David Elazar

Elazar was born on August 27, 1925, in Sarajevo, then in Yugoslavia, and immigrated to Palestine in 1940.[3][4] He studied at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where his subjects included economics and Middle Eastern studies.[4] He joined the Palmach in 1946, entering the military organization in which he served before Israel’s War of Independence.[1]

During the War of Independence, Elazar fought in the Jerusalem sector with the Harel Brigade.[1] His service included reconnaissance in Syria, and in 1948 he became a company commander in the brigade.[4] In May, he led forces that broke through to Jerusalem’s Old City through the Zion Gate.[4] During the second truce, he was appointed commander of Harel’s Breakthrough Battalion, also known as the HaPortzim Battalion, and subsequently led it against Egyptian forces in Operation Horev.[1][3] His participation in important battles during the war established his reputation as a courageous soldier.[3]

After the War of Independence, Elazar taught for three years on a battalion-commanders course.[1] His subsequent appointments moved between operational planning, military instruction, and field command: he became Central Command’s operations officer in 1952, headed the General Staff’s combat doctrine branch in 1954–1955, and commanded the infantry school in 1956.[1] During the Sinai Campaign, he commanded Infantry Brigade 12, an infantry formation that fought in Gaza.[1][4]

Elazar retrained for the Armored Corps in 1957 and commanded the 7th Armored Brigade in 1958–1959.[1] He then served as deputy commander of the Armored Corps from 1959 to 1961 before succeeding Haim Bar-Lev as corps commander.[1][4] He was promoted to major general in 1962.[4] During his leadership of the corps, its combat methods were refined and adapted to changing battlefield challenges.[1]

In November 1964, Elazar became commander of Northern Command, a post he held for five years.[4][5] His command confronted Syrian and Lebanese efforts to divert the Jordan River during the struggle over regional water sources.[1] In the Six-Day War of June 1967, he directed the capture of northern Samaria and the Golan Heights, where Israeli troops overcame strong Syrian defenses.[1] Northern Samaria formed part of the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — in which his command conducted operations during the war.[5]

In testimony about the waiting period before the Six-Day War, Elazar recalled his conviction that war was certain and that Israel should attack immediately.[6] He argued that the northern front faced danger even if fighting began against Egypt, and proposed a campaign that accounted for defensive requirements while ending beyond the Green Line rather than at it.[6] He also testified that proposals accepted by the chief of staff had not been implemented because equipment was unavailable.[6]

Elazar later gave a detailed account of the timing of the Syrian offensive.[7] He said that he had been ready to attack on June 7 but delayed because weather prevented air support and he expected heavier losses without it.[7] He recalled receiving no authorization to attack on June 8, followed by a direct order from Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to attack on June 9.[7] In the same interview, he claimed that Israeli forces could have reached Damascus within another 24 hours had a ceasefire not intervened.[7]

After the war, Elazar supported Jewish settlement in the Golan Heights, made its development a priority for Northern Command, and assisted early communities, including Merom Golan.[5] During the War of Attrition, his command also dealt with Palestinian terrorist activity along the northern front.[5] He coined the term “Fatahland” in 1969 for an area of southeastern Lebanon controlled by Fatah, and maintained close involvement in field-level operational details while welcoming input from personnel in the field.[5]

From 1969 to 1971, Elazar headed the General Staff’s Operations Branch, with responsibility for force development and planning operations against neighboring Arab states and terrorist organizations during the War of Attrition.[1] In 1972, he became the IDF’s ninth chief of staff.[1] The early part of his tenure focused on combating terrorism inside Israel and abroad, including the May 1972 operation to retake a Sabena aircraft and, later, Operation Spring of Youth in Lebanon.[1][5]

The Lod Airport massacre and the Munich Olympics massacre occurred during his first year as chief of staff, killing 26 civilians and 11 Israeli Olympic athletes and coaches respectively.[3] Elazar responded by ordering attacks on Palestinian military compounds in Syria and Lebanon.[3] He was closely involved in planning Operation Spring of Youth, carried out in April 1973 against PLO and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine figures in Beirut and the Sidon area.[5]

In a March 1972 interview, Elazar identified a real danger of war with Egypt in late 1972 or 1973, linking that risk to the absence of diplomatic progress.[7] Discussing Egyptian exercises and preparations for crossing the Suez Canal, he acknowledged that an initial crossing might succeed but predicted that Israeli forces would stop and destroy the attackers.[7] He described Israel’s objectives in a future war as preventing an enemy military achievement, destroying enemy forces while minimizing Israeli losses, and finishing in a better position than at the outset.[7]

Elazar later explained that, in 1972, he had directed headquarters to invest more in strengthening the army rather than maintaining the highest possible daily alert.[8] His reasoning was that permanent maximum alert could consume resources and leave the army less prepared if war came only years later.[8] In testimony to the Agranat Commission, he said that he disagreed with Military Intelligence’s assessment that war was very unlikely, regarding the probability as low but nevertheless the highest since 1967.[8]

