Haim Bar-Lev

Bar-Lev was born in Vienna on November 16, 1924, with the family surname Brotzlewsky.[1][2] His family moved to Yugoslavia before immigrating to Palestine in 1939.[1] He attended the Mikveh Israel agricultural school, graduating in 1942.[2] Although he intended to become a veterinary surgeon, he chose service in the Palmach, the Haganah force led by Yigal Allon.[1]

His Palmach service continued until 1948 and included participation in the struggle against British rule.[2] In 1946, he took part in the detonation of the Allenby Bridge near Jericho.[2] During the War of Independence, he successively commanded the Eighth Battalion of the Negev Brigade and a mechanized battalion, and also served as a brigade operations officer.[2]

After attending the Senior Officers’ School in Britain, Bar-Lev became director of training on the General Staff in 1956.[2] In the Sinai Campaign later that year, he commanded an armored brigade that reached the Suez Canal.[2] He subsequently commanded the Armored Corps from 1958 to 1961, before studying for an M.A. in economics and business administration at Columbia University.[2] On returning to Israel, he headed the General Staff’s Operations Branch from 1964 to 1966, then went to Paris to study political science.[2]

Recalled the following year, he became deputy chief of staff on the eve of the Six-Day War, serving under Yitzhak Rabin.[2] During the battle for Jerusalem, Bar-Lev accompanied Uzi Narkiss into the Old City.[4] Narkiss, recalling his brief entry there during the War of Independence, said, “Let’s not go in if it’s just to go out again”; Bar-Lev replied, “We’ll never leave again.”[4] Three Israeli paratroopers were killed in the capture, two inside the walls and one outside.[4]

Bar-Lev succeeded Rabin as chief of staff in 1968.[2] At a General Staff meeting in September that year, he argued that Israeli forces needed to be “trained to stop a surprise attack and switch to an offensive response.”[5] He considered an all-out war more likely to be initiated by Israel’s adversaries than by Israel itself, and discussed occupying strategic targets in neighboring countries as a means of securing an advantageous long-term outcome.[5] His discussions of Sinai’s defense therefore addressed both the immediate protection of Israeli positions and the relationship between defensive preparations, strategic depth, and a subsequent offensive.[5]

Construction of the Suez Canal stronghold line began in winter 1968.[5] The system was intended to protect Sinai’s western edge both during the War of Attrition and in a large-scale war.[5] Egyptian commando attacks and shelling struck Israeli positions along the canal, while Israel conducted retaliatory raids.[6] As Egyptian attacks increased, Israel constructed the fortifications that became known as the Bar-Lev Line.[6] The Egyptians initially used that name, which later became common in Israel through media usage.[7]

The defenses included fortified strongpoints, firing positions, observation posts, tank emplacements, bunkers, connecting roads, and protected areas for troops.[8] One description places the chain along 180 kilometers of canal frontage, from Ras el-Eish in the north to Port Tawfik in the south, with 11 larger strongholds situated seven to twelve kilometers farther east.[8] The canal-side works included an angled sand wall, described as 60–80 feet high, and a supporting concrete wall.[1] The fortified line was completed in March 1969.[8]

Bar-Lev’s stated concept made the canal positions “only one component of a system which relied on defence in depth.”[8] Troops at the canal were to observe Egyptian activity, summon tanks, and activate resources positioned farther inside Sinai.[8] He also summarized the planned defense in terms of three elements—defined areas, counterattacks, and air power—and expressed the hope that all three would work.[5] The fortifications were intended to provide cover for soldiers exposed to bombardment and reduce casualties, rather than operate as an isolated barrier.[8]

The August 1970 defensive plan, Operation Dovecote, organized the canal front into northern, central, and southern sectors.[8] It provided for three lines of defense: the canal-side Bar-Lev Line, battalions and tanks five to eight kilometers behind it, and reserve forces farther back.[8] In the event of an Egyptian attack, forces deployed to the rear were expected to move forward to support the canal positions.[8] The system thus combined permanently occupied forward positions with reinforcing forces and counterattack capabilities located at greater depth.[8]

During the War of Attrition, Bar-Lev identified several objectives: preventing Egyptian territorial gains, pressuring Egypt to accept a ceasefire, avoiding mutual escalation in the use of heavy weapons such as aircraft, and keeping the number of Israeli forces stationed along the canal to a minimum.[5] These objectives addressed both the military situation on the canal and the desired political outcome of the fighting.[5] Deep Israeli air attacks inside Egypt took place between January 7 and April 13, 1970, and Soviet forces subsequently assumed an active role in Egypt’s air defense.[5]

Bar-Lev recognized that the decision to conduct deep air attacks carried the risk of direct Soviet involvement.[5] In retrospect, however, he believed that the attacks intensified the fighting to a point that helped bring about a ceasefire.[5] His assessment linked the escalation of military pressure with the eventual termination of the fighting, while acknowledging the danger inherent in expanding the air campaign.[5] The War of Attrition continued until August 1970.[7]

