Operation Rimon 20

Soviet forces arrived in Egypt in March 1970 with MiG-21 interceptors, radar systems, antiaircraft guns and modern SA-3 surface-to-air missile batteries.[2] Their deployment brought Soviet personnel directly into the confrontation with Israel: they operated air-defense equipment and flew combat aircraft rather than serving solely as advisers.[4] The intervention formed part of the Soviet Union’s wider political and military support for Arab countries during the Cold War.[5]

The War of Attrition was fought mainly against Egypt, although fighting also occurred along Israel’s ceasefire lines with Jordan and Syria.[6] Israel conducted deep-penetration air attacks inside Egypt from January 7 to April 13, 1970, by which time it had become clear that Soviet aircraft and missile forces were defending the Egyptian interior.[6] Soviet missile batteries were first used against Israeli aircraft on April 18, during a reconnaissance flight over Egypt.[2]

Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser visited Moscow in January 1970 and obtained a commitment to send Soviet personnel to Egypt.[3] Thousands arrived, including pilots, intelligence specialists and air-defense operators, with Soviet units taking responsibility for protecting areas using MiG-21s, radar and missile batteries.[3] Personnel wore Egyptian uniforms and aircraft carried Egyptian markings to conceal the Soviet presence.[3] Soviet-piloted MiGs covered Egyptian troops near the Suez Canal and supported the movement of missile batteries toward Israeli positions.[7]

Israel initially avoided direct combat with Soviet pilots because its leaders feared a confrontation with a nuclear-armed superpower.[3] Soviet pilots increasingly challenged Israeli aircraft, and on July 25 a Soviet MiG fired a missile that struck the tail of an Israeli Skyhawk, forcing an emergency landing at Rephidim.[3][8] Soviet-piloted MiGs also attempted an interception on July 26 and provided cover for Egyptian strike aircraft the following day.[9]

The expanding missile network threatened Israel’s freedom of action over the Suez Canal and Gulf of Suez.[8] Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev described the rationale for confronting the Soviet pilots as “escalation in order to reduce escalation”: without raising the stakes, he believed, Soviet forces would continue moving the missile system forward.[10] The political risk remained substantial; Prime Minister Golda Meir expressed her reluctance with the remark, “I will not be happy on the day we shoot down the Russian.”[10]

Air Force commander Mordechai Hod proposed an air-to-air confrontation after the late-July interception of Israeli Skyhawks, and Golda Meir approved the plan.[1] The ambush was intended to deter further Soviet challenges rather than initiate a wider conflict.[1] Israeli leaders chose to demonstrate superiority against Soviet pilots while facing growing difficulty in confronting Egypt’s missile batteries.[2] An alternative proposal to attack Egyptian air bases south of Cairo, where Soviet aircraft were stationed, was considered and rejected before the air ambush was selected.[2]

Yaakov Agassi, head of the Israeli Air Force Operations Department, and Major David Porat were among the planners.[3] Bar-Lev and Hod approved the plan, and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan also authorized the operation.[3][8] Its central deception was a simulated reconnaissance mission: four Mirages would fly tightly together, presenting a radar image calculated to draw Soviet fighters toward Israeli aircraft waiting below radar coverage.[1][3]

On July 30, four F-4 Phantoms from Squadron 69 attacked an Egyptian radar station near Sokhna, while four Mirage IIICs from Squadron 119 crossed Egyptian airspace near Hurghada in a close formation that appeared on radar as a single reconnaissance aircraft.[1] Additional Mirages from Squadrons 117 and 101 waited at low altitude over Sinai, and another group stood ready at Rephidim.[1] The air battle involved four Israeli Phantoms and eight Mirages.[2]

Airborne intelligence supported the ambush.[3] A specially equipped Stratocruiser departed Lod at noon with two intelligence teams, including personnel from Unit 8200’s Misraga unit.[3] Near 2 p.m., the teams reported Soviet fighters being scrambled, relayed information about Soviet ground-control instructions and then jammed communications between the MiG pilots and their controllers.[3] Soviet fighters launched from several bases, with 24 aircraft committed to the interception.[1]

When the MiGs approached within 20 kilometers, Hod ordered the Israeli aircraft to attack.[1] Fighters concealed below radar coverage climbed to engage, surprising the Soviet pilots.[3] The encounter developed into a close-range dogfight lasting less than three minutes.[1] Israeli aircraft used American Sparrow and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to destroy the opposing MiGs.[9]

