Israeli Direct Action Against Aid Delivery to Gaza

The phrase covers several kinds of action rather than one unified policy or actor: Israeli government decisions about whether and how aid may enter, military controls and operations affecting convoys, civilian efforts to obstruct deliveries, and maritime enforcement against vessels seeking to reach Gaza. Their stated purposes, responsible actors, and consequences differ and should be considered separately.[1][2]

Since October 2023, aid has generally been transported, stored, and distributed by UN agencies and other humanitarian organizations, while Israeli authorities have controlled or influenced entry and security procedures. Aid routes have included Kerem Shalom, Rafah, Kissufim, Gate 96, and Erez East and West. After a short closure following October 7, aid flows resumed on October 21, 2023.[1]

Disputes concern how much aid entered, where delays occurred, whether restrictions were justified by security or hostage negotiations, and how much assistance reached civilians. COGAT and OCHA published persistently different totals, partly because COGAT counted shipments from all sources and crossings while OCHA counted aid registered by UN representatives at crossings. Israeli officials emphasized security, looting, and distribution problems; humanitarian officials also cited inspections, movement restrictions, crossing schedules, and checkpoint delays.[1][3]

A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs account says Israel instituted a naval blockade of Gaza in 2007 and, beginning in January 2009, directed vessels carrying humanitarian supplies to Ashdod for inspection, after which permitted goods could be sent to Gaza by land. This is the source’s account of Israeli policy and legal rationale rather than an independent legal finding.[4]

On May 30, 2010, six ships sailed from Northern Cyprus toward Gaza. Israel told the organizers that the ships would not be permitted to enter Gaza and offered to inspect their cargoes at Ashdod and transfer humanitarian goods by land, with a third party such as the UN invited to coordinate. The organizers rejected the proposal. On May 31, Israeli naval commandos intercepted the flotilla in international waters about 80 miles from the Israeli coast and boarded the Mavi Marmara.[5]

The JCPA account reports that nine people aboard the Mavi Marmara were killed and that 53 activists and seven Israeli commandos were wounded. It also reproduces international criticism, including a UN Security Council call for an impartial investigation and sustained humanitarian flows, while presenting arguments in support of the blockade and interception. The legality and proportionality of the operation remain contested in the material.[5]

The source record contains discrepancies: one JCPA publication lists 718 participants from 37 countries, while another lists 712 from 34. The flotilla article reports nine deaths aboard the Mavi Marmara, while the Security Council statement it quotes refers to at least ten civilians killed without explaining the difference.[5][6]

Israeli maritime interceptions continued in 2025. In June, Israeli forces took control of the Gaza-bound Madleen and detained its 12 activists; the boat intended to deliver a symbolic quantity of aid. A separate brief account described the Israeli Navy diverting a boat carrying Greta Thunberg to Ashdod.[7][8] In October, the Navy intercepted the Global Sumud Flotilla. Organizers said all 42 vessels carried humanitarian aid, while Israel’s Foreign Ministry said none of the 40 vessels it referenced did; the ministry said the passengers were safe and being taken to Ashdod before departure to Europe.[9]

After the October 7, 2023 attack, Israel cut off food, water, electricity, and fuel to Gaza. Under U.S. pressure, it agreed on October 16 to allow water and medicine to enter through Egypt; Rafah opened on October 21, when 35 aid trucks entered. Israel said food and medicine shipments were inspected and that deliveries would stop if Hamas took them. One truck was refused after inspectors reportedly found oxygen concentrators, described as capable of aerating tunnels, hidden among boxes of cookies.[10]

Israeli officials maintained that there was no quantitative limit on aid and emphasized inspection capacity. In March 2024, COGAT official Colonel Elad Goren said 44 trucks an hour could be inspected at Kerem Shalom and Nitzana and argued that the principal obstacle was on the Gaza side, where aid organizations received and distributed supplies.[11] COGAT also said security inspections occurred only at Kerem Shalom and Nitzana, with checks at Allenby and Ashdod constituting quick scans.[3]

UN humanitarian coordinator Jamie McGoldrick gave a different account. He said Israeli movement restrictions regularly prevented convoys from reaching northern Gaza, weekly crossing closures constrained deliveries, and convoys were routinely delayed or turned back at IDF checkpoints. He described the system as “underperforming, over-engineered” and said some shipments were inspected and reloaded more than once. COGAT rejected his description and said the holdup was not on the Israeli side.[3]

On April 7, 2024, Israel announced measures including temporarily opening Erez to supplies arriving from Ashdod, increasing daily traffic through Allenby, extending operating hours at Kerem Shalom and Nitzana, adding scanners and staff, permitting 20 bakeries in northern Gaza, and restoring the water line from Nahal Oz.[12] On April 9, N12 reported that 1,209 trucks had entered over three days—322, 419, and 468—and described a route near Be’eri for trucks heading directly to northern Gaza and the expected use of Ashdod port.[13]

