Israeli Permit Regime in the Gaza Strip

The permit regime governs individual movement from Gaza through Israeli-controlled crossings and access to destinations reached by way of Israel. It is not a single authorization: the documents describe separate arrangements for medical treatment and companions, commerce, work, travel abroad, family and personal matters, and other exceptional purposes. Erez is identified as the crossing for people moving between Gaza and Israel, while Kerem Shalom has been used for goods and, in later medical evacuations, as a route toward Egypt.[6][7]

The system also sits within a broader framework of crossing controls. The 1994 Gaza–Jericho arrangements subjected entry by Gaza residents to Israeli laws and procedures, and reserved Israeli authority to close crossings or limit entry for security and safety reasons. Later policy made movement dependent on the purpose of travel, documentation, permits, screening, and conditions at the crossings. The requirements and practical availability of permits have varied by period and category.[1][8]

A permit quota, a permit actually issued, a valid authorization, and a crossing movement are different measures. Reports give figures for each of these, often for different years and categories; they should not be treated as interchangeable totals. Nor does a report about one type of permit establish the eligibility rules for another.[9][10]

Movement was affected not only by Israeli decisions. The sources also describe Hamas and Palestinian Authority roles in processing or restricting departures, and Egypt’s role at Rafah. Thus, the Israeli permit regime is a major component of Gaza’s movement system, but not a complete account of every barrier or authority involved.[11][12]

The 1994 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area established important principles for movement between Gaza and Israel. Gaza residents entering Israel were to comply with Israeli entry laws and procedures, carry the agreed identity card, and provide additional documentation specified by Israel and communicated to the Palestinian Authority through the Civil Affairs Committee. Passage was to occur through one or more of Erez, Nahal Oz, and Sufa. The agreement also reserved a right to close crossings or prohibit or limit entry by residents and vehicles for security and safety reasons.[1]

The agreement did not establish a fixed numerical employment quota. Instead, Israel and the Palestinian Authority were to agree on procedures for distributing employment permits, while each side retained authority to determine the extent and conditions of labor movement into its area. Employment was to be arranged through the receiving side’s employment service and governed by its legislation. The text also said the parties would attempt to maintain normal labor movement, and provided for notification and discussion if either temporarily suspended it.[13]

An INSS historical account describes movement from Gaza to Israel and the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — as largely unrestricted during the first two decades of Israeli occupation, with restrictions accumulating from the early 1990s.[2] Separate INSS accounts give a sense of the scale of work movement: one reports 46,000 Gazans employed in Israel in 1987, while another says that at the 1986 peak, 46 percent of Gaza’s workforce was employed there. These are distinct measures and years, rather than contradictory estimates of one statistic.[3][9]

A change in the permit structure is dated to 1991 in a later historical review, which says Israel replaced a general exit permit with individual work permits.[14] An INSS account identifies the second intifada, beginning in 2000, as a subsequent turning point. Employment in Israel had reached 26,000 in 2000 according to the INSS work-movement history, but declined after violence began; the U.S. State Department reported that Israel stopped issuing almost all Palestinian-worker permits after violence erupted in October 2000.[3][15]

The State Department’s 2000 and 2001 reports described a wider permit requirement, dating it to March 1993, for Gaza and West Bank residents seeking to enter Israel and Jerusalem. Permits covered work, visits, study, and medical care. The reports said that permits could be difficult to obtain, that some applicants were denied without explanation, and that the available appeal process was inadequate. During comprehensive closures, even people holding valid work permits could be prevented from entering; the 2000 report recorded 88 days of tightened comprehensive closure in that year, compared with 15 in 1999.[15][16]

The Gaza–West Bank safe-passage arrangements were another strand of movement policy. A route announced in October 1999 ran from Erez through Ashkelon, Plugot, Beit Guvrin, and Tarkumiyeh. Applicants applied through the Palestinian Authority, which sent names to Israel; the announcement said approved lists would be returned within two working days. Approved travelers used magnetic cards and personal permits, with separate documentation required for private vehicles.[17]

The southern safe-passage route opened in November 1999 to facilitate work, study, and visits. By the end of November 2000, the State Department-hosted report said 15,000 Palestinians had been approved to use it and 2,900 applicants had been refused; a northern route contemplated in the Interim Agreement had not been established. The route closed in October 2000 after the outbreak of violence and remained closed through 2001. The closure interrupted work, study, and visits, and prevented Gaza students from reaching West Bank universities; some students already there could not return to Gaza over the summer.[16]

