Shaul Mofaz

Shaul Mofaz was born in Tehran, Iran, on November 4, 1948, and immigrated to Israel with his parents in 1957.[1] The family settled in Eilat, where he attended a religious elementary school before continuing his education at the Agricultural Boarding School in Nahalal.[9] Recalling the move in a 2012 television interview, he described his childhood as divided into the years before and after immigration and remembered taking his first airplane journey at the age of nine.[10]

The family experienced financial hardship after arriving in Israel, and Mofaz recalled that his father’s factory went bankrupt soon afterward.[10] In discussing those years, he emphasized his admiration for his parents’ resilience.[10] His subsequent education included two years studying business administration at Bar-Ilan University.[3]

Mofaz enlisted in the IDF’s Paratroopers Brigade in 1966.[1] His route into military leadership was not immediate: he later recalled being rejected initially from officers academy and applying again at the first available opportunity.[10] He went on to serve in the Six-Day War of 1967, beginning a military career that would eventually take him through operational commands, military education, strategic planning, and the leadership of the General Staff.[1]

During the Six-Day War, Mofaz fought at the Rafah junction under Rafael Eitan.[11] His early service also included fighting infiltrators in the Jordan Valley, where he devised an ambush method that became associated with his name.[11] During the War of Attrition, he commanded the Matzah fortress on the Suez Canal.[11] In the Yom Kippur War, he led a Paratroopers reconnaissance operation deep inside Syrian territory.[11]

After his service in the Paratroopers, Mofaz became deputy commander of Sayeret Matkal.[11] He served as deputy to the unit’s commander, Yoni Netanyahu, shortly before the 1976 Entebbe rescue operation.[10] In his own account of the mission, Mofaz described commanding a security force equipped with four armored vehicles carried aboard Hercules aircraft.[12] Its assignment was to confront Ugandan forces if they intervened, destroy aircraft, prevent reinforcements from reaching the military terminal, and cover the Israeli troops as they evacuated the hostages.[12] Mofaz wrote that the force successfully completed each stage of its assignment.[12]

He served in the 1982 Lebanon War and subsequently pursued military studies in the United States.[1] In 1984, he attended the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia.[1] After returning to Israel, he held a military-school command before becoming commander of the Paratroopers Brigade in 1986.[1] He was promoted to brigadier general in 1988 and held a senior Ground Corps Command position from 1988 to 1990.[1]

From 1990 to 1992, Mofaz commanded the Galilee Formation.[13] In August 1993, he became commander of IDF forces in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[13] His promotion to major general followed in January 1994, and in November of that year he was appointed head of Southern Command.[11][13]

Mofaz moved into the IDF’s central planning leadership in March 1996, becoming head of the Planning Directorate.[11] In that position, he managed security negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.[11] In September 1997, he became deputy chief of staff.[11] These appointments placed him in both operational and negotiating roles before his selection to lead the armed forces.[11]

In May 1998, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai selected Mofaz to succeed Amnon Lipkin-Shahak as the IDF’s sixteenth chief of staff.[13] Netanyahu had favored Matan Vilnai, while Mordechai preferred Mofaz; Netanyahu said that the defense minister’s recommendation had been a critical factor in the decision.[13] Mofaz served as chief of staff from 1998 through 2002.[3]

Under the heading “IDF 2000,” Mofaz led a series of organizational changes intended to adapt the military’s operational capabilities to its changing strategic environment.[14] The reforms addressed resource constraints as well as developments in technology and human capabilities.[14] They included dividing the Staff Directorate’s responsibilities between a new Operations Directorate and the Planning Directorate.[14]

The Ground Forces Headquarters was converted into the Ground Forces Command, while combat service-support corps were brought together in a Technological and Logistics Directorate.[14] These changes formed part of the organizational work undertaken during 1998–1999, alongside strategic workshops conducted in 1999–2000.[14] The restructuring thus involved both the arrangement of headquarters and the processes through which the IDF considered its future tasks.[14]

