Gabi Ashkenazi

Ashkenazi was born on February 25, 1954, and grew up in Hagor, a moshav in central Israel near Petah Tikva.[1][3] His father was a Bulgarian Holocaust survivor who immigrated to Israel, and his mother, Freda Ashkenazi, née Jamal, immigrated from Syria.[1] His family background combined the experience of European Holocaust survival with Jewish immigration from the Middle East, and the Center for Israel Education describes him as a Mizrahi Jew.[3] He is married and has two children.[9]

Before entering the army, Ashkenazi attended the Tel Aviv Junior Command Preparatory School.[10] He joined the IDF in 1972 and began his service as a combat soldier in the Golani Infantry Brigade.[10] The Yom Kippur War interrupted his officers’ course: he fought on the southern front in the Sinai and completed the course with honors after the war.[10]

Ashkenazi earned a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Haifa and attended the Advanced Management Program at Harvard Business School in 2004.[1] His professional education also included study at the U.S. Marine Corps University’s Command and Staff College.[1] His military schooling and later management studies accompanied a career that eventually included infantry command, General Staff responsibilities, defense administration, and civilian public office.[1]

In July 1976, Ashkenazi served as a platoon leader in Operation Entebbe, the operation to rescue Israeli hostages in Uganda.[3] He first served in Lebanon during Operation Litani in 1978 and was wounded during that operation.[1][9] By 1980 he commanded a Golani battalion, and in 1981 he participated in the evacuation of the Sinai settlement of Yamit.[10] During the 1982 Lebanon War, he served as deputy commander of the Golani Brigade.[1][9]

Ashkenazi commanded Golani from 1986 to 1988 before becoming Northern Command intelligence chief.[1][10] His subsequent appointments broadened his experience beyond infantry leadership: he commanded a reserve armored division and headed the IDF liaison unit to Lebanon.[1] From 1992 to 1994, he headed the IDF’s civil-administration operations in southern Lebanon and worked closely with the South Lebanon Army.[10] In 1994 he became head of the General Staff’s Operations Division, was promoted to major general in 1996, and became general officer commanding Northern Command in 1998.[1]

As Northern Command chief, Ashkenazi oversaw Israel’s withdrawal from the security zone in southern Lebanon in May 2000, ending Israel’s 18-year presence there.[1][11] He had opposed announcing a date for a unilateral withdrawal and warned that the South Lebanon Army could collapse before the planned departure.[11] After the political leadership rejected his concerns, he directed detailed preparations for the withdrawal; IDF units left under fire without losses, and he subsequently redeployed forces along the border.[11] His responsibility was to execute the withdrawal under his command rather than to make the political decision, which he later criticized.[3][11]

In 2002, Ashkenazi became deputy chief of staff under Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz.[10] His responsibilities included construction of the security fence in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — intended to prevent terrorist attacks within Israel.[1] During its construction amid Second Intifada violence, he favored placing the barrier as close to the Green Line as possible to minimize its effects on Palestinians.[3] He also emphasized restraint in aggressive actions toward Palestinians and expressed concern that the IDF should not lose its humanity.[3]

Ashkenazi left the IDF in May 2005 after Dan Halutz was appointed chief of staff.[1][10] He subsequently became a partner in a Tel Aviv security consultancy before Defense Minister Amir Peretz brought him back into government service as director-general of the Ministry of Defense in 2006.[1] By the time he was selected to lead the army, he had served as an infantry commander, Northern Command chief, deputy chief of staff, and the Defense Ministry’s senior administrative official.[1][2]

After Halutz resigned amid criticism of the military’s performance in the Second Lebanon War, the cabinet approved Ashkenazi, then a reserve major general and director-general of the Defense Ministry, as the next chief of staff on February 4, 2007.[9][2] He reenlisted, was promoted to lieutenant general, and became the IDF’s 19th chief of staff later that month.[1][2] His appointment placed an officer with extensive ground-force experience at the head of an army facing the task of rehabilitating its ground forces after the war.[4][11]

