Israeli Occupation of the West Bank

Israel gained control of the West Bank from Jordan during the June 1967 Six-Day War and established military administration; since the mid-1990s, the Palestinian Authority has exercised limited self-rule in parts of the territory.[1] The resulting system combines Israeli military powers, Palestinian civil institutions, and different security arrangements across Areas A, B, and C.[2] The Palestinian Authority was created through agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization as an interim mechanism rather than a settlement of sovereignty.[6]

The territorial division does not correspond simply to the distribution of population: Palestinian population centers mostly lie in Areas A and B, while most Palestinian agricultural lands and rural communities lie in Area C.[9] Area C also contains Jewish settlements and areas considered strategically important by Israel, including the Jordan Valley and desert frontier region.[10] An estimate places some 99% of approximately 3.36 million West Bank Palestinians in Areas A and B, while most of approximately 520,000 Israeli settlers live in Area C.[1]

Permanent-status questions include borders, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, security arrangements, foreign relations, and other powers not transferred to the Palestinian Council.[6] The Oslo agreements distributed governmental responsibilities without settling those questions and expressly preserved them for future negotiations.[6] East Jerusalem followed a different administrative course from the remainder of the West Bank: Israel extended its law, jurisdiction, and administration there after 1967, while the remainder was not subjected to a general territorial extension of Israeli law.[11]

The territory west of the Jordan River formed part of Mandatory Palestine before coming under Jordanian control during the 1948 War of Independence.[11] Judea and Samaria are biblical names for its southern and northern regions, respectively, with Jerusalem approximately between them.[12] The Israeli-Jordanian armistice of April 3, 1949, left Jordan in control of the West Bank while providing that the armistice lines were without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundaries.[13] Jordan formally annexed the territory in 1950, a move recognized only by Great Britain and Pakistan.[14]

The 1947 United Nations partition plan had allocated much of this area to a proposed Arab state, but Arab leaders rejected the plan.[15] Jordan administered the territory for the following 19 years, until Israel gained control in 1967.[15] The United States did not consider Jordanian administration to have settled ultimate sovereignty.[13]

The Six-Day War began on June 5, 1967, with an Israeli strike on Egypt; during the conflict Israel captured the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights.[16] Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, whose combined Palestinian population was estimated at at least one million, and indicated after the war that it was prepared to withdraw from territory in return for a peace agreement with its Arab neighbors.[15] On June 7, the Israeli area commander issued a proclamation assuming governmental, legislative, appointive, and administrative power over the West Bank and its inhabitants.[14]

Responsibility for governing the Palestinian population fell to the Israel Defense Forces, with Defense Minister Moshe Dayan acting as the principal political authority concerned with administration and daily life.[3] The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, or COGAT, was created to implement his policy, and military governors were appointed in districts.[3] Dayan’s preferred approach sought to preserve security control while allowing Palestinians as normal a life as possible, an approach associated with the phrase “invisible occupation.”[2]

Municipal governments and village councils continued administering local services, but Israel could permit or cancel local elections and appoint or dismiss Palestinian officials.[14] Military orders during the first decade restricted political activity, including displays of political symbols, distribution of political publications, and public gatherings.[17] These restrictions limited civil resistance to Israeli authorities for much of that period.[17] In November 1981, the Civil Administration was established to separate civilian affairs from the military governorate, under the direct authority of the minister of defense; its stated purpose combined care for the civilian population with preservation of unified military command.[2]

Jewish communities were established after 1967, including renewed communities in places where Jews had lived before 1948.[4] Kfar Etzion and other villages along the Jerusalem–Bethlehem corridor had fallen to Arab forces in May 1948; children of former residents were among those who returned after the Six-Day War to renew a Jewish presence.[4] In the 1970s, Israeli governments viewed settlements in the Jordan Valley and eastern slopes of Samaria as a potential military buffer, while Gush Emunim activists established both authorized and unauthorized communities.[4]

Settlement growth continued under subsequent Israeli governments.[4] During Menachem Begin’s administration, from 1977 to 1983, the number of settlements more than tripled and the number of settlers increased more than fivefold.[17]

The first intifada began in December 1987 in the West Bank and Gaza.[5] Large-scale disturbances began in Gaza in early December and continued for more than five years; methods included stone-throwing demonstrations, strikes, commercial boycotts, and closures.[18] Initially spontaneous, the uprising later came under the leadership of the Unified National Command of the Uprising, which had links to the PLO.[18]

During the first year, more than 300 Palestinians were killed and more than 11,500 wounded across the territories, with nearly two-thirds of the wounded under 15.[18] Israeli authorities closed schools and universities, destroyed houses, imposed curfews, and made arrests.[18] By mid-1990, an International Red Cross estimate put Palestinian deaths at the hands of Israeli security forces above 800, including more than 200 children under 16; these figures concern the territories collectively, not the West Bank alone.[18] In 1988, Jordan’s King Hussein renounced administrative responsibility for the West Bank, severing its legal and administrative links with Jordan.[11]

Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993, following negotiations and an exchange of letters in which the PLO renounced terrorism and committed to peaceful resolution, and Israel recognized it as the representative of the Palestinian people.[19] The declaration established a five-year interim period of Palestinian self-rule and envisaged transfers of powers in the West Bank and Gaza.[6] It also provided for Israeli military redeployment outside populated areas while leaving Israel responsible for external defense and the overall security of Israelis.[6]

Implementation in the West Bank began in May 1994 with Israeli withdrawal from Jericho and its environs and the establishment of Palestinian self-government there.[19] The May 4, 1994, Cairo Agreement provided for Palestinian control in Gaza and Jericho.[19] The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, commonly called Oslo II, was signed in Washington on September 28, 1995, and set out further transfers of authority and redeployments.[6]

The 1995 agreement envisaged transitional self-government for no more than five years from the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.[6] It provided for permanent-status negotiations to begin no later than May 4, 1996; those negotiations began in May 1996.[20] A separate 1997 Hebron protocol divided security responsibilities within that city.[19] By March 2000, after two phases of further redeployment, more than 18% of the West Bank was designated Area A and more than 21% Area B, placing 98% of its Palestinian population under Palestinian authority in the contemporary Israeli government account.[20]

The second intifada began in September 2000 after negotiations failed to resolve issues including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, Palestinian sovereignty, and statehood.[18][5] By then, less than one-fifth of the West Bank had come under full Palestinian control, in 15 isolated segments.[18] Palestinian attacks during the uprising included suicide bombings, shootings, and mortar fire.[5] In spring 2002, Israeli troops reentered West Bank towns and cities and reclaimed security control from the Palestinian Authority; Operation Defensive Shield restored Israeli control over most of the West Bank, followed by curfews, checkpoints, and a security fence.[5]

After October 7, 2023, Israeli forces imposed additional movement restrictions and increased raids, including frequent operations around northern West Bank refugee camps; settler attacks on Palestinians also increased.[17] In 2025, the cabinet approved 54 new settlements and a land-registration program under which Area C land could be declared state land if private Palestinian claimants could not prove ownership.[17] Another 35 settlements had been approved by mid-July 2026.[17]

Oslo II defined Area C as the West Bank outside the designated populated areas of Areas A and B, and treated the West Bank and Gaza Strip as “a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.”[6] Its division of responsibilities provided for a large-scale transfer of powers, including 40 spheres of civilian authority, and staged redeployment of Israeli forces.[11] The allocation reflected both the kinds of powers involved and the areas’ demographic and strategic circumstances.[11]

Area A, approximately 18% of the West Bank, came under Palestinian civil and security responsibility.[2] The agreement assigned the Palestinian Council internal security and public order there as Israeli forces redeployed from each district.[6] Area A included the main Palestinian cities, with special arrangements for Hebron.[19] Although the Palestinian Authority retains formal civil-administration and security responsibility, Israeli forces frequently conduct operations in Area A.[9]

Area B, approximately 22% of the territory, has Palestinian civil administration and Israeli security control.[2] More specifically, Palestinian police were assigned responsibility for public order for Palestinians, while Israel retained overriding security responsibility to protect Israelis and confront terrorism.[6] The Palestinian Council received civil powers, including planning and zoning, in Areas A and B during the first phase of implementation.[21]

Area C, approximately 60% of the West Bank, remains under Israeli civil and security control, including territorial matters such as planning and zoning.[2] It includes Jewish settlements and areas Israel considers strategically important.[2][10] More than half of Area C is designated as closed military zones or settlement zoning areas.[9] The agreement envisaged gradual transfer of territorial powers there, except for matters reserved for permanent-status negotiations; first-phase transfers concerned civil responsibilities not relating to territory.[6]

After Oslo, Palestinian institutions assumed personal civil responsibilities concerning Palestinians in Area C, including health, education, and welfare.[22] The Civil Administration continued managing infrastructure, land, planning, construction, transportation, and environmental matters there.[22] Israel also retained responsibility for external threats and the overall security of Israelis and settlements.[6] These allocations distinguish services concerning Palestinian residents from authority over the land and infrastructure where they live.[6][22]

The Interim Agreement provided that the West Bank Civil Administration would be dissolved when the Palestinian Council was inaugurated and that the military government would withdraw, while expressly preserving the exercise of powers and responsibilities not transferred.[6] Israel’s military government retained authority over areas outside Palestinian territorial jurisdiction, powers not transferred to the Council, and Israelis.[6] Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, refugees, borders, foreign relations, and Israelis were among the matters reserved for permanent-status negotiations.[6]

The applicable legal framework combines law in force before 1967, principally Jordanian law, with military orders and other governing rules.[7] Palestinians are subject to pre-1967 Jordanian and British Mandate statutes, Israeli military ordinances, and Palestinian Authority law in relevant areas.[9] Israeli residents are subject to Israeli laws and legislation as well as military ordinances; Israeli legislation applies personally in fields including taxation and national insurance, rather than through general territorial extension of Israeli law.[7][9]

