1956 in Israel: The Sinai-Suez Campaign and Its Aftermath

Since the early 1950s, Israel faced mounting security and economic pressure from Egypt. Egypt blocked Israeli ships from using the Suez Canal and restricted traffic through the Straits of Tiran, severing Eilat's access to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.[1] Ships trading with Asia were forced onto a longer route to Israel's Mediterranean ports, raising costs substantially.[1] Alongside the maritime restrictions, Egyptian-sponsored Palestinian Arab fedayeen conducted cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel with regularity; 260 Israeli citizens were killed or wounded by fedayeen in 1955 alone.[1] In a Knesset address on October 15, 1956, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion cited 242 Israeli dead and wounded caused by Egypt in 1954 and 1955 combined, describing Israel as facing a genuine threat of war.[2]

The security equation shifted dramatically in 1955, when Egypt concluded an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia that supplied modern Soviet equipment, including tanks, aircraft, artillery, and naval craft.[3] Egyptian-sponsored fedayeen attacks and the new weapons intensified Israeli security concerns, while Egypt's coastal artillery at Ras Natzrani tightened its grip on the Straits of Tiran.[1][4]

A significant internal debate shaped Israel's approach. Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ben-Gurion emphasized military strength and reprisal operations, while Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett favored diplomacy, restraint, and the cultivation of international standing.[5] Sharett's departure as foreign minister in June 1956 removed what the INSS analysis describes as a central counterweight to military activism.[5] Golda Meir became foreign minister that year, and the subsequent border escalation culminated in the Sinai Campaign.[5][6]

Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956 — a joint British-French enterprise — set off a broader international crisis.[7] Britain and France, which held strategic and commercial stakes in the canal, viewed Nasser's move as an unacceptable challenge to their regional influence; Nasser saw their opposition as an effort to perpetuate European colonial domination.[7] France was additionally motivated by Nasser's support for the Algerian rebellion against French rule.[3]

The three parties — Israel, Britain, and France — held secret negotiations at Sèvres beginning October 22, 1956.[3] Senior Israeli representatives included Ben-Gurion, Chief of the General Staff Moshe Dayan, operations chief Meir Amit, and Defense Ministry director-general Shimon Peres.[3][8] On October 24, they signed the seven-point Sèvres Protocol.[3]

The arrangement called for Israel to attack Egypt in Sinai, threatening the Suez Canal and providing a pretext for Britain and France to issue an ultimatum demanding that the combatants withdraw from the Canal Zone. Egypt's expected rejection would provide grounds for Anglo-French military intervention, while their publicly stated rationale of separating the combatants and protecting the waterway concealed their objective of retaking the Canal Zone.[3] The protocol also included a British and French commitment to defend Israel against Egyptian air attack and later became known as the Sèvres Agreement or the Collusion.[3]

Israel viewed the Anglo-French preparations as an opportunity to lift the Tiran blockade, weaken the Egyptian army, and remove the fedayeen threat from Gaza.[3] The final operational order, issued on October 28, set three goals: threaten the Suez Canal by capturing nearby objectives, occupy the Straits of Tiran, and disrupt or destroy Egypt's military presence in northern Sinai.[3] Ben-Gurion kept the preparations secret from most cabinet ministers, presenting the plan for government approval only on the eve of the operation; reserve battalions were mobilized that evening and publicly described as a precaution against possible surprise attacks.[3]

The campaign opened on the evening of October 29, 1956, with a parachute drop near the Mitla Pass. Sixteen Dakotas carried 495 paratroopers of Battalion 890, commanded by Major Rafael Eitan, to positions about 70 kilometers east of the Suez Canal.[9][8] The drop landed east of the originally planned western location because intelligence had identified what appeared to be a military camp there, though it turned out to house road workers rather than soldiers.[8] More than 100,000 Israeli soldiers were mobilized in less than 72 hours, and the air force was fully operational within 43 hours.[10] It was the first time the IDF deployed whole divisions on the battlefield.[3]

The campaign unfolded along three axes simultaneously. In the north, forces advanced from Gaza toward El Qantara; in the center, through Qseima and Abu-Ageila toward Ismailia; and in the south, through Mitla toward Port Tawfiq.[3] Brigade 7 captured Abu Ageila and a road junction that encircled Egyptian forces and blocked possible reinforcements from central Sinai.[8] Division 77 captured al-Arish and halted 15 kilometers from the Suez Canal. Israeli forces also captured Sharm el-Sheikh, the coastal-gun position at Ras Nasrani, and the islands of Tiran and Sanafir.[8]

In the air, the Israel Air Force played a support role with notable individual actions. Four World War II-vintage Mustangs cut Egyptian telephone wires, initially using mounted cables and then their own wings and propellers.[9] Israeli fighters downed seven enemy aircraft in dogfights without losses in those engagements, though the air force lost 15 planes during the conflict overall.[9] In one episode, Piper pilot Captain Binyamin Kahana diverted two Egyptian MiGs away from an Israeli ground force by leading them on a chase; Kahana was posthumously awarded the Medal of Valor.[9]

