1988 in Israel

Israel observed the 40th anniversary of its founding as a state in 1988.[1] The planned central celebration at Ramat Gan Stadium was to feature IDF soldiers from 1988 saluting veterans of 1948, with the Declaration of Independence selected as the festivities' theme.[2] Yet the jubilee mood was tempered by acute internal pressures. Israel's society and politics reflected Jewish history and the Zionist movement, as well as divisions over religion, ethnic identity, territorial compromise, and negotiations with the Palestinians.[1]

Those tensions had sharpened dramatically in December 1987, when the First Intifada erupted in the Gaza Strip and spread within days to the West Bank—known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[3] The uprising began on December 9 after four Palestinians died in a traffic accident; Palestinian organizational infrastructures developed in Gaza and the West Bank in the following days to direct it.[3] A Library of Congress study observed that the Intifada "has probably had a greater impact on the lives of both Palestinians and Israelis than any other event in recent years."[1] As 1988 opened, the uprising was still in its first weeks, and Israel had not yet felt its full political and economic weight.

The First Intifada, entering its first full calendar year in 1988, reshaped nearly every aspect of Israeli public life. The uprising involved demonstrations, stone-throwing, and burning tires and sought to draw attention to Palestinian opposition to prolonged Israeli rule, press Arab states and the international community to act, and influence Israeli policy.[4] A Jerusalem Post retrospective estimated that in the uprising's first year more than 300 Palestinians were killed, between 3,000 and 20,000 were injured—with the IDF and UNRWA providing the lower and higher estimates respectively—and approximately 5,500 were detained by Israel.[5] Eight Israelis, including six civilians, were reported killed in that first year.[5] The uprising also encompassed boycotts of Israeli consumer products, tax refusals, general strikes, and other forms of civil disobedience.[5]

The uprising required the IDF both to police the territories and maintain border defenses, fueling debate over territorial concessions, settlements, security, and the effects of continued control.[1] Restrictions imposed during 1988 included prolonged school closures, curfews, periodic cuts to utilities, and limits on Palestinian workers entering Israel.[1] Israeli soldiers performed policing duties in West Bank cities, villages, and refugee camps, and public debate arose over soldiers refusing orders, the use of excessive force, and the boundaries of legitimate civilian protest.[6] Some Israeli soldiers and officers were court-martialed for illegal use of force.[4]

By the end of the Intifada's first year, mass civilian participation was waning and political activity was becoming increasingly important.[7] At an Arab summit in Algiers in June, Arab states expressed sweeping support for the uprising and gave the PLO control over Arab financial support for the territories.[7] The PLO, led by Yasir Arafat, sought to convert the uprising into political gains and prevent local Palestinian figures from bypassing it in future negotiations.[7]

A serious security incident occurred on March 7, when three attackers who had infiltrated from Egypt commandeered a bus near Dimona, killing three Israeli civilians before they were shot dead.[8] Early in January, five residents of the territories had been expelled on accusations of hostile activities and incitement; on January 6, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling on Israel to refrain from further expulsions.[8] The wider effects extended to the Israeli economy: trade with Palestinians declined, Palestinian workers increasingly stopped working in Israel, unemployment rose, and uncertainty grew.[9]

Hamas, organized during the early Intifada around Islamic associations in Gaza, published its charter in August 1988 and positioned itself as a direct challenge to PLO leadership.[7] The charter rejected political compromise with Israel, called for the liberation of all of Palestine from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, and refused to join the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising.[7] Islamic Jihad also remained outside that leadership but did not present itself as a replacement for the PLO.[7] On September 5, the Hamas covenant was circulated in the West Bank.[8]

The rivalry between Hamas and the PLO's Unified National Command—which included all PLO factions—was openly contentious. On August 5, the command praised Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank as an achievement of the "great popular uprising" that would strengthen the PLO's status as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.[10] On September 6, it criticized Hamas for pursuing its own agenda and imposing additional strike days, charging that those actions "broke ranks, damaged unity, and weakened the joint struggle."[10] Hamas challenged the PLO's authority in language of its own, with an August poster asking: "Since when is division a kind of nationalism?"[10]

Beginning in September, the frequency of strike days declined amid fatigue from prolonged strikes and Israeli military activity.[7] The character of the uprising shifted away from mass participation toward more organized armed activity and internal Palestinian violence.[7]

