Gaza War Timeline (17 October–26 November 2024)

The interval opened amid an intensified Israeli ground operation in Jabalia, which had resumed earlier in October. Israel said the renewed operations responded to reports that Hamas fighters were reconstituting in the area. A UN official said no food entered northern Gaza from 2 to 15 October, after which only a limited amount was permitted in.[9] The renewed operation and humanitarian conditions formed the immediate context for the weeks that followed.

Yahya Sinwar had led Hamas in Gaza since 2017 and became the organization’s overall political leader in August 2024. Israeli forces killed him in Rafah on 16 October, although Israel’s public announcement came on 17 October and Hamas confirmed his death on 18 October.[10][1]

The killing brought renewed attention to hostage negotiations. U.S. officials described Sinwar’s death as a possible opening for efforts to end the war and return hostages, and said the United States would intensify its diplomatic work. They characterized Sinwar as a central obstacle to negotiations; that characterization was the stated assessment of U.S. officials.[11]

Israeli forces encountered three figures moving between buildings in Tel al-Sultan, Rafah, on 16 October. In the account later given by the IDF spokesperson, one figure entered a building that Israeli forces fired on; a drone then observed an armed, masked man who had been wounded inside. Soldiers found a body the following morning, and forensic tests identified it as Sinwar. The IDF said the encounter was not a targeted operation and that Sinwar’s identity became clear only after his death.[1] Another account said the forces had not known Sinwar was there, described an exchange of fire, and reported that he threw a wooden stick at an Israeli drone while wounded. It also said no hostages were found with him.[2]

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the killing on 17 October. He described it as “the beginning of the day after Hamas,” while also saying that the war would continue until the hostages were returned.[2] The firefight occurred in Rafah on 16 October, and Sinwar had become Hamas’s overall political leader in August.[10]

After Sinwar’s death, Egyptian and U.S. initiatives sought to restart negotiations. On 20 October, Egypt’s General Intelligence Service chief Hassan Rashad reportedly presented Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar with a proposal for a two-week pause in fighting in return for six hostages, intended to restart talks.[12] During a visit to Israel on 22 October, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged Israel to use the opportunity to secure the release of all hostages and end the conflict, and called for additional steps to increase humanitarian aid to Gaza.[12]

On 25 October, Egyptian officials proposed a short-term ceasefire and a hostage-prisoner exchange. U.S. and Qatari officials subsequently rejoined mediation efforts, although the available account did not supply the proposal’s detailed terms.[13] Another account said Hamas had been reluctant to engage after talks collapsed in July but had indicated openness to the new Egyptian initiative; an Israeli delegation was negotiating in Qatar and waiting for the 5 November U.S. election before deciding how to proceed.[4]

Israeli military activity remained focused on Jabalia and Beit Lahia through the interval, alongside operations in Rafah and the Netzarim Corridor. From 29 October to 5 November, the IDF reported killing operatives and destroying weapons and military facilities. It also reported facilitating the transfer of patients and escorts from northern Gaza hospitals and providing aid to hospitals. The same account recorded two Israeli soldiers killed in northern Gaza during the period and an officer who later died of wounds sustained in a September battle.[14]

On 17 October, the IDF said its operation in Jabalia targeted Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives using a former school building as a command-and-control center. The military said at least 18 operatives were killed and that it used precision weapons and surveillance to limit civilian harm. Palestinian media reported casualties at the school, including 24 people killed and 150 wounded; accounts differed over the site’s use and casualty totals.[15]

Civilians began leaving parts of Jabalia as Israeli operations expanded. A 19 October report said the IDF had established corridors for people to depart and that hundreds had left, while citing UN figures that about 400,000 people still lived in northern Gaza. The report also described coordination by Israeli authorities for medical supplies, fuel, and medical evacuations.[16] On 20 October, Gaza’s government media office claimed that Israeli strikes in the north had killed 80 people. The IDF disputed that figure, saying an initial review found it exaggerated and inconsistent with information about the weapons and targets; it said it was continuing to investigate. The report described the area as an active combat zone and said residents of Jabalia remained in their homes despite evacuation requests.[17]

