Israeli Permit Regime in the West Bank

The permit regime is best understood as a group of related but distinct authorization tracks, rather than one uniform system. The subjects documented in the sources include entry into Israel, employment in Israel or in parts of the West Bank, travel through particular areas, residence in the seam zone, access to farmland, and entry for medical, educational, commercial, family, religious, or other purposes. Rules and figures cited for one track or period should not be assumed to apply to another.[1][2]

The 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, commonly called Oslo II, drew a distinction between movement within the West Bank and movement from the West Bank into Israel. It said movement of people, vehicles, and goods between West Bank cities, towns, villages, and refugee camps would be “free and normal” and would not require passage through checkpoints or roadblocks, while preserving Israel’s security powers and responsibilities.[1] By contrast, entry from the West Bank into Israel was subject to the applicable Israeli laws and procedures.[1]

For entry into Israel, Oslo II required residents to carry their agreed identity card and other documentation specified by Israel and notified through the Civil Affairs Coordination Committee. It also preserved Israel’s ability, for security and safety considerations, to close crossing points or prohibit or limit the entry of people and vehicles from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[1] The agreement thus provides a framework for distinguishing inter-community movement from crossing into Israel; it does not establish that every later movement rule or procedure was identical across time and place.[1]

Oslo II also divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C pending a permanent-status agreement. An INSS account describes Area A as 18% of the territory, under Palestinian Authority civil and security control; Area B as 22%, with Palestinian civil control and Israeli security control; and Area C as 60%, under Israeli civil and security control.[2] These divisions form part of the administrative context in which permit and coordination responsibilities operate.[2]

The Civil Administration was established in November 1981, separating civilian affairs from the military governorship. The INSS account describes it as subordinate to the head of COGAT—the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories—and as a staff body of IDF Central Command.[2] After Oslo, it retained duties including construction approval and enforcement in Area C, issuing Palestinian work permits, and coordination with the Palestinian Authority on security and infrastructure matters.[2]

The division of planning powers also varies by area. A Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs account says that planning and zoning powers in Areas A and B, including issuing building permits and supervising construction, were transferred to the Palestinian side, while those powers in Area C remained with Israel’s Civil Administration, pending possible future transfer and permanent-status negotiations.[3] The account identifies Jordanian Law No. 79 of 1966, as amended by Israeli security legislation and jurisprudence, as the applicable Area C planning legislation; it says that a 2018 military order, Order No. 1797, requires a permit for any new structure and provides for removal through an appeals process when a permit is not granted or its conditions are violated.[3] These legal descriptions are the account’s characterization of the framework.[3]

Sources identify different milestones in the emergence of entry permits. A National Library of Israel catalog record summarizing Yael Berda’s 2018 book says that emergency legislation introduced in 1991 canceled a general exit permit that had allowed Palestinians to enter Israel, and that the directive was reissued annually.[4] The U.S. Department of State’s 2003 human-rights report, by contrast, says that since 1993 residents of the West Bank and Gaza had been required to obtain permits to enter Israel and Jerusalem.[5] These accounts may describe different policy steps; the available material does not resolve the distinction.[4][5]

The State Department’s 2003 report described external closures restricting movement between the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel, and internal closures restricting travel between West Bank towns and villages. It reported that during comprehensive external closures even people with valid work permits could be prevented from leaving the territories.[5] The report also said that permits could be denied without explanation and that effective appeal mechanisms were lacking, and listed work, visits, study, and medical care among reasons Palestinians needed permits to travel outside the West Bank or Gaza.[5] These details describe the situation as reported in 2003, not a complete statement of present-day procedures.[5]

A 2007 document describing arrangements and procedures reported a significant change in internal travel requirements around 2002. It said Palestinians generally had not needed permits for travel within the West Bank before 2002, except to enter East Jerusalem, and that afterward the IDF used different permits for travel through parts of the West Bank, on certain roads, and into Israel.[6] The document classified roads as prohibited, restricted, or open, and characterized the road system as unofficial and not codified in military orders or official legislation; that characterization is the document’s own.[6]

