Gaza–Jericho Agreement

The September 13, 1993 Declaration of Principles supplied the immediate framework for the Gaza–Jericho Agreement, whose formal title was the “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area.”[3] Its preamble situated the arrangements within the peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991 and reaffirmed the parties’ stated commitments to peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, and recognition of mutual legitimate and political rights.[2] The parties presented interim self-government as part of a broader effort to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement through an agreed political process.[2]

The agreement connected these immediate institutional arrangements to a later diplomatic stage: permanent-status negotiations were to lead toward implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.[2] It did not itself purport to settle the parties’ ultimate political relationship, and its provisions expressly preserved their existing claims and positions.[2] Gaza and Jericho were therefore the subjects of an interim transfer of responsibilities rather than a comprehensive permanent-status settlement.[2]

Economic negotiations preceded the Cairo signing by several days.[1] On April 29, 1994, the parties signed the Protocol on Economic Relations in Paris, establishing parameters for economic relations in Gaza and Jericho across trade, labor, money, banking, and taxation.[1] That protocol subsequently became Annex IV of the Gaza–Jericho Agreement, bringing economic arrangements into the same framework as military redeployment, civil administration, and legal matters.[1]

Israel and the PLO reached agreement at the end of April 1994, and the Israeli government unanimously approved it on May 1, authorizing Rabin to sign in Cairo on May 4.[4] The agreement named the United States, the Russian Federation, and the Arab Republic of Egypt as witnesses.[3] Its annexes addressed Israeli military withdrawal and security arrangements, civil affairs, legal matters, and economic relations, giving the accord an administrative and operational scope beyond its main political commitments.[1]

Rabin and Arafat signed the agreement in Cairo on May 4, 1994, on behalf of Israel and the PLO.[1] It was also known as the Cairo Agreement or “Gaza and Jericho First.”[5] The agreement entered into force immediately upon signing, and that date marked the beginning of its five-year interim period.[2]

The ceremony encountered a disagreement over maps showing a smaller Jericho area than Arafat had sought.[6] Arafat initially refused to sign the maps, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s intervention and international pressure preceded their signing.[5] An accompanying letter recorded that discussions would continue on the size of the Jericho Area, the position of a Palestinian official at the Allenby Bridge, arrangements at the Rafah passage, and outstanding issues identified in the agreement.[6] Reservations concerning the maps were attached to the agreement.[7]

The Knesset considered the agreement on May 10 and approved it by 52 votes to none.[4] Right-wing opposition members declined to attend, arguing that most of the Israeli public rejected an agreement with the PLO.[4] The recorded vote therefore followed unanimous cabinet approval but did not represent the participation of the principal parliamentary opponents.[4] In his October 5, 1995 speech seeking approval of the later Interim Agreement, Rabin referred to the Cairo Agreement among the agreements that the Knesset had ratified.[8]

Israel was required to begin an accelerated, scheduled military withdrawal immediately upon signing and complete it within three weeks.[2] The withdrawal included evacuation of military bases and fixed installations for handover to the Palestinian Police.[2] Remaining Israeli forces were to redeploy to settlements and a designated military installation area, from which they would carry out the security responsibilities reserved to Israel.[2] The arrangement thus combined withdrawal from transferred areas with a continuing Israeli military presence in specified locations.[2]

The agreement established the Palestinian Authority and provided for the transfer of specified powers from Israel’s military government and Civil Administration.[2] Once the withdrawal and agreed transfers were completed, the Civil Administration in Gaza and the Jericho Area was to be dissolved and the military government withdrawn, while Israel retained the capacity to exercise the powers and responsibilities assigned to it.[2] These provisions distinguished the removal of the existing administrative apparatus from the continuing exercise of expressly reserved Israeli authority.[2]

The civil-affairs annex required preparations to begin immediately and the transfer to be completed within 21 days.[3] Its subjects included education, health, social welfare, labor, agriculture, land registration, transportation, water and sewage, telecommunications, planning and zoning, taxation, environmental protection, and population registration.[3] To support the handover, the annex provided for Palestinian access to relevant offices, records, equipment, information, data, and statistics.[3] The transfer therefore involved both governmental responsibilities and the administrative resources needed to carry them out.[3]

Implementation in May 1994 involved a substantial Israeli army withdrawal and redeployment, alongside the transfer of most powers in Gaza and the Jericho Area, with exceptions for external security, settlements, Israelis, and foreign relations.[9] Israeli forces withdrew from most of Gaza, while settlements, their main access routes, and military installations along the southern border with Egypt—the Philadelphi Route—remained outside the withdrawal.[10]

The Palestinian Authority was constituted as a single body of 24 members exercising transferred legislative and executive powers and specified judicial functions.[2] Its offices were to be located in Gaza and the Jericho Area pending inauguration of the Council to be elected under the Declaration of Principles.[2] It could administer transferred departments, establish institutions and subordinate units, formulate policies, and employ staff within its jurisdiction.[2]

