Palestinian Views on the Peace Process

Support for negotiations does not necessarily indicate acceptance of a particular agreement, just as support for Palestinian independence does not necessarily indicate acceptance of permanent coexistence with Israel.[1][2] Palestinian polling has separately measured preferred national goals, willingness to resume talks, recognition of Israel, support for armed struggle, and whether a negotiated settlement should terminate the conflict and all further claims.[3][4] The resulting picture includes both openness to practical agreements and opposition to compromises contained in proposed final-status packages.[2]

Geography and political affiliation also distinguish Palestinian attitudes.[2] In July 2023, 46% of East Jerusalem respondents selected negotiations as the preferred national focus, whereas the largest shares in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and Gaza selected escalating resistance, at 41% and 47%, respectively.[4] In July 2024, support for the general two-state concept was 42% among Fatah supporters and 29% among Hamas supporters.[2]

Leadership positions form another part of the subject, but are distinct from public opinion.[5] Fatah figures including Mahmoud Abbas have pursued statehood through negotiations, diplomacy, and civil disobedience, while Hamas has insisted on retaining violence against Israel as an option.[6] Their differences also concern governance: Fatah's secular model contrasts with Hamas's emphasis on Islamic norms.[6]

The Oslo process began with clandestine Israel–PLO negotiations and produced agreements establishing limited Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and parts of the West Bank.[7] In the September 1993 exchange preceding the Declaration of Principles, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat recognized Israel's right to exist in peace and security and committed the PLO to peaceful resolution and negotiations over permanent-status questions.[5] His commitments also included adherence to UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, renunciation of terrorism, and revocation of Palestinian National Covenant clauses denying Israel's right to exist.[7] Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate with it.[7]

Oslo established a five-year interim framework rather than an immediate permanent settlement.[7] Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, and security arrangements were deferred to later negotiations.[5] Oslo II, concluded in 1995, expanded Palestinian Authority areas and included mutual security arrangements.[7] The anticipated permanent agreement was not reached.[7]

Public support for Oslo II reached 72% in 1995, when the process appeared viable.[4] A November 12–14, 1998 survey of 1,321 Palestinian adults found 75% supporting the peace process, but a smaller 59% supporting the Wye agreement and 35% opposing it.[8] Expectations were considerably less optimistic: 78% expected Palestinian Authority implementation of Wye, compared with only 19% expecting Israeli implementation.[8] Fifty-seven percent believed Israel gained more from the agreement, while 18% believed Palestinians gained more.[8] Only 38% expected final-status negotiations to succeed, and 45% expected the process to produce a Palestinian state in the coming years.[8] The survey reported a ±3% margin of error and 3% non-response rate.[8]

Negotiations over Jerusalem around the 2000 Camp David summit revealed specific Palestinian territorial and sovereignty preferences.[9] The Palestinian side sought full sovereignty over East Jerusalem, while expressing acceptance, as discussions proceeded, of Israeli sovereignty in Jewish neighborhoods, the Jewish Quarter, and the Western Wall.[9] Palestinian negotiators opposed substituting limited autonomy or a sovereign corridor for sovereignty over Al-Haram Al-Sharif.[9] At Taba, the parties shared the principle that Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem would belong to Palestine and Jewish neighborhoods to Israel.[9] Disagreement remained over the Armenian Quarter, Al-Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount, and Jewish sites in the Holy Basin; Palestinian representatives expressed willingness to accommodate Israeli interests at those sites while insisting on Palestinian sovereignty.[9] Special and international regimes were among the proposals discussed.[9]

A joint survey conducted on December 30–31, 2004 showed majority Palestinian support for a comprehensive package.[10] Among 1,319 adults interviewed face-to-face, 54% supported the package and 44% opposed it; the reported margin of error was 3%.[10] Its components addressed borders and territorial exchange, refugees, Jerusalem, demilitarization, security, and termination of the conflict.[10] Support varied sharply by component: 63% approved territorial exchange, 46% the refugee arrangement, 44% the Jerusalem arrangement, and 27% the demilitarized-state provision.[10] Sixty-nine percent supported ending the conflict and further claims after full implementation, while 63% supported mutual recognition of Israel as the Jewish people's state and Palestine as the Palestinian people's state after independence and resolution of outstanding issues.[10]