Warnings in April 1973 suggested that Egypt might begin a war in mid-May.[5] Although Elazar considered war unlikely, he argued that the army had to prepare for an unlikely contingency and initiated the “Blue and White” alert in May, including a substantial reserve call-up and other readiness measures.[5] War did not begin that month, and the army returned to its normal alert level on August 12.[5] Elazar subsequently testified that he had told the prime minister that Egypt was thinking and speaking about war, and that his additional readiness measures in 1973 cost 60 million shekels.[8]

During the summer of 1973, the General Staff under Elazar defined Israel’s objectives as defeating Egypt and Syria, preserving the status quo established after the Six-Day War, and improving the ceasefire lines.[2] Elazar expected a war to open with attacks along the Suez Canal and on the Golan Heights, while considering an Israeli preemptive strike unlikely.[2] He did not regard defensive fighting as a sufficient basis for the campaign: “If war indeed breaks out, it must have one mission: to defeat the enemy’s army.”[2]

Retrospective interpretations have emphasized different aspects of this prewar posture.[9][10] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs argues that conflicting assessments and political considerations contributed to delayed preparations, citing an April 18 meeting at which intelligence chief Eli Zeira considered war non-imminent while Elazar, the defense minister, and the Mossad chief drew different conclusions from the information available.[9] Its analysis quotes Elazar as recognizing an “internal logic in favor of war” while also weighing the political consequences of appearing too ready to fight.[9]

A Jewish Review of Books account instead emphasizes Elazar’s caution, describing his assessment as “low but not low enough to ignore” and his resistance to army budget cuts as a fight conducted “tooth and nail.”[10] That interpretation connects his concerns to warnings from Ashraf Marwan and contrasts them with Zeira’s continued reliance on the assessment that Egypt would not fight without particular weapons.[10]

On October 5, the day before the war, Elazar placed the regular army on high alert and reinforced the front lines despite Military Intelligence’s assessment that the likelihood of war was extremely low.[11] He also ordered a limited reserve call-up.[5] These measures did not provide sufficient strength to withstand the Egyptian-Syrian assault the following day, and the prewar decisions left unresolved the risk that regular forces could not contain a major offensive until reserves arrived.[11]

On the morning of October 6, 1973, Elazar warned the air force commander and the head of Military Intelligence: “There is going to be a war tonight.”[12]

At a 6 a.m. meeting with Dayan, Elazar sought full mobilization, a preemptive strike in Syria, and reconnaissance flights over the Suez Canal.[5] Dayan rejected the strike and reconnaissance requests and approved a more limited mobilization.[5] Elazar subsequently told the Agranat Commission that he had been focused on the imminence of war since 4 a.m. and had spoken with both front commanders about deploying the regular army.[13]

Elazar met the cabinet at 8:05 a.m., roughly six hours before hostilities began, and advocated calling up 200,000 reservists immediately.[14] He argued that soldiers mobilized that day could become operational by the following morning or noon, and that Israel should accept criticism for mobilization if it helped secure victory.[13] Because most of the army consisted of reserves, he maintained that a large call-up was necessary for more than defensive fighting.[5] He also argued that a preemptive attack could provide a major operational advantage and save lives.[13][14]

Dayan opposed a preemptive attack partly because Israel might be regarded internationally as the aggressor, while Prime Minister Golda Meir ultimately rejected a first strike and authorized a gradual reserve call-up.[14] Concern that striking first could jeopardize American support was part of the political calculation.[15] The late warning left too little time for an orderly reserve deployment before the Egyptian and Syrian attacks began.[16]

Elazar later testified that Southern Command’s commander had assured him that troops would deploy under Operation Dovecote, which called for two corps along the canal and a third behind them.[13] He told the commission that the deployment had not occurred as planned, while arguing that peacetime plans could not always be fully implemented in wartime.[13] The gravity of the opening battles appeared in his remark at a General Staff discussion the following day: “Friends, this is really a battle for Israel, it's right up to the (Mediterranean) sea.”[17]

As the Syrian breakthrough became clearer on October 7, Elazar transferred the 146th Division, commanded by Moshe Peled, to the northern front and authorized a counterattack for the following day.[18] On October 9, he shifted most air force activity from the Egyptian front to the Golan Heights.[18] A Ynet retrospective argues that these decisions helped push Syrian forces back and made a subsequent Israeli offensive into Syria possible.[18]

On the Egyptian front, Elazar presented three options at an October 7 meeting: position forces farther from the canal and counterattack, deploy near the Sinai passages, or attempt the riskier course of attacking across the canal.[13] He favored counterattacking Egyptian troops already east of the waterway rather than immediately crossing it, and proposed reassessing before deciding the following morning.[13] Later that night, he approved plans associated with commanders “Bren” and Ariel Sharon, under which one corps would attack while the other contained the enemy.[13]

Elazar delayed further Sinai counterattacks until Egyptian forces moved east from their positions beside the canal.[19] He also resisted an early crossing until he judged preparations adequate, citing the danger posed by Egypt’s superior armor.[5]