A separate Israeli airstrike struck a group of homes in Beit Lahia on 19 October. A Gaza civil-defense source said at least 73 people were killed or missing and more than 40 others were wounded. The report placed the strike amid intensified Israeli operations after Sinwar’s death and attributed the casualty count to local sources.[18] On 17 November, the Hamas-run civil defense agency separately reported that dozens of Palestinians were killed or injured in a strike on a multistory residential building in Beit Lahia. The IDF did not comment on that report, and the figure of more than 70 dead was not independently verified in the cited coverage.[19]

On 28 October, the IDF said the 162nd Division and Shin Bet raided Kamal Adwan Hospital in northern Gaza after receiving intelligence that armed operatives were inside. The military said civilians were allowed to leave before the raid and that troops found weapons, money, and Hamas documents. It also said some detainees had participated in the 7 October attacks.[20] A later account reported that the IDF said it detained about 40 operatives during evacuations and dozens more in the raid, that roughly 20 gunmen were killed in fighting around the hospital, and that about 50,000 Palestinians had been evacuated from Jabalia during the wider operation. The military said hundreds of Hamas operatives remained in the area and the broader operation would continue.[21]

The claims about the hospital’s use and the events during the raid were disputed. The available reporting attributed the account of armed activity, detainees, and items found to the IDF; it also noted that footage of damage circulated by the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry could not be independently verified.[20][21] These qualifications concern the specific reported claims and do not resolve the competing accounts.

During 5–12 November, the IDF reported continued operations in Jabalia and Beit Lahia, as well as Rafah and the Netzarim Corridor. The cited report said five Israeli soldiers were killed in northern Gaza during that period. It also recorded the opening of the Kissufim Crossing for humanitarian aid on 12 November and an announcement the previous day that Gaza’s humanitarian zone would be expanded.[22] An IDF update on 7 November said the 162nd Division continued operating in Jabalia and claimed about 50 terrorists had been killed there over the preceding 24 hours. It also said the Kfir Brigade combat team had begun operating in Beit Lahia after intelligence and ground activity indicated the presence of terrorists and infrastructure, and reported further killings in encounters and raids.[23]

The military account of operations from 19 to 26 November described strikes and ground activity in northern Gaza, Rafah, and the Netzarim Corridor against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives, with weapons and facilities destroyed. During that interval, the IDF reported one Israeli soldier killed in northern Gaza.[6] Five rockets were also fired from Gaza toward communities near the Strip: three were intercepted and two landed in open areas, with no reported casualties or damage.[6]

Negotiations in late October and early November centered on temporary pauses and partial hostage releases, while Hamas maintained that an agreement should end the war and require an Israeli withdrawal. On 27 October, Egypt proposed a two-day ceasefire in exchange for four hostages and Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said talks on a permanent ceasefire should begin within ten days after the truce took effect.[24] The proposal was presented as an effort to “move the situation forward.”[24]

The proposal coincided with a meeting in Doha among Mossad director David Barnea, CIA director William Burns, and Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani—the first round of ceasefire and hostage talks in two months. At the time of the report, neither Israel nor Hamas had responded to Egypt’s proposal.[24] Egyptian officials had separately proposed a short-term ceasefire and hostage-prisoner exchange on 25 October, after which U.S. and Qatari officials rejoined mediation.[13]

The proposals discussed in late October and early November included differing durations and aid provisions. One report described an Egyptian proposal for a ten-day ceasefire, the daily entry of 150 aid trucks, and the release of four Israeli hostages. It also described a U.S. proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, the release of women and female soldiers held hostage, and the daily entry of 600 aid trucks. The report said the proposals did not provide for an end to the war, the return of displaced people to their homes, or an Israeli withdrawal.[14]

Hamas leaders rejected proposals for temporary pauses and partial releases, saying a deal should include a complete end to the war, an Israeli withdrawal, the return of displaced Palestinians, and humanitarian aid. In early November, Blinken indicated that Hamas had rejected the Egyptian short-term ceasefire and hostage-prisoner proposal; the available account did not provide a direct Hamas statement or specify which terms it had rejected.[14][13]