In May 2024, Israel closed Kerem Shalom after Hamas fired rockets at Israeli soldiers near the crossing, killing four. Kerem Shalom was then the main humanitarian-aid route; the closure coincided with Israel’s operation in Rafah and its forces taking control of the Rafah crossing. The stated trigger for the closure is distinct from its consequences for aid movement.[14]

Israeli civilians and protest groups also sought to stop or delay Gaza-bound deliveries. Reports described demonstrators blocking roads and crossings, damaging shipments, and moving protests after authorities protected convoys or declared areas closed. These actions were separate from government entry policy and IDF operations.[15][16]

On May 6, 2024, Tzav 9 activists blocked roads along a convoy’s route from Jordan. At Latrun Junction, trucks were held for about four hours and goods were damaged or thrown onto the road. Police said six people were arrested and that officers and security forces removed the blockades. Tzav 9 said it opposed aid deliveries while hostages remained captive.[17]

The U.S. State Department said individuals from Tzav 9 repeatedly obstructed aid convoys for months along a route from Jordan through the West Bank—known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria—sometimes violently damaging trucks and dumping aid onto roads. It said members looted and set fire to two trucks near Hebron on May 13, 2024.[18] Tzav 9 leaders disputed responsibility for the physical damage, and police reportedly arrested four people associated with the initial looting.[19]

The State Department designated Tzav 9 on June 14, 2024, under Executive Order 14115, stating that the group had engaged in actions threatening peace, security, or stability in Judea and Samaria.[18][20] In a separate May 13 briefing about trucks blocked and damaged at Tarqumiyah, spokesperson Vedant Patel said the department had raised the incident with Israeli officials, but the briefing did not identify the protesters or establish their affiliation.[21]

A Congressional Research Service report cited a May 2024 State Department assessment that numerous Israeli actions had delayed or negatively affected aid, including encouragement by some Israeli officials of civilian protesters blocking or attacking convoys. It also recorded the Israeli position that Israel was not limiting aid and that delays reflected security, looting, and UN distribution problems.[2] A House committee document separately reproduced reporting that protesters tried to block trucks at Kerem Shalom because they believed the aid would reach Hamas; UN officials denied the accusation and called for more aid.[22]

After Executive Order 14115 was revoked on January 20, 2025, OFAC removed the West Bank sanctions program and all persons designated under it, including Tzav 9, from the sanctions list on January 24.[23] Protest activity continued: Maariv reported disruptions on routes to Kerem Shalom on October 17, 2025, and a JNS report dated October 22, 2026, said activists blocked aid trucks before police intervened.[24][25]

Several incidents involved Israeli forces and aid convoys or distribution sites. On April 1, 2024, an Israeli airstrike in Deir al-Balah killed seven World Central Kitchen workers. WCK said the convoy had coordinated its movements with the military and that staff traveled in two armored vehicles bearing the organization’s logo; it suspended operations in the area.[26]

The IDF investigation found that forces misidentified WCK vehicles as Hamas vehicles and mistakenly believed armed Hamas operatives were present. It concluded that the attack could have been prevented and identified serious errors in identification, authorization, and decision-making, including firing contrary to orders. Two officers were dismissed and other commanders reprimanded.[27] A later report said the military would not open a criminal investigation or take further action because it concluded that the commanders’ decisions did not cross the criminal threshold.[28]

WCK resumed operations at the end of April.[29] The strike also disrupted other deliveries: ships carrying 240 tons of supplies returned to Cyprus, and aid organizations suspended operations over safety concerns. Israel subsequently agreed to allow more aid through Ashdod and said Erez would reopen.[10]

On August 27, 2024, ten bullets struck a World Food Programme vehicle approaching an IDF checkpoint at the Wadi Gaza bridge. WFP said it had received multiple clearances; no one was injured because the vehicle had bulletproof glass. Israel later attributed the firing to a communication error between military units. Three days later, the IDF said it struck armed men who had taken control of the lead vehicle of an Anera convoy. Anera said four local community members with security experience had entered the vehicle because they feared the route was unsafe, but acknowledged that they had not been vetted or coordinated in advance.[30]

The February 29, 2024 aid-convoy incident near Gaza City produced sharply conflicting accounts. Thousands of people rushed approximately 30 trucks after they passed an IDF checkpoint. The IDF said most deaths and injuries resulted from a stampede or people being run over and acknowledged that troops fired at people approaching soldiers and a tank. Gaza health authorities attributed the deaths to Israeli fire and reported 104 dead and hundreds injured, figures the report said could not be independently confirmed.[31]

