Operation Black Arrow

Before the raid, Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip and was responsible for maintaining its border with Israel. Infiltration was treated as a violation of the Israel–Egypt armistice agreement, while Israeli defenses and offensive initiatives were developed in response to persistent border challenges.[6] A study of the period describes the conflict as involving Palestinian refugee raiding, cross-border attacks by Egyptian-controlled irregulars and commandos, and Israeli defensive and offensive responses.[7]

The BESA Center account says infiltrators crossed into Israeli settlements to steal or to seek vengeance and cause harm. Citing research by Benny Morris, it reports 317 Jewish deaths attributed to infiltrators during 1949–1956, with most infiltrators coming from the Gaza Strip. Its annual figures are 22 deaths in 1949, 19 in 1950, 48 in 1951, 42 in 1952, 44 in 1953, 33 in 1954, and 54 in 1956; the listed years do not include a figure for 1955.[6] The numbers are presented in that study’s account of the broader border-security setting, rather than as an incident-specific count for Operation Black Arrow.

The Institute for National Security Studies characterizes Israel’s 1950s Gaza reprisal operations as directed against Egypt and its army, which it identifies as Israel’s primary enemy at the time. The wider purpose of such operations, in this analysis, was to impose a heavy price for violations of border calm and thereby deter or coerce the opposing side.[8] A Ben-Gurion University research abstract places raids and counter-raids in the wider Israeli-Arab conflict of 1949–1956, and says that the period helped shape Israeli-Arab relations in later decades.[7]

The months immediately preceding Black Arrow saw a series of incidents that Israeli accounts cited as grounds for action. The Israel State Archives identifies an attack by Egyptian infiltrators on a military installation near Rishon LeZion on February 23, 1955, and the killing of a cyclist near Rehovot on February 26. Its editorial note calls these incidents the immediate pretext for the raid, while also identifying death sentences in the Cairo trials as a contributing political context.[1] The Ministry of Defense archive says the last incident involved the infiltration of an Egyptian intelligence squad and the murder of an Israeli citizen; it states that the subsequent operation targeted the Egyptian Army.[9]

Other accounts describe attacks in the Gaza area in the weeks before the operation. Ynet recounts an attack on the night of January 25 in which an infiltrator killed a tractor driver from Kibbutz Ein HaShlosha and wounded his companion. It says the operation order framed the mission as a response to killings and intelligence activity based in Gaza.[4] A Jewish Virtual Library introduction to Abba Eban’s later Security Council statement reports 27 incursions from Gaza into Israel during the first two months of 1955, and describes the February 28 raid as retaliation following an Egyptian raid into Israeli territory.[10]

The Israeli position was presented at the United Nations by Ambassador Abba Eban against a broader account of worsening Egypt–Israel tensions. Eban said armed clashes involving regular forces had risen from five in 1953 to 71 in 1954, and reported that the Mixed Armistice Commission had found Egypt responsible for 40 armistice violations between August 1954 and March 7, 1955. These were figures and explanations in Israel’s diplomatic case; Eban’s statement also acknowledged that the Commission recorded some Israeli firing as violations when it followed Egyptian fire.[10]

Operation Black Arrow, known in Hebrew as Mivtza Ḥetz Shaḥor, was carried out by the Israel Defense Forces against Egyptian military positions in the Gaza Strip.[9] The Ministry of Defense archive dates it to February 28, 1955, while INSS describes an overnight operation lasting into March 1.[9][8] INSS places it within a broader pattern of reprisal raids: short, limited operations intended to exact a price and coerce an adversary. Although the raid had a defined start and finish, planners could not predict the costs it would impose on either side.[8]

David Ben-Gurion, who had returned as defense minister on February 20, proposed a limited attack on an Egyptian army camp near Gaza City, along with a nearby pumping station and railway station. Prime Minister Moshe Sharett approved the plan. The State Archives says planners expected no more than ten Egyptians to be killed and anticipated minimal Israeli losses.[1] Ynet says Defense Minister Ben-Gurion and Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan assigned the operation to Ariel Sharon, commander of Paratroop Battalion 890, and deputy commander Aharon Davidi. The written order called for entering the Egyptian camp and demolishing its facilities, with Egyptian soldiers to be attacked only if they interfered.[4]