The Authority’s territorial jurisdiction covered Gaza and the Jericho Area, including land, subsoil, and territorial waters, but excluded settlements and the Military Installation Area.[2] Its personal jurisdiction generally applied to people within that territory except Israelis.[2] Functional jurisdiction consisted of the powers transferred by the agreement and excluded foreign relations, external security, and internal security and public order concerning settlements, the Military Installation Area, and Israelis.[2] Israel retained authority over those excluded areas, people, and responsibilities.[2]

Within its jurisdiction, the Authority was responsible for administering justice through an independent judiciary and for maintaining population registers and issuing certificates and licenses.[2] Its legislative authority was subject to consistency with the agreement.[2] Existing laws and military orders were to remain in force unless amended or repealed through the procedures the agreement established.[2] This preserved legal continuity while enabling the new institutions to exercise transferred legislative powers.[2]

Israel could request review within 30 days if it considered Palestinian legislation outside the Authority’s jurisdiction or inconsistent with the agreement.[2] The review procedures involved a joint legislation subcommittee, a board of review, and the Israeli–Palestinian Liaison Committee.[2] Foreign relations remained outside the Authority’s responsibilities, but the PLO could negotiate and sign specified agreements for its benefit, including economic, donor-assistance, regional-development, cultural, scientific, and educational agreements.[2]

The Palestinian Authority was to establish a police force responsible for public order and internal security for Palestinians in the areas under its jurisdiction.[2] Israel retained responsibility for defense against external threats from land, sea, and air, including responsibilities concerning the Egyptian border and Jordanian line, and for the overall security of Israelis and settlements.[2][3] These responsibilities were accompanied by joint mechanisms intended to coordinate the activities of the two sides.[3]

A joint Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee and three district coordination offices—for Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Jericho—were established to handle security matters.[3] The agreement prohibited the establishment or operation of armed forces other than the Palestinian Police and Israeli military forces in the two areas.[2] Both parties also undertook to prevent terrorism, crime, and hostilities directed against the other side, people under its authority, and their property, and to take legal measures against offenders.[2]

The authorized Palestinian Police establishment was up to 9,000 personnel, organized as one unit with four branches: Civil Police, Public Security, Intelligence, and Emergency Services and Rescue.[3] Up to 7,000 recruits could come from abroad, subject to the agreement’s conditions.[3] Permitted equipment included 7,000 light personal weapons, up to 120 machine guns, and up to 45 wheeled armored vehicles.[3] These numerical limits specified the personnel and equipment available to the new Palestinian security organization.[3]

Security obligations also included reciprocal commitments concerning hostile acts involving settlements and Palestinians.[3] More broadly, both parties were required to exercise their powers with due regard to internationally accepted human-rights and rule-of-law norms.[3] The agreement therefore paired the allocation of security responsibilities with obligations concerning prevention, enforcement, and the manner in which governmental powers were to be used.[2][3]

The agreement provided for safe passage between Gaza and the Jericho Area for residents and visitors from abroad, with Israel to ensure passage during daylight hours along designated routes.[3] It also established coordination arrangements for the Gaza–Egypt and Jericho–Jordan passages and other agreed international crossings.[3] Israel retained its stated right to close crossings into Israel or limit entry for security and safety considerations.[3]

Israelis, including Israeli military forces, could continue using roads in Gaza and the Jericho Area.[2] Palestinians could use public roads crossing settlements under the terms of the security annex.[2] These provisions addressed access within a territory in which jurisdiction and security responsibilities were divided, while the safe-passage arrangements addressed movement between the two geographically separate areas covered by the agreement.[2][3]

The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, in its analysis of safe passage, identifies Erez and Vered Yericho as crossing points and describes three designated routes.[11] Its account states that travelers needed passage cards or vehicle permits, had to remain on the designated route, and were not to have their journeys interrupted; Israel could modify arrangements for security or safety reasons, but at least one route was to remain open.[11] The analysis also identifies unresolved practical questions, including the form of the passage, who would guard it, and how permits would be granted.[11]

The Paris economic protocol applied initially to Gaza and the Jericho Area and contemplated later application to the rest of the West Bank—known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria—under further agreed arrangements.[3] It created a joint economic committee with equal representation from both sides to monitor implementation and address problems.[3] Its substantive scope included taxation, monetary matters, and movement of workers and goods, alongside trade, banking, and labor.[1][10] Economic relations were thus incorporated into the agreement through a dedicated protocol rather than left solely to subsequent negotiations.[1]

Israel agreed to release or transfer to the Palestinian Authority about 5,000 Palestinian detainees and prisoners within five weeks of signing.[2] The measure concerned residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[2] Those released could return to their homes in either area, while prisoners transferred to the Authority were to remain in Gaza or the Jericho Area for the remainder of their sentences.[2] The parties also undertook to continue negotiations over the release of additional prisoners.[2]

