Palestine Papers

The records later published as the Palestine Papers spanned several phases of Israeli–Palestinian diplomacy rather than documenting a single negotiation or proposed agreement.[3] The collection included a 1999 memorandum on procedures for permanent-status negotiations, material concerning the 2000 Camp David talks and security discussions, a 2003 British security plan, and documents about Gaza disengagement in 2004.[3] Later records addressed the 2007–2009 Annapolis process and discussions of implementation of the Road Map.[3]

Ehud Olmert’s retrospective account placed the resumption of his negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas in 2006.[4] Olmert recalled offering to transfer $100 million immediately from Palestinian tax revenues held by Israeli authorities, presenting the gesture as a demonstration that Israel was serious about negotiations.[4] His account also described talks continuing while settlement construction proceeded on a limited but openly acknowledged basis.[4]

Olmert wrote that he promised American officials there would be no construction in the E1 area during negotiations, while maintaining that Israel would not agree to evacuate that area under a future agreement.[4] He described an understanding that negotiations would continue despite construction elsewhere.[4] In his account, the construction freeze became a major international dispute after the Israeli government changed in April 2009 and the Obama administration took office.[4]

Minutes of a November 8, 2007, meeting preparing for the Annapolis Conference listed Palestinian participants including Ahmed Qurei and Saeb Erekat, alongside Israeli participants including Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni.[5] Their discussion recorded differences over immediate and parallel implementation of the Road Map, monitoring arrangements, and whether settlement activity should be addressed before Annapolis.[5] The conference’s terms of reference and timetable also remained unresolved in that meeting record.[5]

By June 21, 2008, a post-Annapolis plenary was addressing gaps over security, settlements, borders, Jerusalem, and refugees.[3] Its published summary recorded Livni’s rejection of a Palestinian demand for compensation for damage to the Palestinian economy attributed to the occupation.[3] It also recorded her raising a possible exchange involving Wadi Ara, which Qurei rejected.[3] These discussions formed part of the negotiating history exposed by the subsequent disclosure, not a concluded permanent-status agreement.[3]

Al Jazeera began publishing the leaked diplomatic papers on January 23, 2011.[1] Its announcement presented the releases under the title “Top Secret,” with approximately 1,600 confidential documents concerning Israeli–Palestinian peace talks.[6] Al Jazeera and The Guardian published material from the collection, including documents largely produced within Palestinian negotiating institutions.[7]

The cache consisted principally of documents prepared by the Palestinian Negotiation Support Unit, which supplied technical and legal support to the Palestinian side, and was leaked over a period of months from multiple sources.[7] Other documents concerned contacts with American and British security bodies.[7] The collection’s formats included memoranda, emails, maps, minutes of private meetings, high-level exchanges, and strategy papers.[3][8]

Although some material reached back to 1999, much of the reporting concentrated on more recent negotiations.[3][7] The records extended through private discussions in 2010 involving senior Obama administration officials, encompassing roughly a decade from the failed 2000 Camp David summit.[7] They also included late-2009 Palestinian–American exchanges concerning the Goldstone Report, which addressed possible Israeli and Palestinian human-rights violations during the 2008–2009 Gaza conflict.[1]

The publication exposed discussions on sensitive permanent-status issues: possible concessions involving Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, arrangements for Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, refugee return, and security cooperation with Israel.[1] The documents presented accounts of negotiations primarily recorded by Palestinian institutions.[7] Their contents included proposals, internal deliberations, and summaries of exchanges, rather than a single agreement accepted by both parties.[3]

The territorial discussions included a Palestinian position allowing an exchange of up to 2% of the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[2] A reconstruction of the Palestinian map from meeting minutes represented a 1.9% exchange, and a December 14, 2008, Refugee Committee document also recorded a Palestinian offer of 1.9%.[2][3] Erekat and Israeli negotiator Udi Dekel additionally discussed Palestinian willingness to consider an exchange of up to 4%, conditional on approval in a plebiscite.[2]

Accounts of Olmert’s territorial offer contained different figures and dates.[2][9] A published summary dated to August 31, 2008, described Israeli annexation of 6.8% of the West Bank, including major settlement blocs and East Jerusalem settlements, in exchange for land amounting to 5.5% of Israel.[9][10] It included a Gaza–West Bank passage under Israeli sovereignty but Palestinian control, together with a road connecting Bethlehem and Ramallah while bypassing East Jerusalem.[9][10] That summary did not address the Jordan Valley and apparently contained no security component.[9]

A separate account of Olmert’s September 2008 proposal described annexation of 6.5%, offset by 5.8% from within Israel and a Gaza–West Bank corridor equivalent to the remaining 0.7%.[2] Reporting on the maps identified Ma’ale Adumim, Ariel, and Kedumim among the major settlements that would remain under Israeli control.[6] It gave figures of 56,000 settlers to be evacuated and 413,000 to remain in their communities.[6]

Other named areas retained under the Israeli proposal included Gush Etzion, Gilo, and Har Homa, with the Palestinian side opposing retention of Har Homa.[6] Before the meeting associated with the “napkin map,” the Palestinians reportedly proposed exchanging 119 square kilometers for an equal area inside Israel.[6] That account described Israel receiving developed land within the West Bank while the Palestinian side would receive comparatively less-developed areas.[6]