The same 2007 account described a Magnetic ID card issued by the Israeli Civil Administration as a prerequisite for applying for specific movement permits. It said the card confirmed a security check by the Israeli General Intelligence Services, which could also carry out checks for particular permits whether or not an applicant already held the card.[6] Under procedures it dated to September 2004, applicants applied through a local District Coordination and Liaison Office, completed a form, paid Israeli stamps and a processing fee of 30–100 NIS, and supplied hand scans and a photograph. After obtaining the card, a person still had to seek the separate permit relevant to the planned journey.[6]

That document described a “Special Movement Permit at Internal Checkpoints in Judea and Samaria,” introduced in January 2002, for certain restricted roads and checkpoints covering roughly 245 kilometres. It said the permit was nominally valid throughout the West Bank during calm periods, but not during heightened security risks; applicants requested it through a local DCL and paid a stated fee of 80 NIS.[6] The document gave its hours of validity as 05:00 to 22:00 and said the validity period had been reduced from six months to three months.[6]

Other arrangements in the 2007 document were tied to specific locations or modes of travel. It said that from October 2006 Palestinians needed a Jordan Valley permit, issued only to registered residents or people working there; in April 2007 the IDF lifted the restriction for pedestrian traffic, but not for vehicles.[6] It also described a DCL permit and proof of residence or land ownership as requirements for travel between the “Seamzone” and the rest of the West Bank. Trucks carrying commercial goods through certain checkpoints and buses on internal West Bank routes were said to require vehicle permits, described as valid for one year.[6]

Reports from the 2000s also described movement restrictions during closures and around the barrier. A report on human-rights practices for 2000 said that since March 1993 residents of the West Bank and Gaza had required permits to enter Israel and Jerusalem. It reported that closures imposed in response to attacks or changing security conditions could cancel travel permits and bar entry to Israel or Jerusalem, including for holders of valid work permits; it also said applicants were often denied without explanation and lacked an effective means of appeal.[7] The year and context matter: this is a report about conditions described for 2000, not a current operational rule.[7]

In its 2003 account, the State Department said employers needed a government permit to hire Palestinian workers from the territories. It reported that Palestinians working in Israel generally worked on a daily basis and could not stay overnight unless employed on shift work; people working without valid permits were subject to arrest.[5] A 2008 report likewise said West Bank and Gaza residents could enter Jerusalem only with an Israeli-issued travel permit. During Ramadan that year, it reported, Palestinian men over 50 and women over 45 could enter Jerusalem without a permit, while younger people needed one.[8] These are historical reports and should not be read as current eligibility rules.[5][8]

COGAT’s document dated 20 August 2020 sets out authorization categories for West Bank residents that go beyond employment. It lists permits for medical treatment and accompanying patients, legal proceedings, education, business and commerce, worship and family visits, travel abroad, prisoner visits, weddings and funerals, as well as permits for journalists, public-sector workers, and senior Palestinian officials.[9] The document also sets out separate tracks for Gaza residents and exceptional travel between the West Bank and Gaza, underscoring that the term “permit regime” covers multiple processes rather than a single work-permit program.[9]

The same COGAT document states that, under the 1967 Order Concerning Closed Areas (West Bank Area), Judea and Samaria is a closed military area that may not be entered or exited without a permit issued on behalf of the military commander.[9] It says applications are assessed against current authorizations, individual security checks, political, security and strategic considerations, administrative requirements, supporting documents, and any need for further documentation. It also states that a Palestinian resident has no vested right of entry into Israel and that criteria are reviewed and revised in light of political and security circumstances.[9] This document records the Israeli authority’s published framework for authorizations as of its date.[9]

The Civil Administration’s Employment Unit says it is primarily responsible for issuing Palestinian work permits for employment in Israel and in the region of Judea and Samaria. Its page reported that on 1 March 2020, 87,000 permits for Palestinian employees working in Israel and 35,000 for workers in Judea and Samaria were valid.[10] These figures concern that date and those stated categories; they are not current totals.[10]