On July 31, 1988, King Hussein of Jordan announced the legal and administrative separation of Jordan from the West Bank, recognizing the PLO as solely responsible for representing the West Bank's population and political future.[7] Hussein said the severing of links answered "the wishes of the PLO, West Bankers, and the Arab states."[11] Jordan continued issuing or renewing passports for West Bankers, but without their former citizenship rights.[11]

The move had multiple motivations. One INSS analysis says it was intended to relieve Jordan of responsibility for developments in the territories and reduce the risk that Palestinian protest activity would spread into Jordan.[7] It also strengthened the PLO's claim to represent Palestinians internationally.[7] The decision also followed failed 1987 talks between Hussein and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres: Peres had been unable to obtain Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's agreement to their arrangement concerning a possible return of Jordanian rule to territory occupied in 1967.[7]

Before the election, Peres had met secretly with Hussein in London, reaching an understanding about an international peace conference under UN auspices. The proposal envisioned Jordan taking responsibility for Palestinians in the West Bank and representing them at the conference without PLO participation, as part of a framework that included a Jordan-Israel peace treaty. Shamir had approved the meeting but opposed moving forward with the understanding, fearing that an international conference could expose Israel to unacceptable pressure.[9] Hussein's July disengagement effectively closed off that diplomatic avenue and strengthened the PLO's position as the principal Palestinian interlocutor.

The Palestinian National Council met in Algiers from November 12 to 15, 1988, with several Palestinian leaders participating from exile and the session held partly in tribute to Khalil al-Wazir, known as Abu Jihad, who had been assassinated in Tunis in April.[12] On November 15, Yasser Arafat announced a Palestinian Declaration of Independence proclaiming a state of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital.[13] The declaration did not clearly delineate the proposed state's territorial boundaries or specify provisional leadership beyond identifying the PLO as the Palestinians' representative.[13]

An INSS study describes the declaration as a shift toward a Palestinian state alongside Israel, noting that the council accepted the 1947 partition plan and referred to UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.[7] The study cautions, however, that the declaration did not unequivocally commit to accepting a two-state agreement as a permanent solution and notes its continued emphasis on the Palestinian refugee issue.[7] A political communiqué sent to the UN secretary-general the following day described the uprising as a popular revolution against Israeli occupation and called for an international conference, Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967, removal of settlements, temporary UN supervision, a solution to the refugee problem, religious freedom at holy sites, and regional security arrangements.[12]

In December, Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly in Geneva because he had been barred from entering the United States. He expressed Palestinian acceptance of an arrangement based on UN resolutions 242, 338, and 181.[7] A December 7 statement in Stockholm had said he accepted Israel's existence and rejected and condemned terrorism; his subsequent UN speech in Geneva was criticized as less explicit.[12] On December 14, Arafat clarified that he recognized the right of Israel, a Palestinian state, and neighboring states to exist in peace and security and renounced terrorism in all its forms.[7][12] That pledge opened a dialogue between the PLO and the United States.[7]

On December 15, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 43/177 by 104 votes to two, with 36 abstentions, acknowledging the PNC's proclamation and deciding to use "Palestine" instead of "Palestine Liberation Organization" in the UN system.[12] Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir denounced Arafat's UN address as deceptive and said Israel would have nothing to do with the PLO.[12] The PLO's political shift opened a U.S.-PLO dialogue but did not settle the underlying Palestinian claims.[7]

Two significant events outside the election cycle marked the spring and autumn of 1988. On April 16, Khalil al-Wazir, known as Abu Jihad and described as the PLO's second-ranking figure, was assassinated at his home in Tunis, apparently by Israeli commandos.[8] The November PNC session was held partly in his memory.[12]

In September, an international arbitration panel settled a long-running territorial dispute between Israel and Egypt over Taba, a 250-acre area south of Eilat. The three-member panel, whose decision was final and binding under Article 7 of the 1979 peace treaty, ruled for Egypt on September 29, 1988.[14] Israel evacuated the area on March 15, 1989.[14]

On December 8, 1988, Israeli forces carried out Operation Blue and Brown against the headquarters of Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command in Naameh, south of Beirut.[15] The operation involved Golani Brigade troops and Shayetet 13, with support from the navy and air force.[15] Challenging terrain and a loss of surprise complicated the assault. Golani officer Amir Meital was killed, and four soldiers who became separated from the main force were evacuated by Cobra helicopters that were not designed for rescue; the soldiers held onto the helicopters' skids.[15]