The 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access and the Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing followed Israel’s disengagement from Gaza. The agreements addressed movement of people and exports, called for continuous operation of passages, and envisaged bus and truck convoys between Gaza and the West Bank, with security arrangements. The text records commitments, not proof that they were fully implemented. Another account says Rafah and Kerem Shalom were to operate under European Union supervision, while a ministerial committee authorized the defense minister to decide when crossings would open or close.[18][19]

After Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, movement restrictions intensified. The Congressional Research Service says Israel and Egypt maintained strict control over crossings and that Israel formalized its closure regime in September 2007 by declaring Gaza a hostile entity. The stated Israeli rationale described in the CRS account was to prevent Hamas from obtaining materials for rebuilding military capabilities. Restrictions affected movement of people and goods by air, land, and sea, while Egypt controlled its land border.[4]

The Israeli government’s 2022 follow-up submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights describes a September 19, 2007 security-cabinet resolution as limiting movement into and out of Gaza through Israeli territory, subject to humanitarian exceptions, and presents the policy as based on security considerations. The submission also states Israel’s legal position that it has no general duty to ensure Gaza residents’ welfare, while describing its obligations as arising from the continuing armed conflict. Those are the government’s positions, not uncontested conclusions about Gaza’s legal status or the applicable law.[20]

The sources differ in describing when work entry stopped completely. An INSS study says work movement stopped with the 2005 disengagement and was unofficially renewed in 2019; a Globes review says Gaza-worker entry stopped completely in 2006. Other reporting describes the broad collapse of movement after the 2007 takeover, while also documenting later permit categories. The material therefore does not support a single uncontested date for the end of all work-related entry.[3][14]

The 2005 movement-and-access commitments were not a substitute for the later permit system. A CRS overview says the agreement was never fully implemented. Britannica reports that Israel declared Gaza a hostile entity in autumn 2007, approved sanctions that included border closures and restricted imports, and broadened those measures in January 2008 following sustained rocket attacks into southern Israel. It also reports that thousands of Gazans began crossing into Israel for work in 2019, following an easing that began in 2018.[4][21]

A COGAT authorization document updated in August 2020 describes the general application channel for Gaza residents seeking entry into Israel. Applications ordinarily passed from the Palestinian Civil Committee, responsible to the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Civil Affairs in Ramallah, to the Gaza Coordination and Liaison Administration. The Palestinian committee screened and prioritized requests; Israeli authorities assessed applications against relevant criteria and political, security, and strategic considerations, including individualized security checks and supporting documents. The document says Gaza residents had no vested right of entry.[22]

The categories listed in that document included medical treatment, accompanying or visiting patients, medical training, commerce, senior businesspeople, family reunification, travel abroad, weddings, funerals, legal matters, journalism, conferences, work-related meetings, and exceptional personal needs. The breadth of categories did not mean that entry was automatic: applications were subject to documentation requirements and Israeli review, and their availability could change with policy and security conditions.[22]

Medical requests required medical documentation and security evaluation, with the Palestinian health coordinator submitting requests through the Palestinian Civil Committee. The document described punch-card authorizations for recurring care. For complicated treatment, including continuous chemotherapy, an individual permit lasting three to six months, including lodging, could be considered. These provisions describe the system presented in the 2020 document and do not establish that the same procedures remained in force later.[22]

The 2020 document also set out travel-abroad arrangements. The general route was through the Allenby Bridge in escorted groups or shuttles; departure through Ben Gurion Airport was generally unavailable, with a monthly quota of 20 exceptions. Listed purposes for Allenby travel included medical treatment, academic study, conferences, and long-term stays abroad. Applications involved security checks and supporting papers; applicants seeking long-term stays were required to commit not to return to Gaza through Israel or the West Bank for at least three months.[22]

A 2010 COGAT policy document said Israel would streamline permits for humanitarian and medical purposes and for employees of Israeli-recognized international aid organizations. It framed the policy as providing relief to civilians while preventing weapons and materials that could be used by Hamas from entering Gaza, and said further facilitation would be considered as conditions improved. It did not provide a complete application process, eligibility list, quota, or processing deadline.[23]

