Operation Olive Leaves

The roots of the December 1955 operation lay in a prolonged and legally tangled dispute over the Sea of Galilee's northeastern shoreline. The Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement of July 20, 1949, placed the Sea of Galilee and its shore — including the narrow northeastern strip — within the Israeli zone, yet Syria physically controlled that strip and denied Israeli access.[8] Syrian inhabitants used the lake for swimming, boating, and fishing, and Israeli patrol boats periodically challenged their presence, at times triggering violent clashes that escalated into Israeli air strikes or ground assaults on Syrian positions.[8]

In 1954, the Syrian military issued orders effectively claiming "territorial waters" extending 250 meters into the Sea of Galilee.[8] The United Nations attempted, without success, to broker arrangements that would keep Israeli police boats away from the northeastern shoreline while permitting Syrian inhabitants to water cattle and draw water from the lake.[8] In the absence of such an agreement, the UN regarded crossings in either direction — from Syria into the eastern-shore strip, or from Israel into Syrian territory — as armistice violations.[8] During the armistice period, Syria also deployed artillery to the Golan Heights and interfered with Israeli fishermen on Lake Kinneret, forming part of the wider pattern of confrontation.[9] The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs characterizes Syria's posture as encroachment on the coastal strip combined with a unilateral assertion of lake "territorial waters" that denied Israel fishing rights.[10]

The Israeli Government's stated justification for the attack was the shelling of Israeli fishing boats and their police escorts on Lake Tiberias.[5] The timing and sequence of events, however, raised serious questions about whether that shelling was genuinely the trigger. According to U.S. Embassy reporting drawn from sources close to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, and an IDF general officer, Ben-Gurion convened a meeting with Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan and General Staff members on December 9 — one full day before the alleged patrol-boat shelling Israel cited as the provocation — to discuss protecting settlers during the coming fishing season.[6]

At that December 9 meeting, the options considered included shelling Syrian gun positions with artillery, as had been done the previous year, but this was rejected in part due to the risk of civilian casualties.[6] The provisional plan was described as limited in scope, envisaging Syrian casualties and prisoners on a scale comparable to earlier Syrian ambushes.[6] On December 10, Dayan informed Ben-Gurion that this initial limited plan was operationally dangerous and would likely cause heavy Israeli losses; Ben-Gurion then authorized a different plan, which was put into operation the following evening.[6]

A December 15 telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Damascus reported that both UN and Syrian Government sources offered "no foundation" for Israel's claim that Syrian attacks on fishing vessels had prompted the raid.[11] The Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission chairman described the lake as "exceptionally quiet since early November," with the only incident during that period being a December 10 exchange of fire between a Syrian shore position and an Israeli police boat — each side blamed the other, and UNTSO found it "virtually impossible" to establish who fired first.[11] The Embassy assessed that this exchange, whether accidental or provoked, furnished an excuse rather than the underlying cause for the December 11 attack.[11] The commission chairman believed that the operation required at least a week of planning and training by special troops. The telegram also reported that Syria had withdrawn frontier-area reinforcements five days before the attack after following a policy of restraint since an Israeli raid on October 22.[11]

On the night of December 11–12, 1955, Israeli paratroopers and a company from the Givati Brigade raided Syrian outposts east of the Sea of Galilee.[2] Colonel Ariel Sharon commanded the operation.[4][2] The Jewish Virtual Library reports that Israeli forces destroyed the Syrian fortifications and captured the shore.[4]

During an assault on one Syrian post, Rafael Eitan was seriously wounded; his deputy, Tzuri Sagi, assumed command, and the force destroyed Syrian machine guns and captured the position.[12] Meir Har-Zion, a veteran of Unit 101, received the Medal of Courage in February 1956 for his conduct during the operation.[1] The Syrian Government subsequently publicized a claim of 100 Israeli casualties; U.S. Embassy reporting characterized this figure as false and assessed that Damascus was seeking to conceal the extent of its defeat.[11]

Following the operation, Ben-Gurion summoned Dayan from the command post in the Jordan Valley to report to him in Jerusalem. Dayan brought Sharon and Motta Gur with him to that meeting.[2] Ben-Gurion's reported reaction was: "The operation is too good!"[2] A Maariv retrospective links Gur's inclusion in the meeting to his subsequent advancement. In April 1956, Dayan and Sharon appointed Gur commander of the airborne Nahal battalion within Paratroopers Unit 202, although Gur had not taken part in the operation itself.[2]

Syria brought the attack before the UN Security Council on December 13, 1955.[5] In its initial draft resolution of December 22, Syria proposed condemning the attack as "outrageous," treating it as aggression under Article 39 of the UN Charter, seeking economic sanctions, calling for Israel's expulsion from the United Nations, and demanding compensation.[5] A subsequent three-power draft, reflecting UNTSO findings, cited the attack as a deliberate violation of the General Armistice Agreement — including provisions concerning the Demilitarized Zone — while also acknowledging Syrian interference with Israeli activities on the lake.[5]

