Palestinian Prisoners' Document

The document emerged during a period of political division following Hamas's victory in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and the formation of a government led by Ismail Haniyeh. The Quartet had set conditions for engagement with the Hamas-led government, including nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of prior agreements. Palestinian leaders were also contending with disagreements over those conditions and rising tensions between Fatah and Hamas.[4]

The initiative took shape among prominent Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails. Marwan Barghouti, a Fatah leader, and Hamas figure Abd al-Khaleq al-Natsheh were among the prisoners associated with the document.[6][7] Barghouti later said that he presented a draft developed with others, incorporated suggestions, and secured unanimous approval among those involved. He described its 18 points as an effort to prevent civil war and open a path to negotiations with Israel.[7] Acceptance was not stable, however: CRS reported that Hamas prisoners who had co-authored the draft withdrew their support during the referendum dispute, while a Washington Institute analysis reported that al-Natsheh later withdrew his endorsement.[1][8]

The chronology depends on which stage is being described. CRS dates the initial drafting to May 10, 2006, while an INSS account says prisoners published a National Reconciliation Document on May 11.[1][2] A later UN report says Hamas subscribed in June to a common platform shared by five factions.[5] These dates may concern drafting, publication, signing, or subsequent factional subscription rather than a single event.

Reports also vary in their lists of signatories and participating factions. A Jewish Virtual Library page presenting the proposed referendum text lists four individual signatories representing Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The UN account describes the later common platform as shared by five factions, including the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).[6][5] The accounts may therefore describe different stages or versions.

The initial National Accord Document proposed an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital on all land occupied by Israel in 1967. Its opening provisions also called for Palestinian self-determination, refugee return, and the release of prisoners and detainees. It referred to UN General Assembly Resolution 194 in connection with refugees' right of return and compensation.[6]

The document placed these objectives within a broader political program. It called for reorganizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), incorporating Hamas and PIJ into its institutions, and broadening representation in a new Palestinian National Council. The PLO was presented as the representative framework for Palestinians at home and abroad. The proposal assigned negotiations to the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA) president; major agreements were to be submitted to the Palestinian National Council or, where possible, to a referendum.[6]

Its treatment of resistance combined support for resistance with political and diplomatic activity. The reproduced text endorsed resistance by all means while concentrating it in territories occupied in 1967. It also called for political action, negotiations, diplomacy, continued popular resistance, and a unified resistance front.[6] Accounts distinguish this formulation from the revised June text, which said resistance would be concentrated in—but not limited to—the territories occupied in 1967.[4]

The document also addressed internal governance and security. It called for ending internal Palestinian violence, rejecting the use of weapons to settle internal disputes, and addressing disorder and unauthorized weapons. Other provisions proposed periodic elections and peaceful transfers of power, dialogue and peaceful protest, reform of security services, and rules governing their relationship with resistance groups. A national coalition government was envisaged, particularly bringing together Fatah and Hamas with other forces willing to participate on the document's basis.[6]

The text called for support for refugees and the establishment of a representative body to pursue the right of return. It urged international solidarity and implementation of an International Court of Justice decision concerning the separation wall. It also called for protecting and consolidating the PA, respecting its temporary constitution and existing laws, and recognizing the authority of the elected president and government. The liberation of prisoners was described as a “sacred national duty.”[6]

Jerusalem had several roles in the document rather than appearing only as a proposed capital. The Jerusalem Institute counts three references: Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state, as a target for liberation alongside the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and in an opening passage condemning what the document called the “Judaization of Jerusalem.”[9] The provisions therefore combined a statehood claim with other formulations about the city's status and political meaning.

The document became the center of a political dispute between Mahmoud Abbas, president of the PA, and the Hamas-led government. Abbas accepted the initial proposal, while Hamas officials objected to what they understood as implied recognition of Israel within its pre-1967 boundaries.[4] On May 25, Abbas called on Hamas to accept the document within ten days or face a national referendum. On June 10, he scheduled the vote for July 26, asking whether voters agreed with the document.[1]

The referendum was widely interpreted as an effort to pressure the Hamas-led government, according to a Washington Institute analysis, which also noted that its legality was disputed.[8] Hamas opposed the proposed vote and called for a boycott. Haniyeh argued that Palestinian law did not authorize referendums and sought more time to revise the proposals.[1]

Public support for the document's principles exceeded stated support for approving it in a referendum. An INSS account citing a June 15–18, 2006 survey reports that 74 percent supported the principles, while 47 percent said they would vote for the document in a referendum.[3] The distinction suggests that support for broad principles did not automatically translate into support for the ballot or its political circumstances.