Ashkenazi’s reforms emphasized a return to military fundamentals, particularly ground maneuver, training, equipment, and operational planning.[5] Reservist training improved, units were re-equipped, senior-level exercises increased, and operational plans were updated during his four-year term.[5] He also emphasized better-quality training, additional military exercises, necessary supplies, and new courses for senior officers; these changes were associated with renewed military morale.[4] The rehabilitation effort addressed both the practical readiness of units and the preparation of commanders responsible for employing them.[4][5]

Other measures during his tenure included greater logistical autonomy, renewed commanders’ courses, joint study by officers from different services, and more training in the laws of war.[12] These initiatives accompanied renewed attention to the ground forces after the shortcomings exposed in the Second Lebanon War.[5][12] His term included Operation Hot Winter, Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008–2009, and the September 2007 strike on Syria’s nuclear reactor.[1] The restoration of operational capacity after the 2006 war was a central achievement attributed to his military leadership.[1][4]

Military relations with the United States also formed part of Ashkenazi’s work as chief of staff.[1] In December 2007, he met Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the first meeting between an Israeli chief of staff and his American counterpart in ten years.[1] During Ashkenazi’s July 2008 visit to the United States, Mullen awarded him the Legion of Merit at the Commander rank.[1]

In 2009, Ashkenazi declared that the IDF should be “the flag bearer in the field of women’s integration.”[13] He framed the integration of women as both a moral obligation and an operational requirement for sustaining a strong, professional army.[13] His statement linked the issue to military effectiveness as well as to the army’s responsibilities toward those serving within it.[13]

At a March 2010 appearance before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Ashkenazi assessed conditions in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran.[14] He said Hamas was not interested in a flare-up in Gaza and could exercise better control over rocket attacks if it chose to do so.[14] He explained that the IDF struck Hamas targets in response to attacks because Israel regarded Hamas as Gaza’s governing body.[14] Regarding Lebanon, he warned that Hezbollah was building up forces north of the Litani River; the border was calm, he said, but that situation could change.[14]

In the same remarks, Ashkenazi said Iran’s regime remained strong and was continuing its nuclear program despite domestic opposition.[14] He expressed hope that “the three channels of sanctions” would be effective, while arguing that opposition activity inside Iran would not itself stop the nuclear program.[14] Iran remained a subject of his public policy statements after he moved from military command into diplomacy.[15]

Ashkenazi retired as chief of staff in 2011 and became chairman of Shemen Oil and Gas Explorations Ltd.[1] In 2012, he accepted the voluntary chairmanship of the Rashi Foundation, whose education and welfare initiatives seek to support upward mobility for young people in Israel’s social and geographic periphery.[1] These positions preceded his eventual entry into electoral politics.[1]

In January 2019, Ashkenazi had not yet decided whether to enter politics and was being courted by the leaders of Yesh Atid, Labor, Hatnua, and Benny Gantz’s Hosen L’Yisrael party.[3] He subsequently joined Blue and White, the alliance that brought together Israel Resilience, Yesh Atid, and Telem.[1][16] He occupied fourth place on its electoral list, joining a leadership that included fellow former chiefs of staff Benny Gantz and Moshe Ya’alon.[16][6] Blue and White won 35 of the Knesset’s 120 seats in the April 2019 election, and Ashkenazi became a member of the Knesset.[6][7]

By April 2020, Ashkenazi was chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.[7] After Gantz agreed to form a coalition with Benjamin Netanyahu, Ashkenazi joined the resulting unity government.[8] Under the agreement reached in April, Ashkenazi was designated foreign minister while Gantz was to become defense minister.[8] Ashkenazi took office at the Foreign Ministry in May 2020.[1]

The coalition arrangement provided for changes of prime minister and of the defense and foreign ministers after 18 months.[17] Ashkenazi’s appointment restored a full-time foreign minister after a preceding decade in which that arrangement had not consistently prevailed, although the expected short duration of his assignment constrained the opportunity for a broad policy review.[17] He served until June 2021.[1][18]