A March 2005 survey of 1,361 Palestinians, including 860 in the West Bank and 501 in Gaza, found more than 75% supporting negotiations with Israel.[11] It also found 44.5% interpreting Hamas's agreement to participate in Palestinian Legislative Council elections as de facto recognition of Oslo.[11]

Polling in 2008 again separated endorsement of diplomacy from confidence in its immediate prospects.[12] An October 13–21 poll found 65.1% expecting the conflict to end through negotiations and an agreed political solution, compared with 29.3% choosing armed operations; nevertheless, 73% considered an agreement before the end of that year impossible.[12] Separate surveys found support for a Palestinian state on the territories occupied in 1967 at 68.5% in May and 67.1% in September, but support for two states on the historic land of Palestine at only 39.5% and 42.5%, respectively.[12] In August, 72.2% described themselves as supportive of the peace process.[12]

Negative judgments about the talks then underway coexisted with conditional openness to reconciliation.[12] In the 2008 polling collection, 64% considered meetings between Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas unbeneficial and wanted them stopped, while 74% considered a compromise permanent-status agreement with Olmert's government impossible or certainly impossible.[12] Yet 70.1% supported or strongly supported efforts toward full reconciliation if an agreement established a Palestinian state recognized by Israel.[12]

Two polls from the first half of August 2010 found substantial acceptance of a two-state framework: 55% preferred separate Israeli and Palestinian states to a binational state, and 62% in another survey considered two states at least tolerable.[1] In the latter survey, 95% would regard an implemented comprehensive peace agreement as ending the conflict.[1] Expectations of subsequent coexistence were much weaker: 17% answered yes, 38% maybe, and 42% no.[1] Most respondents also objected to direct talks without advance commitments on terms, timetables, and a settlement freeze.[1]

Five further polls conducted in October–November 2010 used representative face-to-face samples of 1,000–1,200 people.[3] Two found majority support for resuming negotiations when no preconditions were mentioned, while three found 54–62% supporting a settlement freeze as a precondition.[3] One poll found 57% in the West Bank and 37% in Gaza willing to recognize Israel as a homeland for the Jewish people within a peace agreement.[3] Another question found only 34% and 23%, respectively, preferring two states permanently side by side, with larger shares favoring two states followed eventually by one Palestinian state.[3]

An October 2010 survey sponsored by The Israel Project similarly found 61% supporting direct negotiations and 60% accepting a two-state solution, alongside 58% supporting armed struggle.[13] Support for armed struggle was 62% in the West Bank and 51% in Gaza.[13] When presented with alternative long-term formulations, 30% chose two states living side by side and 60% chose two states followed by a Palestinian state throughout the area between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea.[13] Twenty-three percent accepted Israel's permanent right to exist as a Jewish homeland, while two-thirds preferred working over time to regain all the land for a Palestinian state.[13]

In 2013, 61% of Palestinian respondents did not believe Israel and an independent Palestinian state could coexist peacefully.[14] A 45% plurality selected armed struggle as the best route to statehood, compared with 15% selecting nonviolent resistance and 15% negotiations.[14] A 2014 survey nevertheless found half supporting renewed peace talks, rising to two-thirds if Israel accepted another prisoner release and a three-month settlement freeze.[15] Support for the two-state principle in that survey was 58% in the West Bank and 52% in Gaza.[15]

A separate June 15–17, 2014 survey of 1,200 adults asked about the primary national goal for the next five years.[16] It found 27.3% choosing an end to occupation of the West Bank to achieve two states, against 60.3% choosing recovery of historic Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.[16] Sixty-four percent favored continuing resistance after a two-state agreement until all historic Palestine was liberated, while 31.6% said an agreement should end the conflict.[16] At the same time, most favored a nonviolent approach in the short term, and 62% in the West Bank and 73% in Gaza regarded demonstrations, strikes, and protests positively.[16]