Qatar’s mediation role came under scrutiny. On 9 November, Qatar’s foreign-ministry spokesperson said the country would freeze its mediation efforts if no agreement was reached and resume them only when serious negotiating partners were involved. Reuters reported around the same time that Qatar had asked Hamas leaders to leave Doha, but Qatari and Hamas figures denied that an expulsion request had been made. Qatar said its channel with Hamas was intended to maintain communication between the parties.[22]

On 20 November, Hamas acting political bureau head Khalil al-Haya said the movement would not discuss a prisoner exchange before the fighting ended. Egypt reportedly invited Hamas leaders to Cairo the following day to revive ceasefire talks; a Hamas figure said the movement would consider the effort if it was based on ending the war and a full Israeli withdrawal.[6] A report also said Netanyahu offered a $5 million reward, free passage out of Gaza, and immunity for a person and immediate family if that person freed a live hostage. The source placed the offer after the killing of six hostages in captivity and presented it in the context of Israel’s stated aim of freeing the hostages.[25]

On 23 November, Hamas’s military-wing spokesperson claimed that one Israeli female hostage had been killed in northern Gaza and another critically injured. The IDF said it was examining the information and accused Hamas of psychological warfare; the claim was not established by the available account.[6]

Humanitarian access and the delivery of food and medical supplies were major concerns throughout the period. Before the interval, a UN official described northern Gaza as receiving no food between 2 and 15 October, followed by only a “trickle.”[9] On 22 October, COGAT said 237 aid trucks carrying food, water, medical supplies, and shelter equipment had entered northern Gaza since 14 October through Erez West after security checks. The report’s headline gave 230 trucks, while its body repeatedly used 237. It also said more than 120 trucks had entered during the preceding week.[15]

That account described aid delivery as disputed: it said no aid had been allowed into northern Gaza for a full two weeks before deliveries resumed, while Gaza medics said aid had not reached them and Israel said Hamas diverted much of it.[15] These figures and statements refer to different reported measures—entry into an area, receipt by medical facilities, and alleged diversion—and the available material does not independently reconcile them.

On 29 October, the World Food Programme called for immediate action to avert famine, warning that conditions could worsen amid what it described as severe restrictions on aid flows.[26] In a 12 November briefing, the U.S. State Department said 404 trucks had crossed into Gaza from 1 to 9 November and that the number was not satisfactory. The department contrasted this with an October U.S. letter calling for a minimum of 350 trucks per day. It said deliveries had resumed in northern Gaza, first to Gaza City and, during the week before the briefing, to areas around Jabalia, while stressing that aid reaching its intended destinations and its effect on conditions remained concerns.[7]

The same State Department briefing listed steps Israel had taken after the U.S. letter: reopening the Erez crossing, opening a crossing at Kissufim, changing customs requirements for the Jordanian corridor, opening or repairing internal delivery routes, resuming deliveries to Gaza City and areas around Jabalia, expanding the Mawasi humanitarian zone, and instituting periodic operational pauses. The department said conditions remained dire and further changes were needed, but said it had not at that time assessed Israel to be in violation of U.S. law.[7]

The assessments of aid access were not uniform. On 12 November, eight international aid organizations said Israel had failed to meet 15 of 19 measures in a U.S. demand to improve humanitarian access, and had partially met the remaining four. They described conditions, particularly in northern Gaza, as worse than a month earlier. An Israeli official said November deliveries averaged about 50 trucks daily to northern Gaza and 150 daily to the rest of the Strip; COGAT attributed October’s lower truck figures to crossing closures for Jewish holidays and memorials marking 7 October.[27]

The World Health Organization and UNICEF said on 6 November that between 7,000 and 10,000 children in northern Gaza remained inaccessible and unvaccinated during the final phase of a polio vaccination campaign.[13] A separate report said Israel and the WHO evacuated 231 Gazans, including patients and caregivers, to the United Arab Emirates and Romania for medical treatment on 6 November. It also reported COGAT’s statement that more than 90 percent of Gaza’s children—about 1.1 million—had been vaccinated against polio.[28]

