Ehud Barak

Ehud Barak was born in 1942 at Kibbutz Mishmar HaSharon.[1] He is married and has three children.[1]

Barak pursued academic study alongside his military career. He earned a Bachelor of Science degree in physics and mathematics from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a Master of Science degree in engineering-economic systems from Stanford University.[6] A contemporary analysis called him a penetrating strategic thinker, while observing that it was not always clear how he would translate ideas into practice.[7]

Barak enlisted in the Israel Defense Forces in 1959, beginning in the Armored Corps before his selection for the elite Sayeret Matkal special-forces unit.[1][8] He served in command roles in the unit from 1962 to 1970, including as operations officer from 1967 to 1968 and deputy commander from 1968 to 1970. After armor training, he returned to command Sayeret Matkal from 1971 to 1973.[9]

During his years in Sayeret Matkal, Barak participated in several prominent operations. In 1972, he disguised himself as a ground technician during the operation to free hostages from a hijacked Sabena aircraft at Lod Airport, persuading the hijackers that the plane required repairs before helping overpower them.[5] The following year, during Operation Spring of Youth in Lebanon, he reportedly dressed as a woman while targeting PLO terrorists.[10] Four years after the Sabena rescue, he was one of the architects of the Entebbe rescue operation.[5]

During the 1967 Six-Day War, Barak commanded a reconnaissance group and participated in the capture of the Golan Heights.[1][11] When the 1973 Yom Kippur War broke out, he returned from the United States to command Tank Battalion 100 on the Egyptian front as part of Armored Brigade 460.[9] His battalion fought in the Chinese Farm battle, participated in Operation Abirey-Halev, crossed into Egyptian territory, destroyed missile bases, engaged in armored battles, and took part in the battle for Suez City.[9] During the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, he served as deputy commander of the Israeli force in Lebanon.[1]

For his special-operations leadership, Barak received four IDF chief-of-staff commendations before the Six-Day War, one of which was subsequently converted into the Medal of Distinguished Service, and a fifth commendation for leadership and courage during his command of Sayeret Matkal.[9] He ultimately received the Distinguished Service Medal and four additional citations for courage and operational excellence.[1] These decorations contributed to his recognition as Israel's most decorated soldier.[2]

After Sayeret Matkal, Barak advanced through senior command. He commanded the regular Armored Brigade 401 from 1974 to 1975, served as assistant head of Military Intelligence for operations from 1975 to 1977, and commanded reserve Armored Division 611 from 1978 to 1980 and regular Armored Division 252 from 1980 to 1981.[9] In January 1982, he became head of the IDF Planning Branch and was promoted to major general.[1] He headed the General Staff Planning Directorate from 1982 to 1983 and then Military Intelligence from 1983 to 1986.[9]

In January 1986, Barak became commander of the IDF Central Command, and in May 1987 he was elevated to deputy chief of staff.[1] In April 1991, he became the IDF's fourteenth chief of the General Staff and was promoted to lieutenant general, the highest rank in the Israeli military.[1][9] He held the post until 1995.[8]

As chief of staff, Barak oversaw operations against Palestinian terrorism in the territories and Hezbollah terrorism in southern Lebanon.[9] He played a central role in finalizing the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty and oversaw the IDF's redeployment in Gaza and Jericho after the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement.[1] He also met his Syrian counterpart during bilateral Syrian-Israeli talks.[1] Although Barak knew about the Oslo talks, he did not participate in them and reportedly had reservations about the resulting agreement.[8]

After retiring from the military, Barak joined Yitzhak Rabin's government as minister of the interior in July 1995.[1] Following Rabin's assassination, he served as minister of foreign affairs in Shimon Peres's government from November 1995 until the government's electoral defeat in June 1996.[1]

Barak was elected to the Knesset in 1996 and served on its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.[1] In June 1997, he became leader of the Labor Party.[8] He subsequently worked to establish One Israel, a joint electoral list combining Labor, Gesher, and Meimad, as his vehicle for the 1999 elections.[1]