Accounts of the process also describe roles for Palestinian authorities. The 2019 State Department report said Hamas required exit permits for Palestinians leaving through Erez and sometimes prevented departures based on travel purpose or to coerce payment of taxes and fines. The 2022 report said Hamas sometimes prevented people from leaving for similar reasons, while the Palestinian Authority sometimes refused to issue passports on security grounds. It also reported that Hamas began collecting applicant names for PA submission to COGAT, before Hamas authorities raided the PA Ministry of Civil Affairs’ Gaza office on May 30, seizing computers and questioning staff; the office later resumed processing requests.[11][10]

These separate administrative roles matter when interpreting a denied, delayed, or unprocessed application. A Palestinian committee might screen or transmit a request, Israeli authorities conducted the Israeli permit review, and other authorities could affect travel documents or departure. The sources do not show that every application followed an identical path or that these bodies shared the same authority over the ultimate Israeli entry decision.[11][22]

Work-related movement has been among the most visible and frequently changing parts of the system. INSS traces a long decline from the high levels of the 1970s and 1980s: 46,000 Gazans worked in Israel in 1987, while its account records 38,000 in 1991–1993 and a few thousand in 1995–1996. The number rose to 26,000 in 2000 before falling amid violence. The same study describes work entry as stopping with the 2005 disengagement and being unofficially renewed in 2019.[3]

A 2001 State Department report said employers needed government permits to hire workers from the territories. Workers were generally employed daily and were not authorized to remain overnight unless they worked shifts. After violence began in October 2000, the government stopped issuing almost all Palestinian-worker permits, and Palestinians working without valid permits could be arrested. The report also described closure measures that could cancel or override otherwise valid authorizations.[15]

After the 2007 Hamas takeover, entry for work was sharply constrained. In December 2017, Ynet reported that 551 Gaza businesspeople held daily entry permits to Israel and only eight Gaza residents held work permits. The report said 300–400 people crossed daily, most for medical treatment in Israel or East Jerusalem, alongside aid workers, diplomats, and businesspeople. It described security interviews and phone checks at Erez. A separate Globes account reported 31,642 permits issued to Gaza residents in 2015, 17,902 in 2016, and 5,490 in 2017, while also giving monthly average Erez exit figures and noting that valid merchant permits fell from more than 3,500 at the end of 2015 to 551 in December 2017. These counts refer to different measures and cannot be read as a single continuous series.[24][25]

Work-related entry began to resume in stages. Britannica describes thousands of Gazans being allowed to cross for work in 2019, after an easing that began in 2018. An INSS study says Israel began increasing merchant permits in 2019, from 3,000 to 5,000 in July and then from 5,000 to 7,000 in early 2020. Some permits officially labeled “merchant permits” were used for salaried work. Worker entry was banned at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.[21][3]

The categories used in this period could obscure the distinction between commercial travel and employment. A Globes review says that after the 2014 Gaza war Israel began issuing trader permits formally intended for merchants and businesspeople but also used in practice by day laborers. It says an “economic needs” exit-permit category appeared in late 2021 and that 10,000 such permits were added in January 2022 as the number of trader permits was reduced. The article quotes an immigration lawyer describing “economic needs” as a hybrid category, and notes that the authorization’s label and associated employment rights were disputed.[14]

In October 2021, Israel announced an increase from 7,000 to 10,000 permits, with a large share intended for salaried work, according to INSS. The study notes that some permits referred to as merchant permits enabled work in Israel. A December 2021 INSS account contrasted this partly unofficial arrangement with the West Bank work-license system, which it said was supervised by Israel’s Population and Immigration Authority, and argued that formal regulation of Gaza employment should address social benefits and workers’ rights.[3]

The permit expansion reflected both employment and policy objectives. A Times of Israel report described the number of Gaza permits as rising from roughly 2,000–3,000 toward the end of Benjamin Netanyahu’s fifth government in 2021, to 5,000 and then 10,000 under the Bennett–Lapid government, and to nearly 20,000 after Netanyahu returned to office in January 2023. It reported that Hamas was included in discussions about raising permit numbers and quoted Israeli officials describing permits as a means of preserving calm, while wages helped families purchase food and basic goods.[26]

In March 2022, the government decided to allocate 20,000 permits for Gaza residents—12,000 for construction and 8,000 for agriculture—according to INSS. A separate Globes review gives a quota of 20,050, including 50 permits for services at crossings, and distinguishes the quota from the 11,501 valid permits Gisha counted in August 2022. The State Department reported that the announced target had not been reached by year’s end: as of November, 15,500 had been allotted and 14,551 issued. These figures describe differing dates and stages of allocation, rather than conflicting counts of one identical group.[27][10]