The factions continued negotiating and reached agreement on a revised document on June 28.[1] The revision assigned the PLO and the PA president responsibility for negotiations aimed at establishing a state in territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Any agreement was to go to a new Palestinian National Council or to a referendum open to Palestinians in the territories and the diaspora. It also called for a national unity government and reform of the PLO to enable Hamas and PIJ to join.[10]

The revised text did not simply duplicate the initial draft. The June version described resistance, alongside political action, as concentrated in—but not limited to—the territories occupied in 1967. It affirmed refugees' right “to return to their homes and properties.” PIJ rejected the revised document, while Hamas officials said it did not require recognition of Israel or acceptance of a two-state outcome.[4][10]

The agreement weakened the immediate rationale for Abbas's planned referendum. On July 15, Abbas said that a national referendum was no longer needed to approve the document.[1] Earlier reporting on the negotiations described the factions as having initialed an understanding and said PIJ welcomed the agreement while retaining objections to provisions. A dialogue committee source said the referendum would be cancelled following formal signature.[11] The reports describe different stages—understanding, initialing, signing, and later implementation—and should not be treated as interchangeable.

The revised document contributed to announced efforts at political accommodation but did not resolve the underlying divisions. On June 24, under public pressure to endorse the proposal, Hamas and Fatah leaders announced agreement on principles for forming a coalition; an INSS historical account says subsequent escalation prevented the agreement from rehabilitating the Palestinian political system. On September 11, Abbas and Haniyeh again announced agreement on basic principles for a unity government based on the prisoners' document, the 2002 Arab peace initiative, and UN resolutions.[3]

Those announcements did not settle the disagreement over recognition of Israel or the terms of a unity government. In September, Abbas said a future government would commit to prior agreements, particularly the 1993 mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. Haniyeh said, “I personally will not head any government that recognizes Israel,” after which Abbas said unity-government efforts had “gone back to point zero.”[1] The exchange demonstrated the limits of the document as a compromise platform.

The broader political setting remained unsettled. The Jerusalem Institute records that Ehud Olmert and Abbas met in December 2006 to promote confidence-building measures. It describes violent clashes between Hamas and Fatah in Gaza and Hamas's takeover there in June 2007 as leading to the dismantling of a unity government formed in March 2007 and the establishment of the Fayyad government.[9]

Accounts therefore distinguish the document's role in generating negotiations and announced understandings from the question of whether it produced durable unity. The INSS history records coalition announcements but concludes that later escalation frustrated their political effect.[3]

Whether the document recognized Israel was a central dispute. The reproduced text called for a Palestinian state on territories occupied in 1967 but did not explicitly name or recognize Israel.[6] The UN Fact-Finding Mission interpreted the statehood clause as implying recognition of Israel, while CRS reported that Hamas rejected the initial draft's implied recognition and that Hamas officials later said the revised text required neither recognition of Israel nor acceptance of a two-state outcome.[4][5] These were competing interpretations and political positions, not a single uncontested textual conclusion.

The refugee provisions and the scope of resistance were also contentious. Israel's Foreign Ministry objected that the revised document did not recognize Israel's right to exist or declare the conflict over, and argued that its refugee-return demand contradicted a two-state solution; CRS records these as the ministry's stated criticisms.[4] The document itself affirmed a return claim and used resistance language that changed between the May and June versions.[4][10]

A Jerusalem Center commentary argues that accepting the PLO as an umbrella organization and adopting its earlier resolutions implied recognition through prior PLO statements, while emphasizing that the document did not recognize Israel in a straightforward way. It also interprets the proposed unified resistance command as having implications for terrorist and other armed activity, and argues that the statehood proposal did not abandon a claim of return to areas inside Israel.[12] These are the author's interpretations rather than explicit clauses that can be stated as settled fact.

Political actors also disagreed over the referendum's purpose and authority. The Washington Institute describes Abbas's initiative as widely understood as an effort to pressure the Hamas-led government and notes disagreement over its legality.[8] The Jerusalem Center attributes to Hamas leaders objections to the document's terminology, the PLO's proposed role, and the referendum's authority, while reporting that Fatah sources portrayed the initiative differently.[12] The document thus became both a proposed common platform and a vehicle in disputes about who could speak for Palestinians and authorize political decisions.