue between Israel, Palestinians, and Arab states other than Egypt and institutionalized bilateral and multilateral negotiating tracks.[27][29]

A further significant development came at the United Nations at the close of the year. On December 16, 1991, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/86, formally revoking Resolution 3379 of November 10, 1975, which had equated Zionism with racism and racial discrimination.[33] The vote was 111 in favor and 25 opposed, with 13 abstentions; 17 countries, including Egypt, Kuwait, and China, did not vote.[33] The 25 opposing states were drawn primarily from Arab League, Muslim, and African states.[34]

A historical survey states that Israel had treated the revocation of Resolution 3379 as a condition of its participation in the peace process.[15] Resolution 46/86 declared that "the General Assembly decides to revoke the determination in its resolution 3379 of 10 November 1975."[33] The vote erased a formal designation that had remained in place for sixteen years.

The events of 1991 reshaped Israel in lasting ways. The Gulf War revealed critical deficiencies in home-front preparedness and accelerated the development of a dedicated civil-defense doctrine. The missile campaign also hastened Israel's transition from experimental anti-ballistic-missile work toward the operational Arrow system.[12] Israel's decision not to retaliate helped preserve the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, despite criticism at home.[3][14]

Operation Solomon remains one of the most celebrated chapters in the history of Israeli Aliyah and worldwide Jewish rescue efforts. The Jewish Agency describes it as the largest individual Aliyah mission from any single country up to that time.[5] A later U.S. Department of State account reported that almost 50,000 members of Ethiopia's Jewish community had immigrated to Israel, including approximately 14,000 during Operation Solomon.[22]

Mass immigration from the former Soviet Union, already underway before 1991, transformed Israeli society. Almost one million people immigrated to Israel during the decade beginning in 1990, nearly 90 percent from former Soviet republics. The influx altered Israel's demographic and political profile and brought a large, highly educated population that contributed to economic and technological development.[22][15]

The Madrid Conference did not produce immediate peace agreements, but it established bilateral and multilateral channels that continued into subsequent years. The Washington negotiations ultimately became deadlocked and were overtaken by secret Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordanian negotiations, which produced the September 1993 Declaration of Principles and the October 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty.[24] Madrid's principal legacy was therefore the creation of regular, direct negotiating frameworks rather than an agreement reached at the conference itself.

Shamir's government survived the year's upheavals but was weakened by the withdrawal of right-wing coalition members over Madrid and by the simultaneous demands of missile attacks, mass immigration absorption, and diplomacy.[31] The 24th government served until July 13, 1992, when Yitzhak Rabin's Labor-led government took office.[1] The year 1991 thus joined military danger, mass Aliyah, demographic transformation, and regional diplomacy in a single pivotal period.