A separate Ynet report in September 2022 said the defense minister announced 1,500 additional work and trade permits, bringing the reported total to 17,000, with further increase to 20,000 planned. It said the measure depended on security assessments and continued calm. A Times of Israel report similarly described a September 2022 increase to a reported total of 17,000. The figures should be understood as dated reports of announced totals, not as proof of the number of permits ultimately in use at a later date.[28][29]

The regulated employment system began on August 1, 2022, according to INSS. It moved from an unregulated market toward formal work permits and employers in construction and agriculture. The account says permits were for married Gaza residents aged 25 and older who passed a security check. Employers were to report working days and hours, withhold taxes and National Insurance contributions, and make pension payments. At the time of the study, about 11,000 Gaza workers had entry permits and were employed informally; the distinction between workers already permitted and the later regulated arrangement is important.[9]

The transition followed reported informal payments. In an INSS survey of 1,000 Palestinian workers conducted in May and June 2022, about one-third of surveyed Gaza workers said they paid for entry permits, with an average payment of NIS 2,830; a small minority said they paid again in later months. The study says workers had previously entered Israel through “economic need permits,” distinguishing this arrangement from the work-permit system introduced in August.[9]

Formal regulation also raised concerns about employment conditions. INSS warned that employers’ control of permits could weaken workers’ bargaining power and expose them to permit fees. The study presented these as risks of the arrangement, not as evidence that every employer charged fees or exploited that control. The aim of regulation, in the study’s account, was to establish formal employers and obligations relating to wages, tax, insurance, and pensions.[9]

Israeli officials and commentators also described work permits as an economic and security-policy instrument. A September 2022 Ynet report contrasted an estimated daily wage of NIS 60 in Gaza with about NIS 400 for a Gaza worker in Israel and characterized permits as both an economic measure and a lever tied to security and calm. A 2022 Globes account described the policy as an economic card directed toward Hamas, estimated a substantial income flow from the permits, and reported competing arguments about whether economic relaxation or its suspension would better influence Hamas. These are attributed descriptions and interpretations, not settled measures of the policy’s effects.[28][30]

The reported quota and the status of any proposed increases remained contested in 2023. In August, the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center relayed a Kan 11 report that Israel froze the quota at 18,000 rather than raising it to 20,000, attributing the decision to Hamas involvement in attacks in Judea and Samaria and events near the Gaza security fence. Gaza workers’ union chairman Sami al-Amsi disputed the account that Israel had previously announced an increase and criticized how the policy was presented. A separate Globes review cited figures for September 28, 2023, of an 18,500 “economic needs” quota and 3,500 trader permits, combined as 22,000; it cautioned that quotas did not show that every authorization was issued or used, and that the mechanism was not transparent.[31][14]

The prewar total is reported inconsistently. Sources cite figures including 18,000, 18,500, nearly 20,000, and a combined quota of 22,000 when trader permits are included. These may represent different categories, dates, and definitions—such as economic-needs authorizations, trader permits, quotas, or active permits—and cannot be consolidated into a single definitive count from the available material.[14][32]

Medical travel has been a central exception within a system that otherwise sharply restricted movement. The 2020 COGAT document listed permits for treatment unavailable in Gaza, accompanying or visiting patients, medical training, and recurring care. It required medical documentation and security review, and described longer individual authorizations as possible in complex cases. A 2010 government policy likewise promised to streamline permits for medical and humanitarian travel and for staff of recognized international aid organizations, without setting out a full procedure or guarantee of approval.[22][23]

The State Department’s 2012 report said people allowed to enter or leave Gaza through Erez were largely limited to humanitarian cases, although some business travelers were also admitted. Citing World Health Organization figures, it reported an 85.1 percent approval rate for medical exit requests from January through November 2012 and an average of 671 medical patients crossing each month. It also said the number of business travelers granted permits increased from 500 in 2011 to 1,000 by August 2012, with 120 allowed to cross daily, compared with 100 in 2011.[33]

