Israeli Law in the West Bank Settlements

Israeli residents of the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — are subject to selected Israeli laws through arrangements often described as “enclave law.”[1] This framework has two principal mechanisms: Knesset legislation that expressly applies beyond Israel’s territory, and military legislation that incorporates Israeli legal arrangements, particularly for settlement local and regional councils.[1] The result is not the general territorial application of Israeli domestic law: laws concerning residents’ taxes, social insurance, or criminal jurisdiction may apply without Israeli land, planning, and zoning laws thereby becoming the law throughout the West Bank.[1]

The distinction between personal and territorial application is central to the system.[2] Personal application connects a person to specified Israeli rights, obligations, or courts; territorial application would make Israeli law applicable to an area as such.[2] Israel did not extend its law and jurisdiction generally to the West Bank after 1967, unlike the specific measures applying Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to East Jerusalem.[3] The settlement framework also differs from the application of Israeli law to the Golan Heights.[2]

The territory’s underlying legal framework contains several historical layers rather than a single comprehensive code.[2] These include Ottoman and British Mandatory rules, Jordanian law, military orders, and relevant public international law.[2] Military orders function as legislation and may amend the pre-existing law, while the military commander’s decisions are subject to judicial review under relevant international law and Israeli administrative-law principles.[1][2]

Applicable rules also vary by population, subject matter, and administrative area.[4] Palestinians may be subject to pre-1967 statutes, military ordinances, and Palestinian Authority law where applicable, while Israeli residents are subject to Israeli legislation and military ordinances.[4] Accordingly, identifying the applicable law requires attention not only to a person’s residence but also to the legal issue involved and the authority responsible for it.[2][4]

On June 7, 1967, the Israeli military commander issued a proclamation assuming governmental, legislative, appointive, and administrative powers over the West Bank and its inhabitants.[5] The postwar framework preserved the law in force on that date, subject to the proclamation, subsequent military orders, and changes resulting from military rule.[2] Its starting point was therefore continuity of existing local law, not the wholesale replacement of that law with Israeli legislation.[2]

The preserved legal inheritance included Ottoman and Mandatory provisions as well as Jordanian rules specific to the West Bank.[2] Later military legislation added another layer and could substantially alter existing arrangements without converting the territory as a whole into an area governed by Israeli domestic law.[2] Military government remained the framework for administering Palestinian inhabitants until the changes introduced in 1995.[5]

Emergency regulations established shortly after the Six-Day War addressed the jurisdictional problems arising from Israeli control of territory outside Israel’s declared borders.[6] They enabled Israeli courts to try Israeli residents for offenses committed in the area under Israeli law and established mechanisms for cooperation between Israeli and military courts, including transfers of certain people and prisoners.[6] As Israeli communities developed, the regulations and related legislation treated their Israeli residents as residents of Israel for specified legal purposes.[6]

The 1967 law extending emergency regulations concerning jurisdiction in felonies and legal assistance became an important route for personal application.[2] It provided Israeli courts with jurisdiction over acts that would constitute felonies if committed in Israel and allowed specified legislation to treat qualifying Israeli residents of the territories as residents for its purposes.[2] Other enactments expressly extended to Israeli citizens in the territories, while Israeli civil and labor courts exercised jurisdiction over certain disputes between Israeli residents there.[2]

The September 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement reorganized authority through a staged transfer of powers from Israel’s military government and Civil Administration to a Palestinian Council.[3] Forty spheres of civilian powers were transferred, with timing and scope depending on the type of authority and the demographic and strategic circumstances of Areas A, B, and C.[3] The agreement also addressed court jurisdiction, security arrangements, and redeployment of Israeli forces.[3]

Israelis and settlements were excluded from the Palestinian Council’s general jurisdiction, and Israel retained authority through its military government over Israelis and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.[2] The agreement preserved applicable Israeli legislation over Israelis in personam, meaning its application to them personally.[2] It nevertheless contained qualifications: Israeli commercial activity in the territory remained subject to the prevailing civil law governing that activity, and Palestinian courts could hear civil actions involving Israelis in limited circumstances.[2]