The proposed application of Israeli sovereignty in parts of the West Bank was an important issue at the start of his tenure.[19] A Foreign Ministry profile stated that Ashkenazi and Gantz supported the Trump plan’s call for Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea basin and described the Jordan Valley as Israel’s “eastern security border.”[20] By July 2020, they reportedly preferred coordinating any annexation with Palestinian leaders, Jordan, Egypt, and other relevant international actors, and were concerned that annexation could accelerate International Criminal Court action.[19] Ashkenazi also engaged Washington over the proposed sovereignty measures.[4]

Regional normalization became a major focus of his diplomacy.[4] On August 16, 2020, he spoke by telephone with United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, and the two agreed to establish direct communication channels and meet to sign a normalization agreement.[21] Both sides affirmed their commitment to pursuing a peace agreement intended to promote regional peace and development.[21] Normalization agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco followed during this period, while Israel shelved its sovereignty plans.[4]

Ashkenazi worked to expand Israel’s diplomatic presence in the countries joining the Abraham Accords, including preparations for missions in the UAE and Morocco.[4] When the renewal of relations with Morocco was announced, he thanked United States President Donald Trump and his staff for advancing peace and stability in the Middle East.[22] He called the announcement “another great day for Israel diplomacy” and, referring to Hanukkah, “a day of light.”[22]

At a conference discussion with the foreign ministers of the UAE and Bahrain, Ashkenazi said the three countries were drafting more than 40 agreements.[15] He reported that approximately 70,000 Israelis had visited the Gulf since normalization and that more than 1,000 Israeli and Gulf companies were engaged in some form of cooperation.[15] His account emphasized the practical expansion of travel, commercial ties, and intergovernmental arrangements following the establishment of formal relations.[15]

Ashkenazi also emphasized relations with Europe, meeting European officials and introducing a “traffic light” system that categorized European countries by their supportiveness toward Israel.[4] During the period after he took office, eight additional countries designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, following six such designations in 2019 and early 2020.[4] At the end of his tenure, he cited 44 visits to Israel by senior officials over the preceding year, including eight visits by senior American officials and 26 by European leaders and senior diplomats.[23]

On Iran, Ashkenazi advocated “a professional and intimate dialogue with the United States,” maintaining “a credible military option on the table,” and persuading Washington that Iran’s nuclear ambitions and pursuit of regional hegemony threatened regional stability.[15] His approach combined engagement with Israel’s principal ally with the preservation of military deterrence.[15] He and Gantz shared concerns about Iran, although their preferred responses could differ from Netanyahu’s.[17]

On April 2, 2021, United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with Ashkenazi about regional security challenges, humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, and normalization with Arab- and Muslim-majority countries.[24] At their May 25 meeting in Jerusalem, they supported the ceasefire and agreed to continue diplomatic engagement with partners working toward peace and security.[25] In his June 2021 concluding briefing, Ashkenazi described relations with the Biden administration as “daily and regular” and said the administration supported the Abraham Accords framework.[23]

In that briefing, Ashkenazi said Israel would seek to strengthen the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank while weakening Hamas, including by giving the Palestinian Authority a more meaningful role in Gaza reconstruction.[23] He also maintained that Israel’s international standing had improved during his term, which included the May 2021 conflict with Hamas.[23] These were his own assessments of the policy direction and diplomatic results at the close of his service.[23]

Ashkenazi announced in December 2020 that he would leave Blue and White and take a break from politics, but remained foreign minister until the new government took office in June 2021.[26] Later that month, at the inauguration of Israel’s embassy in Abu Dhabi, his successor Yair Lapid thanked him among the figures associated with the Abraham Accords.[18]

Ashkenazi’s military legacy centers on the rebuilding of IDF operational capacity after the Second Lebanon War.[1][5] His background in Golani and successive ground-command appointments informed an emphasis on maneuver, training, supplies, and the fundamentals of command.[1][5] The increased training of reservists, re-equipment, senior exercises, and revision of operational plans gave his tenure a substantial institutional dimension beyond the individual operations conducted under his command.[5]

