Timeline of the Gaza War (12 January–6 May 2024)

This chronology covers developments from 12 January through 6 May 2024, during the Israel–Hamas war. It follows military operations and their reported objectives, hostage-related developments, humanitarian access, and diplomatic and legal proceedings. Many details in the period were reported through statements by the Israeli military, Hamas, Gaza authorities, international institutions, or other governments; where accounts differed, those differences are noted rather than treated as settled fact.

The time frame opened with Israeli operations continuing in central and southern Gaza and closed amid renewed activity in eastern Rafah and uncertainty over a ceasefire proposal.[1][10] The chronology is not a complete record of every military action or diplomatic contact: it concentrates on developments documented in the available reporting, including several high-profile incidents and decisions.

On 12 January, Israeli forces continued operations in al-Maghazi in central Gaza and Khan Yunis in the south. A report that day relayed an Israeli military investigation’s assessment that an extensive tunnel found in Khan Yunis had apparently housed Israeli hostages. The IDF also said that Israeli air and ground forces had destroyed more than 700 Hamas rocket launchers since the ground offensive began and seized hundreds of rockets, attributing a recent reduction in rocket fire to control of territory and the capture of launch sites and rocket caches.[1][12]

The same day, Israeli representatives presented Israel’s arguments before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in South Africa’s case under the Genocide Convention. They argued that Israel was acting in self-defense against Hamas, denied genocidal intent, and asked the Court to reject South Africa’s request for provisional measures halting military operations. These were arguments made by Israel in the proceedings, not findings by the Court.[13] On 10 January, the U.S. State Department had said that the hearings on South Africa’s request were scheduled for that week; South Africa sought measures including suspension of Israeli military operations in Gaza.[14]

On 15 January, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said the intensive phase of Israel’s ground operation in northern Gaza had ended and that the focus had shifted to Khan Yunis. He described the northern campaign as moving toward raids, airstrikes, and operations against remaining pockets of resistance, while Israeli forces continued targeting Hamas infrastructure and leadership elsewhere in Gaza.[15]

A Qatar- and France-brokered arrangement announced on 16 January provided for medicines to be delivered to Israeli hostages in Gaza in exchange for additional medicine and aid for Palestinian civilians. The reported arrangement specified 1,000 boxes of medicine for Gaza for each box provided to the hostages. Israel said aid deliveries would be inspected. Because Hamas did not allow the Red Cross to visit the hostages, Israel said it could not verify whether they received the medicine.[16]

On 22 January, 21 Israeli soldiers were killed when two buildings near Kissufim collapsed during an operation to remove buildings and facilities near the Gaza border. The IDF’s preliminary account said RPG attacks apparently triggered explosions in buildings where troops were placing explosives for demolition. Search-and-rescue operations continued through the night. Another account said one RPG struck a tank and another hit a prepared building; the precise sequence and cause were still being investigated in initial reporting.[17][18] The deaths occurred amid heavy fighting in Khan Yunis, where the IDF said forces were working to dismantle Hamas’s governing centers and the Khan Yunis Brigade. The following day, the IDF said its 98th Division had completed the encirclement of the city and that commando troops were advancing into it.[17][19]

On 22 January, Israeli reporting also described a proposed phased hostage exchange. It envisaged the release of remaining women and older hostages, then younger men and soldiers, as well as the return of deceased hostages’ bodies. Reported elements included the release of some Palestinian prisoners, a 30-day pause in fighting, Israeli withdrawal from major population centers, and a gradual return of Palestinians to northern Gaza. Hamas rejected proposals of this kind while demanding an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, a permanent ceasefire, and the release of many Palestinian prisoners, according to the reporting.[16]

On 26 January, the ICJ indicated provisional measures in South Africa’s case. The Court required Israel to take measures concerning the prevention of acts covered by the Genocide Convention, prevention and punishment of direct and public incitement, enabling urgently needed humanitarian assistance, preserving evidence, and reporting on compliance within a month. The measures were provisional: the Court did not decide whether Israel had violated the Convention or whether genocide had occurred. It did not order an immediate end to Israel’s military operations, and it called for the immediate and unconditional release of hostages.[6][20]