Settlements were reserved for permanent-status negotiations rather than declared illegal or required to be dismantled by the Oslo-process agreements.[3] Other reserved issues included Jerusalem, refugees, security arrangements, borders, and water.[3] The interim framework therefore allocated practical authority without itself resolving the settlements’ permanent status.[3]

Periodic renewal of the emergency regulations later became a significant parliamentary issue.[7] In June 2022, a renewal bill failed after members of the governing coalition withheld support; the government subsequently sought automatic renewal by dissolving the Knesset and calling an election.[7] At the time, the regulations were due to expire at the end of June.[8]

The deputy attorney general warned that expiration could disrupt criminal investigations and coordination between Israeli and West Bank police, and could deprive Israeli courts of authority to try Israeli residents for offenses committed in the area.[8] Another anticipated problem concerned the legal basis for holding people convicted by West Bank military courts in Israeli prisons.[8] Approximately 3,500 such West Bank residents were then imprisoned in Israel, and the legal assessment indicated that alternative arrangements would be necessary if the regulations expired.[8]

In January 2023, the Knesset renewed the regulations for five years.[9] The renewal continued the application of Israeli criminal law and selected civil laws, including income tax and health insurance, to Israeli citizens living in the West Bank.[9] The statute is known as the Law to Extend the Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria—Jurisdiction and Legal Aid 5727-1967).[10] Its operation concerns specified laws and residents rather than a general extension of Israeli law to the territory.[10]

Taxation, national insurance, health coverage, and criminal jurisdiction are prominent fields in which Israeli law applies personally to Israeli settlement residents.[1][9] Other identified subjects include mandatory military service, professional licensing, voting and candidacy rights, and social security.[6][11] These arrangements impose obligations as well as confer benefits: Israeli residents may be treated as residents of Israel for tax and service requirements alongside eligibility for insurance programs.[6]

Personal application does not mean that every Israeli statute applies implicitly.[2] A law may expressly extend to citizens or qualifying residents outside Israel, while another subject remains governed by local law or military legislation.[2] Product supervision is among the fields covered by extraterritorial Knesset enactments, whereas land, planning, and zoning remain important examples of the limits of this approach.[1]

Settlement municipal administration operates through military orders incorporating numerous arrangements drawn from Israeli law.[12] Education, welfare, and local government are areas of substantial synchronization between Israeli and settlement systems.[12] Local and regional councils thus operate within a framework that resembles Israeli municipal administration in many respects but derives its territorial authority from military legislation.[1][12]

Land and infrastructure law have remained a major material gap between the systems.[12] Procedures adapting settlement rules to amendments in Israeli law can address some discrepancies without applying Israeli law in its entirety to the territory.[12] Israeli legislation intended to operate locally may also require adjustment to local conditions before implementation through military authority.[13] The military commander, who heads the IDF Central Command, can issue directives governing civilian matters, including labor protection and commerce.[13]

The Oslo-era division of authority adds a geographic dimension.[4] In Area A, the Palestinian Authority has formal responsibility for civil administration and security, although Israeli forces conduct security operations there.[4] In Area B, the PA maintains civil administration and its civil and criminal law applies to Palestinians, while Israel retains overriding security responsibility.[4] Area C constitutes approximately 60 percent of the West Bank and remains under full Israeli security and administrative control, with Palestinians there subject to military ordinances.[4]

The allocation also separates territorial civil matters from services directed to a population.[14] Under the Israeli government’s account of the interim arrangements, Area C includes the settlements, and Israel is responsible for security, public order, planning, and zoning, while the Palestinian Council handles other civilian spheres for the Palestinian population.[14] Hebron has a further division: H1 is under PA control, while in H2, where approximately 800 Israeli settlers lived in the period covered by a 2023 report, internal security, public order, and civil authorities concerning Israelis and their property were under Israeli military protection.[15]

Criminal proceedings illustrate the operation of different legal mechanisms.[16] Israeli authorities try Israelis living in settlements under Israeli civilian law in the nearest Israeli district court, whereas Palestinians prosecuted under the military system are tried under military law in Israeli military courts.[16] The regulations facilitate coordination between these systems, including transfers of people and prisoners.[6]

