01In brief
The Israel–Palestine Liberation Organization letters of recognition were a diplomatic exchange in September 1993 through which Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) established mutual recognition and agreed to negotiate within the Middle East peace process. In his letter to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat declared, “The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security,” and renounced terrorism and other violence. Rabin’s response recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people in light of those commitments. The correspondence, which also included a separate Arafat letter to Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst, preceded the September 13 signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements in Washington.
02Background
Before the recognition exchange, Israel opposed official negotiations with the PLO, and the question of who could represent Palestinians was a barrier to direct talks.[3] Israeli recognition of the organization represented a substantial departure from earlier policy: the PLO had been considered a terrorist organization, and contact with it had previously been prohibited by Israeli law.[4] The eventual exchange therefore addressed not only the substance of negotiations but also the identity of the Palestinian party with which Israel would negotiate.[3]
Earlier American conditions for official dialogue with the PLO anticipated several of the commitments included in the 1993 letters.[3] A 1975 United States–Israel memorandum required the PLO to recognize Israel’s right to exist and accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 before the United States would enter official dialogue with it.[3] In 1985, the United States Congress codified those conditions and added a requirement that the organization renounce terrorism.[3] Recognition of Israel, acceptance of the two resolutions, and rejection of terrorism thus formed an established set of diplomatic requirements before the Oslo negotiations.[3]
Arafat accepted all three conditions in a speech in Geneva on December 14, 1988, after which the United States opened a dialogue with the PLO.[3] President George H. W. Bush suspended that dialogue in June 1990 following an attack on Israel’s coast by a PLO-member organization and Arafat’s refusal to renounce the attack or act against its perpetrators.[3] The interruption of American dialogue provided part of the diplomatic background to the later effort to obtain explicit PLO commitments directly addressed to Israel.[3]
At the 1991 Madrid peace process, Israel participated in talks with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation whose Palestinian participants were not formal PLO members.[3] The PLO opposed a Jordanian role in negotiations concerning the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and insisted on separate PLO participation, while Israel opposed negotiating with the organization.[3] The joint-delegation arrangement allowed negotiations to begin without resolving the underlying representation question.[3]
The recognition exchange emerged from secret Israeli-PLO contacts in Norway during 1993, mediated by Norwegian diplomats.[5] Those contacts also produced the Declaration of Principles, which addressed Palestinian interim self-government rather than a completed permanent settlement.[6] By August, a basic outline of the declaration was emerging, but Arafat remained hesitant.[7] Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres conveyed through Yossi Beilin that Israel was prepared to recognize the PLO as the Palestinians’ official representative, while Rabin sought a reciprocal commitment before submitting the document to his cabinet.[7]
The Palestinian National Covenant was another central issue behind the exchange.[3] Israel sought an explicit response to provisions denying its right to exist, rather than recognition language alone.[3] The eventual correspondence consequently combined recognition and agreement to negotiate with commitments concerning terrorism, organizational responsibility, and the treatment of inconsistent Covenant provisions.[1]
03Course of Events
Israeli lawyer and negotiator Joel Singer first proposed an Israel-PLO mutual-recognition agreement in June 1993.[3] His proposed exchange linked PLO commitments concerning recognition of Israel, violence, and the Palestinian Charter with Israeli recognition of the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people and agreement to negotiate with it.[3] The proposal placed the recognition issue alongside the emerging arrangements for Palestinian self-government, rather than treating it as a matter to be deferred until a final settlement.[3]
Israeli leaders initially resisted formal recognition of the organization.[3] Peres rejected the initial proposal, and Rabin responded that it was “too early” when Singer raised it with him in June.[3] The PLO also initially resisted the proposed commitments.[3] Its position shifted after it sought a role in implementing the Declaration of Principles in Gaza and mutual recognition was presented as a route to that role.[3] Recognition thus became connected to the practical question of who would take part in implementing the anticipated interim arrangements.[3]
The proposed Israeli recognition was drafted to apply to the representative of the Palestinian people, not merely to a representative of Palestinians resident in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[3] That broader formulation reflected the PLO’s capacity to represent Palestinians beyond those territories, including in negotiations on refugee matters.[3] In discussions with the Palestinian delegation, Singer also presented acceptance as potentially bringing “two (recognitions) for the price of one,” referring to Israeli recognition and the prospect of restored official United States-PLO contact.[3]