The Court’s order became a recurring point in political and legal debate. South Africa had requested that Israel suspend its military operations, but the Court did not grant that request in its January order. The distinction between provisional measures and a final ruling on the allegations was important throughout the period: the underlying case remained unresolved.[6][20]

On 26 January, the United States announced a temporary pause in its funding to UNRWA, pending review of allegations that some agency employees had been involved in the 7 October attacks. The Congressional Research Service reported that U.S. UNRWA funding in fiscal year 2024 before the pause totaled $121 million and supported services for refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[8]

The allegations were attributed to Israeli officials and were not established as findings in the reporting cited here. On 16 February, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant publicly identified 12 UNRWA employees whom Israel alleged had taken part in the 7 October attack. He said Israel had significant intelligence indications that more than 30 additional agency workers had participated in the attack or assisted with hostage-taking and looting. Gallant also claimed that at least 12% of UNRWA’s Gaza employees were affiliated with Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad; these figures and allegations were his claims, not independently established findings in the cited reports.[21]

The allegations prompted the United States and multiple European countries to halt aid to UNRWA, while some donors said they would await a UN internal investigation before resuming support. The same reporting described an underground facility beneath UNRWA’s Gaza City headquarters, which Israel characterized as a Hamas data center. UNRWA chief Philippe Lazzarini said he did not know what was beneath the headquarters and that Israel had not officially informed the agency about the alleged tunnel. Israeli and UNRWA accounts differed.[21] In March, the IDF released recordings it described as incriminating two UNRWA employees accused of participating in the 7 October attack and claimed that about 450 Gaza terrorist operatives, mostly Hamas members, were employed by UNRWA.[22]

During February, Israeli forces operated at Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis. The IDF said it had intelligence indicating that Hamas was conducting military activity in the compound and that hostages had previously been held there. It reported detaining more than 100 people suspected of terrorist activity and finding weapons and medicines bearing Israeli hostages’ names. Hamas and Gaza health authorities disputed the Israeli account and criticized the operation; the World Health Organization’s director said that the hospital was no longer functioning after a siege. Accounts of the hospital’s use, the detainees, and military activity differed.[3]

A separate account said Israeli forces raided Nasser Hospital on 16 February after receiving intelligence that hostages and hostage bodies had been held there. It reported that the IDF instructed civilians sheltering in the hospital to leave and facilitated the delivery of medical supplies; the IDF later said it had arrested 200 suspects. Gaza sources reported that one patient was killed and others wounded during the raid. These details, too, were reported through differing accounts.[15]

On 12 February, Israeli forces from the IDF, Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), and Yamam unit of the Israel Police rescued hostages Fernando Marman and Luis Har from a building in Rafah. The two men had been abducted from Nir Yitzhak. The operation began at about 1 a.m., following airstrikes against Hamas’s Shabura battalion, and relied on intelligence about the hostages’ location. Israeli forces entered the building and extracted the two men amid heavy exchanges of fire. One Israeli soldier was lightly injured, and the rescued hostages were taken to Sheba Medical Center.[5]

The possibility of an Israeli operation in Rafah became a prominent issue during February. Israel said it intended to extend its campaign there to eliminate Hamas’s remaining battalions. More than one million displaced people were sheltering in the area, according to reporting at the time, and the United States urged Israel not to proceed without a plan to protect civilians. Israel said civilians would be moved before ground forces entered, but the plans and feasibility of evacuation were disputed.[23] A 15 February report put Rafah’s population at about 1.3 million, compared with roughly 300,000 before the war, and said Netanyahu had instructed officials to begin preparations for a ground offensive. It also reported that about 170 aid trucks were entering Gaza daily through the Rafah crossing at that time.[24]