In the direct election for prime minister held on 17 May 1999, Barak decisively defeated the incumbent Benjamin Netanyahu.[1][12] The One Israel list won 26 Knesset seats.[13] Barak presented his government to the Knesset on 6 July 1999 and simultaneously assumed the defense portfolio.[1]

Barak formed a broad coalition of secular and religious parties that initially commanded 75 Knesset seats, while Likud moved into opposition.[14][7] The coalition's ideological breadth, ranging from the right to the left, gave him a parliamentary majority but also created substantial internal tensions.[13] A contemporary analysis calculated that Barak's margin among Jewish voters was 3.2 percentage points over Netanyahu; Arab voters overwhelmingly supported Barak and substantially enlarged his overall margin.[13][7]

Barak entered office pursuing withdrawal from Lebanon and agreements with Syria and the Palestinians on an ambitious timetable.[12] A contemporary assessment characterized the beginning of his premiership as a period of unusual optimism and broad goodwill. It credited him with repairing relations with the White House, completing Israel's association status with the European Union, and helping secure European consensus for Israel's limited admission to the Western European and Others Group at the United Nations.[13]

Withdrawing Israeli forces from the security zone in southern Lebanon had been a central promise of Barak's election campaign. The IDF completed the withdrawal in May 2000, within a year of his taking office.[1][3]

The withdrawal fulfilled a commitment Barak had made explicitly to the electorate. Three Israeli soldiers were killed in a Hezbollah raid in October 2000, after the withdrawal had been completed.[15] A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs analysis criticized the manner of the withdrawal and argued that a Palestinian perception that Israel had retreated in response to Hezbollah's armed campaign probably hardened the PLO's negotiating posture.[13]

The central diplomatic event of Barak's premiership was the Camp David summit convened by U.S. President Bill Clinton from 11 to 24 July 2000. Barak and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat sought a framework for a final-status agreement addressing Jerusalem, borders, Israeli settlements, Palestinian refugees, and security.[4][12] The official trilateral statement issued on 25 July described the negotiations as unprecedented in scope and detail.[4]

The statement set out five principles for continuing talks: the parties would seek to end decades of conflict and achieve a just and lasting peace; continue negotiations on all permanent-status issues; base negotiations on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; avoid pressure, intimidation, threats of violence, and unilateral actions prejudging the outcome; and continue consulting the United States as a partner in the peace process.[4]

An Anti-Defamation League backgrounder says Barak's reported offer included a Palestinian state in up to 95 percent of the West Bank—known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria—and 100 percent of Gaza, removal of isolated settlements, Palestinian control over parts of Jerusalem, and an arrangement described as “religious sovereignty” over the Temple Mount.[16] A Congressional Research Service account describes proposals involving more than 90 percent of the West Bank, Israeli annexation of settlement areas containing approximately 130,000 settlers, and admission of thousands of Palestinian refugees through a family-unification program. It identifies Jerusalem, especially sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, as a central obstacle.[17]

A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs account describes the Jerusalem discussions as hypothetical, oral, and nonbinding. The parties operated under the principle that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed; very little was put in writing, and many proposals were conveyed through the United States.[18] Barak later said that ideas and positions raised during the summit were “null and void” as opening positions for resumed negotiations.[18]

The same account states that Barak had lost coalition partners from Yisrael B'Aliyah, Shas, and Mafdal by the time of the summit, leaving him with a minority government; Foreign Minister David Levy resigned shortly afterward.[18] It also reports that Arafat rejected U.S. Jerusalem proposals that did not provide full Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem and that Palestinian representatives rejected formulas involving divided or “Divine” sovereignty.[18]

The summit ended without agreement on 24 July 2000.[4] Accounts differ over the causes: Israeli and American officials emphasized Palestinian unwillingness to compromise, while Palestinian participants cited inadequate American preparation, personality differences between Barak and Arafat, and what they described as Barak's take-it-or-leave-it posture.[16] President Clinton later blamed Arafat for the failure.[12] Additional negotiations in the following months produced no agreement.[16]

A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs account describes a later oral bridging plan that Clinton presented on 23 December 2000 and summarized as “Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish areas are Israeli.” Neither side fully accepted it, and Clinton stated that the ideas would leave the White House with him and would not bind the incoming administration.[18] The same account reports that IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz considered the proposal inconsistent with Israel's security interests and warned that Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem could become difficult-to-defend enclaves within Palestinian sovereignty.[18]

The Second Intifada began in late September and early October 2000.[12][8] The relationship between the failed negotiations, the subsequent violence, and responsibility for the outbreak remains politically and historically contested.