The Employment Unit says the Israeli government sets quotas for work in Israel by industry sector. Employment in Judea and Samaria, by contrast, is not quota-limited, but is approved according to the nature and scope of the work and, as a rule, an employment index.[10] COGAT’s 2020 document describes work in Israel as requiring a permit issued through the head of the Employment Unit and subject to Israeli Employment Service criteria, an employer’s employment permit, a security evaluation, and other defined criteria.[9] Work in settlements and industrial zones is approved under Central Command instructions and the Civil Administration’s Employment Unit.[9]

The COGAT document set different minimum ages for work categories: 22 for work in the Seam Zone and 18 for work elsewhere in Judea and Samaria. It said those categories had no quota, and that work outside the Seam Zone had no personal-status restriction.[9] For employment in Israel, it separately listed standing quotas by sector.[9] The document gives two figures for seasonal agriculture: its explanatory text says COGAT was authorized to administer a quota of 10,500, while its quota table lists 9,250.[9] The table further divides seasonal agriculture into categories including orchards, fruits and vegetables, almond harvest, citrus harvest, and olive harvest; the source does not reconcile the two totals.[9]

Employers submit work-permit applications directly to Employment Unit offices for processing, according to the Unit’s description. It says its representatives send issued permits to employers by email and lists eight district service stations: Shaar Ephraim, Ariel, Hashmonaim, Beit-El, Abu Dis, Mishor Adumim, Vered Yeriho, and Etzion.[10] From 29 March 2020, amid the COVID-19 crisis and the prohibition on public reception at Civil Administration offices, work permits were issued digitally. Employers could view and print them, while employees could use COGAT’s Arabic-language Al-Munassiq website to view, send, and print permits issued in their names.[10]

The permit system also includes procedures connected to crossings and entry into Jerusalem. A Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research report describes a proposed arrangement under which Palestinians would enter Israel through official crossing points after obtaining an entry permit and undergoing an Israel Police security check.[11] The report says a committee in 1995 recommended six crossing points for goods, vehicles, and people entering Jerusalem from the West Bank, and that the government reiterated a plan in 1996 for orderly seam-zone crossings while blocking alternative routes.[11] In January 2004, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel filed petitions challenging the seam-zone permit regime and called for crossing points to remain open around the clock, according to the report.[11]

The Jerusalem Institute report also records the State Attorney’s Office telling the High Court that the Jerusalem Envelope was “solely a security barrier” and would not change residents’ existing status, rights, or obligations. It said residents of Shuafat refugee camp and Kafr Aqeb would receive special permits for movement to and from Jerusalem, subject to security arrangements.[11] The report notes residents’ concerns over whether those assurances would be fulfilled and describes difficulties at Qalandiya checkpoint.[11] These are separately attributed positions and reported concerns, rather than a single finding about the operation of every crossing.[11]

The agreement’s stated rule for movement between West Bank communities differs from accounts of controls imposed in later periods. Oslo II said movement between West Bank cities, towns, villages, and refugee camps would be “free and normal,” without requiring checkpoints or roadblocks, while retaining Israel’s security powers and responsibilities.[1] A Washington Institute report focused on the second intifada and its aftermath, by contrast, lists permits for travel within the West Bank and between the West Bank and Jerusalem alongside checkpoints, roadblocks, and security barriers.[12] These sources address different periods and aspects of the system and should not be collapsed into one timeless description.[1][12]

An INSS account describes the Civil Administration’s continued role in issuing Palestinian work permits and coordinating with the Palestinian Authority on security and infrastructure. It also says Israeli controls and permits have been used as leverage: the authors report that Israel denied entry permits after security escalations and increased permit numbers in periods of quiet, describing this as a mechanism intended to encourage stability.[2] The account does not specify whether every permit in those examples was a work permit, nor does it supply dates or counts for the decisions.[2]