The Gaza Strip, which had remained under Egyptian control since the War of Independence, was captured after approximately a day of fighting.[8] By November 5, Israeli forces held virtually the entire Sinai Peninsula, apart from a narrow strip along the Suez Canal, as well as the Gaza Strip.[10][11]

The most costly and controversial episode of the campaign was the Battle of the Mitla Pass. Egyptian forces had five infantry companies inside the pass, and the fighting produced 38 paratroopers killed and 120 wounded on the Israeli side, with four additional paratroopers later dying of their wounds.[8][11] Ariel Sharon led what was officially classified as a large reconnaissance into the pass after an earlier request to capture it had been refused by higher command. Both Mako and Maariv characterize the engagement as costly and the movement into the pass as contrary to orders.[8][11]

Britain and France entered the fighting with air attacks on October 31, and their ground forces landed near the canal on November 5.[12] Israel achieved its principal battlefield objectives — holding the Gaza Strip, virtually the entire Sinai, and Sharm el-Sheikh — in approximately 100 hours.[10] The campaign marked a major step in the IDF's organizational development through the deployment of whole divisions, while the air force emerged from the conflict as a central pillar of Israel's military strength.[3][9]

The United States was caught off guard by the joint operation and responded with sharp opposition.[1] On October 30, the United States introduced a Security Council resolution calling for Israel's immediate withdrawal; Britain and France vetoed it. The United States then sought General Assembly resolutions demanding an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines.[13] Britain declared a ceasefire on November 6 under pressure that included a financial dimension: the Bank of England lost $45 million between October 30 and November 2 amid the crisis.[13] British and French forces left Egypt in December 1956.[12]

President Dwight Eisenhower's administration applied direct economic pressure on Israel as well. The administration threatened to suspend $50 million in U.S. government aid and noted that private American donations to Israel amounted to $100 million annually.[13] On November 1, Eisenhower stated that continuing any kind of aid to Israel, which he called an aggressor, would be a mistake.[13]

Israel's response was gradual and accompanied by significant internal tension. On November 7, Ben-Gurion told the Knesset that the campaign had lasted less than seven days, that the Egyptian force in Sinai had been eliminated, that Egyptian forces had numbered more than 30,000, and that Israeli losses stood at approximately 150 killed.[14] He described operational orders not to cross the Suez Canal or attack Egyptian territory proper, and said Israeli operations had been confined to Sinai.[14] That same day, Opposition Leader Menachem Begin called for humane treatment of Arabs under Israeli rule, including refugees, and stated that Israel's objective was a true peace rather than perpetual war with Egypt.[2]

One day after Ben-Gurion had told the Knesset that Israel did not recognize the armistice lines and would not permit foreign forces in occupied territory, he sent a message to Eisenhower on November 8 stating that Israel had never planned to annex Sinai and would withdraw after satisfactory United Nations arrangements had been made.[13] U.S. pressure proved decisive in bringing about the withdrawal.[13]

Israel completed its withdrawal in March 1957.[12] United Nations forces were deployed in territories vacated by Israel to supervise the withdrawal and help prevent renewed conflict.[1][10] Israel made its withdrawal conditional on assurances of freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran, and those assurances were given.[10][8] Egyptian military and administrative control over the Gaza Strip was subsequently restored.[15]

Most Israeli public opinion and political parties had favored annexation of the Gaza Strip during its occupation, but pressure from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the broader international system led to withdrawal.[15] Critics regarded the outcome as surrendering the campaign's territorial gains without obtaining Egyptian concessions on fundamental questions.[10]

On October 29, 1956 — the first day of Operation Kadesh — one of the gravest internal episodes in Israel's early history took place at the Arab village of Kafr Qassem.[16] Military authorities imposed a wartime curfew on Arab villages near the Jordanian border beginning at 5:00 p.m.[16] District commander Issachar Shadmi had moved the start time forward from 9:00 p.m., while village leaders received only about 30 minutes' notice.[17][18] Many residents were working in the fields and had not learned of the change when they began returning home.[16]

Border Police opened fire on the returning villagers. Company commander Haim Levy testified that the order was to shoot anyone violating the curfew even if the person did not know about it. He also testified that battalion commander Shmuel Malinki said casualties on the first night would make enforcement of the remainder of the curfew easier.[17] News of the killings was censored until Ben-Gurion announced the findings of a secret inquiry weeks later.[16]

Approved sources report differing death tolls. The Jewish Virtual Library reports 47 people killed, while the Center for Israel Education gives 48.[16][19] Ynet and the Jerusalem Post each report 49 killed.[18][17] A separate Ynet topic page explains that residents count 47 people killed directly by Border Police, a man who suffered a fatal stroke after learning of his son's death, and the fetus of a pregnant woman, producing a community total of 49.[20] The sources do not reconcile these figures.