On 21 November, the World Food Programme reported that only seven of 19 bakeries supported by humanitarian partners remained operational: two in Deir al-Balah, one in Khan Yunis, and four in Gaza City. Seven UN-supported bakeries in Rafah and northern Gaza remained closed because of fighting.[6] Hamas’s government media office separately claimed on 25 November that storms had damaged or washed away about 10,000 tents.[26]

Aid transport was also affected by looting and disputed accounts of responsibility. A UNRWA emergency officer said a 109-truck food convoy entering Gaza on 16 November was violently looted and that 98 trucks were lost. The officer said the food was provided by UNRWA and the World Food Program and that Israel had directed the convoy at short notice along an unfamiliar route from Kerem Shalom. The report did not identify who looted the convoy or report deaths connected to the incident.[29] A later account said UNRWA reported that 100 of 109 trucks in a convoy had been “violently looted”; it also recorded UNRWA’s attribution of blame to Israel as the agency’s position, rather than an independently established finding.[28]

Separately, Gaza’s Hamas-run interior ministry said more than 20 people accused of stealing aid trucks had been killed in a security operation. The cited reporting did not establish that those deaths were connected to the 16 November convoy.[29] The accounts therefore describe serious obstacles to aid delivery but do not establish a single, agreed account of responsibility for the reported looting.

On 28 October, the Knesset passed two laws concerning UNRWA. One barred the agency from operating in Israel; the other prohibited Israeli authorities from maintaining contact with it. The measures were expected to inhibit UNRWA’s work in Gaza and the West Bank—known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria. The agency’s activities in both areas depended in part on coordination with Israel for access.[3][30]

One account gave the votes as 92–10 for the law barring UNRWA operations in Israeli territory and 87–9 for the measure prohibiting contact by Israeli state authorities. The legislation drew criticism from the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations; UN Secretary-General António Guterres called its passage a “catastrophe.”[30] Another account described one law as barring the agency’s representative branch, services, and operations directly or indirectly in Israel’s sovereign territory, and the other as ending Israel’s 1967 invitation for UNRWA to operate in Israel, Judea and Samaria, and Gaza. It said the laws were published on 30 October and were to take effect three months later, on 30 January 2025, while also barring contact by Israeli public authorities with UNRWA or those acting on its behalf.[31]

The sources differ slightly on the legislative date: the UN Secretary-General’s letter and other accounts identify adoption on 28 October, while a separate Congressional Research Service report describes the laws as enacted on 29 October.[32][13] The available material does not resolve that discrepancy. It also notes that the legislation was expected to have humanitarian consequences and records differing positions on those effects.

Israel’s prime minister’s office said Israel was ready to work with international partners to facilitate humanitarian assistance in a way that did not threaten Israeli security.[3] The laws attracted warnings from international bodies and governments about their effects on Palestinian refugees and humanitarian work, especially in Gaza.[33] The Knesset’s characterization of UNRWA and the anticipated practical consequences of restricting its activities were politically contested; reports also recorded Israeli claims that some UNRWA personnel had participated in the 7 October attack.[33]

The 5 November U.S. presidential election formed part of the diplomatic context for the latter weeks of the period. Donald Trump won the election, and members of Israel’s right-wing government believed his incoming administration would be more sympathetic to their cause than the Biden administration. The incoming administration later joined mediation efforts intended to reach a hostage-release agreement before Trump’s inauguration, with outgoing Secretary of State Antony Blinken working alongside Trump Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff and Qatar and Egypt acting as mediators.[4]

On 5 November, Netanyahu dismissed Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, citing a breakdown in mutual trust and disagreements over the management of the war, which Netanyahu said had become known to Israel’s enemies. Gallant said the disagreement concerned three issues: conscription of ultra-Orthodox men, bringing the hostages home, and establishing a state commission of inquiry into 7 October and the ensuing war. Gallant argued for prioritizing a hostage deal even if Hamas remained in Gaza. Netanyahu appointed Israel Katz as defense minister.[34]

The U.S. government’s position on aid delivery remained a point of public scrutiny. On 12 November, the State Department said that although it considered conditions dire and more improvements necessary, it had not assessed Israel to be in violation of U.S. law at that time.[7] A separate report said the United States announced on the same date that it would not cut military assistance to Israel, despite what the administration described as limited progress in increasing aid. That account also reported that COGAT said 900 truckloads of aid were waiting uncollected on the Gaza side of the Kerem Shalom crossing, and that an aid convoy had been stopped after the IDF found ammunition and firearms hidden in it.[28] These were reported figures and Israeli-side explanations amid continuing disputes over aid access and delivery.