On 16 February, the ICJ rejected South Africa’s request for additional urgent measures specifically concerning Rafah. The Court said the circumstances required immediate implementation of its 26 January provisional measures, which applied throughout Gaza, including Rafah, but did not require additional measures. The underlying genocide allegation remained undecided.[25]

By 24 February, Gaza-based police had reportedly largely stopped escorting aid convoys after multiple fatal attacks by Israeli forces against some police. Israeli officials said some police sought to divert goods to Hamas. Without police escorts, hungry crowds and armed gangs reportedly looted some convoys before they reached intended delivery points.[8]

On 29 February, an incident involving Palestinians gathered around aid trucks entering northern Gaza produced sharply conflicting accounts. The Hamas-controlled Gaza health ministry said more than 100 people had died, attributing deaths to Israeli shelling and gunfire. The IDF said most casualties resulted from a crowd surge and stampede as people swarmed the trucks. It said its troops fired at people who approached them and posed a threat, but not at the convoy or people seeking aid; its initial account attributed roughly 10 casualties to Israeli gunfire. The Congressional Research Service reported more than 100 deaths and 700 injuries, noting that accounts attributed casualties to some combination of gunfire, stampeding, and vehicular trauma. The causes and circumstances were not independently confirmed in the reporting cited here.[8][26]

On 2 March, U.S. Central Command, coordinating with Jordan, began a series of food airdrops into Gaza. The drops formed one part of a wider effort to expand assistance by land, air, and sea.[8] The following week, President Joe Biden announced a U.S. military mission to establish a port on Gaza’s coast for receiving humanitarian supplies. The Defense Department said the plan would use its Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore capability, involve more than 1,000 U.S. personnel who would not be placed onshore in Gaza, and aim to begin deliveries in about 60 days.[8]

U.N. aid teams reached Gaza City on 12 March for the first time in weeks. U.N. officials said there was “no meaningful substitute to the many land routes and entry points from Israel into Gaza” for delivering large volumes of assistance.[8] On 15 March, the Spanish aid ship Open Arms arrived off Gaza carrying 200 tons of food. Its cargo was unloaded at sea and transferred by boats toward a pier being built off Gaza City. A separate maritime shipment organized by World Central Kitchen from Cyprus was also described as a pilot route to supplement aid deliveries; organizers said it carried nearly 200 tons, while the IDF said 115 tons of food and water were transferred to 12 trucks for distribution. Aid groups cautioned that sea shipments could not replace the volume delivered by land.[27][28]

Efforts to deliver aid overland to northern Gaza continued. On 17 March, six trucks carrying flour reportedly entered northern Gaza, while seven aid trucks entered Gaza City. Distribution was supervised by local clans and family dignitaries.[27]

On 18 March, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) issued a special brief warning that famine was imminent in Gaza. Its assessment projected famine in the North Gaza and Gaza governorates between mid-March and May, and said about 70% of households in northern Gaza were expected to face famine during that period. It estimated that 1.1 million people across Gaza—about half the population—were experiencing catastrophic hunger. These were projections and assessments made at the time, not a later finding that famine had occurred.[29]

That night, Israeli forces began a targeted operation at Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. The IDF and Shin Bet said intelligence indicated that Hamas operatives, including senior figures, had regrouped there and were using the complex for military activity. The IDF said medical staff were not required to leave and that Arabic-speaking personnel were brought to speak with patients; it said it intended to conduct the operation while ensuring the hospital continued to function.[4][30]

A Meir Amit report relayed IDF figures stating that more than 200 people suspected of terrorist activity were detained and that more than 50 operatives were killed, including Faeq Mabhouh, whom the IDF identified as a Hamas operations commander.[27] Contemporaneous reporting cited an IDF count of about 20 gunmen killed inside the hospital and another 20 in the surrounding area.[4] A later account said the IDF reported killing 170 people it identified as terrorists and capturing more than 500 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad members.[15] These figures reflect reports issued at different stages of the operation, not a single independently established tally.

