Dan Halutz

Dan Halutz was born in Tel Aviv on August 7, 1948, and later moved with his family to Moshav Hagor in the Sharon region.[1][6] He enlisted in the IDF in November 1966 as a cadet at the Air Force flight school and graduated as a fighter pilot in July 1968 with the rank of second lieutenant.[1] His flying career eventually encompassed Ouragan, Mystere, Vautour, Phantom, and F-16 aircraft.[6]

Halutz interrupted active military service to pursue academic studies and graduated from Tel Aviv University with a bachelor's degree in economics.[1] He left active service in 1973, returned when the Yom Kippur War began, and left again in 1978 before returning to full-time military service in 1982.[1] He is married and has three children.[1]

Halutz joined the Israel Air Force's first Phantom squadron at the end of 1969 and flew 40 operational flights during the War of Attrition.[1] When the Yom Kippur War began in 1973, he returned to his Phantom squadron from civilian studies; during approximately 43 operational flights, he shot down three enemy aircraft.[1] Following his second departure from active service in 1978, he spent four years as a reserve pilot before returning to active duty in 1982 and beginning to fly F-16s.[1] He also participated in the 1982 Peace for Galilee operation.[7]

In 1984, Halutz became commander of a Phantom squadron, and in 1986 he was appointed head of the operational unit of the Lavi aircraft project.[1] His subsequent appointments took him through air-base command, Air Force staff work, and the General Staff: he became commander of Hazor Air Force Base in 1991, was promoted to brigadier general in 1993, and became head of the Air Force staff in 1995.[1] Promoted to major general in 1998, he moved into senior General Staff work, and in 1999 became the first commander of the General Staff's Operations Branch following its reorganization.[1][6]

Halutz commanded the Israel Air Force from 2000 to 2004 and then became deputy chief of the General Staff.[1] He was appointed commander of the Air Force on April 4, 2000.[7] In February 2005, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz selected him to succeed Moshe Ya'alon as chief of staff, making him the first officer to rise through the Air Force to the IDF's highest command.[8] On June 1, 2005, Halutz was promoted to lieutenant general and formally appointed the IDF's 18th chief of the General Staff.[1][9]

At the appointment ceremony, Halutz emphasized that the military should remain open to public criticism and scrutiny, declaring, “The nation has the right to know, and it is our duty to ensure this right.”[9] His elevation placed a former Air Force commander in charge of all Israel's military forces for the first time.[10] Before assuming that responsibility, he had already participated in developing the IDF's operational concept through his work as head of the Operations Branch and deputy chief of staff; he completed that process after becoming chief of staff.[11]

Halutz had publicly discussed his understanding of contemporary warfare while still commanding the Air Force.[7] In a January 15, 2004, presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs in Jerusalem, published by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, he argued that low-intensity conflict was continuous rather than a succession of short, sharply bounded campaigns.[7] He described it as a contest between societies as well as military forces, in which the ability to endure conflict while maintaining ordinary daily life was an important element of strength.[7]

In that presentation, Halutz argued that military action required legitimacy both internationally and within Israel, which he described as an open society that questioned the decisions of its government and armed forces.[7] He maintained that the military acted according to government decisions and policy, rather than independently determining its own course.[7] Discussing civilian casualties, he said that Israel operated under moral limitations and attributed civilian harm from Israeli operations to terror organizations' decisions to shelter beneath a civilian umbrella.[7] These statements expressed his own account of the relationship between military necessity, democratic authority, and responsibility for civilian harm.[7]

His presentation also advocated precision-strike and long-range capabilities, together with what he called “air supremacy” and “information supremacy.”[7] Halutz said the Air Force was expanding its use of unmanned vehicles, presenting them as a means of reducing both risks to aircrews and operating costs.[7] His argument for technological capabilities thus accompanied a broader account of conflicts in which military effectiveness, social endurance, and political legitimacy all mattered.[7]

As chief of staff, Halutz oversaw the August 2005 Gaza disengagement, which was carried out without casualties.[4] During preparations, he described the evacuation as a difficult command assignment requiring both sensitivity and determination.[12] He told soldiers that pain, hesitation, and tears were acceptable responses, but that failure to complete the mission was not.[12] He also praised soldiers who had protected a Palestinian youth during an assault by settlers.[12] In a subsequent discussion at the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Halutz said that 63 soldiers had disobeyed orders during implementation of the disengagement plan, including 24 soldiers from hesder yeshivas.[13]