In September 2015, a survey of 1,270 people found 48% supporting two states and 51% opposing them, reversing the proportions reported three months earlier.[17] Sixty-five percent considered settlement expansion to have made the solution impractical, and 79% judged statehood within five years unlikely or nonexistent.[17] Forty-two percent selected armed struggle as the most effective route to a state, versus 29% negotiations.[17] In the same polling, 66% rejected unconditional negotiations without a halt to settlement activity, while 32% accepted them.[18]

June 2016 polling found 51.3% supporting a Palestinian state alongside Israel, 47.6% opposing it, and 1.1% undecided or declining to answer.[19] A joint 2016 survey likewise found 51% supporting the general two-state principle, but only 39% supporting a detailed nine-point agreement.[20] In December, support for the principle was 44%, compared with 51% in June, while 42% supported the detailed proposal.[21] A regional agreement involving Israel and Arab states persuaded 28% of opponents to reconsider the proposal; placing it within that regional framework raised reported Palestinian support to 57%.[21]

A September 5–8, 2018 poll found 47% supporting two states and 50% opposing them; 56% considered settlement construction to have made the solution impractical.[6] A differently framed scenario specifying the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as Palestine's capital received 53% support, while 24% preferred an equal-rights one-state solution.[6] Retrospective assessments of Oslo were also negative: a separate 2018 poll found 47% saying the accords harmed Palestinian national interests and 34% saying they made no difference.[4]

Rejection of the United States' proposed peace plan was overwhelming in February 2020: 94% opposed it and 4% supported it.[22] The proposal conditioned Palestinian statehood on measures including recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and disarmament of Hamas and other armed groups, permitted Israeli annexation of settlements, assigned Israel sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, and excluded Palestinian refugee settlement in Israel.[22] Fifty-eight percent saw no chance that accepting it would end Israeli military rule and establish a Palestinian state, and 61% considered two states no longer feasible because of settlement expansion.[22] Although 65% supported Abbas's pledge to end relations with Israel and the United States, 68% believed he would not actually end security coordination.[22]

A separate face-to-face survey conducted January 23–February 11, 2020 interviewed 500 West Bank residents and 500 Gaza residents, with an approximately 4% margin of error for each area.[23] Regaining all historic Palestine was the leading five-year priority for 66% in the West Bank and 56% in Gaza, compared with 14% and 31% choosing an end to occupation through two states.[23] Twenty-six percent in the West Bank and 40% in Gaza said a two-state agreement should terminate the conflict; around 60% in both areas favored continuing until all historic Palestine was liberated.[23] Only about 10% selected an equal-rights one-state solution as their priority.[23]

The January 2023 joint survey publication reported 33% support for the two-state concept, down from 43% in September 2020, and 26% support for a detailed package.[24] When asked what should happen next, 31% selected a peace agreement and 40% armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.[24] The December 2022 findings underlying the reported 33% figure included support of 28% in the West Bank and 41% in Gaza.[4] Conditional acceptance of two states for the Palestinian and Jewish peoples, if it helped end occupation, was higher at 42% and 47%, respectively.[4]

In July 2024, support for the general two-state concept reached 40%, with 59% opposed; support was 42% in Gaza and 38% in the West Bank.[2] A March 2024 poll had found 38% supporting renewed negotiations under international and Arab auspices and 59% opposed.[25] An October 6–17 survey subsequently found 47% selecting negotiations or the peace process as the most helpful route to independence, against 28% choosing all-out militant confrontation and 9% nonviolent popular resistance.[25] Given options for ending the current crisis, 57% selected two states, including 47% in the West Bank and 74% in Gaza.[25]

A May 1–4, 2025 poll reported 57% opposition to two states, while 61% supported an independent Palestinian state when the question did not link independence to a two-state arrangement.[26] Forty-one percent preferred force as the way to end occupation, 33% negotiations, and 20% nonviolent protest.[26] The survey included 830 West Bank respondents and 440 in Gaza, where interviewers concentrated on people in humanitarian shelters.[26]