Differences have also existed in detention periods and rules concerning juveniles.[6] The Supreme Court reduced some detention-period disparities following a petition.[6] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs identifies the Order regarding Security Provisions (Consolidated Version) (Judea and Samaria) (No. 1651), 5770-2009, as a central consolidation of military provisions governing detention and offenses.[17]

Employment disputes show that Israeli law may also apply to Palestinians working in Israeli settlements.[1] The Supreme Court applied Israeli labor law to Palestinian workers in Israeli enclaves using private international law’s “significant linkages” test and the principle of equality.[1] This judicial route differs from a general territorial extension of Israeli labor legislation.[1]

Implementation has not always matched the legal ruling.[18] A 2021 account reported that, despite a 2007 Supreme Court ruling requiring application of Israeli law to Palestinian workers in settlements, enforcement remained incomplete and most settlements continued to apply Jordanian law to those workers.[18] Other accounts describe Israeli labor law being applied in many cases involving Palestinians employed by Israelis in Israeli communities.[6]

Judicial review extends beyond employment to the military commander’s exercise of authority.[2] Review under Israeli administrative-law principles and relevant international law does not itself make all Israeli domestic law applicable throughout the territory.[2] In the 2005 Alfei Menashe judgment, the Supreme Court held that the commander must protect settlers’ security while considering rights recognized in Israeli law, including life, property, freedom of movement, and freedom of occupation.[19] These interests had to be balanced proportionately against the rights of the local Arab population.[19] The Court required reconsideration of barrier-route alternatives that would cause less harm to residents of Palestinian villages within the enclave.[19]

Construction is subject to another set of distinctions within Israeli domestic procedures.[20] Authorized settlements require state sanction, land classified by Israel as state land, and construction permits.[20] Unauthorized outposts are considered illegal by the Israeli government, although some have subsequently received retroactive approval.[20] These classifications concern authorization under Israeli procedures and are separate from the international-law question of settlement legality.[20]

The 2017 Settlement Regularization Law attempted to regularize certain construction on land where builders lacked rights, including privately owned Palestinian land.[21] It provided for use and possession rights in cases involving good-faith construction or state consent, and for compensation to owners.[21] Compensation was set at 125 percent of the land’s value.[22] The legislation also contemplated registering certain land as government property after a period for submitting claims.[21]

On June 9, 2020, the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, annulled the law by eight votes to one.[21] The majority found infringements of Palestinian property rights and rights to dignity and equality that failed the proportionality requirement under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.[21] Chief Justice Esther Hayut concluded that avoiding the demolition of homes did not justify the significant infringement involved, while Justice Noam Solberg dissented from complete annulment.[21] The state received 90 days to prepare for the resumption of demolition proceedings.[21]

The practical context included 3,455 permanent and movable settlement-associated structures on privately owned Palestinian land as of 2016, according to information contained in the ruling.[21] Annulment did not require demolition of every structure: the Court left room for individual solutions where construction had proceeded in good faith in reliance on state consent.[21] More than 1,000 structures stood on land previously believed to be state land but later identified as private land after the Blue Line Team re-examined boundaries using more precise methods.[21]

A further limit on settlement local-government authority emerged in October 2025.[23] The High Court unanimously ruled that the Jordan Valley Regional Council could not enforce its municipal bylaws against Palestinian residents or their property.[23] Four Palestinian herders had petitioned after the council seized livestock and charged fees.[23] The Court held that the relevant military regulations authorized bylaws applying to Israeli residents only and barred their use against livestock reasonably suspected of belonging to Palestinians.[23]

The emergency regulations enable Israeli residents outside Israel’s sovereign territory to participate in many Israeli legal and social institutions without making the same arrangements applicable to Palestinians.[9] Their significance lies in the practical connections they sustain: criminal jurisdiction, tax collection, military-service obligations, insurance coverage, and legal cooperation between civilian and military authorities.[6][10] The disruptions anticipated during the 2022 renewal crisis demonstrate how extensively these arrangements underpin everyday administration.[8]