Approximate accounts of terrorist casualties differ: one report places the number killed at around 30, while another estimates approximately 33, including a senior commander.[15][16] The accounts describe the operation as seriously damaging Jibril's organization, although the first characterizes the outcome as only a relative success.[15][16]

Elections for the 12th Knesset took place on November 1, 1988, with 2,894,267 eligible voters and a turnout of 79.7 percent.[17] Twenty-seven lists contested the election; 15 won representation.[9] The electorate cast 2,073,321 valid votes, with Likud receiving 709,305 votes and 40 seats and the Alignment receiving 685,363 votes and 39 seats.[18] Shas won six seats, Agudat Israel and the National Religious Party each won five, and Degel Hatorah won two.[18] The new Moledet party, led by former Major General Rehavam Ze'evi, entered the Knesset with two seats.[18] The three Zionist parties to the left of the Alignment—the Civil Rights Movement, Shinui, and Mapam—together won 10 seats.[18]

Using different bloc definitions, a contemporary analysis counted 18 religious seats, up from 13 in the previous Knesset, while a later account placed right-wing parties at 65 seats and left-wing parties at 55.[13][19] The religious parties' gains reflected sustained organizational efforts and electoral competition; rabbis Menachem Mendel Schneerson, Eliezer Schach, and Ovadia Yoseph were identified as important mobilizers.[13] Agudat Israel rose from two seats to five and Shas from four to six, with Aryeh Deri's leadership credited for Shas's stronger showing.[9]

The Intifada dominated the campaign. Early polling by the Smith Research Center had shown Labor leading Likud 36 percent to 26 percent, but Labor's advantage evaporated during the campaign.[13] A contemporary analysis concluded that "the intifadah swung the vote to the right": in the final pre-election survey, respondents thought Likud would be better than Labor at suppressing the uprising by 43 percent to 29 percent, even as nearly two-thirds said it was time to talk to Palestinians.[13] A deadly terrorist attack on a bus near Jericho shortly before polling was also widely discussed as a possible influence on the result, although accounts differ over the extent of its effect.[7][9]

The 1988 election was the first in which an amendment to Basic Law: The Knesset was applied to disqualify lists that denied Israel's existence as the state of the Jewish people, denied its democratic character, or incited racism.[9] The Central Elections Committee barred Meir Kahane's Kach party, and on October 18 the Israeli Supreme Court upheld the disqualification.[20] The committee declined to disqualify the Progressive List for Peace, and the Supreme Court upheld that decision by a 3–2 vote, finding that conclusive evidence had not been presented that the list denied Israel's existence as a Jewish state.[9]

After the election, President Chaim Herzog asked Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir on November 14 to try to form a government. Endorsements from Agudat Israel and Shas, together with three right-wing nationalist parties and the National Religious Party, would have given Shamir 63 seats—a working majority.[13] Support from Agudat Israel and Shas came with religious-policy demands, including a proposed change to the legal definition of "Who is a Jew" that would have excluded conversions performed by non-Orthodox rabbis.[13] American Jewish leaders and federations opposed the proposed change, and their pressure may have encouraged Shamir to pursue a broader coalition with Labor instead.[21]

Likud and Labor ultimately formed another National Unity Government, with Labor serving as the junior partner and no rotation arrangement.[22] The government was presented to the Knesset on December 22, with Yitzhak Shamir as prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin as defense minister, Moshe Arens as foreign minister, and Shimon Peres as vice premier and finance minister.[8][18]

The new cabinet comprised 28 members—the largest in Israeli history at that time—and was enlarged to meet coalition partners' demands.[1] The government soon became deadlocked over U.S.-sponsored peace initiatives, the "land for peace" formula, the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and relations with the PLO.[1] A Likud election poster accused factory "bosses" associated with the Alignment of enriching themselves at workers' expense and warned voters about unemployment.[23] Those campaign themes appeared amid economic anxieties intensified by declining trade, labor disruption, unemployment, and uncertainty associated with the Intifada.[9] The outgoing unity government had been criticized as a "government of national paralysis," and its successor soon faced similarly profound divisions.[9]

On April 21, 1988, the United States and Israel signed a Memorandum of Understanding covering military, political, economic, and scientific cooperation.[8] The agreement affirmed the countries' close relationship and common goals, built on their existing Free Trade Agreement, and established regular meetings between U.S. and Israeli officials.[24] In June, the White House announced the joint development of the Arrow anti-missile system and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Israel's security; U.S.–Israeli cooperation on Arrow production was confirmed again on June 29.[8]