Gaza health authorities and Hamas condemned the operation and disputed the Israeli account, including claims about the hospital’s use and the circumstances of the raid. Fighting continued for several days, and the operation was still underway in some contemporaneous reporting, which did not provide a final end time.[4][15] A report after the operation described extensive destruction around Shifa; a reporter characterized the area as looking as if there had been “an earthquake.”[31]

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2728 on 25 March by 14 votes in favor, none against, and one abstention by the United States. It demanded an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan leading to a lasting and sustainable ceasefire, the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, and expanded humanitarian assistance and civilian protection throughout Gaza.[32][33] The resolution’s wording did not directly make the ceasefire conditional on the prior release of hostages. The United States said its position was that a ceasefire should be part of an agreement to release hostages; it also described its abstention as reflecting the resolution’s omission of condemnation of Hamas. The resolution’s binding status and the relationship between its ceasefire and hostage-release provisions were disputed.[32][34]

The U.S. abstention caused a diplomatic dispute with Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cancelled a planned Washington visit by an Israeli delegation after the vote; the White House said the abstention did not represent a change in U.S. policy.[33]

On 28 March, the ICJ issued additional provisional measures after considering South Africa’s request and Israel’s observations. The Court said living conditions had deteriorated and famine was setting in, and concluded that the January measures did not fully address the changed situation. It reaffirmed those measures and directed Israel to ensure, in cooperation with the United Nations, the unhindered provision at scale of basic services and humanitarian assistance, including food, water, fuel, shelter, and medical supplies. It also directed Israel to increase the capacity and number of land crossings and keep them open as necessary, and required a report within a month. Israel disputed South Africa’s allegations and its account of the humanitarian situation; the ICJ’s measures remained provisional rather than a final ruling on the merits.[35][7]

On 1 April, an Israeli strike in Deir al-Balah killed seven World Central Kitchen (WCK) employees after they had unloaded food aid at a warehouse. WCK said the convoy was in a deconflicted area and that its movements had been coordinated with the IDF; the organization suspended its operations in Gaza. Those killed included three British nationals, an Australian, a Palestinian, a Polish national, and a U.S.-Canadian.[9]

On 4 April, President Biden spoke with Netanyahu about the strike and the humanitarian situation. The White House said Biden called the deaths of humanitarian workers and the wider humanitarian situation unacceptable, urged concrete steps to address civilian harm and aid-worker safety, and said an immediate ceasefire was essential to protect civilians and improve conditions. After the call, Israel announced measures to increase aid, including opening access for northern Gaza and approving Ashdod port as an aid hub.[8]

The IDF investigation, released on 5 April, called the strike a grave mistake: troops had misidentified the vehicles and mistakenly believed they contained Hamas operatives. The investigation found that the strikes violated IDF procedures. Two officers were dismissed and other commanders reprimanded. A separate account said the IDF’s initial investigation found a violation of its rules of engagement and reported that five officers were dismissed or reprimanded. WCK called for an independent inquiry.[36][8]

On 5 April, Israel also announced that it would temporarily open Ashdod Port for aid, open the Erez Crossing for deliveries to northern Gaza, and increase aid entering from Jordan through Kerem Shalom.[8][37] The Erez Crossing had been damaged and required security work before being used for these deliveries.[38]

Before dawn on 7 April, the IDF completed the withdrawal of forces that had spent about four and a half months fighting in Khan Yunis. The withdrawal included Division 98, though the IDF retained forces in key areas and around Gaza’s periphery to enable further operations. One brigade remained inside Gaza to secure the Netzarim area and control movement between northern and southern Gaza; other reporting described Nahal Brigade troops and portions of Brigade 401 remaining in northern and central Gaza.[2][31]

Israeli leaders described the withdrawal as preparation for further operations, including a possible offensive in Rafah. Defense Minister Gallant said the withdrawal followed the dismantling of Hamas as a functioning military unit in Khan Yunis. The IDF described the active invasion stage there as concluded for the time being, while leaving open a future Rafah operation. One account characterized the shift as a move toward intelligence-based raids and shorter, focused operations. Interpretations of the withdrawal differed: some analysts speculated that it might improve prospects for a hostage deal or reflect U.S. pressure, while a journalist said it had been planned for weeks.[2][39]