In April 2002, four months before the end of Mofaz’s term, the IDF issued a strategy document bringing together work developed through several organizational and strategic channels.[14] Mofaz regarded the document as a means of establishing a shared strategic language within the military.[14] Its scope extended from the Palestinian arena to threats involving Iran and Libya, and it addressed the changing character of conflict and the organizational response required of the IDF.[14]

His tenure also encompassed the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000.[11] Mofaz led the withdrawal despite having opposed the government’s decision to undertake it.[11] Later that year, the outbreak of the Second Intifada shifted the military’s operational focus toward a sustained confrontation with Palestinian terrorist organizations.[11]

Before violence erupted in late September 2000, the IDF under Mofaz prepared operational plans for multiple scenarios, acquired bulletproof vehicles, and conducted special training for regular and reserve forces.[15] During the confrontation, Mofaz pressed for action against armed Palestinians.[15] His command subsequently became closely associated with the military campaign that culminated in Operation Defensive Shield in 2002.[15]

After the March 2002 Park Hotel attack, Mofaz and his deputy, Moshe Ya’alon, opposed limiting Israel’s response to strikes against Hamas alone.[15] They argued that an effective campaign against terrorism required territorial control, both to obtain intelligence and to secure operational access.[15] Their proposal was to take control first of centers of terrorism in Gaza and the West Bank, and Mofaz initially estimated that such an operation would require at least two months.[15] The proposal led to Operation Defensive Shield being brought before the cabinet for approval.[15]

During a cabinet discussion in April 2002, Mofaz said that the IDF had reached “the point of no return.”[16] He argued that withdrawing and later re-entering the territories would be more difficult and would cost additional casualties.[16] At that stage, he estimated that completing the operation would take four to eight weeks.[16] He identified four objectives: overcoming resistance, arresting wanted individuals, collecting weapons and destroying terrorist infrastructure, and preventing attacks.[16]

Operation Defensive Shield included the siege of Yasser Arafat’s Ramallah compound and raids in Jenin and other Palestinian localities.[17] Its supporters regarded it as dismantling infrastructure used to dispatch suicide bombers into Israel.[17] The campaign involved the IDF’s reoccupation of areas of the West Bank and became a central episode of Mofaz’s final year as chief of staff.[11]

On January 3, 2002, Israeli naval commandos intercepted the freighter Karine-A in the Red Sea while Mofaz was chief of staff.[2] Before approving the operation, he observed the vessel through a specialized telescopic lens and personally checked its painted name.[2] He was concerned about authorizing an attack so far from Israeli territorial waters.[2] The commandos boarded the ship and took control without firing.[2]

The interception took place at approximately 0400, about 350 miles south of Israel.[18] The cargo contained a large quantity of weapons and explosives.[2] Accounts of the operation connected the arms shipment to an alleged smuggling relationship involving the Palestinian Authority, Iran, and Hezbollah.[2] The shipment was described as intended for the Palestinian Authority and ultimately Gaza.[18]

Following the seizure, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon officially sent Mofaz to the United States for meetings with senior political and security officials in President George W. Bush’s administration.[18] The mission extended his involvement beyond authorizing the interception itself to high-level discussions in Washington about the affair.[18]

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon appointed Mofaz defense minister in November 2002, following his military service.[1] Sharon retained him in the position after the 2003 election, and Mofaz served as defense minister until 2006.[1] His ministerial responsibilities included preparations for the disengagement from Gaza and security coordination surrounding its implementation.[4]

Although Israeli officials described the 2005 disengagement as unilateral, practical arrangements were coordinated with Palestinian counterparts.[4] Mofaz and Palestinian Interior Minister Nasser Youssef agreed to coordination at three levels: between ministers, through joint committees, and among field commanders.[4] As the withdrawal approached, the two sides established joint operations centers at the Erez and Rafah crossings to respond to possible violence.[4]

In July 2005, Mofaz said that the IDF would enter homes whose residents had left voluntarily in preparation for disengagement.[11] He also defended the army’s readiness to carry out the evacuation.[11] His involvement therefore covered both the military’s preparations for removing Israeli residents and arrangements for handling security incidents during the process.[11][4]