After the Declaration of Principles was initialed in Oslo in August, Singer drafted the first Israeli version of the recognition exchange as letters between Rabin and Arafat.[3] The choice of correspondence between the two leaders was intended to ensure that Arafat himself made the PLO’s commitments, rather than leaving the document for lower-level officials to sign.[3] The Israeli draft was presented as a short, clear set of commitments that would take effect immediately, following Palestinian proposals containing conditions or commitments applying to both parties.[3]
Even the letters’ conventional courtesies received attention.[3] Rabin asked that “Dear” be removed from the salutations because it conveyed a warmth he did not wish to express.[3] He subsequently objected to “Sincerely” before the signatures as well, but the instruction to remove that word did not reach Singer in time.[3] These drafting details accompanied negotiations over substantially more consequential language on violence, representation, and the Covenant.[3]
One difficult issue concerned a proposed commitment relating to the intifada.[3] The PLO delegation feared it could not ensure that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would stop it; failure could both breach the commitment and undermine the organization’s claim to represent them.[3] The delegation requested that language encouraging Palestinians in those territories to reject violence be placed in a separate letter to Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst rather than in Arafat’s letter to Rabin.[3] Israel accepted that arrangement, producing a wider correspondence of three letters rather than only the reciprocal recognition letters.[3]
The Covenant also proved particularly difficult in the final negotiations.[3] The PLO sought to rely on Arafat’s declaration that provisions inconsistent with the new commitments were no longer valid.[3] Israel insisted on an additional undertaking to submit the necessary formal changes to the Palestinian National Council.[3] The final text contained both elements: an immediate declaration concerning the provisions’ validity and a commitment to seek formal approval of changes.[1][3]
Negotiators resumed discussions in Paris on September 8, 1993, and agreed on the text early the following morning.[3] Holst then flew to Tunis to obtain Arafat’s signature and traveled onward to Jerusalem to obtain Rabin’s.[3] The three letters bear the date September 9, 1993; the negotiating account places Rabin’s actual signature on September 10.[1][3] The correspondence preceded the Washington signing ceremony on September 13.[2]
In the letter addressed to Rabin, Arafat opened the substantive recognition commitment with the statement that the PLO recognized “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.”[1] He also accepted United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.[1] These commitments addressed recognition of Israel and the diplomatic framework within which the PLO would pursue negotiations.[1]
Arafat committed the organization to the Middle East peace process and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.[1] The letter stated that “all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.”[1] It described the signing of the Declaration of Principles as inaugurating a new period of peaceful coexistence.[8] The letter therefore coupled recognition with a commitment to a negotiating process, while leaving outstanding permanent-status questions for that process to resolve.[1]
The letter explicitly renounced terrorism and other acts of violence.[1] It also undertook responsibility for all PLO elements and personnel in order to ensure compliance, prevent violations, and discipline violators.[8] The undertaking extended beyond a general statement favoring peace: its wording addressed the organization’s responsibility for the conduct of its own components and personnel.[8] Prevention and discipline were both included in the commitment, alongside the renunciation itself.[8]
On the Palestinian Covenant, Arafat affirmed that articles denying Israel’s right to exist, and provisions inconsistent with the letter’s commitments, were “now inoperative and no longer valid.”[1] He undertook to submit the necessary changes to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval.[1] The wording distinguished between the declaration made in the letter and the subsequent formal action promised through the council.[1] It did not present submission of changes for approval as already completed.[1]
Arafat’s separate letter to Holst addressed Palestinian participation in the anticipated transition following the signing of the Declaration of Principles.[1] It said that the PLO would encourage Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in steps toward normalizing life, reject violence and terrorism, and contribute to peace and stability.[1] It also called for participation in reconstruction, economic development, and cooperation.[1] These undertakings accompanied the recognition exchange but were addressed to the Norwegian intermediary rather than directly to Israel’s prime minister.[1]
Rabin’s response was a single paragraph confirming Israel’s decision in light of the PLO commitments contained in Arafat’s letter.[1][7] It stated that the Government of Israel had decided to recognize the PLO as “the representative of the Palestinian people” and to commence negotiations with it within the Middle East peace process.[1] The actual wording was “the representative,” not “the sole representative.”[1] Israel’s recognition in this letter concerned the PLO’s representative and negotiating role; Arafat’s letter, by contrast, recognized Israel’s right to exist and set out the accompanying PLO commitments.[1]
The two principal letters were consequently reciprocal without containing identical undertakings.[1] Arafat’s was the more detailed statement, addressing Israel, the Security Council resolutions, peaceful negotiations, terrorism and violence, organizational compliance, and the Covenant.[1][8] Rabin’s response recognized the PLO as the Palestinian people’s representative and agreed to negotiate with it, expressly connecting that decision to the commitments received.[1] The separate Holst letter completed the correspondence with language directed toward normalization, reconstruction, and Palestinian participation in peaceful life.[1]