Israeli official and media accounts characterize internal movement differently from some human-rights reporting. In a follow-up report to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Israeli government stated that freedom of movement within the West Bank was not limited and that checkpoints were not operational day to day, but were established temporarily after security incidents or on the basis of security intelligence. The government also said around 100,000 Palestinian workers entered Israel daily at the time, alongside tens of thousands for medical, commercial, and other purposes, and described entry policy as public and regularly reviewed in light of security conditions.[13] This is the government’s stated position, not an independent assessment.[13]

A 2023 Mako report characterized Palestinian movement within the West Bank as generally fairly free, while noting exceptions. It said Palestinians could not enter Israeli settlements without authorization and accompaniment for work, and could not use certain “blue routes” leading to settlements; it described only short stretches between settlements in the Gush Talmonim area northwest of Ramallah as routes Palestinians were not permitted to use.[14] The report also distinguished this movement from entry into Israel, for which it said Palestinians required authorization and encountered security forces at crossings. It described temporary checkpoints and blockages during operational incidents or after attacks, and reported the Prime Minister’s Office’s characterization of policy as providing “maximum freedom of movement” in the West Bank to Israelis and Palestinians.[14]

The 2007 procedures document described permits for certain restricted roads and checkpoints, as well as separate Jordan Valley, seam-zone, bus, and truck arrangements.[6] A 2008 State Department report said Palestinians residing outside the Jordan Valley were restricted from driving across its four main access points from April 2007, though Highway 90 was not explicitly restricted from Palestinian use.[8] The particular route, vehicle, and period therefore matter when comparing descriptions of movement.[6][8]

The seam zone refers in the cited material to land between the separation barrier and the Green Line. A 2003 State Department report said that about 5,000 Palestinians living in areas between the barrier and the Green Line were required to obtain permits to remain there.[5] A 2008 report said Palestinian residents in such communities needed residency permits to remain in their homes. It reported that community services were generally east of the barrier, requiring children, patients, and workers to pass through gates to reach schools, health services, and workplaces; gates were not open around the clock, and ambulances did not have free access.[8]

The 2008 report counted 71 gates or checkpoints along the barrier, of which 40 were accessible only to Palestinians with permits, and said operating hours were limited.[8] A Jerusalem Institute report describes the barrier and crossing system as affecting access to homes, relatives, work, schools, hospitals, commercial centers, religious sites, farmland, and infrastructure. It reported that after sections were completed, daily passage arrangements remained inadequate in some places, citing children unable to attend school, farmers unable to reach fields, and people unable to reach jobs.[11]

The 2022 State Department report records Israel’s stated security rationale for the barrier and movement restrictions, including prevention of attacks and responses to attempted attacks. It also describes reported effects on employment, hospitals, schools, farmland, family life, and religious life.[15] These are distinct parts of the report: Israel’s explanation is an attributed official rationale, while the effects are reported impacts.[15]

Access to farmland on the barrier’s far side has involved a separate permit process. The 2009 Jerusalem Post report described a requirement for Palestinians to obtain permits to cross the barrier and reach farmland in the seam zone. In the area it covered, about 2,500 dunams of Palestinian-owned farmland were affected.[16] The article said that after several years in which farmers listed with IDF guards could use a gate, the Civil Administration changed procedures in early 2009 and required permits. Farmers in several villages north of the barrier said they could not prove ownership through formal records and refused to apply; an eight-month standoff continued as the olive harvest approached.[16]

A 2021 State Department report described a complicated system requiring more than ten different permits for farmers seeking to reach land cut off by the barrier. It said the IDF denied 73% of farmer permit applications in 2020, compared with 63% in 2019; the IDF attributed only 1% of 2020 denials to security reasons. The report attributed to HaMoked the view that most denials reflected difficulties navigating military bureaucracy and increasingly restrictive criteria, and that gates did not open early enough for farmers to use the full day.[17] These figures and explanations are attributed in the report and concern the specific periods named.[17]

