Dan Harel

Harel was born in Haifa in 1955 and enlisted in the IDF in 1974.[1] Before enlisting, he studied electronics at the city’s Basmat technical school and completed an additional year of study.[3] He entered pilot training and, after being dismissed near the end of the course, transferred to the artillery, where he spent most of his military service.[3] He subsequently attended the U.S. Army artillery course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where he learned fluent English.[8]

Harel advanced through artillery command and staff positions, serving as battery commander, battalion operations officer, headquarters company commander, deputy battalion commander and battalion commander.[3] In 1995, he became commander of the IDF Artillery Corps, which upgraded its capabilities during his command, including through the introduction of precision munitions.[8]

Following Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, when Israeli artillery shells struck a UN building in Kfar Kana and killed more than 100 civilians, Harel was sent to the United Nations in New York to present Israel’s explanation of the incident.[8] In September that year, he was wounded while travelling to visit soldiers near Tulkarm: a bullet penetrated his jeep and struck his thigh.[3]

After three years commanding the Artillery Corps, Harel became military aide to Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai and continued under Moshe Arens and Ehud Barak.[8] His work included helping draft security arrangements with the Palestinians for the Wye Plantation agreement and participating in the military aspects of peace talks with Syria.[8] In 2000, he returned to command an armored division; in 2001, he was promoted to major general and appointed head of the Operations Directorate.[8] He was the first Artillery Corps officer to command a division and subsequently reach the rank of major general.[7]

As head of the Operations Directorate, Harel served during the Second Intifada and played a key role in Israeli preparations ahead of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.[8] In July 2003, he became head of Southern Command, coordinating its activities with ground forces, the air force and the Shin Bet.[8]

By 2005, Harel had spent 31 years in the IDF, despite repeatedly considering retirement after successive assignments.[8] “I have been in the army for 31 years simply by chance,” he said, explaining that he had reconsidered remaining in service after each major command.[8] After the Gaza disengagement, he accepted appointment as Israel’s military attaché in Washington rather than retiring.[9] The U.S. Department of State’s Spring 2007 diplomatic directory listed him at the Embassy of Israel in Washington as “Defense & Defense Cooperation Attaché.”[10]

As Southern Command chief, Harel was the overall military commander of the 2005 Gaza disengagement.[3] He later described it as the most personally difficult operation of his service and one of the most complex.[3] In his account, approximately 15,000 soldiers carried out the evacuation, while another 10,000 protected it amid continuing attacks; fewer than 10,000 residents, together with their belongings, had to be evacuated through Gaza’s sole exit route at the Kissufim crossing.[3]

Harel regarded the operation’s central challenge as preserving Israeli society through a deep political and ideological division, rather than simply completing a military withdrawal.[8] Before it began, he anticipated possible gunfire between soldiers and opponents, Israeli casualties, logistical difficulties and fighting with Palestinian armed groups.[8] During the first week, he described an approach that relied on dialogue where possible and kept violence low, although he reported that police officers had been injured during resistance at Kfar Darom.[11]

At Netzarim, shortly before the settlement evacuations were completed, Harel said the withdrawal had remained on schedule while preserving evacuees’ dignity and avoiding violence on a scale that could cause a national rift.[12] He credited both the settlers’ conduct, including a ceremony at the Neve Dekalim synagogue, and the restraint of the evacuating forces.[12] “The evacuation is over, the unity begins,” he said.[12] Looking back, he characterized the effect on Israeli society as “only a scratch,” rather than the deeper schism he had feared.[12]

Israeli forces completed their departure from Gaza on September 12, 2005, and Harel signed a declaration marking the end of 38 years of Israeli military rule there.[13] He subsequently said that successfully completing the operation left him relieved and ready to leave military service.[3]

In a 2010 interview, Harel recalled having previously drawn a Gaza map connected with the Oslo agreement that included places such as Gush Katif which Israel defended, only to become responsible years later for dismantling those locations.[3] He said that he had warned his superiors that unilateral withdrawal could increase terrorism and lead to a Hamas takeover, but considered implementing the state’s decision his duty as an officer.[3] In December 2007, he said that he had expected peace after the withdrawal, but that about 3,000 rockets had since been fired at Israel.[14]

Harel became deputy chief of staff in October 2007, replacing Moshe Kaplinski after completing his Washington posting.[9] He had again planned to retire but accepted the position when asked; his responsibilities included force-building.[9] He later explained that Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi had asked him to return after the Second Lebanon War to help restore the army, rebuild confidence, remedy deficiencies and prepare for future challenges.[3] His tenure lasted from 2007 to 2009 and included Operation Cast Lead.[3]

In a subsequent account, Harel described Cast Lead’s objectives as severely damaging Hamas, reducing rocket fire and hostile activity from Gaza, strengthening Israeli deterrence and improving security in southern Israel.[2] He explained that the aim was not to conquer Gaza and remain there, but to inflict damage, create deterrence and withdraw.[2] The three measures of mission completion he identified were stopping Hamas fire, damaging the organization and strengthening deterrence.[2]