Olmert’s memoir account dated his presentation of the proposed settlement and map to September 16, 2008.[4] He recalled Abbas asking for time to consult and proposing that mapping experts review the map together.[4] Olmert said the follow-up meeting was postponed and that he did not meet Abbas again afterward.[4] Another report of the memoir excerpts repeated that Abbas wanted consultation with experts and that Olmert urged him to sign.[11]

The leaked internal deliberations also recorded Erekat considering three possible responses to Olmert’s proposal: a counterproposal with a map that could be shown but not handed over, an ambiguous response, or a negative response.[2] He asked his team to consider how to avoid an accusation of rejecting and torpedoing the proposal without making the Palestinian position irreversible.[2]

A Palestinian map presented in May 2008 placed Gilo, French Hill, and Ramat Shlomo within Israel while opposing Israeli annexation of Har Homa, Ma’ale Adumim, and Givat Zeev.[2] The broader Palestinian approach envisaged two capitals and an “open city,” combining divided sovereignty with arrangements for movement and shared infrastructure.[2] Abbas proposed a “supreme municipality” to coordinate infrastructure and municipal services, while Livni emphasized Israeli security concerns and the need for clear, supervised borders.[2]

In discussing annexation of Jewish neighborhoods in exchange for territory in the Jerusalem corridor, Erekat declared, “We are building for you the largest Jerusalem in history.”[2] A reported June 15, 2008, meeting record similarly attributed to Qurei a proposal that Israel annex East Jerusalem neighborhoods except Har Homa, which he characterized as unprecedented.[10] A separate exchange concerned Qurei’s suggestion that Ma’ale Adumim could remain under Palestinian rule; Livni called that proposal unrealistic.[10]

A January 2010 record attributed to Erekat a statement to American envoy George Mitchell that the Palestinians had agreed to “greater Jerusalem,” with the remainder of the Old City under Palestinian rule.[10] It also recorded discussion of handling Temple Mount through a committee or authority and of a demilitarized Palestinian state.[10] Other published claims included leaving the Jewish Quarter and part of the Armenian Quarter under Israeli control.[6]

The published summary of Olmert’s August 2008 package deferred sovereignty over the “Holy Basin” to a later stage.[9] It described the area as approximately 2.2 square kilometers, or about 0.04% of the West Bank, and envisaged continued bilateral negotiations with involvement by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, none of which could impose an agreement.[9] Another account described joint administration of Temple Mount and other holy places without sovereignty assigned to any one state, involving Egypt, Jordan, the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians.[6]

The refugee negotiations exposed a fundamental gap over responsibility and return.[2] The Israeli side argued that the solution should lie within the Palestinian state and that Israel was not responsible, or not exclusively responsible, for the refugee problem.[2] The Palestinian team sought recognition of Israeli responsibility and maintained a right of return.[2]

Olmert’s offer included admitting 5,000 refugees to Israel as a humanitarian gesture, at 1,000 annually for five years.[2] His proposal would acknowledge Palestinian suffering without accepting Israeli responsibility, mention Israeli suffering as well, and provide compensation without restitution or a general right of return.[9] Continued family reunification was also included in the published summary.[9] Erekat, by contrast, cited 80,000 as the lowest number discussed on the Palestinian side.[2]

Most refugees were envisaged as resettling in Palestine, existing host countries, or third countries.[2] The parties agreed in principle to an international mechanism covering claims, resettlement, rehabilitation, and compensation, while leaving important operational details unresolved.[2] The collection also contained an April 28, 2007, draft titled “Principles of Permanent Status Agreement between Israel and Palestine,” whose listed provisions included a cap of 100,000 returning refugees; its origin was unspecified.[3]

Other released records and contemporary accounts contained additional figures.[12] One account described 1,000 refugees annually for five years, while later memoranda reportedly referred to a Palestinian demand for twice that number and possible Israeli acceptance.[12] A February 2009 exchange attributed to Erekat the statement “the deal is there” and a description of 1,000 admissions annually for ten years.[12] Another report described discussion in June 2009 of 10,000 refugees and their families returning to Israel.[13] These figures related to different documents or stages of discussion, rather than one settled proposal.[12]

A March 29, 2008, meeting record attributed to Abbas the view that asking Israel to admit five million or even one million refugees would be illogical and “would mean the end of Israel.”[13] Another contemporary account described a possible arrangement of 5,000 admissions annually for ten years.[6] The variety of figures reflected the range of reported proposals and internal discussions exposed by the publication.[6][12]

Security material included descriptions of close Israeli–Palestinian cooperation and suggestions that Palestinian officials had received information before Operation Cast Lead in late 2008.[10] Published allegations also concerned Palestinian encouragement for Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor, advance warning to Abbas from Israeli official Amos Gilad, Palestinian Authority support for the Gaza blockade, and cooperation aimed at silencing the Goldstone Report.[6] These were allegations presented through the released material, not established findings of an independent investigation.[6][10]