In August 20–25, 2026 polling, 48% preferred two states, 22% a binational state throughout Palestine, and 19% a Palestinian state; two-state support was 40% in the West Bank and 60% in Gaza.[25] A separate October 7–11 poll found 42% selecting negotiations as the best means of ending occupation and achieving independence, 33% armed struggle, and 18% peaceful popular resistance.[25] Negotiations received 43% in the West Bank and 41% in Gaza, while armed struggle received 29% and 37%, respectively.[25]

A detailed proposed agreement in the July 2024 joint poll received 34% Palestinian support and 63% opposition, below the 40% supporting two states in general.[2] The package proposed a demilitarized Palestinian state, Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with territorial exchange, East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital, arrangements for Jerusalem's quarters and holy sites, family reunification for 100,000 Palestinian refugees in Israel, outside guarantees, and termination of the conflict and claims.[2] Individual provisions elicited very different responses: 57% supported the refugee arrangement, but 11% supported the specified demilitarization provision and 24% the East Jerusalem capital arrangement.[2]

Earlier package polling demonstrated similar distinctions.[20] The 2016 nine-point proposal included equal land swaps, refugee family reunification for 100,000 people, capitals in West and East Jerusalem, demilitarization, and termination of claims.[20] Its 39% overall support included 57% among Fatah voters but 25% among Hamas voters.[20] Forty-three percent supported mutual recognition of the two states' national identities.[20] The detailed December 2016 proposal likewise addressed withdrawal, land swaps, demilitarization, Jerusalem, 100,000 refugees, and an end to the conflict.[21]

One-state preferences also require distinctions between equal citizenship and exclusive national control.[2][27] Polling collected in 2020 found fewer than 40% preferring two states over one-state alternatives across the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, but only around 10% in the West Bank and Gaza favoring a binational state with equal rights.[27] In July 2024, 25% supported one equal-rights state and 33% supported one state in which Jews would not enjoy equal rights.[2] These responses overlapped because respondents could support more than one alternative; an analysis counting two-state supporters first classified 44% as rejecting all listed options or remaining undecided.[2]

Willingness to engage Israelis personally can exceed support for a political settlement.[4] In July 2023, 55% in the West Bank, 64% in Gaza, and 74% in East Jerusalem agreed that Palestinians should encourage direct personal contact and dialogue with Israelis to assist advocates of peace.[4] Support for resuming negotiations was 50% in the West Bank and 58% in Gaza.[28] The survey used face-to-face interviews conducted July 8–27 with a geographical probability sample of 1,572 adults across the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, and reported an approximately 4% margin of error for each area subsample.[28] In East Jerusalem, 64% conditionally accepted two states for two peoples if that could help end occupation.[4]

Regional diplomacy has sometimes attracted broader approval than isolated final-status proposals.[21] In July 2024, 65% preferred a regional peace deal incorporating a two-state Palestinian–Israeli agreement and Arab–Israeli normalization over a hypothetical regional war; 29% preferred war.[2] Nevertheless, respondents divided equally, 48% to 48%, over whether a diplomatic way out existed, while 61% believed a military way out existed.[2] Asked whether a newly elected Palestinian government should pursue a final-status agreement requiring compromises, 43% said yes and 54% no.[2]

Confidence-building measures also produced uneven support.[2] Eighty-seven percent backed a permanent Gaza ceasefire in exchange for releasing Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, and 56% backed a two-state commitment by newly elected Israeli and unified Palestinian governments.[2] A combined measure pairing Israeli action against violent settlers with a new Palestinian leadership's disavowal of violence against Israeli civilians received 45% support.[2] Thirty-six percent supported pairing a halt to Palestinian recourse to the International Criminal Court with Israeli permission for Palestinian communities to be built in Area C.[2]

Preferences about negotiating formats have reflected dissatisfaction with bilateral diplomacy.[19] In June 2016, 44% selected a major-power-sponsored multilateral forum as the most promising way to revive negotiations, compared with 22% selecting bilateral talks.[19] The joint 2016 survey also found 44% preferring multilateral negotiations.[20] After negotiations stalled, Abbas and other PLO and Palestinian Authority leaders sought support for Palestinian aspirations and grievances in international forums.[6]

