Aviv Kochavi

Kochavi was born in 1964 and grew up in Kiryat Bialik, in the Haifa District. His father, Shaul, owned a shop, and his mother, Riva (also rendered Riba), was a physical education teacher; he was the second of three children. He attended Habonim School and the ORT Kiryat Bialik school and was a member of the HaMahanot HaOlim youth movement.[1][6]

Kochavi earned a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard University and an MA in international relations from Johns Hopkins University.[1][7]

Kochavi was drafted into the IDF in August 1982 and volunteered for the Paratroopers Brigade, serving in its 890th Battalion. His early positions included platoon commander and battalion operations officer. He subsequently served as operations branch commander of the brigade and moved through infantry command roles, including command of Battalion 101.[1][8]

The Paratroopers Brigade was a formative institution in Kochavi’s career. He was one of ten IDF chiefs of staff who rose through its ranks, placing his path from paratrooper service to senior command within a broader pattern of military leadership.[9]

Kochavi commanded the Paratroopers Brigade from 1995 to 1997 and again from 2001 to 2003.[1] In 2002, his troops operated in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus. A profile described the crowded camp as home to about 25,000 people in roughly a quarter of a square kilometer, and reported that troops moved through buildings by breaching walls rather than entering streets where gunmen had prepared traps. The four-day operation left one Israeli soldier dead; the report said around 20 gunmen were killed and dozens arrested.[10]

A biographical account credits Kochavi with developing the wall-breaching tactic to reduce soldiers’ exposure to sniper fire and claims the U.S. military later adopted it in Iraq and Afghanistan. That reported influence is not independently corroborated by the other material in this bundle.[1]

In 1998, after completing a master’s degree at Harvard, he was appointed commander of the Eastern Division of the Liaison Unit for Lebanon. He later held a post described in one biography as commander of the “Fire Brigade,” and on November 30, 2004, became commander of the Gaza Division. During his command, Israel’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza took place, and in June 2006 Hamas operatives entered Israel through a tunnel, killed two soldiers and captured Gilad Shalit. A review committee chaired by Giora Eiland called the incident an operational failure but found Kochavi’s actions reasonable and recommended no disciplinary measures against the command chain.[1][11]

Kochavi headed the Operations Division in the IDF Operations Directorate from 2007 to 2010 and became director of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Aman, in November 2010.[1][11] Accounts describe structural changes during his intelligence leadership, the creation of new units, broader intelligence support for operational forces and development of cyber capabilities. The same profile notes criticism of intelligence assessments before the Arab Spring and of IDF preparedness for tunnels before Operation Protective Edge, while placing the latter issue within a broader institutional and procurement context.[11] He later became commander of the Northern Command in November 2014 and advanced humanitarian assistance to Syrians through the “Good Neighbor” project.[11]

Kochavi became deputy chief of staff in May 2017, serving until December 2018. His work in that office included involvement in the IDF’s Gideon multiyear plan and future procurement planning. His preceding assignments had included command of the 98th Paratroopers Division, the Gaza Division and Northern Command, as well as leadership of the Operations Division and Military Intelligence.[1][11]

In November 2018, the cabinet confirmed Kochavi as the IDF’s 22nd Chief of Staff, with a planned start date of January 15, 2019. At the time he was deputy chief of staff. His candidacy was reviewed by the Senior Appointments Advisory Committee, which reported finding no deficiency in his integrity. The selection process nevertheless drew political attention, including reported disagreement over whether then-Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman or Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had driven the choice.[12]

Kochavi assumed office on January 15, 2019, in a security and operational environment described as marked by substantial uncertainty. He served until January 16, 2023, when Herzi Halevi succeeded him as the IDF’s 23rd Chief of Staff.[13][2]

Soon after taking office, Kochavi set out a framework called “Readiness and Change.” It aimed to distribute technology and intelligence more widely throughout the military and improve coordination among branches and units. Proposals included a Planning Directorate unit to integrate methods and technologies; a task force combining Military Intelligence, the air force and regional commands to identify targets using artificial intelligence and big data; and wider access to air power and anti-tank missiles for ground forces.[14]