The agreement provided for a temporary international or foreign presence of 400 qualified personnel drawn from five or six donor countries.[3] These personnel could include observers, instructors, and other experts.[3] The initial term was six months, with an extension or change in scope possible through agreement between the parties.[3] This presence was distinct from the Palestinian Police and Israeli military forces authorized to operate in the two areas.[2][3]

The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, discussing the civil-affairs annex, identifies an obligation on the Palestinian Authority to ensure free access to holy sites in Gaza and the Jericho Area.[12] Its account names the Naaran synagogue, the Jewish cemetery in Tel Sammarat, the Shalom al Israel synagogue in Jericho, and the synagogue in Gaza City among the sites concerned.[12]

For disagreements over application or interpretation, the parties were first to use the relevant coordination mechanism.[2] Unresolved disputes were to proceed to negotiations through the Joint Israeli–Palestinian Liaison Committee.[2] They could subsequently be referred to an agreed conciliation mechanism, and arbitration was available by mutual agreement.[2] These procedures supplied a sequence for addressing implementation disputes without making either conciliation or arbitration automatic.[2]

Palestinian police began arriving in Gaza on May 11, 1994, and in Jericho on May 12, replacing Israeli military and border-police personnel.[13] Arafat entered Gaza on July 1.[14] Israel released thousands of Palestinian prisoners following the signing; one historical account gives a figure of 4,000, distinct from the agreement’s commitment to release or transfer about 5,000.[4]

Implementation transferred control of Gaza’s water-supply system to the Palestinians, who assumed responsibility for managing, developing, and maintaining water-supply and sewerage systems.[15] The transfer excluded Israeli communities, principally in Gush Katif, whose wells, pipes, and storage reservoirs remained Israeli-owned.[15] These arrangements gave the civil transfer a direct infrastructure dimension while preserving separate systems serving the Israeli communities.[15]

On August 29, 1994, Israel and the PLO signed the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, extending Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank to education, taxation, social welfare, tourism, and health; the expansion was completed by December 1994.[1] The September 28, 1995 Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement then established a broader self-government framework and mechanisms for relations leading toward a final-status agreement.[10][1] It incorporated earlier agreements, including the Cairo Agreement and Paris Protocol, and superseded the Gaza–Jericho Agreement except for Article XX on confidence-building measures.[10] In Gaza it transferred additional powers and responsibilities but did not require or produce a further Israeli military withdrawal.[10]

During Israel’s 2005 disengagement, the water systems serving the former Israeli communities were also transferred to the Palestinians.[15] These included 25 wells, storage reservoirs, and a transmission system, after which all water-supply and sewerage systems in the Strip were under exclusive Palestinian control.[15] The transfer completed a process whose initial administrative division had followed the 1994 agreement.[15]

The agreement’s institutional legacy included the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and the translation of the Declaration of Principles into arrangements for policing, legislation, courts, civil administration, economic relations, and coordination with Israel.[1][2] Its interim framework expressly treated Gaza and the West Bank as a single territorial unit whose integrity was to be preserved.[2] Gaza and the Jericho Area were to remain integral parts of that unit, with their status unchanged during the agreement’s operation.[2]

Its arrangements were to remain in force until superseded by the Interim Agreement or another agreement between the parties.[2] Neither side waived existing rights, claims, or positions by signing, and the agreement did not prejudge permanent-status negotiations.[2] These provisions distinguished the immediate exercise of transferred authority from the final settlement envisioned by the wider peace process.[2]

The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, in a critical analysis, describes a core text of 23 articles across 19 pages and an official English-language volume of 198 pages excluding maps.[16] It identifies four protocol annexes, a side letter, and correspondence between Rabin and Arafat, and argues that difficult questions—including water, religious-site custody, refugees, settlements, statehood, and political sovereignty—were postponed to later negotiations.[16]

Rabin expected Arafat’s return and the establishment of the Authority to reduce Palestinian terrorism, but the subsequent security experience did not fulfill that expectation.[4] The agreement’s legacy therefore encompasses both the creation of new Palestinian governing institutions and the security expectations attached to their establishment.[2][4] Later descriptions of Gaza’s territorial arrangements have also distinguished the security fence used for delimitation from a national border and maritime operating areas from a settled maritime boundary.[7]

The legal status of areas from which Israeli forces redeployed remained disputed.[10] One approach held that areas transferred to the Palestinian Authority were no longer under effective Israeli control and therefore no longer under belligerent occupation; another emphasized residual Israeli authority and overall security responsibility, treating Palestinian self-rule as limited.[10] Israel did not make a clear determination of those areas’ status, while the military continued in practice to exercise powers derived from the law of belligerent occupation.[10] The agreement’s allocation of interim responsibilities therefore did not resolve the broader legal disagreement over control and occupation.[10]