On August 15, 2005, Mofaz stated that Israel would retain several settlement blocs: Ma’ale Adumim, the Etzyon Bloc, Efrat, Ari’el, Qedumim-Qarney Shomrom, and Rehan Shaqed.[19] These were described as lying within, or expected to lie on Israel’s side of, the security barrier.[19] He also said that Israel would retain the Jordan Rift Valley to guarantee its eastern border.[19]

Mofaz’s defense ministry tenure also included an agreement with U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2005 concerning sensitive arms transfers to third parties.[20] The bilateral arrangement required Israeli consultation with the U.S. government and was intended to make such transfers more transparent.[20]

In 2005, after U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney warned that Israel might act preemptively against Iran, Mofaz instead urged a preemptive American strike.[21] In January 2006, he alleged that Iran had financed a Palestinian Islamic Jihad suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.[21] That statement was an accusation made by Mofaz, rather than an independently established finding in the account recording it.[21]

As deputy prime minister and transportation minister in 2008, Mofaz also held responsibility for strategic dialogue with the United States.[22] During speculation that year about a successor to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, he opposed an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and threatened an attack on Iran to stop what he characterized as its nuclear-weapons plans.[22] Olmert was believed to favor Mofaz as his successor.[22]

In August 2008, Mofaz and American diplomat Nicholas Burns addressed a policy forum on Iran and its nuclear program.[23] Both had led the U.S.–Israel strategic dialogue focused on Iran.[23] Mofaz’s role in those discussions continued his involvement in strategic relations with Washington beyond his service as defense minister.[22][23]

When Sharon established Kadima in November 2005, Mofaz initially declined an invitation to join and announced that he would seek the Likud leadership.[1] About a month later, he withdrew from that contest, left Likud, and joined Kadima.[1] He was elected to the Knesset on Kadima’s slate in 2006.[9] From May 2006 until April 2009, he served under Ehud Olmert as deputy prime minister and minister of transportation and road safety.[1]

Mofaz contested Kadima’s leadership against Tzipi Livni in September 2008.[24] Livni won the September 17 primary by 431 votes, with reported shares of 43.1 percent for Livni and 42 percent for Mofaz.[24] Her result was sufficient to avoid a runoff.[24] Mofaz returned to the Knesset after the 2009 election, in which Kadima won 28 seats.[11]

During the eighteenth Knesset, he chaired the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and the Joint Committee for the Defense Budget.[1] He also chaired the Lobby for Direct Employment and belonged to the Lobby for Eilat and the lobby promoting a two-state solution and separation between Israel and the Palestinians.[1] These parliamentary affiliations extended his work beyond military oversight to employment and diplomatic policy.[1]

In 2012, while chairing the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and seeking Kadima’s leadership, Mofaz opposed stopping the Merkava tank program.[25] He argued that Israel needed the tank as an armored platform for regional ground missions and warned that ending the program would mean losing accumulated expertise.[25]

On March 27, 2012, Mofaz defeated Livni in Kadima’s leadership election.[1] One reported result gave him 61.7 percent of the vote to Livni’s 37.2 percent.[1] In his victory speech, he emphasized party unity and highlighted social justice alongside his defense and security experience.[26] Livni subsequently resigned from the Knesset, left Kadima, and formed HaTnuah.[1][27]

In 2009, Mofaz presented a two-state proposal centered on an independent, disarmed Palestinian state with provisional borders.[5] The initial state would cover 60 percent of the West Bank and include 99 percent of its Palestinian population.[5] The proposal combined this first stage with the immediate opening of negotiations on a final-status agreement.[5]

No settlements would be dismantled during the first stage of the plan.[5] A final-status agreement would later be submitted to an Israeli referendum.[5] The proposal therefore distinguished between the establishment of provisional Palestinian statehood and the later resolution of final-status questions through negotiations and a public vote in Israel.[5]