The framework also proposed connecting units through an IDF intranet and forming combined units that brought together infantry, combat engineering, artillery, air force and intelligence elements. Some elements required government budgetary and legislative approval. The proposals reflected a broader effort to connect intelligence collection, target identification and firepower across military branches.[14]

Kochavi’s principal force-buildup initiative as Chief of Staff was Tnufa, or “Momentum,” a multiyear plan designed for 2020–2024. Its stated aims included increasing offensive capacity and deterrence, extending periods of calm, and enabling the IDF to produce a clear outcome in a war or operation.[3][15] The plan was presented in February 2020.[16] Kochavi had said in December 2019 that “in practice, this plan has already gone into effect.”[15]

Tnufa was framed as more than a list of purchases and projects. Kochavi described it as an effort to align the military around shared concepts, priorities and organizational direction. Its proposals included greater ability to expose and destroy enemy forces, more precise and rapid firepower, stronger coordination among branches, sensors and communications equipment, cyber capabilities, and multidimensional units combining different military functions.[16]

The plan’s development began with an intelligence assessment and proceeded through discussions of trends, capability gaps and possible responses. In practice, the IDF implemented it through internal budget reallocations. It did not, however, receive formal approval and funding as a multiyear plan from the political echelon. The IDF announced its launch on February 13, 2020; INSS reported that then-Defense Minister Naftali Bennett had approved it on January 26, while cabinet deliberations on approval were deferred until after elections and the formation of a new government.[3][15]

Political stalemate and the absence of a state budget constrained implementation, prompting Kochavi to reprioritize funds toward urgent requirements, including munitions. A later budget allocated NIS 5 billion for dealing with Iran.[17] Economic and political conditions were also expected to delay or limit the plan’s launch.[18]

Tnufa’s operational concept emphasized identifying an adversary’s important centers and vulnerabilities, then exposing and striking them accurately and quickly. The plan strengthened real-time tactical intelligence, the ability of the air force to strike many high-quality targets in a short period, and digital infrastructure intended to connect intelligence and air operations more quickly.[3]

The plan’s implementation and results were not uniform. The multidimensional unit was an example of innovation but had not yet reached full operational capability or been widely replicated. Ground forces and logistics remained weaknesses in force buildup. More broadly, the transformation required continued implementation and evaluation rather than treating the program’s design as proof that its goals had been achieved.[3]

Kochavi promoted a “Victory” approach centered on identifying adversaries’ key centers and weaknesses, then exposing and striking them accurately and rapidly. INSS describes the approach as linking intelligence and digital networks to rapid, precise firepower, while treating these as analytical descriptions rather than independent measures of battlefield outcomes.[3]

During Kochavi’s tenure, the IDF created the Strategy and Third Circle Directorate in June 2020 by dividing the Planning Directorate. Also known as the Iran Directorate, it focused on force buildup for threats beyond Israel’s immediate region, including planning for possible Iranian nuclear developments. The accompanying investment in air power, intelligence and the links between them came partly at the expense of force buildup in the ground forces, according to INSS analysis.[3]

Kochavi repeatedly emphasized preparations for a possible military operation against Iran’s nuclear program. In a 2021 speech, he called a return to the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, even in a slightly improved form, an “operational and strategic mistake.” He argued that Iran’s advances in centrifuges and uranium enrichment had to be halted and warned that the country could eventually be only weeks from a nuclear bomb. He also said that, under the agreement, Iran could still break out to a weapon in 2030, when the accord expired.[19]

Kochavi said he had ordered operational plans for a possible strike on Iran to be ready, while stressing that the decision to use them and the circumstances for doing so belonged to Israel’s political leadership. He urged the United States and other countries to maintain sanctions and pressure. In a later account of his tenure, he said that four days after taking office he ordered preparations across immediate, medium and long time horizons; he also described increased target identification and rehearsals of attack models. These details were reported as his account, alongside criticism from security officials about gaps in procurement and attack planning at the beginning of his tenure.[19][2]