The numerical record varies by year and by how applications or crossings are counted. COGAT’s 2010 report said 17,924 patients and accompanying individuals were permitted to leave Gaza that year for care in Israel, the West Bank, or abroad, a reported 70 percent increase over 2009. In a 2020-era medical-permit account, JCFA reported 4,932 patient permits in 2006, 7,176 in 2007, and 8,796 in the first six months of 2008; its table gave approval rates of 90.2 percent, 81.5 percent, and 66 percent respectively. The account said WHO had verified COGAT data through December 2007 but had not yet confirmed the 2008 figures.[34][35]

The State Department’s 2022 report recorded serious difficulties alongside the continued use of medical permits. It said some patients seeking treatment unavailable in Gaza were denied permits on security grounds. Citing Physicians for Human Rights, it reported that 32 percent of medical-permit requests for Palestinian minors in Gaza were rejected in 2021, nearly double the 2020 rate. It also reported, citing media accounts, that seven Palestinians, including three children, died in 2022 because they could not leave Gaza for health care.[10]

A 2022 news report, citing World Health Organization data, counted 20,411 applications for patients to leave Gaza for medical care that year, of which about 34 percent were denied. It described a process in which patients submitted medical documentation and a Gaza Health Ministry permit through the Palestinian Authority’s Civil Affairs Committee. The Authority determined whether it would fund treatment, after which the committee sent the applicant’s information to Israel for security review and a decision on entry. Some decisions were explicit denials; other requests were unanswered until the appointment date had passed.[36]

For 2023, the State Department reported that WHO data showed Israeli authorities rejected or delayed 33 percent of medical-permit requests for Gazans; the report gave a 29 percent refusal rate for Palestinian children in Gaza in 2022. These figures concern applications and delays, not necessarily the proportion of all patients who crossed, and should not be conflated with aggregate departures that may include companions or nonmedical travelers.[5]

Medical decisions brought security screening into direct tension with the need for timely care. A JCFA article reports that Physicians for Human Rights-Israel argued that security checks could cause life-endangering delays and recommended assigning a doctor to the Erez team. It also reports COGAT spokesman Peter Lerner’s statement that patients were not moved to Erez for evacuation until Gaza physicians considered them stable, and the Coordinator’s stated policy of providing treatment, in Israel or elsewhere, even to people considered security risks. The same article says the Israel Security Agency decided how to handle cases involving critically ill patients suspected of posing security risks, not necessarily in consultation with a doctor. These accounts reflect differing positions on screening, medical judgment, and delay.[35]

A JCFA article says COGAT reported that four out of five requests for permits for treatment in Israel were accepted. It says requests were typically rejected when an applicant had a security background that barred entry or when the Palestinian Authority preferred treatment in Egypt or Gaza. The article also reports that during the 2014 Operation Protective Edge, 268 ambulances transported patients into Israel for urgent treatment. These figures and explanations are the account’s reporting and should be read with its stated institutional perspective.[19]

Humanitarian travel included more than treatment. The COGAT category list included companions, family reunification, funerals, weddings, legal matters, journalism, conferences, and exceptional personal needs. A 2015 Jerusalem Post report described families divided between Gaza and the West Bank seeking permission for exceptional occasions such as weddings, funerals, or a critically ill relative; it said applications could take weeks and that some applicants missed such events while waiting. The account also listed patients, merchants, national sports teams, students traveling abroad, and exceptional humanitarian cases among categories for which entry could be allowed after the 2007 restrictions.[22][37]

The 2019 State Department report said that restrictions could impede travel to Jerusalem for visa interviews, to Jordan via the Allenby Bridge, and to the West Bank for work or education. It reported that, according to the Israeli government, 40 percent of Gaza exit requests to Jordan and 56 percent of requests to Israel and the West Bank were approved that year. It also said authorities often denied or did not respond to Erez applications and largely limited entry and exit to humanitarian cases and permits for businesspeople and day laborers.[38]

Educational travel was particularly constrained. The State Department’s 2019 report said the permit system restricted movement from Gaza to the West Bank for higher education, that higher-education contacts said permits for Gaza students to attend West Bank universities were seldom granted, and that the Supreme Court continued, with few exceptions, to uphold a ban imposed in 2000 on those students. Delays could cause students to miss exchange-program travel or overseas enrollment dates.[38]

The available evidence also records medical departures during the war and after the general permit system changed. A June 2024 report said six children with cancer were being prepared to leave Gaza through Kerem Shalom for treatment in Egypt. It also said military officials reported that Palestinian patients and people with humanitarian needs who had the necessary permits left, but it did not identify the permit issuer or the applicable eligibility criteria.[7]

