Agreement on Movement and Access

Israel's 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip — the withdrawal of Israeli military forces and the removal of all Israeli civilian communities — left unresolved the question of how Gaza would connect to the outside world for trade, travel, and humanitarian purposes.[1] Before disengagement, Israel maintained a direct physical presence at Gaza's border crossings, and the existing framework for customs and commerce rested on the Paris Protocol of April 29, 1994, which established a customs union between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.[3] With Israeli forces no longer stationed inside Gaza, a new set of arrangements was required to define who would operate the crossings, how goods would be inspected to prevent weapons smuggling, and how Palestinian civilians and officials would move between Gaza and the West Bank — territories that are geographically separated by Israeli territory.

The terminal at Rafah, Gaza's crossing point with Egypt, had been closed beginning September 7, 2005, pending a border-crossing agreement, though the PA and Egypt had periodically opened it to pedestrian traffic in the interim.[6] The United States took a leading diplomatic role in pressing for a comprehensive agreement, with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice personally involved in the final negotiations. Quartet Special Envoy James Wolfensohn also urged the parties toward a deal, and the European Union and Egypt were identified as contributors to the process.[2][1]

The agreement was reached on November 15, 2005, after negotiations in which Rice and Wolfensohn played central roles, with support from the European Union and Egypt.[1][2] The published agreement package contains two documents: the Agreement on Movement and Access itself and the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing, which set out detailed operational rules for that terminal.[3] The stated commitments were those of the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and implementation and further elaboration were to be assisted by the Quartet Special Envoy for Disengagement and/or the United States Security Coordinator.[3]

The UN General Assembly took notice of the agreement within weeks: on December 1, 2005, it adopted Resolution 60/39, welcoming the accord and stressing that its commitments should be fully implemented in accordance with its timeline. The resolution also called on the parties and the international community to resolve outstanding issues including border crossings, the airport, seaport construction, and a permanent physical link between Gaza and the West Bank.[7]

The Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt stood at the center of the agreement's people-movement provisions. The Agreed Principles set a target opening date of November 25, 2005, conditional on the crossing being ready to operate to international standards and the European Union third party being present on site.[3] Under the arrangement, the Palestinian Authority would operate the Gaza side and Egypt the Egyptian side; the European Union was designated as the third party responsible for monitoring compliance, assisting with training, and providing equipment and technical support.[3]

Ordinary use of the crossing was restricted to Palestinian identity-card holders. Specified exceptions covered diplomats, foreign investors, representatives of recognized international organizations, and humanitarian cases. For those exception categories, the PA was required to notify Israel 48 hours in advance; Israel then had 24 hours to state any objections and reasons, and the PA had a further 24 hours to notify Israel of its final decision and the reasons for it.[3][8] Israel could express concern about a particular person or bag being denied entry but held no formal veto; Palestinian border agents could hold a suspected entrant for up to six hours while investigating or completing consultations.[1] These procedures were to remain in place for twelve months unless the EU third party issued a negative evaluation of PA operations.[3]

For vehicle passage, cars were permitted through Rafah only once the third party was satisfied that the PA had developed inspection capacity meeting agreed criteria; until that standard was met, cars could pass only on an exceptional basis under security-protocol specifications. The Rafah principles listed required search equipment, personnel training, and cameras to monitor vehicle searches.[3] Goods could be exported to Egypt through Rafah; Rafah was designated as the only Gaza–Egypt crossing during the agreed period, with the exception of Kerem Shalom.[8]

EU monitors were authorized to check PA compliance and, in cases of non-compliance, to order the re-examination or reassessment of a passenger, luggage, vehicle, or goods. Their role was monitoring rather than physical enforcement, but they could freeze the transit process while a check was repeated. The PA made final decisions on individual persons of concern after consulting Israel and the third party.[1][3] A third-party-led liaison office at Kerem Shalom was to receive real-time video and data feeds from Rafah, review implementation, and help resolve disputes.[3] The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) deployed up to 70 unarmed monitors and support staff.[1][9]

For goods moving between Gaza and Israel, Karni in northern Gaza was designated as the primary commercial crossing and as the model for other passages. The agreement called for continuous operation of passages and required Israel to permit exports of all Gaza agricultural products urgently during the 2005 harvest season.[3] A new high-tech scanner was to be installed and operational at Karni by December 31, 2005; upon its installation, the target capacity was 150 export trucks per day, rising to 400 per day by the end of 2006.[3]