On January 19, 1956, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 111.[5][7] The resolution condemned the attack of December 11, 1955, as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of the Council's 1948 resolution, the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement, and Israel's obligations under the UN Charter.[7] It called on both parties to respect the armistice demarcation line and demilitarized zone, requested continued efforts to improve conditions around Lake Tiberias, and called for an immediate exchange of all military prisoners.[7] The resolution explicitly stated that reported Syrian interference with Israeli activities on the lake did not justify Israel's action.[7]

The UNTSO Chief of Staff, reporting on December 15 and in a supplementary statement on December 30, found "a striking disparity between the scale of retaliation and the provocation that the Israeli Government had cited."[5] The U.S. Embassy in Damascus assessed that the raid damaged prospects for regional peace and ongoing U.S.-British diplomatic efforts, warning that Syrian public opinion was deeply stirred and that the government faced pressure from hard-line opponents if it did not secure satisfaction through the UN or other channels.[11]

The operation generated significant controversy within Israel's own government. Abba Eban sent the Foreign Ministry a telegram listing seven reasons the action was a mistake, citing concerns about the Arab question, U.S. public opinion, and a British parliamentary debate on Middle East issues.[6] After returning to Israel, Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett reportedly asked, "How can I ever face Dulles again?"[6] On December 14, Religious Affairs Minister Shapira — supported by Ministers Rosen and Ben Tov — challenged Ben-Gurion's decision as unconstitutional on the grounds that the Cabinet Foreign Affairs Committee had not approved it; Minister Eshkol defended Ben-Gurion, while Minister Aranne did not attend the meeting.[6] The dispatch also reported that Ben-Gurion had not consulted his Mapai party colleagues before ordering the action.[6]

In defending the raid to Eban, Ben-Gurion reportedly argued that "invasion of Arab territory" was no more serious a matter than denying Israelis use of their own territory, and that the operation was necessary to assure settlers' complete security.[6] U.S. Embassy reporting also noted that the IDF's proposal may have been partly motivated by a persistent effort to secure the release of four Israeli soldiers imprisoned in Damascus, while cautioning that this factor may not have influenced Ben-Gurion's final decision.[6]

On December 16, Ben-Gurion convened the IDF General Staff and senior officers and instructed them to exercise uninterrupted restraint along the border for a coming period regardless of provocations — accounts differed on whether he said two to three months or three to four months.[6] He reportedly stated that these months would be decisive for arms procurement and Israel's future.[6]

The operation became an early reference point in debates over Israeli strategic doctrine. Ben-Gurion and Dayan responded to critics who argued that no Syrian provocation had preceded the operation by articulating a doctrine of preventive war: a state threatened by an enemy seeking its destruction need not wait for an act of provocation before striking.[3] The INSS-hosted study by Zaki Shalom attributes to Ben-Gurion and Dayan the following analogy: "A snake comes into your house and curls up by the door. It appears to be in a deep coma. You do not know when it will wake up. You need to hit him even when he is not hurting you. You are the one who will choose the time and place to attack it."[3]

The operation is also notable for the early-career roles of figures who later became prominent in Israeli military and political life. Ariel Sharon commanded the raid, and Rafael Eitan was seriously wounded during an assault on a Syrian post.[12][2] Meir Har-Zion received the Medal of Courage for his conduct during the operation.[1] Motta Gur did not participate, but accompanied Dayan and Sharon to their post-operation meeting with Ben-Gurion; a Maariv retrospective links that encounter to Gur's appointment as an airborne battalion commander in April 1956.[2] Benny Morris's study of Israeli border wars from 1949 to 1956 places raids against the Syrian Sea of Galilee positions within the broader pattern of infiltration, retaliation, and Israeli defense-policy development that characterized the period.[13]

The operation is known by more than one name across the reviewed sources. The Jewish Virtual Library identifies it as Operation Kinneret and dates it to December 11, 1955.[4] The INSS-hosted article likewise uses the name Operation Kinneret for the mid-December 1955 IDF operation against Syrian forces in the Golan Heights, without using the name "Operation Olive Leaves."[3] Contemporary U.S. State Department records refer to the event as the "Tiberias action" or "Lake Tiberias attack."[5][6]

The Jerusalem Post and Ynetnews use the name Operation Olive Leaves for the December 1955 raid against Syrian positions on or near the Sea of Galilee's northeastern shore.[12][1] A 1962 U.S. State Department memorandum refers to the earlier event as the "Tiberias raid" and describes it as one of the retaliatory raids previously condemned by the Security Council.[14] Although the shared date, location, and personnel strongly indicate that these accounts concern the same raid, no single reviewed authoritative document formally establishes all the names as equivalents.