The IDF also gave approximate six-month operational figures: 32,000 targets attacked by the Israeli Air Force, 12,000 operatives killed, 3,250 rocket launchers seized or destroyed, and 4,250 facilities destroyed. These figures were attributed to the IDF.[31]

The scale of the humanitarian and physical impact was also reported during April. As of 15 April, the Congressional Research Service cited more than 33,000 Palestinians killed in Gaza according to the Hamas-controlled Gaza health ministry; more than 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals killed in the 7 October attacks; and at least 259 Israeli soldiers killed in battle since ground operations began. It also reported that about 1.7 million of Gaza’s roughly 2.1 million residents had been displaced and that more than 60% of housing units had reportedly been destroyed or damaged. These figures are attributed to the report’s identified sources and estimates, not presented here as independently verified counts.[8]

On 10 April, an Israeli aircraft struck a car in Gaza City’s Shati refugee camp. The passengers included three sons of Hamas political leader Isma’il Haniyeh—Hazem, Amir, and Muhammad—and Palestinian media reported that four of Haniyeh’s grandchildren were also killed. Israeli sources described the sons as Hamas military-wing operatives and said one had been involved in holding Israeli hostages. Those claims about their roles are attributed to Israeli sources.[40]

On 13–14 April, Iran launched drones and missiles directly at Israel, an escalation within the wider regional conflict during the Gaza war. The Congressional Research Service described the attack as retaliation for a reported Israeli strike on Iranian targets in Syria, in a building within the Iranian embassy compound. The Washington Institute said the attack increased the risk of overt conventional conflict and reported that Haniyeh congratulated Tehran afterward. Observers debated how the Israel–Hamas war and the possibility of regional escalation might affect one another.[8][41]

Ceasefire and hostage negotiations continued. On 13 April, Hamas rejected Israel’s ceasefire response while maintaining its main demands, according to reporting summarized by the Congressional Research Service. Negotiations involving the United States, Egypt, and Qatar sought a multi-week ceasefire and a hostage-prisoner exchange. In early April, Hamas had also rejected a proposal calling for the initial release of 40 living hostages who were women, children, older people, or sick, saying it did not have 40 hostages who met those categories. At the end of April, as Israel prepared for a possible Rafah evacuation, Hamas released videos showing three hostages alive.[8][23]

On 24 April, a proposed Rafah operation and civilian evacuation arrangements remained under discussion; the prime minister and war cabinet had not approved the proposed operation. A report estimated that about 1.4 million Palestinians, mostly civilians, were in Rafah before the April withdrawal from Khan Yunis and would need to be evacuated for an invasion to proceed. It said Israel had purchased 40,000 additional tents and that the proposed plan would evacuate separate sectors in stages.[42]

During the second half of April, the IDF said forces were carrying out targeted operations in central Gaza and securing an east–west road through the former Netzarim settlement area. The military described the road’s purpose as controlling movement and preventing Palestinians from returning from southern Gaza to Gaza City and northern Gaza. In the north, the IDF reported operations against terrorist groups and facilities; rocket fire toward Israeli communities was also recorded.[38]

On 1 May, the Erez Crossing opened for humanitarian aid for the first time since the war began. Following security work at the damaged crossing, 30 Jordanian aid trucks entered Gaza carrying aid intended for northern Gaza. Unloading was reported at a UNRWA center in Jabalia refugee camp.[38]

On 5 May, rockets and mortar shells were fired from the Rafah area toward Israeli forces near Kerem Shalom, killing Israeli soldiers and wounding others; the crossing was closed. The Meir Amit report counted 14 projectiles, while the U.S. State Department described an attack involving about 10 rockets and reported three soldiers killed. Other reporting counted four Israeli soldiers killed. The Hamas military wing claimed responsibility, and the IDF said it attacked launch sites, some near Palestinian population camps.[38][11]