The collection included a 2009 matrix comparing Israeli and Palestinian negotiating positions.[3] A January 26, 2009, table on Road Map implementation argued that the Palestinians were closer to meeting their obligations than Israel or the Arab states, and that Israel had not implemented most objectives.[3] Those assessments were claims made within the documents themselves.[3]

Palestinian leaders, including Abbas and Erekat, defended their conduct after publication.[1] Erekat said negotiators had “made no backroom deals” and that “no agreement has ever been reached between the parties on any of the permanent status issues.”[14] The release prompted outrage among Palestinians who understood the records as showing consideration of compromises on refugee return.[14] Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar urged refugees to protest over the reported discussions.[13]

Israeli officials downplayed the disclosure and declined to comment on confidential negotiations or Palestinian interpretations of them.[1] Erekat resigned as head of the Palestinian negotiating team in February 2011, then withdrew his resignation not long afterward.[2] A subsequent analysis described the political and media tempest as subsiding quickly, with turmoil in Egypt displacing the papers from the public agenda.[15]

At a January 27, 2011, American press briefing, spokesperson Philip J. Crowley said no specific Palestinian request for assistance in interviewing a person possibly connected to the leak had been received, although public comments about such a request had been seen.[16] He confirmed that Clayton Swisher had previously worked for the State Department but did not answer whether Swisher had access to documents.[16] The briefing did not establish that Swisher was responsible for the leak.[16]

Crowley said the United States was not investigating the disclosure because the documents were not American documents.[16] American officials were nevertheless discussing the release’s potential consequences with regional counterparts.[16] He distinguished those conversations from an investigation and said the documents had not changed the American understanding of the diplomatic challenge or its willingness to act.[16] Separately, on January 24, Crowley warned that the release would “at least for a time, make the situation more difficult than it already was.”[1]

The Palestine Papers made available thousands of pages of diplomatic correspondence, private meeting minutes, high-level exchanges, and strategy papers, with documents subsequently accessible in PDF form.[3] Their chronological range allowed examination of multiple negotiating phases, including Camp David, disengagement, Annapolis, and exchanges with the Obama administration.[3][7] Olmert’s memoir excerpts, published alongside the disclosure, supplied an Israeli participant’s retrospective account; he characterized the parties as having been closer than ever to a framework agreement.[4]

Pinhas Inbari’s analysis of the disclosure described Al Jazeera creating a website for original documents and The Guardian publishing them in a similar format.[17] He argued that the papers did not establish the sweeping Palestinian concessions attributed to them, distinguishing acceptance of land swaps in principle from agreement on their size or location.[17] In his interpretation, Palestinian opposition to Israeli retention of settlement blocs remained substantial: Ariel was to be dismantled, while Ma’ale Adumim might remain only under Palestinian sovereignty.[17]

Inbari also described accusations that negotiators had departed from Yasser Arafat’s positions on Jerusalem by accepting the principle “what is Jewish to Israel and what is Arab to Palestine,” and by discussing sovereignty over the al-Aqsa Mosque compound, including the space beneath it.[17] He reported an internal briefing attributed to Abbas rejecting the return of millions, and discussed a figure of 100,000 admissions over ten years without identifying clearly which side proposed it.[17]

The same analysis characterized the Palestinian Authority’s response as treating the publication as espionage and described accusations of treason against Qatar.[17] It quoted Erekat’s complaint that “instead of delegitimizing the occupation, they delegitimized us.”[17] It also advanced an uncorroborated allegation of Palestinian cooperation in killing senior Hamas terrorists and warned of possible family-based revenge attacks.[17]

An analysis of the public reaction argued that the disclosure failed to produce an uprising because the Palestinian public was not surprised by sensitive negotiations and feared deterioration.[15] Its author interpreted Al Jazeera’s publication as an effort to provoke protest and undermine the Palestinian Authority.[15] These explanations of the broadcaster’s intentions and the public’s motivations were analytical interpretations, rather than demonstrated consequences of the documents themselves.[15]

The collection’s authenticity and interpretation produced significant disagreement.[10] The Guardian was reported to have independently authenticated the bulk of the papers, while a reference overview stated that authentication also came from sources within the Israeli government.[7][3] Abbas said positions had been mixed together; Qurei alleged fabrication and denied the reported Jerusalem offer; Erekat called the material “a bunch of lies”; and Olmert’s office cited “many inaccuracies.”[10] Yasser Abed Rabbo initially said the Palestinian leadership could neither confirm nor deny authenticity and would examine accuracy.[6]

Accounts of the response were themselves inconsistent: one later analysis said Palestinian officials never questioned authenticity, whereas contemporary reporting recorded explicit allegations of fabrication.[18][8] Counts also varied between more than 1,600 and approximately 1,700 documents.[8][18] A methodological caution is that the leaked records were not jointly approved protocols, and some territorial maps were reconstructed from minutes rather than obtained as shared originals.[2] Inbari considered most documents genuine but voiced suspicions about refugee records and conditionally speculated about forgery without establishing it.[17] Proposals, drafts, and internal options therefore must not be mistaken for a concluded agreement.[2][3]