For the 2022 olive-harvest season in Tulkarm, the State Department report cited a Palestinian District Coordination Liaison who said COGAT had granted 140 of almost 2,000 permit requests by October. NGOs also reported that checkpoint personnel barred some farmers from bringing equipment to their land.[15] The 2023 report said farmers needed special Civil Administration permits to reach olive groves between the barrier and the Green Line and, citing the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, said the Civil Administration typically approved 50–60% of permit requests during harvest season. It also noted that farmers who had coordinated access with the Civil Administration and Palestinian Authority still encountered difficulties reaching their land.[18] These seasonal figures refer to different sources and periods and are not directly comparable measures.[15][18]

In 2022, the High Court of Justice dismissed a petition by farmers from Qaffin, Akaba, and Nezlet Issa seeking to move or dismantle sections of the barrier separating them from their farmland. The farmers said permits to pass through a gate often prevented cultivation; the court found that most specific grievances had been canceled or soon would be, and Justice Isaac Amit said he found no justification to intervene in the army commander’s decision not to dismantle the barrier.[19] The ruling concerned that petition and the barrier route, not the legality of every permit category or practice.[19]

Employment is one of the regime’s most prominent permit tracks. Under Oslo II, the Palestinian side received the Civil Administration’s employment powers and responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was to organize and plan employment for Palestinians seeking jobs in Israel and the settlements and provide Israel with information about those workers; after a positive Israeli decision, Israel would issue the necessary permits.[1] The agreement also provided for continued Israeli assistance concerning workers’ social rights under applicable law and for a joint committee to establish procedures.[1]

The Civil Administration’s Employment Unit says it issues permits for employment in Israel and in the region of Judea and Samaria, with different rules for the two settings.[10] The Israeli government sets a quota for work in Israel by industry sector, while employment in Judea and Samaria is not quota-limited and is assessed according to the nature and scale of the work and, as a rule, an employment index.[10] COGAT’s 2020 document says work in Israel depends on an employment permit for the employer, security evaluation, Employment Service criteria, and other defined criteria; work in settlements and industrial zones is approved under Central Command instructions and by the Employment Unit.[9]

Historical reports provide snapshots of eligibility and scale, not a continuous count. A 2012 Ynet report described eligible applicants as people without a record of activity against Israel and said a magnetic card enabled entry. It reported that Israel had added 10,000 permits that year, bringing the reported total to 40,000; it compared this with a peak of 200,000 permits in the 1990s and said most permits had been revoked after the uprising that began in late 2000.[20] The article separately reported 25,000 Palestinians working in Israeli settlements in the West Bank.[20] A 2020 Employment Unit page, by comparison, reported 87,000 permits for work in Israel and 35,000 for work in Judea and Samaria valid on 1 March of that year.[10] These figures differ in date and category and should not be combined into a single trend without further information.[10][20]

The 2012 report also described applicants seeking permits at a military coordination office near Jerusalem amid long queues, and said workers generally found jobs through contacts on the Israeli side.[20] An individual example in the same article concerned Emad Misbah, a gravedigger in Petah Tikva whose special permit allowed him to stay overnight during the week rather than commute daily. The report said he worked ten hours per day, slept in a trailer at the cemetery, returned home once a week, and earned $1,500 a month—more than twice what Palestinians earned for the same work in the West Bank, according to the article.[20]

A 2021 pilot created a distinct route for Palestinian high-tech workers. A Globes report said an Israeli company recognized by the Israel Innovation Authority had to identify a particular candidate and apply to the Population and Immigration Authority. After approval, that authority contacted the Civil Administration to enable daily travel to Israel.[21] The pilot was to issue 500 permits, and employers had to pay at least 150% of the average Israeli monthly salary, stated in the article as NIS 17,000 or more. The report said a worker who left a job could retain the permit while seeking work at another Israeli technology company.[21]

The pilot did not remove the practical uncertainties of crossing. The same report said security incidents or emergencies could close crossings even for permit holders. One Palestinian technology worker described a passage taking ten minutes on one occasion and 90 minutes on another; the article said the Population and Immigration Authority had promised faster passage for technology workers, but did not describe the pilot’s separate security-vetting criteria.[21]