The period also saw improvements in military morale and public confidence after the failures of 2006.[4][12] Operation Cast Lead was widely perceived as demonstrating improved military performance, and the renewed attention to commanders’ courses, interservice study, and logistical preparedness formed part of the same rehabilitation effort.[12] His support for women’s integration added an explicit connection between equal participation and the operational strength of a professional army.[13]

His civilian public service extended into education and welfare through the voluntary chairmanship of the Rashi Foundation.[1] Its work on upward mobility for young people in Israel’s social and geographic periphery represented a different form of national service from military command and parliamentary office.[1] He held that role after retiring from the IDF and before entering the Knesset in 2019.[1]

As foreign minister, Ashkenazi helped translate normalization into diplomatic infrastructure, direct ministerial communication, and expanding commercial and travel links.[4][15] His work included preparing Israeli missions in the UAE and Morocco, engaging European governments, and maintaining contact with the United States.[4][24] The opening of Israel’s embassy in Abu Dhabi shortly after his departure, and his successor’s acknowledgment of his contribution, connected his brief ministerial term with the institutional development of the Abraham Accords.[18]

The Harpaz Affair became a major crisis in relations between Ashkenazi and Defense Minister Ehud Barak.[27] It centered on a document associated with Boaz Harpaz and the selection of Yoav Galant as Ashkenazi’s successor, amid deteriorating relations between Ashkenazi and Barak.[27] The state comptroller, as summarized by INSS, found that Ashkenazi’s bureau had gathered damaging material about Barak and his associates with Ashkenazi’s partial knowledge, conduct inconsistent with the bureau’s duty to remain subordinate to the political echelon.[27]

By the end of 2014, the attorney general was considering a police recommendation to indict Ashkenazi and other officials, although authorities had cleared Ashkenazi of the most serious allegation of obstructing the democratic system by overthrowing a civilian supervisor.[28] In January 2016, Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein closed the criminal case against him for insufficient evidence to indict; that decision did not erase the comptroller’s criticism of conduct deemed unworthy of a senior officer.[29] The criminal-case outcome and the administrative criticism were distinct findings.[29]

Following Operation Cast Lead, Ashkenazi ordered five special command investigations on January 20, 2009, covering civilian casualties, damage to international facilities, firing on medical facilities, destruction of property and infrastructure, and phosphorus-containing weapons.[30] Operational debriefings delayed criminal investigations and could not be released or used as court evidence.[30] Preliminary findings released in July rejected many allegations among approximately 100 complaints, but remained subject to military advocate general review and possible further investigation, with additional potential oversight by the attorney general and Supreme Court.[30]

After the May 31, 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, Ashkenazi appointed retired Major General Giora Eiland to lead an external military operational probe.[31] A separate public commission had a limited mandate concerning the blockade and its enforcement.[31] Turkish proceedings subsequently named Ashkenazi and other commanders; Israel rejected the trial as political and maintained that its troops acted in self-defense after an attack.[32] A UN inquiry found significant organized violent resistance by passengers but judged the boarding and use of substantial force excessive and unreasonable; the Turkish charges were allegations, not a reported conviction.[32]

Assessments of his command also raised questions about doctrine, commanders’ education, legal consultation during operations, and openness to criticism and creativity within the senior command.[5][12] Claims that his 2011 departure removed an opponent of a possible Iran strike were reported interpretations, not established reasons for his retirement.[33] Similarly, officials and analysts disagreed over how much credit he deserved for suspending annexation and advancing normalization; some credited his Washington engagement, while others emphasized Netanyahu’s decisive authority.[4]

Other security episodes included the kidnapping of three soldiers near Mount Dov after the Lebanon withdrawal; an inquiry cleared Ashkenazi of direct responsibility.[11] In 2009, Rawi Sultani was arrested on suspicion of spying for Hezbollah after allegedly discussing his shared gym with Ashkenazi and receiving requests for security information; his father and lawyer disputed the seriousness of his conduct.[34]