His term as chief of staff ended on January 1, 1972, when David Elazar succeeded him.[5] Bar-Lev submitted an outgoing report of approximately 300 pages to the prime minister, defense minister, and incoming chief of staff.[5] He personally wrote and signed the first 27 pages.[5] Those pages covered the course of the War of Attrition, developments in other arenas, IDF force buildup, manpower, and his conclusions at the end of his command.[5]

After leaving the army in 1972, Bar-Lev joined the Labor Party and soon became minister of commerce and industry.[3] He was serving in Golda Meir’s government when the Yom Kippur War began on October 6, 1973.[1][9] Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal at several points, and many Israeli strongholds were captured or left unmanned.[9] The canal defenses were thinly held, with only about half the positions occupied on the eve of the attack.[8] Egyptian forces breached the sand barrier using explosives and water cannons; the initial breach took approximately two hours.[1]

Meir recalled Bar-Lev to military service.[1] His mobilization made him the first serving minister and the first reserve officer of lieutenant general rank to be called to active duty.[3] He was initially sent to the northern front.[10] At an October 8 meeting, Bar-Lev and Yigal Allon reported after visiting both fronts that Israel’s situation was improving and that enemy forces were suffering losses.[11] Bar-Lev discussed Syrian tank numbers and conditions in the north, asked about developments along the canal, and received an update from Y. Li’or on the fighting and stabilization of the line.[11]

His son Omer later recalled that, on October 9, after the failure of the Israeli counterattack in the south, Meir asked Bar-Lev to go to Sinai and Elazar proposed appointing him commander of the southern front.[10] Bar-Lev took responsibility for the front on October 10, replacing Shmuel Gonen in its leadership.[12] Elazar considered Gonen insufficiently experienced to manage the campaign.[12] The arrangement brought the former chief of staff, then a government minister, into a position above Gonen with responsibility for directing the fighting.[3]

Bar-Lev’s arrival also became associated with a conspicuously calm command style.[13] After receiving a briefing at the southern front, he took off his shoes and announced that he would sleep for a few hours.[13] The confidence he projected helped improve morale among the troops.[13] His later letter to Gonen acknowledged the “complicated and delicate” situation created by his appointment and praised Gonen for finding a way to cooperate with him during the campaign against the Egyptian army.[14] Bar-Lev wrote that he was leaving with the feeling that command remained in “reliable hands” and wished Gonen continued success.[14]

On October 12, Bar-Lev came directly from Sinai to participate in senior military deliberations, arriving at 9:30 a.m.[12][15] He examined several possible courses of action rather than presenting the canal crossing as a risk-free choice.[12] Forcing Egyptian troops back across the canal, he warned, could mean “very many casualties” and leave Israeli armored forces “completely depleted.”[12] He also doubted that taking Port Said would persuade Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to accept a ceasefire.[12]

A crossing operation presented its own serious difficulty: it depended on a single bridge vulnerable to artillery fire.[12] Waiting for an Egyptian attack was not an attractive alternative in Bar-Lev’s view, because Israel might wait “two weeks or a month” while its troops remained under attack and continued expending ammunition.[12] He opposed withdrawing to more defensible positions in the passes, arguing that doing so would neither advance a ceasefire nor reduce clashes, and would not necessarily induce an Egyptian attack that Israel could defeat.[12] He characterized waiting as defense without a subsequent offensive, leaving Egypt to determine when to attack.[12]

After consulting his generals, Bar-Lev favored crossing at Matsmed.[15] He and Elazar regarded this as the only viable option for disrupting Egyptian forces while exploiting the mobility of Israeli tanks.[15] When Yisrael Tal warned about the risks, Bar-Lev said that he agreed with most of Tal’s assessment but saw no alternative.[15] In a subsequent meeting with the inner cabinet, he outlined potential gains, including severing supply lines to the Egyptian Third Army’s bridgehead and destroying missile batteries.[15]

Bar-Lev initially ordered defensive battles along the canal.[9] On October 14, the IDF repelled a major Egyptian attack.[9] He subsequently ordered Israeli forces to cross the canal and envelop Egyptian troops from the rear.[9] His wartime command thus included both the defensive phase following the initial reverses and the decision to carry the fighting across the canal.[9]

The campaign also involved members of Bar-Lev’s family.[16] His son Omer recalled seeing him shortly before a helicopter flight across the canal: “He happened to pass by just then. We exchanged glances.”[16] Staff officers kept Bar-Lev informed about Omer’s whereabouts and those of another relative, Rafi, until he asked them to stop, fearing the effect of an abrupt end to such reports.[16] Rafi was killed during the fighting, and Bar-Lev later searched for him and found his body.[16]