04Aftermath
The recognition exchange cleared the way for the Rabin-Arafat handshake at the White House on September 13, 1993.[3] The Declaration of Principles was signed there in the presence of United States President Bill Clinton.[2] Although closely connected politically and chronologically, the letters and the declaration were separate components of the Oslo process.[3] The correspondence established recognition and negotiating commitments before the public ceremony associated with the interim self-government framework.[1][3]
The Declaration of Principles set out Palestinian self-government arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, general principles for a five-year interim period, and provisions for further negotiations.[6] It envisioned a transitional period not exceeding five years leading toward a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.[9] The declaration subsequently provided a framework for negotiations involving staged transfers of powers and redeployment of Israeli forces.[10] Its temporary arrangements differed from the recognition exchange, which was intended to remain in force indefinitely.[3]
Contemporary reactions combined broad hopes for reduced regional tensions with sharply differing expectations about the political outcome.[9] Many Palestinians hoped that the agreement would lead to statehood, a prospect that alarmed many Israelis.[9] Critics on both sides opposed the agreement even as it was widely welcomed as a step toward easing tensions.[9] These responses concerned the larger Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the process it opened, rather than a change in the express wording of the recognition letters.[1][9]
The Covenant undertaking remained an issue during subsequent implementation.[3] In 1996, the Palestinian National Council appointed a committee to propose a redraft rather than carrying out the formal Charter changes described in the negotiating account.[3] On December 14, 1998, in Clinton’s presence, the council adopted a letter signed by Arafat specifying provisions it considered abrogated.[3] Clinton and the Israeli government accepted that action as fulfilling the commitment, while some Israeli commentators continued to argue that the Charter remained unchanged.[3]
The recognition exchange also supplied a basis for subsequent dealings with the PLO as the Palestinian negotiating party.[3] This addressed the earlier representation barrier that had complicated the Madrid arrangements, under which Palestinians participated without formal PLO membership in a joint delegation with Jordan.[3] The letters did not themselves settle outstanding permanent-status issues; Arafat’s letter expressly committed those questions to negotiations.[1]
05Historiography and Legacy
The exchange marked a political and legal watershed by replacing the previous framework of non-recognition with explicit recognition and agreement to negotiate.[10] Its significance lay in redirecting the dispute toward questions of borders, powers, and responsibilities, while the Declaration of Principles supplied the framework for subsequent negotiations.[10] Israel’s acceptance of the PLO as a representative and negotiating partner was matched by the PLO’s written recognition of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security.[1] The recognition language and the rejection of terrorism were central elements of that transition.[1]
The distinction between recognition and interim self-government is important to the exchange’s legacy.[3] The Oslo process included the recognition correspondence, the Declaration of Principles, and later implementation agreements, but these components did not all have the same intended duration.[3] The self-government arrangements were conceived as temporary, whereas the recognition exchange was intended to continue indefinitely.[3] Recognition therefore supplied a continuing basis for negotiations rather than merely identifying the parties for the duration of one interim arrangement.[3]
The letters also preserved a clear distinction between recognizing a state’s right to exist and recognizing an organization as a people’s representative.[1] Arafat’s letter addressed the State of Israel and the PLO’s obligations concerning peaceful conduct and negotiations; Rabin’s addressed the representative status of the PLO and Israel’s readiness to negotiate with it.[1] The Israeli formulation applied to the Palestinian people broadly, rather than only the inhabitants of the territories covered by the interim self-government arrangements.[3] That scope made the recognition relevant to later negotiations involving Palestinians outside those territories, including refugee matters.[3]
The reciprocal Rabin–Arafat letters’ legal form has received more than one interpretation.[10] One interpretation treats them as an agreement concluded through an exchange of correspondence; another, considered more plausible in the legal analysis contained in the research material, treats them as two legally binding unilateral declarations.[10] This is a question of legal characterization rather than terminology supplied by the letters themselves.[10]
The most substantial implementation dispute concerned the promised Covenant changes.[3] The final text combined an assertion that inconsistent provisions were already inoperative with a promise to seek formal approval of necessary amendments.[1] Subsequent disagreement focused on whether the Palestinian National Council’s actions fulfilled that second undertaking, despite acceptance of the 1998 action by Clinton and the Israeli government.[3] The broader Oslo process also remained politically controversial, with contemporary hopes for peace accompanied by opposition and divergent expectations about statehood.[9] These debates did not alter the distinct written commitments contained in the September correspondence: recognition of Israel and peaceful negotiation on the PLO side, and recognition of the PLO as the Palestinian representative and negotiating partner on Israel’s side.[1]
Sources
- 1U.S. Department of State, Israel-PLO Recognition: Exchange of Letters, accessed on November 4, 2026.