Eleven border policemen were charged, and eight were convicted.[16] The military trial, conducted between 1956 and 1958 and partly held behind closed doors, rejected the defense that the defendants were merely following orders.[18] Judge Benjamin Halevy formulated the doctrine of a manifestly illegal order, describing such an order as marked by a black flag and therefore one a soldier was obligated to disobey.[18]

No one imprisoned served more than three and a half years.[16] Shadmi received a fine of ten prutot.[16][18] A public board headed by Petah Tikva mayor Pinhas Rashish set compensation for the victims' families at 500,000 Israeli pounds, and a reconciliation ceremony — a sulha — between the families and a representative of the Jewish community was held at the end of 1957.[21]

The episode remained a source of pain and political significance in subsequent decades. Shimon Peres expressed deep regret during a 2007 visit to Kafr Qassem. In 2014, Reuven Rivlin became the first sitting Israeli president to attend the memorial ceremony and condemned the killings.[18]

The campaign produced significant strategic consequences for Israel, even as the political outcome was mixed. Fedayeen attacks from Gaza temporarily ceased, and the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force helped bring roughly a decade of quiet to the border with Egypt and Gaza.[13][10] Israel secured assurances of freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and declared that a renewed Egyptian blockade of the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba would constitute a casus belli.[10][1]

The campaign also deepened Israel's military and strategic relationship with France. Cooperation expanded through arms procurement and French assistance connected with the construction of a nuclear reactor in Israel.[3][8] The operation was the first in which the IDF deployed entire divisions in the field, representing a significant step in its organizational maturation.[3] The air force also emerged as a central pillar of Israel's military strength despite losing 15 aircraft during the conflict.[9]

At the same time, critics viewed the forced withdrawal as a diplomatic defeat that relinquished the military's territorial gains without Egyptian concessions on fundamental questions.[10] The campaign's battlefield success further entrenched reliance on military strength and offensive action within Israel's security approach.[5]

For Egypt's Jewish community, the campaign worsened an already deteriorating situation. The conflict brought additional riots and arrests against Egypt's Jews, accelerating their departure; by 1957, only approximately 15,000 Jews remained in Egypt.[22]

Beyond the Sinai Campaign, 1956 brought other significant developments inside Israel. Finance Minister Levi Eshkol authorized the establishment of Ashdod on May 1, 1956, on the Mediterranean coast between Ashkelon and Tel Aviv.[23] Immigration continued at a substantial pace: 22,149 immigrants arrived during the first five months of 1956, compared with 36,227 for all of 1955 and 17,485 for 1954, with more than 600,000 immigrants having arrived during Israel's first three years overall.[24]

Golda Meir became foreign minister in 1956, and the Sinai Campaign began within her first months in office.[6] The Third Knesset's debates that year covered foreign policy and defense in January, a Herut no-confidence proposal in March, the foreign minister's resignation in June, diplomatic relations with West Germany in July, and pre-campaign foreign-policy debates in October.[25] Following the fighting, the Knesset debated the political and military situation on November 7, implementation of a UN General Assembly resolution on November 14, persecution of Jews in Egypt on November 25, and the incident in the villages of the Triangle on December 12.[25]

The 1956 campaign remains a historically debated episode. The Central Zionist Archives notes that historical discussion has not settled whether Israel independently sought the conflict or was drawn into it through its commitments to Britain and France, on which it depended for military and economic aid.[26] The U.S. Department of State emphasizes the secret joint plan to invade Egypt and overthrow Nasser.[7] Benny Morris's study of Israeli-Arab border relations identifies Palestinian refugee raiding and Egyptian-controlled commando attacks as among the chief causes of Israel's invasion, while describing the operation as Israel's part in the broader Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt.[27]

Casualty figures also vary considerably. The Jewish Virtual Library's campaign overview reports 231 Israeli soldiers killed, while Maariv gives 172.[10][11] The Central Zionist Archives and Mako each report 177 Israeli deaths.[26][8] Ben-Gurion's contemporary Knesset address placed the figure at approximately 150.[14] Maariv estimates Egyptian losses at approximately 3,000 killed, 500 wounded, and 6,000 captured, while the Central Zionist Archives reports approximately 3,200 deaths across all parties.[11][26] These figures are not reconciled across the sources.

The campaign's end date is reported differently as well. The ADL says hostilities ended on November 5, while the INSS account records Britain's declaration of a ceasefire on November 6.[1][13] Maariv dates the campaign from October 29 to November 5.[11] These variations appear to reflect different milestones — the end of Israeli operations, the Anglo-French ceasefire, and the broader cessation of fighting — rather than a single uniformly defined endpoint.