A COGAT document on medical evacuations to third countries describes a separate mechanism for Gaza residents with complex conditions for which treatment is unavailable in Gaza and for whom travel is medically feasible. A requesting state or recognized international organization must send an official request; the destination country must provide written acceptance, and patients and companions undergo security screening. The document sets coordination periods—normally two weeks to submit patient lists, 48 hours for coordination inside Gaza, and 72 hours for coordination through Israel—and states that all requests remain subject to COGAT approval.[39]

Reporting on 2025 wartime evacuations demonstrates why totals require careful definition. A Times of Israel account says that after Rafah closed in May 2024, evacuations increasingly went through Israeli territory and Kerem Shalom. COGAT counted about 1,500 departures in the first nine months after June 2024 and about 2,500 from mid-March through July 2025, but those totals included patients, companions, and some people leaving for nonmedical reasons. WHO separately counted 399 patients during the latter period, less than three percent of the 14,800 patients it said urgently needed evacuation.[36]

The same reporting records disagreement over whether the process was becoming easier. Israeli officials described an easing of medical evacuation, while a Physicians for Human Rights representative disputed that characterization. The article also recounts the case of Aisha, a 35-year-old woman with a degenerative disease, and her sister-in-law and caregiver, Najm. Their application was submitted in November 2023; although a hospital in Belgium had agreed to receive Aisha by March 2025, the pair left only on July 30, 2025, after the article says Gisha contacted COGAT and received confirmation of no objection. They traveled with Najm’s five children through Kerem Shalom and Ramon Airport and onward via Romania to Norway; Najm’s husband, despite holding a U.S. student visa, remained in Gaza.[36]

Individual permits did not guarantee that a crossing would be open or that an authorization could be used on a particular day. The 1994 agreement reserved the right to close crossings or limit entry for security and safety reasons. The State Department’s 2000 and 2001 reports described partial and comprehensive external closures under which permits could be cancelled, including valid work permits. In 2000, the southern safe-passage route closed after violence began; in October 2000, the Gaza–West Bank route was closed and did not reopen during 2001.[1][16]

The State Department’s 2022 report documents several shorter closures and their consequences. Erez was closed from April 22 to 25 after rockets were launched from Gaza, temporarily preventing workers from entering Israel or returning home. Crossings were closed for nearly two weeks in May after an attack in Elad and for a week in August amid Israeli concerns about a possible Palestinian Islamic Jihad retaliation. The report said the closures disrupted work, medical travel, supply chains, and humanitarian goods.[10]

During the August 2022 closure, fuel trucks could not enter for more than a week and Gaza’s power plant shut down. Residents were left with four hours of electricity daily, a situation the report said jeopardized medical services, water desalination, and wastewater treatment. These effects followed from a broader closure of crossings and supplies, rather than from the refusal of any one individual permit.[10]

Reports describe the movement restrictions as affecting travel for work, education, medical care, and personal reasons, as well as the delivery of goods. A 2014 Ynet account said average monthly entries from Gaza into Israel had been about 500,000 before the second intifada began in 2000, compared with an average of 4,400 per month in the four years preceding the article; it said most of the later entries were by patients, companions, and businesspeople. These reported monthly figures refer to crossing movements, not necessarily unique individuals or permits issued.[6]

The system also affected people holding permits who were already in Israel when policy changed. After the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, the State Department reported that Israel suspended all 18,600 Gaza-resident permits to enter Israel, eventually returning permit holders to Gaza, and cancelled virtually all permits for medical care or work, with no new permits granted through the end of 2023. The report describes the pre-October 7 Erez categories as humanitarian cases, medical patients, businesspeople, and day laborers.[5]

A Times of Israel report says Israel rescinded Gaza residents’ work rights three days after the October 7 attack and records a November 2 security-cabinet statement that “There will be no more Palestinian workers from Gaza.” It reported that hundreds of workers detained in Israel since the attack were sent back to Gaza through Kerem Shalom in November.[32] A State Department report says all Palestinian worker permits were suspended after October 7, 2023, while later allowing some permit holders to resume work in certain sectors; its estimate of 30,000 Palestinian workers with permits in Israel and the settlements in the fourth quarter of 2024 is not Gaza-specific and cannot establish the number of Gaza permit holders.[40]