On 20 November, the UN Security Council considered a draft resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. The draft was not adopted because the United States, a permanent Council member, voted against it. The U.S. State Department said its objection was that the draft did not make the release of hostages an explicit condition of an immediate, unconditional ceasefire; it also said seven U.S. citizens remained hostages in Gaza.[35]

On 26 November, Israel and Lebanon accepted a U.S. proposal for a cessation of hostilities, scheduled to take effect at 4 a.m. local time the following day. President Joe Biden announced the agreement and said the United States would make another effort with Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, Israel, and others to secure a Gaza ceasefire, release the hostages, and end the war without Hamas in power.[8]

Netanyahu said he would bring the Lebanon framework to the security cabinet, which approved it by a 10–1 vote. He gave three reasons for accepting it: focusing on Iran, allowing Israeli forces to rest and replenish stocks, and separating the fronts to isolate Hamas. He said that with Hezbollah out of the fighting, Hamas would be alone and pressure on it would increase, helping efforts to free hostages.[36] These were Netanyahu’s stated rationales and predictions, not terms of a Gaza agreement.

The Israel–Hezbollah arrangement was a separate regional development, not a ceasefire in Gaza. A Lebanese official likewise described the agreement as unconnected to the Gaza front and to Hamas-held hostages.[37] At the close of the period, Israeli operations in Gaza were continuing, and no Gaza ceasefire or hostage-release agreement had been reached in the cited material.[6][8]

On 14 November, Human Rights Watch published a 172-page report alleging that Israeli officials were committing the war crime of forcible transfer and that displacement could amount to a crime against humanity or ethnic cleansing in areas where Palestinians could not return. The report drew on interviews, satellite imagery, and public reporting through August 2024, and therefore did not cover the intense northern Gaza offensive that began in early October. A UN Palestinian refugee agency spokeswoman said at least 100,000 people had been displaced from far northern Gaza to Gaza City and surrounding areas. Israel rejected the allegations, saying operations aimed to dismantle Hamas and that evacuations were temporary precautions; the IDF accused Human Rights Watch of bias and factual distortion.[38]

On 21 November, the International Criminal Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and former defense minister Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected to the Gaza war. The court said there were reasonable grounds to believe the two had intentionally and knowingly deprived Gaza’s civilian population of objects indispensable to survival, and that it could identify no clear military need or other justification under international humanitarian law for the restrictions. The alleged-crime period described in another report ran from at least 8 October 2023 through 20 May 2024. The warrants were allegations and findings at the warrant stage, not convictions.[4][39]

The court also issued a warrant for Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif, concerning his role in commanding the 7 October attacks against civilian targets and responsibility for subordinates’ cruel treatment of and sexual violence against hostages. The court had not yet verified Deif’s reported death in July. It had intended to issue warrants for Ismail Haniyeh and Sinwar before their deaths.[4] Israel and the United States rejected the warrants and disputed the court’s jurisdiction and process; the United States and Israel are not members of the ICC, and the court said Israel’s acceptance of its jurisdiction was not required.[5]

The ICC action intensified legal and diplomatic disputes. The court’s stated grounds should be distinguished from a final judgment of guilt, and the available reporting records both the allegations and the Israeli and U.S. objections without resolving them.[4][5] The Prime Minister’s Office rejected the decision and called it antisemitic, as reported in coverage of the warrants.[39]

Accounts of strikes and casualties also remained contested. Palestinian and Hamas-run authorities supplied several estimates, including figures for Beit Lahia, while Israeli officials disputed some accounts or did not comment on others. The cited material does not independently verify every reported casualty total.[18][17] Likewise, reports about displacement and aid access included statements by humanitarian organizations, U.S. officials, Israeli authorities, and Gaza-based agencies that used different measures and attributed responsibility differently.[27][7]