Military legislation remains legally distinct from Israeli domestic legislation even where their substance is similar.[2] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs emphasizes this distinction and describes the post-1967 approach as an undertaking to respect pre-existing law under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations unless absolutely prevented.[17] Its account also identifies Palestinian Authority legislation as a later addition to the earlier Ottoman, Mandatory, Jordanian, and military layers.[17]

The application of Israeli rights and administrative principles has made Israeli courts important institutions in settlement governance.[1][2] Their decisions address both the protection of Israeli residents and limits on public authority, including proportionality in security measures and labor protections for Palestinian employees.[1][19] They also address property rights and the scope of municipal bylaws.[21][23] The 2020 Regularization Law judgment resolved the constitutional challenge before it without deciding whether the Knesset possessed general authority to enact legislation applying outside Israel’s territory.[21]

Administrative arrangements have also changed without a general territorial extension of Israeli law.[24] Beginning in late 2022, decision-making authority over civil affairs in Area C was transferred from the military to a civilian minister within the Ministry of Defence.[24] Settlement administration shifted from military control to a new political body in 2023.[20] Settlement regional and local councils have also exercised de facto jurisdiction over their communities.[24]

A further development concerned land registration.[25] In February 2026, the cabinet approved resumption of a land-registration process in Area C and instructed the IDF Central Command commander to authorize the Justice Ministry’s Land Registry to carry it out.[25] The resolution allocated an initial NIS 244 million for 2026–2030.[25] The measure was presented by the government as land registration and stopped short of formally annexing the territory.[25]

Regulatory reach has expanded across numerous subjects.[24] The legal arrangements encompass criminal law, national health insurance, taxation, and elections, alongside separate traffic-enforcement arrangements and planning and building regimes.[24] These developments operate within a system in which military law has substantially replaced portions of the local law that existed in 1967, while selected Israeli laws have been extended extraterritorially to Israeli residents.[24] The central distinction remains between expanding specific legal and administrative mechanisms and extending Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration territorially as a whole.[2][3]

Israel’s official position describes the West Bank as disputed territory whose final status should be negotiated, arguing that it lacked a legitimate, recognized sovereign before 1967 and that Israel has competing claims.[26] Successive governments have disputed the Fourth Geneva Convention’s de jure applicability while undertaking to implement its humanitarian provisions; Israeli Supreme Court decisions have nevertheless described Judea and Samaria as held under belligerent occupation.[1] The nonbinding 2012 Levy Committee likewise concluded that Israel did not meet the criteria for a military occupying power and recommended steps to regulate outposts and planning.[27]

Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention is a central point of disagreement.[3] Palestinians, UN organs, and the European Union consider settlements contrary to its prohibition on an occupying power transferring parts of its civilian population into occupied territory.[3] Israel interprets the provision as addressing deportation or transfer rather than voluntary movement that does not displace local inhabitants.[3] Israeli arguments also invoke the absence of a previous legitimate sovereign and the existence of some Jewish settlements under Ottoman and Mandatory rule.[20]

The International Court of Justice’s July 19, 2024 advisory opinion concluded that the settlements and their associated regime violated international law and that extensive application of Israeli domestic law helped entrench Israeli control.[24] The opinion was advisory and nonbinding and called for Israel to end its presence as rapidly as possible.[28] Separate unresolved issues concern the legal nature and continuing effect of the 1995 Interim Agreement, including its original five-year interim period.[3]

Debate also concerns whether expanded legal integration constitutes annexation.[12] A proposed 2014 “Norms Law” would have required the military commander to enact Knesset laws by order within 45 days, but was discussed as a proposal rather than an enacted rule.[1] The Institute for National Security Studies argued that it would subordinate the commander’s discretion and amount to de facto annexation.[1] Palestinian officials and advocacy organizations similarly characterized the 2026 land-registration measure as a step toward de facto annexation.[25] A competing Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs interpretation disputes reducing the framework to two legal systems divided simply between Israelis and Palestinians, emphasizing personal jurisdiction and the allocation of powers.[29]