Kerem Shalom, situated at the meeting point of Israel, Egypt, and Gaza, was controlled by Israel and served as the main point for goods entering Gaza from Israel. Under the Rafah Principles, Palestinian Authority customs officials were to clear incoming cargo at Kerem Shalom under Israeli customs supervision, continuing the customs-union framework of the 1994 Paris Protocol.[3] Kerem Shalom and Sufa were described as backup points for Karni, while Nahal Oz was designated for fuel.[10] The agreement also called for a common crossing-management system, with the Karni system to be adapted, with local variations, at Erez and Kerem Shalom.[3]

Israel undertook to facilitate the speedy exit and onward movement of agricultural produce so that its quality and freshness could be maintained — a recognition that delays at crossings directly reduced the commercial value of Gaza's exports.[3] The Palestinian Authority was assigned responsibility for protecting the Palestinian side of the passages, training crossing management, and establishing a unified border-management system, with a bilateral committee to develop operating procedures.[3]

One of the agreement's most significant provisions addressed the physical separation between Gaza and the West Bank. Because convoys linking the two Palestinian-administered territories would necessarily pass through Israeli territory, the agreement explicitly stated that Israel's security was a prime and continuing concern and that appropriate security arrangements would be adopted.[3][8]

The agreement provided for escorted convoys to move both people and goods during an interim period, pending a permanent connection such as a railway or sunken roadway. Bus convoys were to be established by December 15, 2005, and truck convoys by January 15, 2006, with detailed arrangements to be worked out by a bilateral committee with international participation as needed.[3][8] For movement within the West Bank, the parties agreed to accelerate work between Israel and the United States to establish an agreed list of movement obstacles and develop a plan to reduce them to the maximum extent possible, consistent with Israel's security needs, with that work to be completed by December 31, 2005.[3]

The agreement permitted construction of a new Gaza seaport to commence and included an Israeli undertaking to assure donors that it would not interfere with the port's development and operation.[3] Before the port could open, the parties were to establish a U.S.-led tripartite committee to develop security and other arrangements, using the third-party model at Rafah as a basis.[3]

On the question of Gaza's airport — whose infrastructure had been damaged and was not operational — the agreement did not authorize reconstruction, but it recorded both parties' agreement on the importance of the airport and committed them to continuing discussions about security arrangements, construction, and operation.[3] The agreement thus left the airport as an open question, acknowledging political and practical will without creating a firm timeline or obligation.

The Rafah crossing reopened on November 25, 2005, under EU monitoring — the target date set in the agreement — marking the first time the Palestinian Authority independently operated an international border crossing.[6] PA security forces took formal control of Rafah in late November 2005.[4] Between November 2005 and June 2006, Rafah was open every day but one for more than nine hours daily on average, with approximately 650 people crossing per day.[4] EUBAM observers were present throughout this period, with the mission reaching 70 unarmed personnel at its peak; a 2025 N12 retrospective reported that approximately 450,000 Palestinians crossed under EUBAM supervision during its deployment, averaging around 1,500 people per operational day.[9]

At Karni, the agreement's commercial provisions yielded early gains. In December 2005, the crossing processed 66 export trucks per day — twice the number recorded before the agreement took effect.[4] However, this figure fell short of the agreement's December 31 target of 150 trucks per day, which was tied to the planned installation of a new scanner, indicating that even in the most favorable period of implementation the cargo commitments were not fully met.[4][3]

By year's end, several other commitments had not been fulfilled. The State Department's human-rights reporting noted that Palestinian transit through Rafah was limited and generally restricted to Palestinian identification holders, and that the bus convoys specified in the agreement for a December 15 start had not begun by the close of 2005.[6] The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs similarly observed that the planned Gaza–West Bank bus convoys had not been implemented by the December 15 target date.[11]

Security incidents began to undermine the crossing framework almost from the start. At least nine security incidents were recorded at Karni in late 2005.[4] In January 2006, a tunnel was discovered beneath Karni; an explosion near the crossing occurred in February; and an attack on the terminal took place in April 2006.[4] These incidents reinforced Israeli security concerns about the vulnerability of the crossing infrastructure.

Hamas's victory in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections compounded the political difficulties. The Institute for National Security Studies characterizes the agreement as having stalled after Hamas formed a government — one with which Israel was unwilling to cooperate — and says the agreement was never fully implemented in the aftermath.[12] The PA's capacity to give effect to its obligations under the agreement was accordingly constrained by the changed political landscape.