Abbas's statements have linked continued support for diplomacy to demands for substantive action.[29] In 2022, he called for immediate negotiations based on relevant UN resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative, alongside an end to unilateral measures he said undermined two states.[29] In a September 2021 UN General Assembly speech, he warned that continued occupation and erosion of the two-state outcome could lead instead to demands for equal political rights in one state throughout historic Palestine.[29]

Expectations of peaceful coexistence can remain low even where negotiations receive substantial support.[1][25] A survey of 1,038 people in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, conducted in Arabic from March 30 to April 28, 2026, found 21% believing Israel and an independent Palestinian state could coexist peacefully and 68% believing they could not.[30] Gaza was not surveyed, so the findings do not represent its population.[30]

Respondents who believed coexistence possible often emphasized peace's desirability and potential economic benefits.[30] Their explanations included prosperity, employment, trade, economic interdependence, and the possibility of the two peoples becoming independent of one another.[30] Some described two states as a logical solution or pointed to Oslo and diplomacy based on 1967 lines.[30] Those who rejected the possibility cited competing land claims, Israeli control and occupation, checkpoints, settlements, violence, and distrust.[30] Some identified movement restrictions, unemployment, displacement, home demolitions, or settlement expansion as obstacles to independence and coexistence.[30]

Views about responsibility and trust help distinguish assessments of existing negotiations from willingness to consider future arrangements.[20] In June 2016, 62% blamed Israel for the collapse of negotiations, 26.4% blamed both sides equally, and 7.9% blamed the Palestinian side.[19] The joint 2016 survey similarly found 62% blaming Israelis for previous failures; 43% believed the other side wanted peace, while 89% described Israeli Jews as untrustworthy.[20] In September 2018, 40% preferred changing the status quo through a peace agreement and 30% through armed struggle; a separate effectiveness question gave negotiations 39% and armed struggle 33%.[6] Sixty-two percent opposed renewed dialogue with the Trump administration.[6]

The historical record therefore includes support for an agreement alongside doubt that negotiations will deliver it, and acceptance of broad formulas alongside rejection of particular terms.[1][2] A study summary of Israeli and Palestinian opinion found that both publics had, at one point, supported a permanent-status package resembling the Clinton parameters and Geneva Initiative, while remaining far from ready for difficult concessions and trade-offs.[31] Support also fluctuated with political and military circumstances.[31] A 2024 diplomatic strategy document described Palestinian opinion as mixed and reported increased willingness to accept two states after October 7, 2023, especially in Gaza, without supplying numerical estimates or survey methods.[32]

Responsibility for Oslo's breakdown and the interpretation of negotiating proposals remain disputed.[9][33] Palestinian accounts associated Madrid and Oslo with an expected state and an end to occupation within an agreed timeframe, and blamed settlement growth, incomplete withdrawals, prisoner issues, worsening economic conditions, and stalled refugee discussions for disillusionment.[33] The parties accused each other of bad faith, and a crisis of confidence emerged before permanent-status talks began.[33] Palestinian expectations of a settlement halt exceeded the signed agreements, which contained no explicit commitment of that kind; related accounts describe disappointment over redeployment, territorial fragmentation, roadblocks, and the absence of anticipated safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank.[34]

An unnamed Palestinian negotiator's 2001 account gave an approximately 70% initial Oslo-support figure without polling methodology, defended rejection of the Camp David offer, and interpreted settlement expansion as undermining the process.[35] Such explanations represent participants' judgments rather than independently established causes of failure, and accounts of the Jerusalem negotiations likewise differ.[9][35]

Survey comparisons present a separate interpretive problem: wording, question order, sample size, translation, timing, and wartime conditions can affect results.[25] The July 2024 joint poll interviewed 1,270 adults face-to-face, including 830 in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and 440 in Gaza, with a reported ±3.5% margin of error.[2] Its findings, like other surveys, are time-specific observations rather than a single enduring Palestinian position.[2][25]