Alongside these operational responsibilities, Halutz introduced changes to the IDF's senior command structure in 2005.[14] He separated force buildup, placed under the deputy chief of staff, from force deployment, coordinated by the head of the Operations Branch.[14] He defined the General Staff as an operational headquarters responsible for allocating resources and coordinating these processes, rather than as a body that directly executed operations.[14] The Second Lebanon War interrupted implementation of these changes, and the structure was reversed after Gabi Ashkenazi became chief of staff in early 2007.[14]

The operational concept published in April 2006 had largely been developed during Ya'alon's 2004–2005 tenure, with Halutz participating before completing it as chief of staff.[11] It placed greater emphasis on defense of the home front and on standoff fire relative to ground maneuver and territorial seizure.[11] Only part of the concept was implemented, and it was shelved after the Second Lebanon War.[11] The organizational changes and the operational document therefore both reached the military during a period when the new approach was still being introduced.[11][14]

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers, precipitating the Second Lebanon War.[15] In the ensuing security discussion, Halutz advocated treating Lebanon as a whole as the address for Israel's response while also attacking Hezbollah targets.[15] He described the incident as a possible “turning point in the Israeli-Lebanese dialogue.”[15] Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz instead chose to concentrate the response on Hezbollah rather than Lebanese infrastructure.[15]

During the discussion of infrastructure targets, Halutz proposed a far-reaching attack on Lebanon's electricity system, saying, “We have to put out all the lights in Lebanon. We can shut off their electricity for a year”; Peretz rejected the proposal.[10] Halutz also approved attacks on main roads in southern Lebanon in an effort to restrict Hezbollah's mobility, and was quoted threatening to “turn Lebanon's clock back 20 years.”[16] His proposals concerning Lebanese infrastructure went beyond the response ultimately selected by the political leadership.[10][15]

The initial military approach relied principally on precision standoff attacks, including air strikes, artillery, and battlefield rockets, rather than an early large-scale ground operation.[10] The Library of Congress-hosted study treats the strategy as a product of decisions by both Halutz and the civilian leadership, noting that Olmert and Peretz assented to the approach.[10] It also cautions against reducing the campaign to a simple failure of air power, emphasizing the combined effects of military and civilian decisions about goals and strategy.[10]

In later testimony to the Winograd Commission, Halutz presented a pre-existing response plan that envisaged several days of extensive air attacks on Hezbollah and infrastructure targets, followed by a limited ground operation along the border.[15] He confirmed in his exchange with the commission that this plan had not been presented to the political leadership in a comprehensive, organized form and consequently had not received its authorization.[15] The distinction between available military plans, the strategy actually selected, and the political authorization of particular operations became an important part of the subsequent examination of the campaign.[15][17]

During the war, Halutz replaced Northern Command chief Uzi Adam with his deputy, Moshe Kaplinsky.[18] Adam subsequently criticized Halutz for preventing him from implementing prepared plans, and the command change did not produce a noticeable improvement in the campaign.[18] Journalist Uri Bar-Joseph also criticized Halutz's support for the battle at Bint Jbeil, arguing that the battle offered little military value relative to its casualty toll.[16] These criticisms concerned both senior command relationships and the purposes of particular ground operations.[16][18]

Public and media criticism of the political and military leadership increased as the war progressed. After the ceasefire, reservists and other Israeli social movements called for the resignations of Halutz, Olmert, and Peretz, blaming them for an inconclusive and costly war.[16][19]

Olmert appointed the Winograd Commission in fall 2006 in response to criticism of the government's and military's handling of the conflict.[20] Halutz announced his resignation late on January 16, 2007, issuing a public statement shortly after midnight on January 17, before the commission released its interim report.[19][21] He had remained in office until internal military investigations were completed and a work plan for implementing lessons during 2007 had been established.[21] In his resignation statement, he said, “I chose to take responsibility,” explaining that he had first dealt with the investigation and with a nation demanding a solution.[19]

The Winograd Commission's interim findings later criticized Halutz for an impulsive response to the abduction and for failing to present political leaders adequately with the army's condition, available plans, and analysis of the theater.[17] Gabi Ashkenazi succeeded him as chief of staff.[6] Halutz subsequently entered business: by a 2008 interview, he had become chief executive of Kamor Motors and chairman of Sterling Communications, while also pursuing business activity abroad.[5]

Halutz's appointment marked the first time an Israel Air Force officer became chief of staff of the IDF.[2] His tenure also encompassed an attempt to reorganize the relationship between force buildup and operational deployment, completion of a new operational concept, the Gaza disengagement, and command of the military during the Second Lebanon War.[4][11][14] After the war, his resignation became an example of an IDF chief of staff taking public responsibility following criticism of both the army's performance and his own conduct; Halutz said he had “fulfilled his responsibility.”[3]