Bar-Lev continued in political life after the war.[2] Although he was not elected to the Eighth Knesset, Meir appointed him minister of commerce and industry and development in the government formed in March 1974, and he retained the post under Yitzhak Rabin.[2] He was elected to the Ninth Knesset in 1977 on the Alignment list and subsequently served in the Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Knessets.[2][3]

Following the Alignment’s electoral defeat, Bar-Lev became Labor Party secretary-general, holding that office from 1977 to 1984.[1][2] Working with party chairman Shimon Peres, he sought to rehabilitate the party’s organization and finances.[2] In a contested reelection held on November 26, he received 63 percent of the vote against Eliahu Speiser.[17] Peres supported Bar-Lev, while Rabin supported Speiser.[17]

During the national unity government period of 1984–1990, Bar-Lev served as minister of police.[2] He left the Knesset in 1992 and became Israel’s ambassador to Russia following the resumption of diplomatic relations.[1][2] His appointment took place in summer 1992, and he remained ambassador until his death in 1994.[2][3]

Omer Bar-Lev later said that his father had ALS during his final two years but concealed the illness from senior Israeli officials while continuing to function fully as ambassador.[10] After Rabin visited Moscow in late April 1994, a Foreign Ministry doctor examined Bar-Lev, who returned to Israel for further tests.[10] He died at Tel Hashomer on May 7, 1994.[1][10]

The defensive system bearing Bar-Lev’s name linked his chief-of-staff tenure to the military history of the Suez Canal front.[2] Built during the War of Attrition, its strongpoints, protected positions, rearward forces, and counterattack plans embodied his approach to defending Sinai.[5][8] His September 1968 instruction to prepare to stop a surprise attack and then switch to the offensive also expressed the relationship he sought between holding ground and regaining the initiative.[5]

His return to command in October 1973 gave him a separate role in the history of that front: he assumed responsibility during the crisis, assessed the costs of competing operational options, and supported the canal crossing despite its acknowledged risks.[12][15] The October 12 discussions preserve his reasoning about casualties, ammunition expenditure, vulnerable bridging equipment, and the limits of waiting for the enemy to act.[12] They also record his effort to connect battlefield action with a ceasefire, rather than treating territorial gains alone as a sufficient objective.[12][15]

Bar-Lev’s public service extended from Palmach battalion commands to the IDF’s senior post, cabinet office, party administration, and diplomacy.[2] His work with Peres on Labor’s organization and finances and his final appointment to Moscow formed substantial parts of his postmilitary career.[2] Russia was his last official posting, held after renewed diplomatic relations and until his death.[2]

The Bar-Lev Line generated a significant military dispute over fixed fortifications and mobile defense.[8] Ariel Sharon and Yisrael Tal opposed a static line, favoring maneuver and concentrated mobile forces and warning against positional warfare.[8] At a classified meeting on May 29, 1972, Tal warned that Egyptian forces could subject each canal fort to 5,000 shells an hour; Bar-Lev and most of the high command expected the line to hold long enough to permit reserve reinforcement within 24–48 hours.[18] Historical analysis has questioned whether the forward positions offered sufficient tactical or systemic depth.[5] Bar-Lev maintained that the outposts protected observers while tanks farther inside Sinai were intended to stop an assault, and blamed Sharon’s subsequent handling of the defenses.[16] Omer Bar-Lev later presented a similar family interpretation of his father’s concept.[10]

Debate also concerned prewar assumptions and possible diplomatic alternatives.[19][20] Bar-Lev was among senior security-minded ministers who accepted assessments that Egypt was deterred and unlikely to initiate war.[19] In “Athens or Sparta?”, Benny Morris identifies him as an opponent of early-1970s peace or interim-peace initiatives involving Moshe Dayan and Sadat, and argues that those initiatives might have averted the October War.[20] That suggested outcome is a historical counterfactual, not an established consequence of an agreement that occurred.[20]

After the ceasefire, Bar-Lev participated in the “war of the generals,” the dispute over military appointments, doctrine, obedience, and wartime responsibility.[21] In January 1974, he said he had recommended Sharon’s removal as a divisional commander two days after assuming command in the south, but that the recommendation had not been implemented.[21] He called Sharon’s public statements “extremely grave” and urged the defense minister to respond, warning that unanswered accusations could harm IDF performance.[21] Rejecting allegations of favoritism toward armored officers, he cited his promotion of Motta Gur and Yitzhak Hofi from colonel to general; against claims of politically driven appointments, he pointed to generals who later joined Gahal.[21]

Other accounts preserve criticism from Gonen and Sharon rather than uncontested findings about command performance.[3][11] Gonen complained about the handling of his replacement, while Sharon criticized senior commanders’ absence from the battlefield.[3][11] Omer Bar-Lev later said that the Agranat Commission did not invite his father to testify because its mandate covered events only through October 8; he recalled that the omission upset Bar-Lev, who wanted Elazar’s wartime performance recognized.[10] This explanation of the commission’s decision and its personal effect comes from his son’s recollection.[10]