A separate account by a former SodaStream manager describes how sector quotas could affect an individual employer and workforce. The author said permits were issued by profession, with quotas for agriculture, nursing, construction, and manufacturing, and that the manufacturing quota was already full when SodaStream moved to the Negev in early 2016. He said that he and former coworkers could not work at the new facility without permits and were out of work from February 2016 until May 2017, when, according to his account, permits were renewed.[22] This is an attributed personal account, not an independent summary of all workers’ circumstances.[22]

Reported totals immediately before and after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack vary by source and population. One INSS article reported that before the war around 165,000 Palestinians worked in Israel and West Bank settlements, of whom about 130,000 worked legally.[23] Another INSS analysis reported approximately 175,000 workers with and without permits in Israel and Israeli settlements on the eve of the war, including around 150,000 within the Green Line.[24] These descriptions have different scopes and should not be treated as interchangeable.[23][24]

A November 2023 Jerusalem Post report said around 140,000 West Bank Palestinians had their Israeli work permits suspended after the October 7 attack and ensuing war, while an exemption that week allowed 8,000 workers to enter because of a labor shortage.[25] An INSS account reported that Palestinian workers were not permitted to enter Israel except for about 8,000 described as essential workers, while another 18,000 were permitted to work in West Bank industrial zones and settlements.[23] A separate INSS account said entry to localities within the Green Line was prohibited except for special permits granted to approximately 8,000 workers for exceptional essential needs.[24] These are reports tied to the periods discussed, not statements of current policy.

The State Department’s 2023 report said Israel canceled permits for Palestinians from Gaza who were living in the West Bank, including day laborers and people who had lived and worked there for years. It also said Israel suspended all 18,600 permits for Gaza residents to enter Israel and later returned them to Gaza, and that the vast majority of Palestinian workers from the West Bank and Gaza were blocked from entering Israel. The report said the labor restrictions led to the immediate unemployment of approximately 13% of all employed Palestinians.[26] The State Department’s 2025 Investment Climate Statement said all Palestinian worker permits were suspended after October 7, 2023, and that Israel later allowed some permit holders to resume work in certain sectors. Citing the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, it estimated that 30,000 workers worked in Israel and settlements using permits in the fourth quarter of 2024.[27] The dates and definitions matter: that 2024 estimate is not equivalent to the earlier reports’ counts of all workers, permit holders, or workers across different areas.[27]

For decades, work permits in sectors such as construction and agriculture were based on quotas allocated administratively to Israeli sponsors, according to an INSS analysis. Sponsors could request permits for named Palestinian workers and commit to employing them; if dissatisfied, a sponsor could revoke a worker’s permit and use the quota to request a permit for somebody else.[28] The analysis says this arrangement gave employers or Palestinian intermediaries substantial control over workers’ access to permits and employment.[28]

In December 2016, the Israeli government decided to reform the work-permit system in construction and manufacturing. The reform canceled employer-specific quotas and shifted control to eligible veteran workers, who could contact registered employers and negotiate new terms. The INSS article describes a 60-day separation window for construction workers and a 14-day window for manufacturing workers.[28] Implementation in construction was announced in December 2020 and implementation in manufacturing and services in March 2021.[28]

An INSS analysis describes a parallel market in which brokers—usually Palestinians operating in the West Bank—connected workers with sponsors for a fee. It reports that in 2019 about 43,000 workers bought permits for roughly NIS 2,300 per month, generating total revenues of NIS 1.2 billion; it cites an estimate of NIS 427 million in net profits from the trade.[28] Roughly 75% of workers who paid for permits in the cited surveys said they used them to enter Israel and then worked for an employer other than the sponsor.[28] The analysis states that selling permits is illegal in Israel.[28]