The Winograd Commission's April 30, 2007, interim report sharply criticized Olmert, Peretz, and Halutz for choosing an immediate, intensive military response without a detailed, comprehensive, authorized plan.[20] It faulted them for not adequately considering containment or a combination of military action with political and diplomatic measures, although it did not recommend resignations in that interim report.[20] Its findings assigned the main responsibility to Olmert, Halutz, and Peretz, in that order, while also recognizing responsibility elsewhere in the political and military systems.[17]

The commission faulted Halutz for an impulsive response to the abduction, insufficient preparation, and failures to convey to political leaders the army's condition, available plans, and analysis of the theater.[17] It emphasized his position as supreme military commander and principal source of military information for the government.[17] Its findings also criticized his “excessive faith” that standoff attacks could achieve the government's aims without substantial ground action.[10] The criticism addressed not simply the use of aircraft, but the relationship between military capabilities, government objectives, and the advice provided to civilian decision-makers.[10][17]

The final report, submitted on January 30, 2008, described the war as a “serious missed opportunity” that ended “without a clear military victory.”[20] It identified serious failings in decision-making, preparedness, strategic thinking, planning, protection of civilians, and the conduct of the ground offensive.[20] Unlike the interim report, it did not include individual conclusions or recommendations, emphasizing systemic defects while expressly stating that this did not mean individual responsibility was absent.[22] Its findings complemented and stood alongside those of the earlier report.[22]

Halutz acknowledged both systemic and personal failures in his own retrospective account.[2] He identified five principal shortcomings: reservists were not called up at the appropriate time to threaten a ground maneuver; communication between levels of command failed; field-corps training and readiness had been neglected; the home front and the authorities responsible for it were inadequately prepared; and expectations were inflated, partly through faulty explanations of the situation.[2] He described the neglect of training as a longstanding problem rather than one originating solely during his command.[2]

Nevertheless, Halutz defended the decision to respond militarily to the abduction of reservists Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser.[2] In his retrospective account, he called the government's decision “correct and justified,” said that his recommendation reflected a strategy formulated over time, and maintained that under the same circumstances he would recommend the same approach.[2] He described the purpose as imposing costs on Hezbollah greater than the benefits it expected from its actions.[2] He also argued that leadership required making decisions and being prepared to answer for their results.[2]

Halutz's assessment of the outcome was more positive than much of the postwar criticism: he argued that Israeli deterrence had strengthened and that Hezbollah had suffered a major blow.[2] In his retrospective essay, he claimed that approximately 700 Hezbollah members were killed and about 1,000 injured during the month of fighting, while also acknowledging that Hezbollah subsequently rearmed with tens of thousands of rockets.[2] In a 2008 interview, he rejected “failure” as a description of the war, preferred the commission's formulation of a missed opportunity, and said that the IDF had drawn its own lessons before the commission reported.[5] He nevertheless acknowledged that he had made mistakes during the campaign.[5]

Halutz's remarks after the 2002 targeted killing of Hamas operative Salah Shahade, in which Palestinian civilians were also killed, drew opposition to his subsequent senior appointments.[4] Asked about his feelings during similar missions, he described “a light bump to the aircraft due to the bomb's release, and a second later, it's over.”[6] The remark became part of debate over the morality of targeting in densely populated areas; a petition against his appointment as deputy chief of staff was rejected by the Supreme Court.[6][23]

His sale of shares on July 12, 2006, also provoked criticism and questions about his priorities.[24] Halutz confirmed the sale but rejected its portrayal as “deceitful and distorted,” saying that personal financial considerations were involved.[24] He said that he had lost NIS 25,000 and had not known war would break out when he instructed his adviser to sell.[25] Politicians called for an investigation, but the Israel Securities Authority spokesperson said the instruction did not violate securities law, whose insider-information provisions concerned information about a company.[24][25] The reporting did not establish insider trading.[24][25]

Halutz later sought compensation from Bank Leumi for distress caused by the disclosure of transactions in his personal account; the bank said its investigation found that it was not the source of the leak.[26] More broadly, the Library of Congress-hosted study treated the war's shortcomings as the result of combined military and civilian leadership decisions, while INSS cautioned that the April 2006 operational concept had only partly entered military practice.[10][11] Halutz's claims of strengthened deterrence and Hezbollah losses remained his own retrospective assessments rather than independent verification.[2]