The most consequential single event occurred on June 25, 2006, when a Palestinian terrorist cell attacked through a tunnel near Kerem Shalom, killing two Israeli soldiers and capturing IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit.[4][5] Israel subsequently curtailed operations at many crossings, including Rafah, and denied EU monitors access to the crossing.[4] Between June 25, 2006, and June 13, 2007, Rafah was open for only 83 days, during which nearly 165,000 people crossed; for the rest of that period it was closed for normal operations and opened only exceptionally.[13] The Congressional Research Service notes that Israel retained authority to open and close Rafah according to its security assessment, monitoring the crossing by closed-circuit cameras rather than maintaining a physical presence there.[13]

The U.S. Department of State's 2006 human-rights report, citing OCHA's assessment, described movement of people and goods into and out of Gaza as severely restricted during this period. After the Shalit capture, Rafah was closed for 127 of the next 149 days, and from June onward was open only 14 percent of the time. Karni operated erratically and at reduced capacity, with Gaza exports averaging fewer than 20 truckloads per day; December 2006 exports averaged 44 truckloads per day, compared with the agreement's target of 400 per day by the end of 2006.[14]

In 2006, foreign nationals in Gaza were kidnapped and Palestinian gunmen began forcibly breaking into Rafah. International observers left the crossing because they feared for their safety, further eroding the EU monitoring framework that had underpinned the agreement's Rafah provisions.[15]

Hamas's violent seizure of control over the Gaza Strip in June 2007 effectively ended whatever remained of the agreement's operational framework. The takeover dealt the crossings regime a fatal blow, and EUBAM immediately suspended operations at Rafah and did not return.[4] Following the takeover, Egypt worked with Israel to close the Rafah crossing.[13]

A legal position paper prepared by the Military Advocate General's Corps and submitted to the Turkel Commission addressed the status of the earlier agreements after Hamas's rise to power. It stated that the Palestinian Authority no longer controlled events in Gaza and that Hamas was not a member organization of the PLO, making the applicability of the earlier agreement framework legally and practically complicated. The position paper said Israel continued to apply relevant agreement provisions insofar as possible, while the international community continued to regard the Israel–Palestinian agreements as binding.[16] The Turkel Commission's report separately noted that a December 2005 decision had authorized Israel's Minister of Defense to decide whether to open or close border terminals.[5]

The INSS also describes the later Gaza–West Bank split — with Hamas ruling Gaza and Fatah ruling the West Bank under the PA — as further worsening the situation for the crossings framework. Repeated proposals from 2007 onward sought partial implementation through a PA presence at crossings, but the PA and Hamas did not reach agreement on PA deployment at Rafah.[12] In a 2010 interview, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad publicly urged reactivation of the 2005 agreement, saying it covered Gaza's land crossings with Israel, the seaport and airport, the Rafah crossing, and movement between Gaza and the West Bank. He argued that restoring the arrangement would return management of Gaza's crossings to the PA and help reunify Palestinian institutions, and that the land crossings could be opened immediately even if not every element could be implemented at once.[17]

The record of implementation is contested across multiple dimensions. The published agreement texts present the Agreement on Movement and Access and the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing as two related documents within the same agreement package.[3][8] However, EUBAM head Colonel Alain Faugeras stated in a 2009 interview that only one of the agreement's three sections — covering passage of people — had actually been signed in 2005, and that the Rafah goods-passage agreement and a security protocol were never signed or implemented. He described that protocol as intended to set shared standards for suspicious objects and people and for the passage of money.[18]

Sources report different averages for Karni exports in December 2005. The Washington Institute gives 66 trucks per day,[4] while a PLO Negotiations Support Unit paper gives 56 trucks per day.[19] Both figures fall short of the agreement's target of 150 trucks per day. The U.S. Department of State's figure of 44 export truckloads per day refers instead to December 2006, when the agreement's target had risen to 400 per day, and therefore is not a third estimate for December 2005.[14]

The UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, whose report was subsequently hosted on the Israeli government's website, found that the AMA's target of approximately 400 trucks daily was never reached and documented the gap between pre-closure averages and post-closure trade volumes. It reported pre-closure monthly averages of approximately 10,400 truckloads of imports and 1,380 of exports, contrasted with post-military-operations figures of about 2,834 import truckloads and no exports; it recorded only 134 truckloads of cash crops exported in total between June 2007 and May 2009, and one isolated flower-export shipment in March 2009.[20] These findings reflect that mission's characterization of events and should be understood in that context.

The Congressional Research Service's retrospective characterizes the agreement as never fully implemented, a conclusion consistent with the evidence that some arrangements began — Rafah monitored operations and increased Karni throughput in December 2005 — while other core commitments, notably the Gaza–West Bank bus convoys, had not commenced by the end of 2005.[21]