The INSS account describes how visibly this market operated: it reproduces a September 2021 photograph of a Qalqilya office advertising “Entry permits to Israel of all types.”[28] The same analysis says permit trading declined by about 40% during the second-quarter 2020 COVID-19 lockdown and recovered in the second half of that year. It reports that about 40,000 workers bought permits in 2020 for NIS 2,440 per month, generating total revenues of NIS 1 billion.[28]

The preliminary evaluation found that the 2020–21 reforms had not produced a decline in the share of workers purchasing permits or in permit prices in the first half of 2021. It also said active permits reflecting registered employment relationships had not increased despite full utilization of the construction quota.[28] By late October 2021, about 10,000 workers had joined a smartphone app intended to match employers and Palestinian workers, but only employers could contact registered workers.[28] The analysis said the reform had not reduced permit trading or prices in its first seven months and suggested difficulty matching employers and workers may have limited the app’s effect; it recommended improving the app and enforcing the prohibition on permit trading.[28]

A 2023 Globes report described work permits as tied to a specific employer and said that, in practice, a worker needed the employer’s prior agreement to work. An Israel Builders Association representative described eligibility criteria as including a minimum age of 22, marriage with children, and Shin Bet security clearance. Bank of Israel researcher Haggay Etkes said the need to remain continuously employed could make construction workers reluctant to change jobs, despite the technical possibility of switching employers.[29] These are descriptions and views attributed to participants in the report, and should not be read as a single universal eligibility rule for every sector or permit category.[29]

The same Globes report described workers allegedly buying permits through fictitious employers, obtaining checkpoint access and then finding work elsewhere. Figures from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, processed by Etkes, counted 53,000 Palestinians on legal employment programs, 39,000 working illegally, and 58,000 who had purchased permits.[29] The report also recorded disagreement about the scale: a 2019 Bank of Israel study estimated that about 20,000 permit-holding workers—around 30% of Palestinian workers employed in Israel with permits—had bought permits illegally, while an Israel Builders Association representative estimated fictitious-employer trading at no more than about 5%.[29] The estimates use differing methods and populations, and the article does not reconcile them.[29]

The U.S. State Department’s 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report describes an employer-based permit system that ties workers to specific employers, with exceptions for Palestinian workers in construction and manufacturing. It says the arrangement can enable some employers to exploit workers in forced labor.[30] The report says NGOs considered reforms intended to let workers change employers insufficient and reported continued illicit fees charged by employers and middlemen; it also says third-party brokers charged Palestinian workers recruitment fees for Israeli work permits.[30] These are reported concerns and characterizations in the State Department report, not a claim that every employer or worker experiences the same conditions.[30]

Israeli authorities and other sources have presented movement controls as a response to security threats, while reports also describe effects on Palestinian mobility and access to services. A Washington Institute report on controls during the second intifada and its aftermath says the measures—including permits, checkpoints, roadblocks, and barriers—were established to address terrorism and protect Israelis. It also argues that they constrained Palestinian movement and the Palestinian Authority’s freedom of action and contributed to economic and territorial fragmentation.[12] The report is a dated account and does not establish rules in force today.[12]

The 2022 State Department report records Israel’s stated position that the barrier was built to prevent attacks and that movement restrictions responded to security concerns and attempted attacks. It also describes reported effects on employment, access to hospitals and schools, farmland, and family and religious life.[15] A 2023 report said Israel imposed significant movement restrictions within the West Bank and between the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel, citing security concerns and frequent attempted terrorist attacks; it also said Israeli authorities described the barrier as a means of preventing attacks by Palestinian terrorists.[18] These reports convey both the stated security rationale and reported consequences, without making those accounts identical in evidentiary status.[15][18]

The 2023 report said 85% of the unfinished barrier was inside the West Bank and that, after October 7, further restrictions significantly affected access to jobs, hospitals, and schools.[18] It also reported that Israeli forces sealed entrances to most Palestinian villages, towns, and cities in the West Bank after October 7 and imposed internal and external closures that prevented Palestinians from leaving for Israel, Jordan, or travel abroad.[18] In December, UNOCHA counted 49 new access and movement restrictions since October 7 and changes in the status of 100 of 645 pre-existing movement obstacles, according to the report; it said the restrictions disconnected communities and disrupted access to basic services and humanitarian aid.[18]