On 10 December 2000, Barak announced his resignation and called for a special prime-ministerial election rather than a general Knesset election.[1] At his press conference he said: “I will officially advise the president of my resignation (and) in 60 days ... go to special elections for prime minister... Due to the emergency situation the country is in ... and the need to continue reducing the violence and moving forward the chances of peace negotiations, I have decided to ask again for the mandate of the people of Israel.”[1]

The Jewish Virtual Library account states that the Basic Law restricted eligibility in a special election to sitting Knesset members whose parties held at least 10 seats, thereby excluding Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, who was not then a Knesset member.[1] Barak remained prime minister during the campaign. On 6 February 2001, Ariel Sharon defeated him in the special election.[17] Barak completed his term on 7 March and subsequently resigned his Knesset seat and stepped down as Labor leader.[1][8]

Barak returned to Labor Party leadership in 2007. On 12 June, he defeated former Shin Bet chief Ami Ayalon in the second round of the party's leadership contest and then became defense minister in Ehud Olmert's coalition.[19] He also served as deputy prime minister.[1]

Following the 2009 elections, Barak was again appointed deputy prime minister and defense minister, this time in Benjamin Netanyahu's government.[1] He therefore held the defense portfolio under prime ministers from both Kadima and Likud.

In January 2011, Barak broke with Labor and founded a breakaway faction called Atzmaut, meaning Independence.[1] On 26 November 2012, while serving as defense minister and chair of Independence, he announced that he would leave politics after the January 2013 election. He said he would remain defense minister until a new government was formed and that he wanted to devote more time to his family.[5]

In 2019, after approximately six years away from political life, Barak announced a return to political activity ahead of Israel's repeat election. At the launch of his new political framework, he declared that “The future of the Zionist movement is on the line here.”[20]

Barak's career spanned more than three decades of military service and several of Israel's highest political offices. He commanded Sayeret Matkal, participated in multiple wars, and rose to chief of the General Staff.[8] His decorations and citations earned him recognition as Israel's most decorated soldier.[2]

His diplomatic record is more contested. The withdrawal from southern Lebanon fulfilled a campaign promise and ended Israel's long deployment there.[3] A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs account describes the Camp David summit as the first serious official Israeli-Palestinian negotiation over Jerusalem and the first time since 1967 that an Israeli prime minister was willing to consider specific proposals for dividing the city.[18] Barak's stated position was that he would not sign an agreement unless, in his judgment, it strengthened rather than weakened Israel.[11]

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy presented Barak with its 2015 Scholar-Statesman Award. Its announcement highlighted a career that included service as IDF chief of staff, prime minister, foreign minister, and defense minister, as well as his status as Israel's most decorated soldier.[2]

A serious personal allegation arose from a 1992 military exercise at Ze'elim, during which a newspaper article accused Barak of abandoning wounded soldiers and later giving contradictory explanations. Barak denied the allegations, and a State Comptroller report that was largely published in 1999 exonerated him of wrongdoing.[21]

The 2000 Camp David negotiations remain the most historically and politically contested aspect of his career. Accounts differ over the scope and precision of the Israeli proposals, with some presenting specific figures as reported rather than definitive, and over responsibility for the summit's failure.[16][16] One analysis argues that Barak abandoned the principle of reciprocity in the Oslo process and that his concessions may have hardened Palestinian expectations.[13] Israeli and American officials who attended the summit rejected Palestinian characterizations and emphasized what they described as Palestinian unwillingness to compromise.[16] The relationship between the summit's failure and the outbreak of the Second Intifada also remains contested.