Sharon sought approval to add the nearby Gaza water installation and railway facilities as targets. Ben-Gurion and Dayan authorized them on the condition that the main camp be attacked first. The mission instructions emphasized that no Israeli dead or wounded were to be left behind, and called for unmarked ammunition and minimizing traces of the operation.[4] Uzi Eilam later recalled receiving a more direct verbal instruction to kill Egyptian soldiers and destroy the camp, a recollection he said he could not reconcile with the wording of the written order.[4]

Preparations emphasized concealment. According to Ynet, vehicles departed at 15-minute intervals, and the soldiers wore knit caps and bucket hats instead of helmets. Women soldiers were dispersed among them to make the movement appear less like a military operation. After a briefing at Be’eri, the force drove in darkness toward Kfar Aza and continued on foot. Planning relied substantially on aerial photographs, some of them old, and a 1947 British map; no preliminary ground reconnaissance was conducted because it might alert the Egyptians.[4]

The force encountered an intelligence error at the Gaza water installation. Sa’adia Elkayam, also rendered in accounts as Sufufu, commanded Force A and mistook the brightly lit installation for the Egyptian camp, which was unexpectedly unlit. His force attacked the installation and came under heavy fire. Fire from the actual camp then disclosed its location, and the troops moved toward it.[4]

Elkayam was killed in the fighting, and Eilam assumed command of Force A. Davidi arrived while the force was under fire, regrouped the soldiers, and led a renewed assault with sappers into the camp. Ynet reports that Davidi and Eilam received the Medal of Courage for their actions during the operation.[4]

After entering the camp, Israeli soldiers searched it while sappers demolished it during the withdrawal. Ynet recounts that one squad leader lifted a tent flap and saw a Sudanese sergeant beneath a bed, then recoiled and threw a grenade. The operation also included attacks on the railway facilities and an ambush against Egyptian reinforcements. The water installation was destroyed and most of the camp demolished.[4]

Egyptian reinforcements were ambushed by the Israeli force, contributing substantially to the Egyptian losses.[4] The withdrawal was complicated by the number of wounded, a shortage of stretchers, and poor communications. Soldiers improvised carrying devices from clothing and weapons, and some carried wounded comrades in their arms. An Egyptian truck was used to move casualties toward the agreed departure point, while ambulances that were meant to meet the force near the border went in the wrong direction. Despite coming under fire during withdrawal, the force evacuated its wounded and left no dead or wounded behind.[4]

The State Archives gives the final toll as 38 Egyptians and eight Israeli soldiers killed.[1] Other accounts vary: the Center for Israel Education reports eight Israeli paratroopers and 39 Egyptian soldiers killed, with 30 other Egyptian soldiers wounded, while Ynet gives 36 Egyptian soldiers killed and 28 wounded.[2][4] The U.S. diplomatic record relays Egypt’s report to the Security Council that 37 members of its armed forces and two civilians were killed, and 30 service members and two civilians injured.[11] The different totals are not reconciled in the available accounts. Ynet reports eight Israeli soldiers killed and 13 wounded.[4]

The raid brought immediate diplomatic consequences. On March 1, Sharett instructed Israel’s missions abroad to explain the operation as “the unavoidable result of a long chain of activities of armed espionage, sabotage and murder.” In a separate message to Ben-Gurion that day, he anticipated that Egypt would take the matter to the Security Council and warned that the raid would make it harder for Israel to present its case to the U.S. government and public.[1] A separate diplomatic report in the State Archives says Israel’s explanation was met with skepticism and the attack was viewed as a planned military operation, with doubts about its political wisdom.[1]