Sources differ in their wording about Erez’s physical condition after October 7. The State Department’s 2023 report says it was destroyed by Hamas, while the Congressional Research Service describes it as damaged in the attacks and closed. Both sources describe it as closed, but the bundle does not resolve the difference in characterization.[5][4]

The permit system has had significance both as a mechanism for individualized movement and as a way to regulate the scale of access to Israel and routes through Israeli territory.[2][3] It has enabled some medical treatment, business activity, employment, and travel, while the rules, quotas, closures, screening, and delays have limited or interrupted those activities.[10] The material documents changes in both directions: restrictions tightened during periods of violence and after Hamas’s 2007 takeover, while later easing and work-permit expansions remained conditional and reversible.

Work permits have been presented in the sources as a source of income for Gaza households and as a means of influencing conditions and security. A 2022 profile described Ibrahim Slaieh, a Khan Younis resident with a six-month permit to work at a grocery store in Beersheba. He said he brought home about $75 per workday, compared with roughly 30 shekels, or about $10, for comparable long hours in Gaza; the article described his routine as three weeks in Israel followed by one week in Gaza. It also reported that his father lost his job when Israel largely shuttered the border in 2007.[41]

The employment arrangements also raised questions about the legal and practical status of workers whose permissions were called merchant or economic-needs permits rather than work permits. INSS argued for formal regulation to address social benefits and workers’ rights, and warned that employer control could weaken bargaining power. Globes described the economic-needs category as a hybrid and reported dispute over the rights associated with it. These sources show that permit terminology was connected to the employment framework, not merely a matter of labels.[9][14]

The security rationale is prominent in Israeli government and security-service accounts. The 1994 agreement expressly reserved powers to close crossings for security and safety.[1] Israeli government accounts describe later restrictions as measures to address security conditions and deny Hamas materials for military capabilities.[4] A 2007 Israel Security Agency account said entry in special humanitarian circumstances, including life-saving treatment, could be permitted when security considerations allowed, while alleging that some applicants used false medical referrals to obtain permits. That alleged exploitation reflects the security service’s assessment and is not a rule applicable to every medical application.[42]

Other reporting emphasizes the consequences for civilian movement and access to services. The State Department’s 2001 report describes permits being denied and closures interrupting movement.[15] Its 2022 report records medical and work disruptions associated with permit decisions and crossing closures.[10] The 2019 report documents impediments to education and other travel.[38] These effects coexist in the sources with Israeli security explanations; the factual record does not make every security decision or every reported consequence interchangeable.

The political and legal characterization of the broader restrictions is contested. A Ynet explainer says Israel preferred “closure,” while Hamas called for the “lifting of the blockade,” and reports that international organizations argued Israel remained an occupying power because of the closure and that collective sanctions violated the Geneva Conventions. These are attributed legal and political positions, not an adjudication of the dispute.[6] The Congressional Research Service describes a closure regime and reports the Israeli security rationale.[4] Israel’s 2022 UN committee submission presents the government’s legal position on its obligations and control.[20]

Restrictions and their effects were not attributable to one authority alone. State Department reporting describes Israeli decisions concerning Erez permits and closures, Hamas restrictions on some departures, Palestinian Authority roles in passports and application transmission, and Egyptian controls at Rafah. Treating every impediment as an Israeli permit denial would therefore misstate the source record; conversely, the existence of other authorities does not erase the distinct Israeli permit requirements for entry through Israel.[11][12]

The sources also offer different explanations for changes in permit volume. They refer to security conditions, the prevention of attacks or military rebuilding, economic relief, incentives for calm, pressure on Hamas, and Palestinian Authority handling of applications. For example, a 2017 Globes report attributed a decline in permits partly to PA officials not forwarding requests, while reporting Israeli sources’ claims about security concerns and Hamas exploitation; the article questioned whether the PA could exert economic pressure without Israeli cooperation. These remain attributed, contested explanations rather than a single established cause.[25]

The evidence is time-bound. The latest specific report in the bundle about Gaza work quotas is from August 2023.[31] Later material addresses suspension after October 7 and medical evacuation procedures through 2025.[36] The 2025 State Department estimate of Palestinian workers with permits covers Israel and the settlements collectively and does not give a separate Gaza count.[40] The sources therefore do not establish the general Gaza permit regime or its work quota as of October 22, 2026.