Kochavi also expanded the IDF’s “Campaign Between the Wars” geographically and beyond kinetic operations to include cyber, economic and maritime activity, according to INSS analysis. The authors describe his approach as involving regular assessments and defined targets in the campaign against Iranian entrenchment in Syria, and roles for regional commands in campaigns involving Hezbollah in the Golan Heights and Hamas in Gaza. These are the analysts’ assessments of the campaign and its effects.[3]

In a farewell interview, Kochavi said the IDF had conducted more than 52 operations in its “war between the wars” campaign during 2022. He also said that target production by the Operations Division had increased from 15 targets a week to 50–100, and described an AI-supported target-generation system as one element of the changes. These figures were presented as Kochavi’s account of the military’s development.[10]

Kochavi’s approach to recurrent exchanges of fire with Gaza-based terrorist groups was described as “days of battle”: each episode, in this framing, was intended to change deterrence rather than simply return to the prior situation. INSS cited IDF annual-summary figures for rockets and other high-trajectory weapons fired in the half-year after four operations: 76 after Operation Pillar of Defense, 21 after Operation Protective Edge, five after Operation Guardian of the Walls and three after Operation Breaking Dawn. The authors interpreted the declining counts as reflecting restraint in rocket fire, while emphasizing that Gaza remained a continuing security and humanitarian challenge.[3]

Kochavi changed recruitment and personnel processes. The IDF ended the “quality group” ranking system, altered initial psychological testing, added suitability parameters and streamlined screening, with the stated aim of making recruitment fairer and shorter. Other measures included new combat-soldier training and technology-service programs, higher soldiers’ salaries and expanded breaks intended to encourage soldiers to use vacation days.[3]

The INSS analysis notes a tension between these measures and the emphasis on operational buildup, which it characterizes as a “cannons before socks” priority. That emphasis drew criticism over service conditions. During the pandemic, complaints concerned command failures, soldiers’ rights and medical treatment. Kochavi’s slogan “our people are valuable” accompanied calls for measures to improve service and conditions, but the analysis presents unresolved concerns alongside those initiatives.[3]

In his farewell interview, Kochavi identified the handling of career-service pensions and failure to complete a new career-service pay model as his two principal disappointments in office. He said the pension issue was not a mistake in the decision itself but in how it was communicated. He also said a pay reform had been close to agreement with the Finance Ministry before the Knesset was dissolved and another election was called.[2]

In 2021, Kochavi became the first recipient of an IDF campaign medal recognizing service in southern Lebanon. The military formally recognized the 1982–2000 period as a distinct campaign after a committee review and approvals. Israel’s presence there had been intended to protect northern Israel from attacks, but remained contentious within Israel: about 675 Israeli soldiers were killed, and questions were raised about the campaign’s efficacy.[20]

In public remarks on the possibility of war with Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Gaza, Kochavi warned that Israel would strike houses where weapons were held. He said terrorist groups deliberately concealed weapons in civilian areas, claimed that weapons were located in every fifth house in Lebanon, and said civilians in those areas should evacuate when war began. These claims were attributed to Kochavi in the reporting.[19]

Kochavi said Israel would warn civilians and “follow international law.” He also proposed that debate about the laws of war consider the “relative relationship” between an attack’s objectives and its impact on civilians, rather than relying only on the concept of proportionality. His remarks address contested issues of civilian protection and the conduct of hostilities; they should be understood as his stated position, not as an independent legal finding.[19]

He said new intelligence and technological capabilities helped the IDF locate hidden weapons more accurately, with the aim of destroying enemy rockets while avoiding civilian deaths. He described target-gathering as faster than before and said more than 200 officers were dedicated to vetting selected targets. These were Kochavi’s descriptions of military capabilities and procedures.[19]