On September 19, 1988, Israel launched Ofeq-1 from Palmachim using the Israeli-made Shavit launch vehicle.[25][26] The satellite weighed 156 kilograms, orbited at 1,150 kilometers, and remained in space for 118 days.[27] Ofeq-1 was a test satellite designed to demonstrate that Israel could independently develop and launch both a satellite and a launcher. It sent back technical information but did not yet carry the imaging or communications capabilities envisioned for intelligence purposes.[25][26]

The launch made Israel the eighth country capable of placing a domestically developed satellite into orbit and marked Israel's official entry into the space age.[25][26] It attracted substantial media attention domestically and was widely celebrated, while the communications strategy surrounding the launch helped avoid regional condemnation.[26]

On March 22, 1988, the Knesset repealed a British Mandate-era provision that prohibited same-sex sexual relations, removing the prohibition from the Penal Law as part of a broader package of legislation on sex and sexual offenses.[28] Although the inherited law had not been enforced against consenting adults in practice, liberal groups had campaigned against its continued existence as stigmatizing.[29] A reform proposal had originally been introduced in 1980 but was shelved; the 1988 change built on that earlier effort and was described as an important step toward LGBTQ equality in Israel.[29]

Israeli cultural life in 1988 reflected tensions generated by the Intifada and unresolved questions about Israeli identity. Si Heyman recorded "Shooting and Crying," a song critical of Israeli policy in the territories that was barred from radio broadcast.[6] Yehuda Poliker and Yaakov Gilad released their album Ashes and Dust, which addressed the Holocaust's impact on survivor parents and the complex emotional inheritance of the second generation of Israeli society.[6]

In sport, Maccabi Haifa defeated Maccabi Tel Aviv 10–0 at Kiryat Eliezer Stadium on May 14. The score was already 7–0 at halftime, and the match became an enduring symbol of one of the most extraordinary defeats in Israeli football history.[30]

In March, military sentry Roni Almog was sentenced to 18 months in military prison for fleeing his post during the Night of the Hang-Gliders, a late-1987 terrorist infiltration in which Israeli soldiers were killed.[6] The case triggered debate about assigning soldiers to roles for which they were ill-suited. The phrase that emerged from it became shorthand for shifting responsibility for a systemic failure onto the lowest-ranking person in a chain of command.[6]

The events of 1988 set trajectories that shaped Israeli politics and regional diplomacy for years. The National Unity Government formed in December, despite its 28-member cabinet, soon reached an impasse over peace diplomacy and territorial questions similar to the deadlock that had affected its predecessor.[1] The "Who is a Jew" controversy exposed a widening fault line between Israeli religious politics and the priorities of American Jewish leadership.[21]

Jordan's disengagement, combined with the Palestinian Declaration of Independence and Arafat's December pledges, consolidated the PLO's claim to represent the Palestinians in future negotiations.[7] The opening of a U.S.–PLO dialogue in December 1988 followed Arafat's statements in Geneva and Stockholm, although observers differed over whether those statements represented an unequivocal change in PLO policy.[7][31] Israel, under Shamir, declined to engage with the PLO on those terms.[12]

The religious parties' rise from 13 to 18 seats was described by a contemporary analysis as part of a longer political trend rather than an isolated election surge.[13] Kach's exclusion marked the first application in a Knesset election of the amended legal criteria permitting disqualification for racist incitement or denial of Israel's Jewish or democratic character.[9]

Israel's launch of Ofeq-1 placed it among a small group of nations with indigenous satellite-launch capability and demonstrated the country's ability to develop both a satellite and its launcher.[25][26] The April Memorandum of Understanding institutionalized regular political, security, economic, and scientific cooperation with the United States.[24][8]

Later accounts differ most sharply over the causes and political meaning of the First Intifada and the adequacy of the PLO's diplomatic shift in 1988. An INSS study presents the uprising as a locally triggered revolt whose mass phase waned as political activity, organized violence, and internal Palestinian rivalry increased, while a Ynet retrospective notes that researchers and commentators continue to dispute its causes.[7][9]

Interpretations of Arafat's December statements also diverge. INSS identifies his renunciation of terrorism as the breakthrough that opened U.S.–PLO dialogue, whereas a Jerusalem Center analysis argues that the PLO's 1988 declarations did not constitute unequivocal recognition of Israel and initially failed to satisfy U.S. conditions.[7][31] These differences help explain why the same events have been remembered either as a diplomatic turning point or as an incomplete and contested change in policy.