The UN Truce Supervision Organization Chief of Staff, Major General E. L. M. Burns, reported that the Egypt–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission found Israel responsible for the Gaza attack on March 6 and determined that it violated the General Armistice Agreement. Burns described the preceding months as comparatively tranquil overall, while noting that repeated minor incidents and infiltration from Egyptian-controlled territory had contributed to tension. He proposed considering joint patrols, an agreement among local commanders, barbed-wire obstacles in some areas, and regular Egyptian and Israeli soldiers manning outposts and patrols.[11]

On March 29, 1955, the Security Council unanimously condemned the attack. Resolution 106 recorded the Commission’s finding that Israeli authorities had prearranged and planned an attack by regular Israeli forces against regular Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip on February 28. The Council characterized it as a breach of the cease-fire provisions of an earlier Security Council resolution and as inconsistent with the Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement and the UN Charter; it called on Israel to take steps to prevent such actions.[12] The State Archives describes Israel as isolated in the debate and says it had difficulty explaining the reasons for an operation of this magnitude.[1]

The operation also prompted demonstrations in Gaza. The BESA Center account reports large-scale protests in which residents called for an intifada and requested weapons for self-defense. Citing Palestinian historian Hussein Abu Naml, it says Palestinians also demanded that Egypt establish a national guard in Gaza, authorized and trained by the Egyptian army to conduct operations inside Israel.[6] The Center for Israel Education likewise reports large riots in support of armed attacks against Israel after the raid, and says Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser established commando training camps to prepare fedayeen for incursions.[2]

The BESA Center paper says Egypt established a Palestinian National Guard, or al-Haras al-Watani, in response to residents’ demands. It reports that the force reached 500 fighters at its peak, was trained and equipped by the Egyptian military, and was primarily intended to defend the Strip; it was later redefined as a Palestinian battalion within the Egyptian army.[6] This account presents the guard as one institutional response to the protests and the post-raid security situation.

Nasser regarded the raid as an affront to his honor and to the Egyptian military, which had failed to protect Gaza’s residents, according to the BESA Center account. The paper says he saw the operation as demonstrating that Israel could strike Egyptian bases deep inside the Strip, and identifies this perception as one factor in Egypt’s subsequent response to the security situation.[6] The Center for Israel Education says the raid influenced Nasser’s decision to seek military aid from the Soviet bloc because he recognized that Egypt’s arms were inadequate for further retaliation; it also notes that he had secretly formed an alliance with the Soviet bloc the previous year.[2]

Encyclopedia.com describes the raid as a full-scale attack on military bases in Gaza and says it prompted Egypt to negotiate a Soviet arms deal for weapons from Czechoslovakia.[13] This is a consequential interpretation of the raid’s relationship to the later arms deal rather than a universally settled account of causation.

The operation sharpened divisions in Israeli politics over the use of large-scale reprisals. The Center for Israel Education characterizes Ben-Gurion as favoring an aggressive security policy and a show of strength, while Sharett and other moderates argued that major raids did little to stop fedayeen activity and might encourage it. The same account says Ben-Gurion successfully challenged Sharett for Mapai leadership after the raid and returned as prime minister in November 1955.[2] Sharett’s own March 1 warning about the diplomatic costs reflects the concerns recorded in the State Archives.[1]

Israeli accounts commonly describe Black Arrow as a tactical success, while its strategic effectiveness is debated. The Center for Israel Education calls it a military success with far-reaching regional effects.[2] Ynet says the General Staff, government, and public treated it as a success at the time, and describes it as the largest reprisal operation the IDF had conducted in enemy territory.[4] The BESA Center also assesses it as a military success, citing the destruction of Egyptian military headquarters and the force’s entry into the heart of Gaza.[6]

The question of deterrence is distinct from the question of whether the raid achieved its immediate operational objectives. Historian Yoav Gelber is reported by Ynet as noting that fedayeen incursions continued after the operation, undermining claims that reprisals stopped the attacks. Eilam, by contrast, argued that such operations contributed significantly to the IDF’s fighting spirit even if they did not halt incursions.[4] INSS’s broader analysis describes reprisal raids as instruments designed to exact a price and coerce an adversary, but stresses that planners could not know in advance what the costs would be.[8]