On Gaza, Kochavi described deterrence as combining military force with measures intended to improve civilian life. He cited the targeted killing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad commander Baha Abu al-Ata and Israeli responses to rocket fire, while also supporting increased exports and imports and the facilitation of Qatari financial assistance. He said economic opening had limits until the bodies of dead Israelis and living Israeli prisoners were returned. He also predicted that the Gaza border wall would be finished by summer and said the IDF continued to uncover attack tunnels.[19]

Kochavi said that the IDF had developed more advanced surveillance and other technologies for the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and that it had significantly increased cyberattack capabilities and operations in the preceding year. He also warned that ISIS remained active in parts of the Middle East, naming Sinai, Jordan, Egypt and Syria.[19]

Near the end of his term, Kochavi objected to proposed changes that would place parts of West Bank civil administration under a second minister in the Defense Ministry and transfer control of the Border Police to the national security minister. He argued that the military should brief political leaders on the consequences before decisions were made and that operational command in the field needed to remain clear. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich accused him of politicizing the IDF; Kochavi said his intervention was professional rather than political.[2]

A Congressional Research Service report summarizing media accounts described another dispute over command and political authority. It reported that Kochavi said the IDF would not be answerable to Bezalel Smotrich or Itamar Ben Gvir. The report also said that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reportedly stated that decisions about implementing changes to the command structure would follow military assessments of their consequences. These statements are reported accounts, not independently verified direct quotations in the material available here.[21]

After the October 7, 2023 attack, Kochavi said that his own decisions and actions as Chief of Staff should be examined as part of investigations into the military’s failures. He said he was responsible for decisions made during his command and called for a thorough, multiyear examination drawing on facts, classified information and the period in which he led the IDF. The responsibility for those failures remains a matter for investigation.[4]

After his military career, Kochavi was appointed chairman of the executive committee of the Branco Weiss Institute, an organization working on education and social change, including the personal and social development of students and teachers. He described education as central to developing people and society and emphasized the institute’s efforts to provide “second chances” to young people facing difficulties.[5]

In December 2024, Kochavi joined AWZ Ventures, an Israeli-Canadian venture capital fund specializing in deep-tech investments. The fund’s stated investment focus includes Israeli startups in security, cyber and space technologies.[22]

Assessments of Kochavi’s tenure emphasize both organizational ambition and incomplete implementation. INSS describes his period as a major process of change in force buildup and force application, highlighting the use of real-time intelligence, networked operations and more rapid, precise strikes. The same analysis cautions that complex reforms require continued implementation and evaluation, and identifies gaps in ground-force capability, soldiers’ conditions and public trust.[3]

Kochavi’s stated approach linked intelligence, digital systems and firepower to the goal of identifying adversary targets and striking them quickly. Tnufa supplied an organizational and planning framework for that effort, but its lack of formal multiyear political approval and budgetary constraints limited what could be implemented as planned. Analysts therefore describe substantial innovation while also noting that some capabilities remained incomplete and that investments in airpower and intelligence could come at the expense of ground forces.[3]

The operational record is also presented through assessments and claims that should not be confused with independent measurements. INSS interpreted reduced post-operation rocket counts as evidence of restraint, while noting continuing challenges in Gaza; its broader appraisal describes claimed gains alongside unresolved weaknesses. Kochavi’s own farewell account stressed improved urban-combat capacity, better ability to locate and strike adversaries, and a military that had become more capable and ready. He named improving security, improving capability and readiness, and maintaining an ethical military as tests for the IDF; these were his assessments of the institution he led.[3][2]

Kochavi’s career also reflects the Paratroopers Brigade’s contribution to senior IDF leadership. His progression from the brigade through field command, intelligence, regional command and the General Staff culminated in four years as Chief of Staff. Assessments of that tenure remain tied to the tension between the strategic aims of force transformation and the practical limits of funding, implementation, personnel conditions and military readiness.[1][9]