In 2011, as a former defense minister and senior Kadima opposition figure, Mofaz called for renewed negotiations with both the Palestinians and Syria.[20] He argued that regional changes made diplomatic movement necessary, saying: “Because of the strategic change in our region, we have to move forward with the Palestinians.”[20] He also urged doing what was possible to restart those negotiations.[20]

In May 2012, Mofaz and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed that Kadima would enter a national unity government.[6] Adding Kadima’s 28 Knesset members brought the coalition to 94 of the legislature’s 120 seats.[6] Under the agreement, Mofaz was to become vice prime minister, serve as a minister without portfolio, and join the inner security cabinet.[6]

The announced agenda included replacing the Tal Law, making electoral changes, adopting a state budget, and advancing a peace process with the Palestinians.[6] The military-service issue became decisive in determining how long Kadima would remain in government.[7] Kadima favored requiring most ultra-Orthodox students to perform military or civil service, shortening deferrals, and imposing fines for draft evasion.[7]

On July 17, 2012, Kadima left the coalition after negotiations over a replacement for the law exempting most yeshiva students from military service failed.[7][28] Twenty-five Kadima Knesset members supported the departure and three opposed it.[7] The exit came 70 days after the party entered the coalition and reduced the government’s majority to 66 seats.[7]

Mofaz said that efforts to reach an agreement had failed and linked the dispute to his conception of social justice and equal sharing of public obligations.[7] He said that “there cannot be a law without a duty of service and there can be no law without personal responsibility.”[7] He also maintained that he had done everything possible to advance equal national service.[28]

Kadima won only two Knesset seats in the January 2013 election, receiving 74,735 votes, or 2.09 percent of the total.[29] In January 2015, Mofaz announced that he was leaving politics after deciding not to join the Zionist Camp list for the forthcoming election.[8] Akram Hasson replaced him as Kadima leader three months before that election.[29]

In announcing his departure, Mofaz described service as “a way of life and great privilege” and said that he would continue to devote his experience and abilities to Israel.[8] He also offered a candid assessment of his political career: “I am not a great politician… Politics is not something in which I strive to excel.”[8]

His military record included participation in the Entebbe hostage rescue, leadership of the IDF during the Lebanon withdrawal and Second Intifada, and organizational reforms intended to adapt the armed forces to changing threats and resources.[11][14] His subsequent public service included the defense ministry, strategic dialogue with Washington, parliamentary defense oversight, and leadership of Kadima.[1][22]

Mofaz is married to Orit and has four children.[30] Reflecting on the personal demands of military service, he said that his wife had moved homes 15 times during his career and that he had missed some birthdays and parent-teacher meetings.[10]

Mofaz’s conduct during the Second Intifada generated substantial disagreement over the relationship between military action and the political leadership’s containment policy.[31] He opposed concessions Ehud Barak had offered at Camp David, in the Clinton plan, and at Taba.[31] A Jerusalem Institute study argued that the IDF’s response exceeded authorization and contributed to escalation, while recording Mofaz’s denial that the army caused the escalation and his statement that its preparations had taken the Palestinians by surprise.[31] An INSS study also noted that distinctions among people carrying weapons were not always maintained.[15]

In 2001, left-wing activists sought a criminal investigation over an allegation that Mofaz had demanded a daily “quota” of 70 Palestinian bodies.[17] This was a reported accusation, not an established finding.[17] His use of house demolitions and other severe counterterrorism measures also formed part of the criticism of his military leadership.[17]

As defense minister, Mofaz opposed proposed changes to the approved separation-fence route, while legal difficulties were raised over some sections extending deeply into the West Bank.[32] In a January 30, 2004 interview, he acknowledged unresolved problems and said a special team was examining the fence, following an earlier statement that he was certain it did not affect Palestinian life.[32]

Interpretations of disengagement also differed: the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs interpreted his statements as indicating that the initiative partly sought to challenge the belief that Jewish settlement in the territories was irreversible.[33] That formulation was the analysis’s interpretation of his statements, rather than a direct quotation from Mofaz.[33]