The Jerusalem Institute report describes restrictions and crossing arrangements as affecting daily links to work, education, health care, family, commerce, religious sites, and agricultural land.[11] The 2022 report’s Tulkarm example—140 permits granted out of almost 2,000 requests for an olive-harvest season—illustrates the scale of one reported application process, but it concerns that place, period, and attributed source rather than an overall approval rate.[15] Likewise, the 2021 report’s denial percentages and the 2023 harvest-season approval range concern different reporting and periods.[17][18]

Accounts also describe consequences for employers and workers when permits or quotas change. The former SodaStream manager’s account describes a period when he said former employees could not work at the company’s new Negev facility because the manufacturing quota was full, followed by a reported return of permits in May 2017.[22] The high-tech pilot report describes a separate permit path and variable checkpoint delays, even for workers with authorization.[21][21] These examples show distinct reported experiences and do not establish a uniform outcome for all industries or crossings.

Disputes about the permit regime concern its legal basis, security purpose, administrative operation, and effects. Oslo II’s provision that movement between West Bank communities should be “free and normal” is not the same claim as a description of later controls reported in particular contexts.[1] The agreement also preserved Israeli security powers and treated entry into Israel separately.[1] Subsequent reports describe rules and restrictions that varied by time, area, and type of travel.[5][12]

In 2009, the Jerusalem Post reported that the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and Moked for the Defense of the Individual argued that the seam-zone permit regime was illegal and discriminatory. ACRI attorney Limor Yehuda said applications required detailed requests and documentation and argued that proving land rights could impose a particular burden where land was not formally registered and local inheritance practices were relevant. She said permits, if granted, could be short-term and require repeated applications.[16] The report said the organizations had petitioned the High Court in 2003 to cancel the regime and that it had not yet ruled at the time of the 2009 article; Central Command chief Gadi Shamni said the army’s view differed.[16] This account records the petitioners’ arguments and the military’s disagreement, not a final adjudication of every seam-zone rule.[16]

The 2022 High Court decision described above concerned a petition to move or dismantle barrier sections and specific farmers’ grievances. It did not constitute a general ruling on the legality of every permit category or practice.[19] The Jerusalem Institute report also records both the State Attorney’s Office’s security characterization of the Jerusalem Envelope and residents’ concerns about the promised special permits and the operation of crossings.[11]

Reports of movement restrictions within the West Bank also differ in scope and emphasis. The Israeli government told the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that movement within the West Bank was not limited and that checkpoints were temporary responses to security incidents or intelligence; Mako described movement as generally fairly free while noting prohibited settlement routes, restrictions on entry to settlements, and episodic closures.[13][14] Other reports document permit requirements for specific roads and farmland.[6] State Department reports describe seam-zone residence and movement during closure periods.[5][8] These statements address different kinds of movement and different periods, and should not be treated as mutually interchangeable summaries of one fixed system.

The labor-permit system has its own contested questions. INSS describes brokers and illicit permit trading, while the 2023 Globes report records substantially different estimates of how many workers bought permits illegally.[28][29] The State Department’s trafficking report raises concerns that employer ties can enable exploitation and says NGOs considered reforms insufficient, while the INSS analysis evaluates reforms aimed at loosening employer control and reducing brokerage.[28][30] The reports support describing these as concerns and disagreements, not assigning one prevalence estimate to the entire system.

Finally, labor totals before and after October 7, 2023 vary because sources count different populations and periods. One INSS account reports approximately 165,000 workers, around 130,000 of them legal.[23] Another reports approximately 175,000 workers with and without permits.[24] A November 2023 report described a temporary exception for 8,000 workers after broader suspensions.[25] The 2025 Investment Climate Statement later estimated 30,000 permit-using workers in Israel and settlements during the fourth quarter of 2024.[27] These figures are time-bound and not directly comparable. They do not establish current permit policy or present-day totals.