The participating Israeli crews included Avraham Salmon, Asher Snir, Avihu Bin-Nun with navigator Shaul Levi, and Aviem Sella with navigator Reuven Reshef; Iftach Spector also pursued a MiG with Salmon.[1] Five Soviet aircraft were destroyed, and no Israeli aircraft was lost.[2] Snir’s Mirage was badly damaged but landed safely at Rephidim.[1] One MiG, flown by Vladimir Zhuravlev, escaped the immediate engagement but subsequently crashed, with Salmon and Spector receiving shared credit.[1]

The victory list records two F-4E victories and three Mirage IIICJ victories over MiG-21s attributed to the USSR on July 30, 1970.[11] It names Aviem Sela and Avihu Ben-Nun for the F-4E victories, and Asher Snir, “Avik” and Yiftah Spector for the Mirage victories.[11] The page cautions that some attributions and details are missing or sketchy and also includes an incomplete shared-credit entry for Asher Snir.[11]

Israel initially withheld public confirmation that its aircraft had shot down Soviet-piloted MiGs, acting at the United States’ request and seeking to avoid damaging Soviet prestige.[9] Egypt denied losses, Moscow remained silent, and foreign reporting identified the pilots as Soviet within days.[1] Meir publicly confirmed their identity in October.[1]

Soviet Air Force commander Pavel Kutakhov traveled to Egypt after the battle and ordered that its occurrence be kept secret.[3] Egyptian accounts later described private celebrations over the Soviet defeat and a subsequent change in Soviet attitudes toward Egyptian personnel.[3] Further Soviet reinforcements nevertheless followed, including additional MiG units and Su-15 interceptors.[1]

The engagement heightened concern about an open Israeli-Soviet confrontation and accelerated ceasefire contacts.[8] Israeli aircraft losses and American diplomatic pressure also shaped the decision to accept the August ceasefire.[2] A U.S.-brokered ceasefire took effect on August 7, 1970, ending the War of Attrition’s large-scale fighting.[1]

The ceasefire required both sides to freeze their force deployments, but Egypt immediately violated that provision by advancing its surface-to-air missile batteries.[6] The movement of those batteries meant that the diplomatic end to large-scale fighting did not reverse the expansion of the missile defenses that had helped bring about Israel’s decision to confront Soviet pilots.[6][10]

Rimon 20 demonstrated Israel’s ability to plan and execute a successful air ambush against Soviet pilots without losing an aircraft.[2] Its combination of decoy formations, concealed fighters, communications interception and jamming made intelligence and timing integral to the combat result.[1][3] The operation was designed to send a deterrent message in the air-to-air arena at a time when Israel faced a more difficult challenge from Soviet-supported surface-to-air defenses.[2]

The battle belonged to a wider aerial confrontation in which Israeli aircraft fought Egyptian aircraft and later Soviet aircraft, while the Israeli Air Force also conducted airborne commando operations inside Egypt.[2] The broader air-combat tally was 73 opposing aircraft shot down against three Israeli aircraft lost; those figures describe the wider confrontation, not Rimon 20 alone.[2]

Historical accounts differ in explaining the origins of the Soviet deployment.[2] An earlier interpretation linked it to Israel’s deep attacks and Nasser’s January 22, 1970, visit to Moscow, whereas research using Russian sources places planning in late 1968 and emphasizes broader global-strategic considerations rather than the War of Attrition as the cause.[2] This distinction changes the context in which the ambush is understood: the Soviet presence can be situated within a wider strategic commitment as well as the immediate defense of Egypt.[2][5]

Published loss totals vary, with contemporary diplomatic reporting giving four Soviet-piloted MiGs destroyed and other accounts giving five.[9][12] The difference may partly reflect the treatment of an aircraft that escaped the immediate dogfight before crashing.[1] Reports of a sixth Soviet aircraft loss and differing counts of the fighters committed to the battle are not consistent across accounts.[3][13] A five-aircraft tally appears in both the detailed operational account and the broader air-power study.[1][2]

The strategic consequences are also assessed differently: one account presents July 30 as a turning point after which the Soviet Union backed down, while another assessment emphasizes the influence of Israeli aircraft losses and American pressure on Israel’s acceptance of the ceasefire.[12][2] The wider war’s outcome has likewise prompted disagreement, with Israel demonstrating superiority in aerial dogfights while Egypt gained diplomatically and brought its missile batteries closer to the canal.[14] These distinctions separate the clear Israeli tactical success in Rimon 20 from judgments about the outcome of the War of Attrition as a whole.[2][14]

A related debate concerns Israeli Phantom losses elsewhere in the air campaign, rather than losses during Rimon 20.[15][16] Patrick Tyler, writing in the Jewish Review of Books, cites a claim that Soviet forces shot down six Israeli Phantoms; a rejoinder in the same publication rejects the attribution of such losses to Soviet-piloted MiGs and argues that Soviet surface-to-air missile crews probably caused them.[15][16]