- 2Anti-Defamation League, The Oslo Accords/Oslo Process, accessed on November 4, 2026.
- 3Center for Israel Education, Joel Singer, The Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition Agreement, accessed on November 4, 2026.
- 4Ynet, The Oslo Accords, accessed on November 4, 2026.
- 5Center for Israel Education, PLO and Israel Recognize Each Other's Existence, accessed on November 4, 2026.
- 6Government of Israel, Facts About Israel: History, accessed on November 4, 2026.
- 7My Jewish Learning, Oslo Negotiations, accessed on November 4, 2026.
- 8Institute for National Security Studies, Israel-PLO Recognition: Exchange of Letters, accessed on November 4, 2026.
- 9EveryCRSReport, Israeli-Palestinian Agreement, accessed on November 4, 2026.
- 10Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, Israel and the Palestinians: Some Legal Issues, accessed on November 4, 2026.
IsraelPedia Question & Answers
What were the Israel–Palestine Liberation Organization letters of recognition?
The Israel–Palestine Liberation Organization letters of recognition were a diplomatic exchange in September 1993 in which Israel and the PLO established mutual recognition and agreed to negotiate within the Middle East peace process. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and renounced terrorism and other violence. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to begin negotiations with it.
What commitments did Yasser Arafat make in his letter to Yitzhak Rabin?
In his letter to Yitzhak Rabin, Yasser Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, accepted United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and committed the PLO to peaceful negotiations. He explicitly renounced terrorism and other violence and accepted responsibility for PLO elements and personnel to ensure compliance. He also declared that provisions of the Palestinian National Covenant inconsistent with these commitments were inoperative and no longer valid, and undertook to submit necessary changes for formal approval.
Why did the recognition exchange include a separate letter to Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst?
The PLO delegation feared it could not ensure that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would stop the intifada, so it asked for language encouraging them to reject violence to be placed in a separate letter to Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst. Israel accepted this arrangement, making the correspondence a three-letter exchange. Arafat’s letter to Holst also encouraged participation in normalizing life, reconstruction, economic development, cooperation, peace, and stability.
What did Israel agree to in Yitzhak Rabin’s response to Yasser Arafat?
Yitzhak Rabin’s response said that the Government of Israel had decided to recognize the PLO as “the representative of the Palestinian people” and to commence negotiations with it within the Middle East peace process. Rabin explicitly tied Israel’s decision to the commitments in Arafat’s letter. The wording was “the representative,” not “the sole representative.”
How did the recognition letters relate to the Declaration of Principles signed in 1993?
The recognition letters established mutual recognition and negotiating commitments before the Declaration of Principles was signed in Washington on September 13, 1993. The declaration set out interim Palestinian self-government arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and a framework for further negotiations; it was separate from the correspondence. The letters were intended to remain in force indefinitely, while the self-government arrangements were temporary.
What happened to the Palestinian National Covenant commitment after the letters were signed?
The PLO’s commitment to submit necessary Covenant changes for formal approval remained disputed during implementation. In 1996, the Palestinian National Council appointed a committee to propose a redraft rather than carrying out the formal changes described in the negotiating account. On December 14, 1998, the council adopted a letter signed by Arafat specifying provisions it considered abrogated. Clinton and the Israeli government accepted that action as fulfilling the commitment, while some Israeli commentators argued that the Charter remained unchanged.