The IDF’s initial account said troops fired warning shots and then at the legs of people who continued approaching, causing fewer than ten casualties from Israeli fire. A separate account cited the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry’s claim that more than 100 people died from Israeli shelling and gunfire, while the IDF described a lethal stampede and threats to troops. The United States said it did not yet have all the facts.[31][32]

At Kuwait Square on March 14, Gaza’s health ministry claimed 20 deaths and 155 injuries, while the Hamas government media office claimed more than 30 deaths. The IDF said it had allowed a convoy of 31 trucks through and denied that its forces fired at Gazans, attributing the disorder to Palestinian gunmen, looting, and trampling. Casualty figures and responsibility remain disputed.[33]

A ceasefire announced on January 15, 2025, provided for aid to increase to 600 trucks per day during its first six-week phase.[34] During the January 19–March 2 ceasefire, approximately 25,200 trucks brought 447,538 tons of humanitarian aid into Gaza, including about 338,676 tons of food. The ceasefire eased movement and opened access to areas that had been difficult to reach, although north-south movement remained partly restricted.[1]

Israel halted goods entering Gaza and closed the crossings on March 2. The Prime Minister’s Office said Hamas had refused a proposed extension of negotiations and that the ceasefire could not continue without further hostage releases. Israeli explanations also cited alleged Hamas seizure, hoarding, diversion, or profiteering from aid.[1][35] INSS estimated that food delivered during the ceasefire was sufficient for at least five months under international standards.[1]

INSS reported that the suspension did not produce greater negotiating flexibility, while UN officials warned by late March that their supplies might last only about two more weeks. The ADL likewise described Israel as blocking all humanitarian-aid entry from March until May 2025 to pressure Hamas to release hostages, while noting disagreement over whether aid admitted at other times was sufficient.[1][36]

Five trucks carrying flour, baby food, and medical supplies entered through Kerem Shalom on May 19, marking the first reported truck entry since the crossings closed. COGAT said the cargoes had been thoroughly inspected. UN aid chief Tom Fletcher called the amount “a drop in the ocean of what is urgently needed” and called for regular flows through multiple routes.[37] More than 660 trucks reportedly entered between May 20 and 27, carrying food and medical supplies.[38]

A separate Gaza Humanitarian Foundation mechanism began on May 27. INSS described prepackaged food being distributed at centers in IDF-controlled areas, with private American companies managing site operations and security while the IDF secured perimeters and access routes.[1]

INSS also described an IDF “distancing protocol” around GHF sites that used warning shots to deter entry into areas designated as dangerous and reportedly resulted in civilian deaths and injuries. The IDF denied intentionally harming civilians. Reported changes included rerouted paths, improved signs, additional barriers, relocation of a center, and revised field instructions. INSS’s assessment that Israel increasingly used aid as leverage against Hamas remains politically contested.[1]

The actions affected more than the total quantity of aid entering Gaza. They altered routes, inspection schedules, access to northern Gaza, convoy security, the operating capacity of humanitarian organizations, and the mechanisms used to distribute assistance. The WCK strike, for example, caused cargo to return to Cyprus and prompted organizations to suspend work, while later policy changes expanded access through Ashdod and Erez.[1][10]

The record also demonstrates why the actors must remain distinct. Government suspensions and crossing rules, military strikes and checkpoint incidents, civilian convoy blockades, and naval interceptions arose from different authorities and rationales. Treating them as one policy would obscure responsibility for particular actions.[2][18]

A central dispute concerns whether the primary obstacles to aid delivery arose from Israeli inspections and movement controls or from insecurity, looting, and distribution failures inside Gaza. COGAT and OCHA used different counting methods, while Israeli and UN officials gave conflicting descriptions of inspections, crossing closures, and checkpoint delays.[1][3]

The March–May 2025 suspension intensified disagreement over the use of aid in hostage negotiations, alleged Hamas diversion, and humanitarian consequences. INSS estimated that the ceasefire had left food sufficient for months but also reported UN warnings that organizational stocks might last only weeks. Aid agencies and Israeli officials consequently offered different assessments of both available supplies and the policy’s effects.[1][36]

Casualties at aid distributions and during convoy operations are also disputed. The February 29 and March 14 incidents produced conflicting casualty totals and accounts of responsibility, while the August Anera incident involved disagreement over the status and authorization of armed men in the lead vehicle.[31][33]

Civilian obstruction, official entry policy, military operations, and maritime enforcement are related to aid delivery but are not interchangeable. Claims against Tzav 9 concern civilian conduct; the March 2025 halt was a government decision; convoy strikes involved military forces; and flotilla interceptions arose from enforcement of the naval blockade.[18][4]