The distinction also affects criminal proceedings: Israelis living in West Bank settlements are tried under Israeli civilian law in Israeli courts inside the Green Line, while Palestinians are tried under military law in Israeli military courts.[9] Israeli administrative-law principles also constrain the military commander’s exercise of governmental authority in the territory.[7]

Hebron illustrates arrangements more specific than the general A–B–C division.[9] H1 is under Palestinian Authority control, while H2 contains approximately 800 Israeli settlers, with internal security, public order, and civil authorities concerning Israelis and their property under Israeli military protection.[9] The city’s Tomb of the Patriarchs/Ibrahimi Mosque is important to Jews, Christians, and Muslims.[9]

By late 2025, approximately 150 state-authorized settlements existed in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem, containing the vast majority of approximately 503,000 settlers outside Jerusalem.[23] Around 220 smaller unauthorized settlements or outposts had a combined population in the tens of thousands; some were dismantled, some remained, and others received retroactive authorization.[23] Earlier demographic figures, such as a 2005 estimate of 2.3 million Palestinians and nearly 400,000 Israeli settlers, describe their reporting period rather than current populations.[12]

In 2026, the government moved to permit direct Israeli land purchases, renew land registration in Area C, and expand Israeli enforcement powers into Areas A and B in several fields.[24] Israel had not formally annexed the West Bank, and its formal legal framework remained one of belligerent occupation and military governance.[24] East Jerusalem remained administratively distinct because Israel had applied its law, jurisdiction, and administration there after 1967.[11]

Security Council Resolution 242, adopted after the Six-Day War, became a framework for peace negotiations by linking withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories of the recent conflict with an end to belligerency and recognition of states’ right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.[25] The Oslo agreements subsequently framed Palestinian self-government and Israeli redeployment within a process intended to lead to a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338.[6]

The territory’s significance to Jewish history is reflected in the renewal of communities abandoned or lost in 1948 and in the return of descendants of earlier residents, including at Kfar Etzion.[4] Some Jewish communities had existed under Ottoman or British Mandate rule before 1948.[4] At the same time, the Palestinian Authority’s establishment created institutions of limited Palestinian self-government without full functional and territorial control or a completed permanent-status settlement.[14]

The interim agreements separated immediate administration from the questions intended for final negotiations: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security, borders, water, and certain archaeological matters remained unresolved.[11] They stated that interim arrangements should not prejudge the permanent outcome and that neither side should take steps changing the status of the West Bank and Gaza pending those negotiations.[6] The projected interim timetable therefore did not itself establish permanent sovereignty or a final territorial division.[6]

Israeli judicial review has also had practical consequences for settlement policy.[26] In June 2020, the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, voted eight to one to void the 2017 Regulation Law, which concerned retroactive recognition of settlement construction, including construction on privately owned Palestinian land.[26] The majority found that the law disproportionately infringed Palestinian residents’ property and equality rights while favoring settlers without adequate case-by-case examination.[26] More broadly, the applicable framework combines international occupation law, preexisting local law, military orders, and Israeli administrative-law principles.[7]

Israel’s customary government position treats the West Bank as disputed territory, arguing that Jordan lacked legitimate recognized sovereignty and that the Fourth Geneva Convention consequently does not apply as a matter of law; Israel nevertheless committed to implementing its humanitarian directives.[7] Israeli Supreme Court decisions have characterized the territory as held under belligerent occupation.[7] The government also presents Israel’s presence as the consequence of self-defense, while differing assessments of the 1967 war and Resolution 242’s withdrawal language remain part of the legal debate.[11][27]

Most countries and a majority of international legal specialists regard settlement transfers into occupied territory as unlawful, particularly under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; Israel disputes the Convention’s applicability and the interpretation supporting that conclusion.[28] The nonbinding 2012 Levy Committee reached a contrary assessment of occupation and settlement legality and recommended regulating outposts.[29] In 2019, the United States announced that it no longer considered settlement activity inherently inconsistent with international law, while the European Union reaffirmed its contrary position.[30]

On July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice concluded in an advisory opinion, by 11 votes to four, that Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory was unlawful and should end as rapidly as possible; by 14 votes to one, it called for an immediate end to new settlement activity.[8] The opinion covered the entirety of the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967 and preserved Israel’s international-law obligations until its presence ended.[8] It was advisory and nonbinding; Israel disputed the Court’s authority to address the matter.[31]

The Court also found that settlement expansion, associated infrastructure, the security wall, resource exploitation, and extensive application of Israeli domestic law entrenched Israeli control, particularly in Area C.[8] On September 18, 2024, the General Assembly adopted Resolution ES-10/24 by 124 votes to 14, with 43 abstentions, demanding an end to Israel’s unlawful presence within 12 months and calling for military withdrawal, cessation of settlement activity, settler evacuation, and dismantling of parts of the wall.[32] It also called for specified state measures concerning settlement goods and arms transfers.[32]

A 2026 INSS analysis distinguishes formal status from practical developments in governance: it states that Israel has not officially declared annexation and that the legal framework formally remains one of belligerent occupation, while characterizing government policy as gradually applying de facto sovereignty.[24] The latter is an analytical interpretation of policy changes, not a formal declaration annexing the West Bank.