Harel’s account dated the operation from December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009, and described three stages: an opening strike against dozens of targets, further attacks on launch areas and other targets, and a ground maneuver followed by unilateral withdrawal and redeployment.[2] He reported that more than 1,000 targets were attacked during the 22-day operation.[2] In a February 2009 discussion, he said national leaders had considered three alternatives: a limited operation to improve a ceasefire, seizing Rafah and the Philadelphia Strip, or retaking Gaza and destroying Hamas.[15] He said the leadership chose the limited option, despite pressure for a broader objective.[15]

After the operation, Harel argued that curbing weapons smuggling into Gaza required American and Egyptian cooperation and political will, not merely action near Gaza’s border.[15] He urged attention to routes beginning at the Sudanese-Egyptian border and considered U.S. leverage important in encouraging Egyptian action.[15] He said that more than 500 Israeli air sorties had targeted tunnel complexes along the Philadelphia corridor, but that Israel did not assume all tunnels had been destroyed; he estimated that up to 100 had been rebuilt since the ceasefire.[15] Reflecting in 2010, he judged that Cast Lead had proved itself without solving the underlying problem.[3]

After retiring from the IDF in 2009, Harel became director-general of the Ministry of Transport in January 2011 and left later that year.[1] He subsequently attributed his resignation to the minister’s refusal to approve a metropolitan transport authority plan he had developed.[16]

Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon appointed Harel director-general of the Ministry of Defense, a position he entered on August 1, 2013.[4] At his entry ceremony, he said resource constraints and a growing workload would require the ministry and military to “do more with less.”[4] An immediate task was implementing a new multiyear IDF plan involving major unit closures alongside a three-billion-shekel defense-budget reduction.[4] His tenure continued until 2016.[16]

Harel later said he negotiated a five-year agreement with the state establishing a fixed defense budget of 300 billion shekels.[16] He described a tightly controlled process involving only five people, with a room set aside inside the ministry for Finance Ministry officials, and credited the agreement with providing stability for the defense establishment.[16]

During his Defense Ministry service, Harel revised his earlier criticism of Iron Dome’s economic logic.[6] Rather than comparing the price of an interceptor with that of an incoming rocket, he argued that the relevant comparison was with the damage the rocket could inflict on people and property in populated areas.[6]

Harel accepted the chairmanship of Ayalon Highways in 2017 and joined Israel Railways as chairman in 2018, amid delays in opening the Jerusalem–Tel Aviv electric railway line.[16][5] In February 2020, he announced his departure after approximately two years.[5] His recommendation to terminate the contract with Spanish company SEMI over the delayed electrification project had been rejected.[5]

Harel set out his analysis of Gaza warfare in “Asymmetrical Warfare in the Gaza Strip: A Test Case,” published in 2012 and based on a presentation delivered on December 6, 2011.[2] He emphasized the difficulties of distinguishing combatants from civilians in densely populated areas, coordinating forces, evacuating and caring for civilians, and maintaining access for humanitarian organizations.[2] His account connected the operation’s reported effects with rocket suppression, psychological warfare and extensive use of precision weapons.[2] He reported that 290,000 telephone calls to civilians’ homes were answered during psychological-warfare efforts that included instructions on civilian behavior.[2]

Harel stressed the need to define operational goals clearly in advance and advocated coordinated national communications and legal efforts.[2] He also argued for a Fifth Geneva Convention, believing that the Fourth Convention had lost much of its relevance.[2]

In a 2025 retrospective, Harel recalled an average of ten attacks a day against Israeli settlers and soldiers in Gaza before disengagement, including rockets, roadside bombs, tunnels and gunfire.[17] He said schoolchildren required military escorts and concluded that “there wasn’t a future” for the settlements.[17] He continued to consider the evacuation decision correct, while criticizing its unilateral implementation for failing to obtain concessions and criticizing Israel’s subsequent containment policy toward Hamas.[17] He rejected disengagement as the explanation for the October 7 attack, saying instead that “the main issue is what we did in the 18 years in between.”[17]

Harel’s role in disengagement prompted opposition to his 2007 promotion from Gush Katif representatives and right-wing activists and politicians, who blamed him for the evacuation and its security consequences.[18]

His reported Cast Lead remarks also became part of the UN Fact-Finding Mission’s allegations concerning Israeli targeting policy, including its interpretation that attacks extended to non-military infrastructure.[19] A later UN report summarized the Mission’s contention that such statements supported allegations of deliberate disproportionate destruction and violence against civilians, rather than establishing Harel’s personal intent independently.[20] Harel’s own casualty classifications and operational judgments were military assessments: his 2012 account reported 709 dead belonging to terrorist organizations, 295 civilians and 162 people of unclear involvement, alongside a 75-to-25-percent ratio that he wrote was generally considered by Western armies to be a good result in urban warfare.[2]

Naval procurement became another significant dispute: in 2020, Harel alleged that Netanyahu and officials in the Prime Minister’s Office and National Security Council had pressured him to avoid an international tender and favor ThyssenKrupp, while he opposed purchasing a seventh submarine as unnecessary and unaffordable.[21] Netanyahu’s representatives rejected his account and said the claims had already been examined by law-enforcement authorities.[21] In testimony reported in 2025, Harel again described pressure for an additional submarine amid severe defense-budget constraints; the state commission of inquiry said it lacked the authority and evidence to determine Netanyahu’s motives.[22]