The operation’s effects on Egyptian policy have also been interpreted in different ways. The Center for Israel Education and Encyclopedia.com connect Black Arrow to Nasser’s turn toward Soviet-bloc arms.[2][13] A Jewish Review of Books discussion presents a competing explanation: it examines whether the reprisal changed Nasser’s attitude and helped prompt escalation and a turn to Soviet-bloc arms, or whether Egypt’s increased involvement on the Israeli front was driven mainly by Nasser’s pan-Arab aspirations. The discussion does not settle the competing explanations, and quotes the conclusion that “1955 was a year in which the status quo created by the armistice agreements became shaky.”[5]

Retrospective accounts place the raid within the deterioration of the border situation that preceded the 1956 Sinai campaign, known in Israel as Operation Kadesh. The BESA Center connects escalating infiltrations and Israeli retaliatory actions to the campaign.[6] A Ben-Gurion University research abstract likewise places cross-border attacks and Israeli responses among the chief causes of Israel’s 1956 invasion of Sinai and the Gaza Strip, but frames this as broad period context rather than a claim about Black Arrow alone.[7]

The Israel State Archives calls the raid a landmark in Israel’s retaliatory operations because of its scale and because, in its assessment, it was not preceded by unusual acts of provocation. Its editorial material says the operation had serious consequences for the border situation, Israel’s relations with the Great Powers—especially the United States—and Egypt’s position toward Israel.[1] The INSS account emphasizes the raid’s form as a bounded overnight operation, describing it as having “a known beginning, middle, and end,” while observing that the costs to either side could not be predicted.[8] A chronology from the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs places the raid in a category it labels “Defensive Military Operations”; that is the chronology’s own characterization.[14]

The operation’s place in historical accounts is also reflected in the periodization of scholarship on Gaza. A Hebrew-language book by Arnon Golan, as catalogued by the University of Haifa’s Herzl Institute, divides its account into a chapter titled “From the armistice to ‘Black Arrow,’” covering March 1950 to February 1955, followed by “From ‘Black Arrow’ to Kadesh,” covering March 1955 to October 1956. The latter chapter includes a section on the breaking of the lull, the course of the operation, and its consequences.[15] This framing treats the raid as a dividing point in the narrative of Gaza during the armistice period, without by itself resolving the debate over its long-term effects.

The raid’s rationale and legal status were presented differently by the parties. Israeli officials described it as a response to infiltration, killings, sabotage, and other border incidents; Sharett’s instruction to diplomats framed it as the result of a long chain of armed espionage, sabotage, and murder.[1] The UN Mixed Armistice Commission, as recorded in the Security Council’s resolution, found that the attack had been planned and ordered by Israeli authorities and violated cease-fire and armistice obligations. The Council unanimously condemned it.[12] These are distinct diplomatic and institutional findings, not merely competing descriptions of the raid’s tactical outcome.

Casualty counts differ across accounts and depend in part on how military and civilian casualties are categorized. The Israel State Archives reports 38 Egyptians and eight Israelis killed, while the Center for Israel Education gives 39 Egyptian soldiers and eight Israeli paratroopers killed.[1][2] Ynet reports 36 Egyptian soldiers killed and 28 wounded. Egypt’s account, relayed in a U.S. diplomatic document, lists 37 armed-forces members and two civilians killed, with 30 service members and two civilians injured.[4][11] Ynet reports eight Israeli dead and 13 wounded.[4]

There is also a distinction between the operation’s immediate military results and its political or strategic consequences. Ynet records disagreement over whether reprisal operations deterred further fedayeen activity.[4] Sources also differ over the extent to which the raid influenced Nasser’s turn toward Soviet-bloc arms.[5][13] The broader contribution of cross-border violence and Israeli responses to the escalation toward the 1956 war is treated as period context by the Ben-Gurion University research abstract.[7]