On October 10, Elazar went to Northern Command headquarters to finalize an offensive across the Purple Line, directed principally toward the northern Golan Heights and the foothills of Mount Hermon.[20] He sought to demonstrate Israel’s determination to win, induce Syria to request a ceasefire, and advance before Iraqi reinforcements arrived and while air support remained available.[20] Meir accepted his recommendation, and the IDF launched the offensive on October 11.[20]

By October 12, Elazar’s deliberations on the southern front reflected the constraints of exhausted forces, limited reserves, and an air force warning that it might soon be unable to support an offensive.[20] He also feared a ceasefire before Israel had achieved gains against Egypt and argued that an offensive should be connected to the political possibility of obtaining one soon afterward.[20]

The principal offensive option discussed that day was a crossing by two divisions to establish a bridgehead on the western bank of the Suez Canal.[20] A Mossad report then described an Egyptian plan to advance toward the Sinai passes.[20] Returning to General Staff headquarters, Elazar declared: “We will prepare well; we will repel the advance of the Egyptian armored divisions on October 13-14, and we will hit them hard. After that, we will cross the canal.”[20]

Elazar eventually supported crossing once he judged preparations sufficient and presented the operational plans to the government for approval.[5] Israeli forces crossed the canal and encircled Egypt’s Third Army before the ceasefire took effect.[19]

The government established the Agranat Commission in November 1973 to investigate the IDF’s functioning before and during the Yom Kippur War, including available intelligence, its analysis by civilian and military bodies, and readiness, particularly on October 5.[21] Its first interim report appeared on April 1, 1974, and its final report was presented on January 30, 1975.[21][22]

The interim report concluded that Elazar should have recommended partial reserve mobilization at the beginning of the week before the war and extensive mobilization by the morning of October 5 at the latest, even if the enemy’s intentions remained unclear.[16] It identified reliance on Military Intelligence’s assurance of adequate warning, the absence of a detailed defense plan for a simultaneous surprise attack on both fronts, and deficiencies in deployment and operational orders.[16] It also found that authority and responsibilities among the government, defense minister, and chief of staff were not clearly defined.[16]

The commission concluded that Elazar bore personal responsibility for prewar evaluation and IDF preparedness and recommended terminating his appointment.[16] At the same time, it assigned primary responsibility for mistaken prewar evaluations to the Director of Military Intelligence and his principal assistant in the Research Department.[16] It expressed regret at its recommendation concerning Elazar, recognizing his devoted and distinguished service and his notable achievements before and during the Six-Day War.[16]

Elazar resigned in April 1974, stating: “I see no possibility to continue in my position despite the fact that I believe the errors attributed to me and the weight given to them do not justify the severe conclusions the commission has made concerning me.”[3] Mordechai Gur succeeded him as chief of staff, and Elazar left permanent IDF service.[21][1] After leaving the military, he became head of the Zim Shipping Company.[4]

Elazar died of a heart attack in April 1976.[3] He was buried on Mount Herzl in Jerusalem.[19]

Elazar’s military record encompassed the Jerusalem battles of the War of Independence, the development of Israel’s armored forces, the capture of the Golan Heights, and command of the IDF during the Yom Kippur War.[1] His leadership in October 1973 included both the defensive battles under difficult opening conditions and the subsequent offensives that carried Israeli forces into enemy territory.[1]

Two decisions received particular recognition from General Aviezer Ya’ari: transferring reserves from the Jordanian border to the Golan Heights, where they helped halt and reverse the Syrian advance, and delaying further Sinai counterattacks until Egyptian troops moved east from their positions beside the canal.[19] The latter decision allowed fighting on terms better suited to Israeli tactics and contributed to the eventual canal crossing.[19] The Agranat Commission itself acknowledged Elazar’s devoted service and distinguished achievements even while recommending that he leave office.[16]

Responsibility for the war’s failures generated a public dispute involving Elazar, Ariel Sharon, Shmuel Gonen, and Haim Bar-Lev.[23] Sharon accused the leadership under Elazar and Bar-Lev of inadequate preparation and misreading the opening situation; Elazar challenged Sharon’s account and criticized his conduct.[23] Rejecting criticism about his presence at the fronts, Elazar said he had visited the north or south every day, usually both, and had come under fire while traveling by helicopter.[23] On January 27, 1974, the government expressed “full confidence” in him while leaving war-related allegations to the Agranat Commission, to which Elazar also referred his dispute with Sharon.[23]

Elazar’s resignation letter rejected the expectation that a chief of staff personally supervise every tactical detail and questioned why he, but not the defense minister with access to the same information, was expected to demand mobilization on October 5.[19] Many Israelis regarded him as a scapegoat, and debate continued over the division of military and political accountability.[19][22] The commission’s interim report did not offer an opinion on Dayan’s responsibility, treating that question as beyond its remit.[22] In his own testimony, Elazar maintained that his conduct and tactics were reasonable and asked that criticism also recognize the positive aspects of his actions.[8]