The attack threatened an important route for humanitarian deliveries. The U.S. State Department described Kerem Shalom as a major entry point for aid, particularly for southern Gaza, and said the attack and closure threatened deliveries.[11] Separate reporting said ceasefire negotiations that had appeared to be progressing broke down around this time.[23]

On 6 May, Israel issued evacuation orders for residents of eastern Rafah, directing them toward expanded humanitarian areas in al-Mawasi and Khan Yunis. The U.S. State Department said the order affected approximately 100,000 people. Reporting described the evacuation area as part of a broader Rafah population of about one million, while another account estimated that approximately 1.4 million people, mostly civilians, had been in Rafah before the Khan Yunis withdrawal.[43][44]

The same day, Hamas political bureau head Isma’il Haniyeh told Qatari and Egyptian officials that Hamas accepted a ceasefire proposal conveyed through the mediators. Hamas said it had received guarantees from the United States, Egypt, and Qatar that Israel would not resume fighting after an agreement. Israel said the version Hamas accepted differed from the proposal Israel had approved and did not meet its essential demands; an Israeli official described it as unacceptable. Israel nevertheless sent a working-level delegation to Cairo to explore whether an agreement acceptable to it could be reached.[10][11]

The proposal’s contents and status were not presented by the parties as a mutually agreed final text. Reported terms included an initial 40-day truce and the release of 33 living hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, but those terms were reported rather than published as an agreed document. The U.S. State Department said it was reviewing Hamas’s response and consulting regional partners; on 7 May, it clarified that Hamas had not accepted the proposal as presented and had instead made suggestions or amendments. Thus, Hamas’s public announcement of acceptance and the U.S. and Israeli descriptions of the response referred to different understandings of the proposal.[11][23]

Also on 6 May, after directing residents to evacuate, the IDF began a targeted operation in limited areas of eastern Rafah. The operation led to Israeli operational control of the Gaza side of the Rafah Crossing. Reporting said the operation targeted Hamas facilities and followed the attack near Kerem Shalom. Israel’s war cabinet authorized military action in Rafah to exert pressure on Hamas, while a working-level delegation pursued talks. Palestinian officials warned that closure of the Rafah crossing would disrupt aid deliveries and medical evacuations.[38][10]

The U.S. State Department opposed a full-scale Rafah operation as then envisioned, warning that it could increase civilian suffering, disrupt aid deliveries, and make humanitarian distribution in southern Gaza more difficult. It said it had not seen a humanitarian plan for such an operation that it considered both credible and implementable.[11] The period therefore ended with military activity in eastern Rafah, an evacuation underway, the crossing coming under Israeli operational control, and negotiations continuing without a mutually recognized ceasefire agreement.[38][10]

On 7 May, the U.S. State Department clarified that Hamas had not accepted the ceasefire proposal as presented, but had offered suggestions or amendments. The statement reinforced that the parties had not reached a mutually accepted agreement.[45] The immediate military consequence of the 6 May decisions was continued Israeli activity in eastern Rafah and operational control of the Gaza side of the Rafah Crossing, while Palestinian officials warned of disruption to aid deliveries and medical evacuations.[38][10]

Several developments in this period generated materially different contemporaneous accounts. These included the 29 February aid-truck incident and Israeli operations at Nasser and Shifa hospitals.[8][3] The World Central Kitchen strike investigation, the reported toll from the 5 May attack near Kerem Shalom, and the terms and status of the 6 May ceasefire proposal also produced differing figures or descriptions.[36][10] Figures and explanations cited in this chronology are therefore attributed to the institutions, parties, or reports that supplied them rather than presented as a single agreed account.

The ICJ’s January and March decisions were provisional-measures orders in a case brought by South Africa under the Genocide Convention.[6][7] They set out measures concerning prevention, incitement, humanitarian assistance, evidence, and reporting, but did not decide the underlying allegation or constitute a final judgment on whether genocide had occurred. The Court did not order Israel to cease military operations in its January order.[6][20]